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Abstract 
 
Since the early 1990s British Islamists have been fighting, killing and dying in a 
succession of conflicts across the world, beginning with the Bosnian civil war of 
1992-95. A decade later this violence reached the United Kingdom, with a series of 
deadly attacks on the London transport system in July 2005, the first suicide 
bombings in Western Europe.  
This thesis provides a historiography of the involvement of Britons in global and 
domestic jihadist struggles at home and abroad across three decades. It catalogues 
and records their actions, and bring into a central document the names and 
affiliations of both British Islamist combatants, and those from jihadist organisations 
who have settled in this country. The ever increasing number of Britons travelling to 
the Islamic State does not come as a surprise when the scale of past involvement in 
such causes is considered.  This thesis deconstructs the religious objectives is 
intrinsic to these trends, and emphasises that in British Jihadism it is the goal, as 
much as the message, which is religious.  
 
The reluctance of British Muslim representative organisations to address early 
examples of these developments, the ‘denial’ – is analysed herein. The development 
of a religious terrorism which often targets women and minority groups may have 
been expected to face critical examination from academics, in particular from within 
the critical terrorism studies school. Regrettably such rigour is found to be lacking. 
Indeed it is within the academy that some the most sustained attempts to deny any 
religious influences behind contemporary terrorism have been found. Detailed 
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feminist critiques of Islamist practice are deployed to advocate a new approach – 
one that leads to a critical terrorist studies which critiques not just government 
responses to terrorism, but terrorist actors also.   
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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations Used 
 
Allah Akbar God is great.  
Al-Qaeda Jihadist organisation responsible for the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States. Also abbreviated to AQ 
AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
ARC Advice and Reformation Committee. An organisation of 
Saudi dissidents based in London, who distributed many 
of Osama Bin Laden’s early statements.  
BMI British Muslim Initiative. Representative group 
established by former figures in the Muslim Association of 
Britain.  
Caliphate A system of governance established following the death 
of Muhammad. The established leader, the Caliph, 
ensures the sharia is enacted.  
Dawah or dawa Mission, often involving missionary work to call people to 
Islam 
Deen    Religion 
DGSE Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure – France’s 
external security service 
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EDL English Defence League. An organisation opposing what 
it perceives to be Islamic extremism. Formed after 
members of Al-Muhajiroun booed a march by the Royal 
Anglian Regiment in Luton in 2009 
Fatwa    Religious ruling issued by an Islamic scholar 
FOSIS Federation of Student Islamic Societies. Umbrella 
organisation for ISOCs in the UK and Republic of Ireland  
GIA Abbreviation of Groupe Islamique Armé, an Algerian 
jihadist group known as the Armed Islamic Group in 
English 
Hadith Term applied to the sayings and practice of Muhammad 
Harkat ul-Mujahideen Pakistani jihadist organisation, abbreviated as HuM.  
Hizb-ut-Tahrir Global Islamic party seeking to restore the caliphate. Also 
known as HuT.  
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence – the primary Pakistani 
security agency 
ISOCs University Islamic Societies 
Jahiliyyah                            A concept developed by Sayyid Qutb, referring, roughly, 
to ignorance 
JeI Jamaat-e-Islami – the largest clerical party in Pakistan 
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LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. From 2011 it has used the 
name Libyan Islamic Movement for Change  
Madrasa  A Muslim institution of learning. Also spelt madrassa and 
madrasah.  
MAB Representative body formed by Muslim Brotherhood 
associates in the United Kingdom. A constituent part of 
the MCB.  
MCB Muslim Council of Britain, the largest representative body 
of British Muslims 
MCU Muslim Contact Unit of the Metropolitan Police  
MI5 The Security Service, which has a domestic focus  
MI6 The Secret Intelligence Service, which has an 
international focus.  
MPSB Metropolitan Police Special Branch. Scotland Yard’s anti-
terrorist unit, which also held a wider brief against political 
subversion. It merged into Counter Terrorism Command 
in 2006. 
Salafi A strand within Sunni Islam which seeks to return to the 
original way of Muhammad and the first three generations 
of the Prophets companions 
Sawha A movement of religious awakening, associated with 
Saudi Arabia 
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Sharia The law of God, as set out in the Qur’an  
Sunnah Prophetic tradition and those of the first generation of 
Muslims 
Umma    Or ummah. The concept of a global Muslim community 
UNSC    United Nations Security Council 
Wahhabism  The predominant strand of Islam in Saudi Arabia, 
developed in the eighteenth century by Muhammad abd 
al-Wahhab 
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Introduction 
Few subjects have dominated political discourse in the United Kingdom this century 
as frequently as terrorism. Whether the actions of terrorists themselves, or debates 
considering the wisdom of our responses to violence, there has rarely been a 
substantive period when this subject has been absent from domestic or international 
debate. The 30 June 2014 declaration of a caliphate in territory held by jihadists in 
Iraq and Syria, and the participation of British Muslims in that struggle, further 
crystallised attention.  
The analysis below considers the historical background to these developments. It 
sketches the involvement of a small but not insignificant number of British Muslims, 
and co-religionists who moved to the UK, in a series of conflicts of which we are now 
in the third decade. The civil war in Syria and renewed conflict in Iraq may be the 
latest, and in the case of Syria the largest of these conflagrations, but is far from 
unique. Instead, when examined across a timescale of over twenty years, beginning 
with British participation in the Bosnian Mujahideen of the early 1990s, the 
movement of Islamists from across the UK to armed jihadist organisations in the 
Middle East is characteristic, predictable and consistent with long term political and 
theological expressions.  
 
Definitions  
In any research in this field, the problem of definitions looms large. This thesis uses 
the British government’s definition of terrorism from the Terrorism Act 2000, which 
states:  
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1. – (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where –  
a. the action falls within subsection (2),  
b. the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a 
section of the public and 
c. the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.  
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it –  
a. involves serious violence against a person,  
b. involves serious damage to property, 
c. endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
d. creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public or 
e. is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.    
3. The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or 
explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1) (b) is satisfied. (HM Government, Terrorism 
Act 2000, 1).  
 
This is not without limitations, but no single definition of terrorism is likely to be 
satisfactory to all, at least in part because the phenomenon has proven so diverse 
(English, 2009, 55). In a substantial examination Richard English states; “terrorism 
might best be considered as a method deployed by people who collectively see 
themselves as engaged in a war” (English, 2009, 23). Whilst he goes further in 
justifying association of terrorism with warfare, the word ‘method’ in his description is 
arguably as significant. By seeing terrorism as a method, we are recognising those 
thus defined are attempting to do or achieve something – this is not violence for the 
sake of violence. What we call terrorism has a purpose – it is a means to an end.  
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The primary focus of this research is on the United Kingdom and/or those British 
Muslims who have engaged in violence in pursuit of particular aims. This brings 
international factors into consideration - Islam is a global religion, with centres of 
influence or power in countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia 
and Pakistan. This research establishes that although British Jihadism may be 
characterised by its presence on United Kingdom soil, it displays aspirations and 
practices which may be local, national or international.  
The terms Islamist and in particular British Jihadism are used throughout this thesis. 
Before looking at the latter conceptualisation in detail, it is necessary to define 
component political and religious terms hereby deployed as adjectives and nouns. 
Azim Nanji observes that an Islamist seeks to: “enforce an ideological view of Islam 
in the political and social life of Muslim societies” (Nanji, 2008, 83). Islamists also 
“seek to establish norms of Muslim conduct in the affairs of society without 
necessarily seeking to challenge those in authority or encouraging extremism, 
including the use of violent means” (Nanji, op cit). 
In this thesis British Islamism is characterised as the desire to put forward an 
ideological view of Islam within the United Kingdom, establishing norms of Muslim 
conduct in the affairs of British society. In this globalised era, a legalistic definition of 
citizenship is avoided, with those taking part in British Muslim life considered worthy 
of analysis, even if some may not be British passport holders.  
 
Within Islamic thought there are two different types of jihad. The first is the greater, 
or individual jihad. This is to live life as good a Muslim as possible, something that 
may require the individual to fight against themselves in an inner struggle. Second is 
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the lesser jihad, where emphasis is again on struggle – but with an objective to 
create a just and divinely ordered society. A Jihadist is simply someone who 
undertakes jihad. However Nanji adds: 
The term has come to refer to those groups in the Muslim world who believe in remaking 
Muslim societies and fighting Western influence through acts of violence, including suicide 
missions. Their imagined ideal of the Muslim world includes a unified society under a single 
authority which would impose Islam on all, by force if necessary (Nanji, 2008, 90-91). 
The ‘greater jihad’ and what may be considered the spiritual struggle suggested by it, 
is not considered herein. In this dissertation British Jihadism refers explicitly to the 
involvement of UK Muslims in the lesser jihad. It is the contention of this research 
that a discernible British Jihadism exists, it has been present on these shores for 
some time and indeed is likely to continue, if not necessarily prosper. Problematically 
for western liberal democracy, evidence is presented demonstrating some adherents 
are willing to go further than seeking to remake Muslim societies, and instead to 
influence societies in which Muslims are a numerical minority.  
 
Any sensitivity over the term Jihadism is rejected. Analysis of many of the events 
below, particularly those in chapter five such as the Bosnian and Syrian civil war’s, is 
lost without reference to both the conceptualisation and the word itself. To quote 
Peter Neumann of The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence: 
It is nearly impossible to describe the movement that has been responsible for the terrorist 
attacks in Washington and New York as well as those on Madrid and London with accuracy 
and without causing offence by joining together Islam and terrorism and/or militancy 
(Neumann, 2008, 8).  
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An understanding of why young Britons may travel thousands of miles, at physical 
and legal risk, often to countries with which they have no familial or linguistic 
connection, requires an understanding of the motivations of the men themselves. 
Where declared, these are frequently rooted in religious declarations. To quote 
Ibrahim al-Mazwaghi, a University of Hertfordshire graduate later killed fighting in 
Syria “Jihad is to spend all your time and effort fighting the enemies of Allah” 
(Channel 4 News, 2013). 
This is not to rely purely on stated declarations. In his study of jihadist recruitment in 
Europe, Neumann observes key shared elements – a literalist approach to Sunni 
Islam, a political agenda (Islamism) and a belief in achieving these goals through 
jihad (Neumann, 2008, 8-9). In other words, there is a demonstrable unity between 
theory and practice, or if you prefer, praxis.  
To illustrate this, an interpretation and analysis of the conduct of British jihadists 
across a series of armed conflicts is conducted, in order to develop the 
conceptualisation of those involved in these struggles as primarily religious actors, 
for whom the realisation of purely political goals is insufficient. The removal of 
President Assad from power and his replacement by a cross-party government, or 
the establishment of a Kashmiri state purged of Indian government and security 
forces (to take just two examples) would be unacceptable to jihadists. Only life under 
the Qur’an, on genuinely Islamic territory, is. It is the delivery of literal Sunni Islam 
which matters.  
 
If the concept of jihad represents a potential hurdle for researchers, further 
problematic terms occur in this analysis. The word fundamentalism, regularly 
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associated in the west with Islam, is arguably even more problematic than the term 
jihad. There is potentially little value in a particular religion if its fundamentals are not 
recognised and it considered desirable to adhere to them. Malise Ruthven makes a 
significant contribution to reasserting the validity of such a concept in academic 
research when he defines fundamentalism as:  
A religious way of being that manifests itself in a strategy by which beleaguered believers 
attempt to preserve their distinctive identities as individuals or groups in the face of modernity 
and secularisation (Ruthven, 2007, 5-6).  
 
Originally used to describe trends within early twentieth century Protestantism, in 
1920 Curtis Lee Laws argued fundamentalists would do battle for the fundamentals 
of the Christian faith (Ruthven, 2007, 8). Although hardly beleaguered, early British 
Muslim organisations such as the Islamic Foundation felt the need to stress the 
fundamental principles of Islam and to organise together so Islam could be 
propagated in contemporary Britain.  
Salafi Islam adopts a similar posture to those 1920s American Christians, but is 
characterised by strict adherence to the literal word of the Qur’an and the first three 
generations of Muslims. Burr and Collins observe Salafism as being rooted in a 
commitment to “keeping the faith with the early generations of Muslims renowned for 
their piety, and Salafists regard themselves as the direct descendants of the ‘best of 
the people’ at the founding of Islam” (Burr and Collins, 2006, 21). The Prophet and 
his companions – those with direct, personal association of Muhammad – are central 
to this world view:     
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These three generations were highly esteemed by later Muslims for their companionship with 
the Prophet and proximity to his time and for their pure understanding and practice of Islam 
and contribution to it (Shahin, 1995, 463).  
Salafists seek to return to this original way, a perspective which to Ruthven is by 
necessity both mono-cultural and rooted in the theoretical ideal of a golden age.  
The “fundamentalist” is the believer who reaches into the core of the tradition, who identifies 
and returns to the “fundamentals” in order to recover that faith in its pristine form. That faith at 
its origins is Manichean, involving as it does a radical separation of the world between the 
saved and the damned, believers and infidels (Ruthven, 2002, 26).  
Sadakat Kadri has referred to Salafism as the “reinvention of tradition” (Kadri, 2011, 
107), and credits Ibn Taymiyya (discussed later in this thesis) with propagating the 
viewpoint that the practice of the first three generations of Muslims can be legally 
binding (Kadri, 2011, 112). If so, this potentially puts Salafists on a collision course 
with other systems of legal governance.  
 
Not all Salafists adopt jihad (Lambert, 2008, 39) indeed the division between those 
perceived to be peacefully loyal to Saudi Arabia, and those influenced by jihadist 
groups can be vociferous (Kepel, 2011, 220).  But those who adopt jihad 
characteristically combine Jihadism and Salafism. Gilles Kepel was the first 
academic to develop a categorisation conjoining Salafism and Jihadism (Tax, 2012, 
8n). His term Jihadist-Salafist serves as an appropriate descriptor for the 
phenomena under consideration in this thesis. Jihadist-Salafists have deployed a 
“supercilious respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, but they combined 
it with an absolute commitment to jihad” (Kepel, 2011, 220). Had this thesis been 
devoted solely to international developments, the categorisation Jihadist-Salafist 
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would have been adopted. As the focus is primarily on the United Kingdom, the term 
British Jihadism, as defined above, is preferred. It is noteworthy that when Kepel 
seeks to illustrate his categorisation of Jihadist-Salafist, he does so by naming two 
dissident Saudi preachers, and three men who for long periods lived in London – 
Abu Hamza, Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Qatada (Kepel, op cit).    
 
Research Questions  
Four core questions guide this work, which seeks to establish the depth and scope of 
a discernible British Jihadism, and to explain the reticence in the academy in 
accepting the phenomenon:  
 What is the history of British Islamist involvement in violence, both on these 
shores and beyond?  
 Why did so many Jihadist actors coalesce in the United Kingdom?  
 Who are the British Jihadists? Are they religious or political actors? Are they 
linked to particular districts, mosques, institutions or organisations?  
 In challenging traditional approaches to terrorism and counter radicalisation 
strategy, why has critical terrorism studies struggled to come to terms with the 
concept of violence from British Jihadists and the religious nature of their 
struggle?  
 
In addressing these questions, distinct objectives predominate.  One is to call for, 
and to take steps to commence, the re-positioning of terrorism studies between its 
two major camps – the orthodox and critical schools.   To explain why this is both 
necessary and indeed important if British Jihadism – and other stripes of terrorism –
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is to be better understood and in time fully addressed, the following pages establish 
some of the characteristics of the primary academic approaches to the study of 
terrorism.   
 
Theoretical Background: The Chimera of Terrorism Studies 
Terrorism studies is an emerging academic discipline. Whilst students of 
international relations may have up to a dozen theoretical approaches to construct 
their research from, terrorism studies has not, yet, diversified in such a manner. In 
the United Kingdom the discipline’s roots begin with the school at St Andrews 
University, founded by the late Paul Wilkinson. St Andrews, and American 
institutions such as Georgetown University in Washington, developed strong working 
relationships with police, security services and defence officials. Indeed, if anyone 
preceded Wilkinson in the field it was possibly Richard Clutterbuck, a former army 
officer who became an academic specialising in conflict, as well as developing the 
work of Control Risks in the private security sector (Wilkinson, 1998). 
Wilkinson was not merely an observer of counter-terrorism strategies or the work of 
institutions in countering challenges such as that posed by Irish Republicanism. In 
advising bodies such as the Department of Transport on aviation security and Lord 
Lloyd of Berwick’s inquiry which resulted in the Terrorism Act 2000, Wilkinson at 
times moved from spectator to player (Reisz, 2011, Cohen, 2000).  Press coverage 
of the time stated:  
He acts as adviser to several western governments, international organisations and large 
corporations operating in politically volatile parts of the world. Wilkinson is evasive on that 
subject (Sunday Times Scotland, 1990).  
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Paul Wilkinson could also be a protagonist, for example becoming involved in the 
campaign against army whistle-blower Colin Wallace, allegedly trying to prevent 
Channel 4 News broadcasting a feature on Wallace’s accusations concerning 
military misconduct in Northern Ireland (Ramsay, 1988).  
 
Ironically recommendations put forward by Wilkinson in the 1980s and 1990s to 
assist the liberal democratic state in resisting terrorism appear mild when compared 
to decisions implemented by certain Western governments against a minority of 
British jihadists in recent years – targeted drone attacks, detention without trial, 
rendition and control orders being prominent examples   (Boyle, 2013, Fenwick, 
2002, Blakeley 2011, Zedner, 2005). To Wilkinson the rule of law was always 
paramount:  
It must be a cardinal principle of a liberal democracy in dealing with the problems of terrorism, 
however serious these may be, never to be tempted into using methods which are 
incompatible with the liberal values of humanity, liberty and justice (Wilkinson 2005, 115).  
 
A second trend has emerged within terrorism studies. Taken aback by the sheer 
volume of literature emerging, noting its sometimes variable quality and its 
provenance, a critical academic approach to the subject issued forth in the years 
following the allied war on terror. Here research from academics associated with the 
Rand Corporation, St Andrews University or the International Centre for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) cannot necessarily be separated from 
the military and political circles academics may move in. A critical perspective 
emerges that raises centrally the reality of state terrorism, is wary of overplaying the 
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threat from Islamist organisations, and seeks to consider wider societal factors that 
may lead to such tendencies emerging. Perhaps most of all, it attempts to develop a 
new framework for research which considers both the content of terrorism discourse 
and omissions from it (Jackson et al, 2009).  
 
Substantial methodological critiques may be made of academics basing themselves 
in and around state institutions, and the process by which information may be 
disseminated from actors in the policing and security sectors. For example, writing 
on domestic terrorist threats, Anthony Richards places a figure of 30 on the number 
of animal rights activists in the United Kingdom willing to take part in the most 
serious types of violence – e.g. firebombing – which may be investigated under 
counter-terrorism legislation (Richards, 2007, 101). A footnote informs the reader the 
source for this figure is a telephone conversation with an unnamed Special Branch 
officer, who is presumably employed to monitor and/or counter such threats. This is 
not to question the veracity of Richards’ published estimate, but Terrorism Studies is 
perhaps one of the few academic fields where a researcher may credibly suggest 
data has come from a confidential source he or she cannot name, and expect it to go 
unchallenged. Such information cannot be ostensibly neutral or objective – even if it 
is correct - as it comes from a protagonist, releasing information on a selective, 
privileged basis.  
 
Such potential methodological frailties have led to spirited deconstructions of 
orthodox academics in which the focus of attack is not merely the author’s text but 
the framework in which they are perceived to operate. Writing of Rohan Gunaratna 
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and the ICPVTR’s analysis of Islamic insurgents in southern Thailand, Frank 
Connors considers negative conclusions to be inevitable. “The research design and 
methodology of the book makes the authors partisan to intelligence agency 
perspectives and susceptible to superficial explanations” (Connors, 2007, 148).  
 
The criticisms articulated by Connors give some indication of the political debates 
which have come to colour terrorism studies. Indeed, elements of the divide between 
orthodox and critical terrorism researchers mirror the west’s traditional left/right 
political divisions (English, Interview, 2010). If examples may be found of orthodox 
terrorism studies working with and in alleged support of ruling elites, some equally 
familiar political positions can be discerned in the arguments of critical academics. 
Consider Richard Jackson, discussing how the 9/11 attacks could potentially have 
been viewed differently. He speculated: 
Instead of completely unprecedented attacks they might have been seen as part of a 
message of rage that the developing world has been trying to communicate to the developed 
world for many decades (Jackson, 2005, 98).  
 
This would suggest accepting the strikes as some form of representative attack of 
the poor against the rich, or the weak against the strong, class war by other means. 
Aside from the reality Al-Qaeda statements did not articulate 9/11 in such terms, 
those who took part in the hijackings were curious representatives of the world’s 
dispossessed. The majority came from Saudi Arabia, the richest, rather than the 
poorest nation in the Arab world.  At the time Al-Qaeda was led by Osama Bin 
Laden, a multi-millionaire from one of the desert Kingdom’s most important families. 
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The Bin Laden group was personally selected by King Saud to redevelop both 
Mecca and Medina, whilst the success of the family business earned Osama’s father 
a considerable fortune (Coll, 2008, 127). Hijackers such as Mohammed Atta, 
Marwan al Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, were well educated, and had spent periods of 
their lives in the West (Kean and Hamilton, 2004, 231-9). It was precisely because 
they came from such backgrounds they were able to live and study in the United 
States, without drawing sustained suspicion from the security services. Whilst not 
rejecting that the hijackers may have been driven by a considerable sense of 
injustice, they, and Al-Qaeda, make curious representatives of the developing world 
in a confrontation with the global north.  
A second, more post-modern dichotomy may be observed across the terrorism 
studies divide, when the focus is on assessing the practices, beliefs and actions of 
perceived terrorist actors. This has involved an assessment of organisations such as 
Al-Qaeda within a rubric of what is referred to as religious terrorism (Hoffman 2006, 
Wilkinson, 2007). This strand of violence is perceived as posing a serious threat to 
the liberal democratic state and its citizens, thus requiring a substantive response 
from it. It is here we reach one of the most contentious debates within the academy 
and beyond its walls. Prominent academics within critical terrorism studies, activists 
on parts of the political left, and leaders of Muslim representative organisations, are 
either uncomfortable with the concept of religious terrorism, or reject it outright. 
Opposing any association between Islam and terrorism is also a position increasingly 
shared by political elites. Most noticeably this occurs after major terrorist incidents. 
Consider the Scottish National Party’s deputy leader Nicola Sturgeon following the 
Glasgow Airport bombing (Gallagher, 2007), Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg after 
the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby (Muslim Weekly, 2013, C) and Prime Minister 
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David Cameron during the hostage crises involving the Islamic State (Cameron, 
2014). Each referred to Islam explicitly as a ‘religion of peace’. 
This tendency has not been accompanied by a robust analysis from critical theorists. 
Nor, more importantly for this research, have the religious demands – for sharia law, 
and a truly Islamic state – articulated by terrorist actors, been foremost in the 
thoughts of critical researchers. The consequences of these demands on others and 
the impact of their adoption is unexamined.  Critical terrorism studies have instead 
tended to focus on what may be safely expected of the discipline – assessing the 
wisdom of counter terrorism legislation, and its effect on particular groups of citizens. 
In a foundational text, Jackson, Smyth and Gunning elaborate a need to focus upon  
 the impact of counterterrorism polices on specific communities, individuals, institutions, 
the legal order, domestic society, and the international system 
 the effects of counterterrorism policy on human rights, social trust, community cohesion, 
democratic culture, the academy and academic research (Jackson et al, 2009, 231). 
 
Potentially, such a framework mitigates against detailed examination of the terrorist 
themselves, their belief systems or the impact of their actions on communities. In 
positional terms, the declared analytical focus of Jackson et al would appear to be 
rooted in a characteristically post-modern approach, where it is not jihadism, 
Islamism or even Islam that is primarily studied, but how others respond to it. 
Johannes J.G. Jansen, the Dutch academic writer on Islamism, has warned of an 
approach which ensures “We can always study our own reactions to, e.g., another 
person’s religion, rather than studying the other person’s religion” (Jansen, 1997, xv).  
Chapter six of this thesis is devoted to de-constructing what has become a limiting 
and substantial flaw in the approach Jackson and others have established to 
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studying contemporary terrorism, or perhaps more accurately, not studying it. This is 
not to reject or denounce critical terrorism studies per se, but merely to illustrate the 
presence of limitations, which in time may become binding unless restorative action 
is taken.  
 
The Theoretical Approach Herein 
For the above reasons, this thesis moves beyond the structures provided by both 
‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ terrorism studies, opening up the possibility of finding space 
outside of, or better still between these two traditions. Indeed it is to be hoped the 
publication of research which takes the beliefs of perceived terrorists seriously, whilst 
at the same time maintaining a critical approach towards institutions of the state, 
reinvigorates the field. It is an original contribution of this research to move beyond, 
rather than stay located within existing paradigms within terrorism studies.  
In theoretical terms, four academics have informed this research and thinking – 
Meredith Tax, Richard Hofstadter, Joseph R Gusfield and Michel Foucault. Richard 
Hofstadter (1916-70) and Joseph R Gusfield provide a platform from which to 
consider religious movements, their thinking and their actions. Hofstadter’s “The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics” is a political classic which benefits re-reading. 
Hofstadter researched a series of political movements, from anti-Masonic campaigns 
to the revived Ku Klux Klan. He deploys the descriptive term ‘paranoid style’ not in 
the clinical sense but in the modes of expression adopted by those under 
consideration. Hofstadter found paranoid movements appear in waves, but this is not 
a process with readily negotiable interests (Hofstadter, 2008, 39). Indeed the 
paranoid tendency may become aggravated when adherents cannot make their 
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presence felt in the political process – initial suspicions are confirmed by exclusion. It 
is not difficult here to consider particular Islamist actors, on the outside of democratic 
political discourse, expressing sentiments of exclusion and grievance. Indeed as 
later chapters educe, the declaration and articulation of grievance is a recurring 
theme in the history of British Islamism.  
 
Status politics, as examined in Hofstadter’s analysis of Goldwater’s 1964 
Presidential campaign, centres on the recognition of society’s problems as being 
moral. Decline can be arrested by returning to old virtues, indeed Goldwater’s 
candidacy pivoted on moral, not economic realities. When researching developments 
in Conservative politics in the United States, Hofstadter discovered concepts of 
status central. He traces what he coins ‘pseudo-conservatism’ to the manner in 
which American’s status has been linked to their Americanism. Here status politics 
refers to “the clash of various projective rationalizations arising from status 
aspirations and other personal motives” (Hofstadter, 2008, 53), before adding  “I 
chose the term “status politics” because I was looking for a way to designate an 
impulse held in common by a variety of discontented elements” (Hofstadter, 2008, 
86).  
Status politics covers the issue of American identity, the problem of social status and 
most relevantly for this research, the effort of Americans to win assurance their 
values are reflected in the community at large. This desire for status runs through 
British Islamism, both in declarations of the society it wishes to see constructed 
domestically, and the type of society Jihadists seek to build out of conflicts abroad. 
Most importantly,  “Status politics seeks not to advance perceived material interests 
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but to express grievances and resentments about such matters, to press claims 
upon society to give deference to non-economic values” (Hofstadter, 2008, 87). This 
tendency is demonstrated by Ibrahim al-Mazwagi, a Londoner fighting in the forces 
of the Katiba al-Muhajireen (The Battalion of Migrants) in Syria: 
I had a car, I had a job. My dad had a car and a job. We weren’t struggling, but we were just 
normal..... A Muslim is a Muslim. Is he in need of protection? Is he being transgressed upon? 
Is his lands being taken? Is his honour being violated? Yes he is. Then I’m there (Channel 4 
News, 2013).  
 
Gusfield’s “Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance 
Movement” (1976) was first published in the period Hofstadter was writing – 1963. 
Gusfield saw his analysis as an attempt to “answer theoretical questions about moral 
reform movements” (Gusfield, 1976, xvi). Gusfield’s definition offers a particular 
piquancy when Islamist movements and Jihadist actors are considered. Moral reform 
is a way “in which a cultural group acts to preserve, defend or enhance the 
dominance and prestige of its own style of living within the total society” (Gusfield, 
1976, 3).  
Religious motives and moral fervour occur in a setting, and in nineteenth century 
America temperance was a way in which a declining social elite attempted to 
maintain power and demonstrate respectability. This was against a backdrop of a 
United States becoming increasingly urban, secular and more Catholic. As we shall 
see this type of defensiveness was a cornerstone of early British Islamists such as 
Dr Kalim Siddiqui or the Islamic Foundation in the 1980s and into the 1990s, faced 
with the need to both ‘survive’ in a country they had migrated to, and in time to move 
beyond mere survival as a community, towards properly instigating Islam in the west.  
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Gusfield found embracing religion saw the adherent commit to a set of codes 
governing their behaviour, with revivalism serving as part of embourgeoisement. In 
response to a perturbing and increasingly decadent society, they express “the belief 
that a return to the dominant values of the past, based on religion, economic 
morality, and familial authority, will solve social problems” (Gusfield, 1976, 144).  The 
parallels between this revivalism and Salafi Islam are striking, with both approaches 
seeing life as having degenerated:  
Salafism denotes a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth 
century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas. It advocated a return to the traditions 
of the devout ancestors (salaf in Arabic) (Kepel, 2011, 219).  
Such developments bring with them not just life affirming change for the individual, 
but potential problems for broader society. One of the challenges for liberal 
democracy is that the entry of status issues into political discourse carries with it the 
prospect of destabilisation; 
The sources of conflict are not quantitative ones of the distribution of resources. Instead they 
are differences between right and wrong, the ugly and the beautiful, the sinful and the 
virtuous. Such issues are less readily compromised than are quantitative issues (Gusfield, 
1976, 184). 
We might consider here how Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses” was described by 
Dr Mughram Al-Ghamdi of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs in 1988; “This 
is the most offensive, filthy and abusive book ever written by any hostile enemy of 
Islam and deserves to be condemned in the strongest possible way” (Appignanesi 
and Maitland, 1989, 59). The polarisation afforded by such statements mitigates 
against possible compromise. As Muslim musician Aki Nawaz, who attended the 
anti-Rushdie protests, states of the subsequent fatwa: 
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For me it was just a tragic step in a tragic long episode and I think this caused the biggest 
division - it was the beginning of the division of Muslims and everybody else, including inside 
our communities (BBC Radio 4, 2009). 
 
Whilst Gusfield and Hofstadter provide a theoretical basis from which to consider the 
emergence and development of Islamism in this society, the work of the American 
feminist Meredith Tax is used in this research in a particularly distinct manner. In 
2012 she published a vigorous denouement of the flawed response of academics, 
the left, human rights organisations and feminists to what she terms the ‘Muslim 
Right’ (Tax, 2012, 1). Her book emerges out of the 2010 controversy involving Gita 
Saghal, the Head of Amnesty International’s Gender Unit at its International 
Secretariat, who publicly objected to Amnesty’s work with a British former 
Guantanamo Bay detainee, Moazzam Begg. Tax opposes rendition and torture, but 
insists Islamists like Begg seek to establish a society which is ultimately 
discriminatory (Tax, 2012, 7).  
 
Here a clear frustration is also elucidated. A dangerous vacuum exists where 
terrorism is not considered in terms of its effects upon the human rights of civilians. 
Despite what Tax sees as the overwhelmingly local focus of religious 
fundamentalists, instead human rights discussions in the circles she condemns have 
focused on the conduct of counter-terrorism strategies of Western governments and 
their allies. Chapter six of this thesis demonstrates the extent to which critical 
terrorism studies is immersed in this failing, with particular reference to the founding 
academic within that school, Richard Jackson, and prominent colleagues Jeroen 
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Gunning, David Miller and George Kassimeris.  The emancipatory agenda of critical 
terrorism studies comes to a juddering halt when faced by virtually any Islamist actor.  
 
The final academic influence on this work is Michel Foucault. In terms of a theoretical 
approach towards the language of both terrorism and terrorism studies, the work of 
Michel Foucault is invaluable. In “The Archaeology of Knowledge” Foucault sets out 
the parameters by which statements may be examined: 
 Who is speaking? Who is accorded the right to use this language and who is 
qualified to do so? What is their status, and how is that status achieved? 
 What are the institutional sites from which discourse emerges, derives 
legitimacy and is applied? 
 What is the position of the subject? What is his situation? What position does 
the subject occupy in informational networks? 
 
Significantly Foucault sees the property of discourse as sometimes being confined to 
a particular group of individuals. In such circumstances only that particular group 
may invest a discourse in decisions, institutions, practices or to even take part in that 
discourse. This is particularly relevant if we are considering issues such as terrorism 
allegedly associated with a particular religion - the rules of discursive formations are 
to be found in the rules of discourse itself.  
 
Any analysis though should not be confined merely to the statements that appear, 
but on their modes of existence “what it means for them to have appeared when and 
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where they did” (Foucault, 1972, 109). The regularity, for example, with which senior 
British politicians insist immediately after a terrorist attack faith played no bearing in 
the incident may be considered significant not merely in terms of the accuracy of 
such sentiments, but the timing and the location of these expressions.  Discursive 
formations are groups of statements – consider as an example the groups of 
statements which may appear over several days after a deadly terrorist attack, or 
debates concerning a proposed government initiative to counter terrorism. In chapter 
four the response of several Muslim representative organisations to Mohammed 
Sidique Khan’s suicide video is examined critically, and the presence of a discursive 
formation which serves to diminish religious elements in Khan’s statement.  
 
Having given notice of the intellectual influences and theoretical approaches taken in 
this research, the following section addresses some of the methodological issues the 
author has tackled in preparing this thesis, and establishes a method for detailing 
both British Jihadist actors, and those from established jihadist groups who migrated 
to the United Kingdom.   
 
The Data Set Used In This Research 
To analyse the history, scale and nature of British Jihadism this thesis uses 
quantitative methods to record planned and actual terrorist attacks involving British 
Muslims at home and abroad, and in particular to build up a detailed overview of 
British Jihadis – who they are, and what activities they participated in. Throughout 
this research I have sought to build up data on Jihadist actors, keeping an Access 
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database of Britons convicted of terrorist offences, those held in Guantanamo Bay 
and similar institutions overseas and those convicted of criminal offences where a 
politico-religious element may be present. Information from the Access Database 
was then placed into tables in word format, giving, for example, lists of Britons killed 
fighting in Pakistan, or members and former activists of University Islamic Societies 
(ISOCs) convicted of terrorist offences. Data is also presented on international 
jihadists who have settled in the United Kingdom, with reference to the organisations 
they have been publicly associated with, and their country of origin. Such an 
approach is crucial to illustrate the scale and depth of the issue under consideration, 
its longevity, the validity of concepts such as designating the United Kingdom as 
‘Londonistan’ and serve to move debate away from generalities. Tables representing 
this data are to be found throughout chapters three, four and five. The material 
presented has been entirely developed from the public domain – what is described 
as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). Former CIA officer Robert Steele is perhaps 
the best known proponent of this concept and defines it thus:  
Open source intelligence, or OSINT, is unclassified information that has been deliberately 
discovered, discriminated, distilled and disseminated to a select audience in order to address a 
specific question (Steele, 2007, 129).  
 
The OSINT used to discover the extent and depth of British jihadism has eleven 
main components.  
 Books by recognised authors in the field, such as Peter Bergen, Jason Burke, 
and Camille Tawil  
 Memoirs from those involved in countering terrorism in a professional capacity 
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 Memoirs, articles and statements by those currently or formerly involved in 
Jihadist and Islamist organisations.  
 Material from those supporting terrorist suspects and those convicted, in 
particular the British organisation Cage (formerly Cageprisoners) 
 Press releases at the culmination of trials, from police forces and the Crown 
Prosecution Service 
 Official government documents and statistics, including those published by the 
Home Office on terrorism arrests 
 US Government sources such as affidavits and indictments. Also American 
government sources which were not intended for publication, but have 
subsequently been released via Wikileaks 
 Media coverage of terrorism cases and incidents across a range of national 
and international print and web media 
 Coverage of terrorism cases in the local press in Birmingham, Coventry, 
Derby, London, Luton, Manchester and Stoke 
 Articles in the ethnic press, predominantly Muslim Weekly and Jewish 
Chronicle 
 Analysis from websites tracking jihadist organisations and individuals, such as 
Internet Haganah 
 
The third of the above categories, the statements of the jihadists themselves, has 
expanded substantially during the course of this study, due to the prominence of a 
range of social media platforms. Facebook, Twitter, What’s App, AskFM, Instagram 
and others have been used by British fighters in Syria and Iraq to disseminate their 
world view in a manner which was not conceivable to those taking part in similar 
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struggles a decade or so earlier. Here a note of caution concerning SOCINT (Social 
Media Intelligence) is necessary. If academics have declared Wikipedia a site to 
view with caution as anybody may write there what they will, so we may view with 
caution the social media output of an individual hiding behind a nom-de-plume, 
claiming to be on a battlefield in Homs. They may be. But they just as easily may not 
be. Whilst such information may be useful, and is used at times in this thesis, it is 
recognised it is not of the same quality as that determined in, for example, a court of 
law.  
 
Bias is inherent in reporting, as no writer approaches an issue free of values. It 
should be noted however in the vast majority of instances where data is presented in 
this research it concerns matters of public record – that someone has been arrested, 
convicted, or killed. The high number of guilty pleas in contemporary terrorism cases 
must be noted (Croft, 2012, 192-3) some 73% of terrorism prosecutions in the period 
2001-10 resulted in conviction (Foley, 2013, 147). The author has attempted to 
deploy as broad a range of sources as possible in order to mitigate against any 
inherent bias. It is hoped by synthesising so much material, covering three decades, 
into one place, that both additions and indeed corrections may be made by 
subsequent researchers, so a permanent archive of British Jihadism may be 
established.  
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Challenges with Terrorism Data 
In methodological terms, listing planned terrorist attacks is an inexact science. Not 
only is it extremely difficult to decide when discussed action may be considered 
substantive enough to be ascribed the designation ‘planned’, but such a field is 
contaminated by press exaggeration, and the not always dispassionate contributions 
of counter-terrorism agencies. This phenomenon can be considered inherently more 
speculative than that pertaining to convictions, enacted terrorist attacks, or the 
deaths of individual fighters. In some instances whether a terrorist attack was being 
planned is a scene of considerable contestation – the alleged Easter 2009 plot to 
attack landmarks in Manchester is a prominent example. Counter terrorism 
surveillance officer Harry Keeble states  
Early in 2009 MI5 received information that a team of suspected AQ operatives were based in 
the north of England and surveillance officers were dispatched to track the suspects 24/7. 
They soon built up a strong intelligence picture as they followed the suspects (Keeble and 
Hollington, 2010, 108).  
 
After Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Bob Quick inadvertently revealed 
possible details of the investigation, termed Operation Pathway, surveillance was 
abandoned and twelve suspects arrested. Whether the police had prevented a 
credible terrorist attack was clearly a matter of dispute, as “Within two weeks of their 
arrest, detectives had to throw in the towel and release all the arrested men without 
charge” (Keeble and Hollington, 2010, 111). Relatives of those arrested accused the 
authorities of Islamophobia (Walsh and Wainwright, 2009).  
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In this instance, the authorities proved tenacious in not totally abandoning Operation 
Pathway, with the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound producing 
fresh evidence against Liverpool University student Abid Naseer. This led to his 
extradition to the United States, and eventual conviction (FBI, 2015, b). On balance, 
and due to the successful legal procedures against Naseer, this research includes 
the ‘Easter plot’ in its dataset. It is however entirely possible if this analysis was 
being conducted at a different time, before the new material had been made 
available, a different decision could be justified.  
In terms of time scale, this thesis does not consider British Muslim involvement in the 
jihad in Afghanistan from 1979-89. Whilst Britons did fight in the Mujahideen, Olivier 
Roy’s contemporaneous categorisation carries considerable weight;  
The Afghan resistance has not sparked off militant movements of support in the West, 
because there are no shared overarching values to which appeal can be made (Roy, 1986, 
207).  
For similar reasons British participation in broadly secular, nationalist struggles in 
Muslim majority nations – for example the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF)1, Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) or even the Free Syrian Army - has 
also been discounted.  
In recent years some prominent British Muslims of Bangladeshi heritage stand 
accused of having committed crimes, including genocide, whilst fighting against the 
independence movement in Bangladesh from 1970-1. On 3 November 2013 
Chowdhury Mueen Uddin, the former Chairman of Muslim Aid, Deputy Director of the 
                                                          
1 In the 1980s the JKLF had some presence in English towns with high numbers of migrants from Kashmir. 
Street collections and graffiti, in towns like Burnley, was noticeable in a manner rarely seen today.  
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Islamic Foundation and Vice Chairman of East London Mosque2 was sentenced to 
death for the targeted killing of academics and intellectuals (Daily Star Bangladesh, 
2013) committed by Al-Badr, a paramilitary wing of the clerical party Jamaat-e-Islami 
(JeI).  Whilst noting the influence activists from Mr Mueen-Uddin’s background have 
enjoyed within British Islamism, such historical offences are not considered herein.  
 
In the years after 1989, the ‘overarching values’ between Westerners and 
Mujahideen Olivier Roy considered to be lacking, were found. This began with a 
conflict involving Muslims in Europe - Bosnia from 1992-5. This research therefore 
considers as many cases as possible of Jihadist struggle involving Britons from 1992 
until 31 March 2015 – a twenty two year period which encompasses three separate 
decades. Such research cannot, by its nature, be complete. The solitary nature of 
doctoral research precludes the large scale, collaborative project which British 
Jihadism deserves. It is to be hoped this work motivates future developments of this 
type.  
 
As well as terrorism related to Northern Ireland and that conducted by far-right 
actors, two particular terrorist attacks in Britain within the designated research period 
have been excluded. On the 26 and 27 July 1994 explosions occurred at the Israeli 
embassy and at the Balfour House office complex in Finchley, north London. On 11 
December 1996 two Palestinians were convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions 
and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Both came from secular campaigning 
                                                          
2 All biographical information is taken from his website http://www.chowdhurymueenuddin.com/  this also 
contains a vigorous rejection of the Bangladeshi charges.  
 
43 
 
traditions, although neither had connections to any terrorist organisations (Guedella, 
2001). This research takes no position on the widely articulated view their 
convictions amount to a miscarriage of justice (Fisk, 1998) although the extent to 
which the 1994 bombing stands distinct from subsequent violence is noteworthy.  
 
The millions of documents published by the Wikileaks website since 2006 were not 
originally written for publication. As such, they develop a particular curiosity. It has 
made public, for example, statements on alleged terrorist involvement made by 
particular Britons whilst in American custody. They, or their supporters, are free to 
point to the circumstances in which the US material was written, and to point to 
errors and inaccuracies which may be present. There will be errors of fact, as 
scared, abused or demoralised individuals are unlikely to always make accurate or 
consistent statements. Such errors, the setting for these statements, plus the 
treatment of many prisoners in American custody, raises questions about the validity 
of documents leaked to Wikileaks as a source. Overall my approach to these 
documents has been to see them as an indication of how a section of the United 
States government assessed an issue or individual at a set point in time. They have 
been read critically, which is the approach I have taken to all information used in this 
thesis.  
 
Chapter Outline 
The next chapter considers some of the literature already published which attempts 
to explain jihadist violence, those involved in such campaigns, and existing studies 
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on British contributions to this phenomenon. A position emerges of some distinct 
studies pertaining to particular issues and controversies, without an over-arching 
focus on the substantive subject of British Jihadism on its entirety. This research 
aims to address that shortcoming.  
In Chapter two, this thesis begins to develop. The genealogy of jihadism is 
established, with reference to thinkers who have influenced contemporary jihadist 
currents. Importantly it is established that politico-religious actors have increasingly 
displaced nationalist organisations, and that the demands of these figures preclude 
secular outcomes. This allows the reader to begin to see that religious demands are 
not mere ornamentation but intrinsic to these movements practice.  
Some of the earliest articulations for jihadism made on these shores are considered, 
before analysis moves to examples of ‘denial’ towards emerging jihadist groups. The 
inability of many within British Islam to address developments is seen as having 
damaging side effects – an aura of sensitivity and defensiveness. It is a fear later 
shown to be replicated within critical terrorism studies, where caution concerning 
‘neo-Orientalism’ ensures the religious goals of jihadist organisations do not receive 
due consideration.  
Chapter three, Settlement, considers those Islamists from 14 territories who arrived 
to this backdrop, and establishes the broad range of jihadist groups and individuals 
who coalesced in the United Kingdom in the period under consideration. The extent 
to which émigrés were able to facilitate their fight for sharia in their homelands from 
Britain is demonstrated, as are the sometimes generous conditions in which they 
were able to operate. The cross-national co-operation between jihadist 
organisations, who often contained members from a series of countries, is used to 
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demonstrate that these are not mere political exiles seeking the removal of individual 
dictators in their home nation. In chapter three we also meet some of the Imam’s 
who were to influence and shape British Jihadism.  
In Chapter four those clerics – Abdullah el-Faisal, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri 
Muhammad and Abu Qatada are placed in the context of the burgeoning struggle for 
sharia in the United Kingdom. The violence which Islamist actors have been involved 
in, and the structures they have come from, form the central part of this section. Here 
religion is demonstrated to central not just to their rhetoric but practice, be it at times 
in terms of target selection by terrorists, but also in the core practice of some 
jihadists. Not violence, but dawah. The history of conflicts surrounding Islamism on 
campus across three decades is also examined. The reluctance to accept these 
problems is later to be found repeated within critical terrorism studies.  
Chapter five considers British Jihadists as external actors, sketching their 
participation in three decades worth of conflict in more than a dozen different 
countries, and an even greater number of armed groups. Tentative totals, and where 
possible names and dates, are given for those who died attempting to achieve their 
objectives. Those travelling to Syria and Iraq since 2012 to fight for the Islamic State 
do not form a unique occurrence, but instead the peak of a series of interventions 
ongoing for over twenty years. Indeed an earlier recognition of the phenomena 
described herein could have enabled a better informed response to the Syrian crisis. 
If terrorism studies has a purpose, it is surely to inform such debates.   
Finally, in perhaps the most important section, chapter six, the structural and 
intellectual limitations of critical terrorism studies response to the above events is 
established. Two prominent feminist authors, Bennoune and Tax, are deployed to 
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put forward the contention that the local goals of jihadist actors have been 
overlooked by critical researchers, leading to a stunted understanding of their 
approach. Critical terrorism studies failings, whilst not necessarily fatal, are 
demonstrated with reference to some of its leading figures, to be substantial.  
  
This research develops, at least in part, an archive of a small contested part of 
British Islam - Jihadism. Foucault believed such work could never be exhaustive: “It 
is obvious that the archive of a society, a culture or a civilisation cannot be described 
exhaustively; or even no doubt, the archive of a whole period” (Foucault, 1972, 130). 
This snapshot is as exhaustive as possible, but cannot be complete. In presenting 
the argument for a truly critical terrorism studies however, it seeks to develop a more 
accurate archive of the period we have lived through.  
 
In the text which follows there feature names, words and religious terms which have 
been translated into English. This can produce inconsistencies – for example in the 
print media references to both Usama and Osama Bin Laden are readily found, with 
the organisation he founded described as Al Qaeda, al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda. For 
ease of reading and understanding this thesis has attempted to standardise all such 
references, with the Penguin Dictionary of Islam and what it refers to as its “generally 
accepted forms of transliteration of the terms” (Nanji, 2008, ix) providing adjudication 
where necessary. The one exception to this is where text has been quoted, where all 
wording is as per the original.   
 
47 
 
Chapter 1 - Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
This literature review seeks to examine existing material in the field of jihadist 
violence, and to demonstrate such literature has not covered the depth, breadth or 
history of British Jihadism in the detail it deserves. Initially, a fundamental challenge 
emerges when researching terrorism - the sheer volume of published material. 
Andrew Silke has attempted to monitor developments in this literature, estimating in 
the five years following 9/11, more books were published on terrorism than in the 
previous fifty. At one stage a new book on terrorism was being published in English 
every six hours (Silke, 2008, 28). Any researcher may also consider articles in three 
specialist terrorism journals, analysis in security and intelligence publications, plus at 
times those devoted to international relations, race, religion, and politics or to 
particular regions such as the Middle East. When writing in quality newspapers and 
magazines is also considered, a PhD student could conceivably read continuously 
for the duration of their doctorate. And that is before considering primary literature 
from perceived terrorist actors.  
Given the need for selection, this literature review elects to focus on three core 
issues. Firstly some primary sources from key figures in Jihadist struggle in recent 
decades – an early Arab fighter in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, Al-Qaeda’s founder 
Osama Bin Laden, and its current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Each is instantly 
recognisable to any UK based jihadist, and Abdullah Azzam’s name was taken as 
inspiration for one of the UK’s most prominent distributors of information on jihadist 
struggles – London’s Azzam Publications. Secondly it is necessary to examine the 
far more limited literature concerning British participation in these campaigns, the 
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coverage of domestic terrorist attacks and wider studies of British Islamism. This is 
followed by a discussion of academic literature within terrorism studies, and a 
summary of the two main schools – orthodox and critical terrorism studies. This 
overview of the literature serves to give some indication as to the intrinsic beliefs and 
practices of jihadist actors, and to the partial examination thus far of those who hold 
such beliefs and are from the United Kingdom.  
 
1.2 Literature on Jihadist Terrorism  
Abdullah Azzam was one of Osama Bin Laden’s closest comrades in the Afghan 
jihad, who spoke of him with reverence (Lawrence, 2005, 77). A graduate of Cairo’s 
Al-Azhar university, where he obtained a Master’s degree in sharia law and a PhD in 
Islamic jurisprudence (Ruthven, 2002, 2012), Azzam combined religious knowledge 
with a commitment to armed struggle. Assassinated with his two sons in a Peshawar 
car bombing in 1989, Azzam’s influence on the broader Mujahideen movement is 
discussed by a succession of writers (Bergen 2001, Burke, 2007, Wright 2007, Tawil, 
2010).  
This inspiration reached the United Kingdom, with the formation in 1997 of the 
organisation Azzam Publications by Talha Ahsan and Babar Ahmad, and a series of 
accompanying websites, the most prominent of which was Azzam.com (US District 
Court Indictment, 2006). This project brought together British Islamists to raise funds 
for Jihadist struggles abroad, to publish the proclamations of revered fighters and to 
publicise and promote the work of jihadists in the field. One of their titles is believed 
to contain the last writings of Abdullah Azzam, “The Lofty Mountain” (2003). The 
book is divided into three sections. First comes Azzam’s biography of Islamic 
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Scholar Sheikh Tameem Al-Adnani (d.1989), second is Azzam’s description of a 
1987 battle between Mujahideen and Soviet forces at Jaji in eastern Afghanistan, an 
analysis introduced by the pen of Osama Bin Laden. The final section is not written 
by Azzam but is devoted to one of the book’s translators, Azzam.com correspondent 
Suraqah al-Andalusi, who is described as Shaheed – a martyr. Al-Andalusi was 
killed during the battle at Tora Bora as Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters retreated from 
Northern Alliance and US forces on 14 December 2001.  
 
The book’s introduction is a brief summary of Azzam’s life, without a named author, 
but presumably written by al-Andalusi or a staff member of Azzam Publications. It 
uses quotes from Abdullah Azzam to stress the primacy of jihad over political 
methods, and informs the reader Azzam turned down profitable academic posts in 
order to fight for his beliefs. He is quoted as stating “Jihad and the rifle alone. NO 
negotiations. NO conferences and NO dialogue” (Azzam, 2003, 13). This theme 
continues when the battle of the Lion’s Den is assessed: 
One of the most beneficial lessons learnt, is a lesson from the whole of Islamic history: that 
directly confronting the enemy on a military basis is the best way to put an end to any 
oppression (Azzam, 2003, 118). 
“The Lofty Mountain” closes with what is described as “the latest Crusade against 
Islam and its people on 7 October 2001” (Azzam, 2003, 135) – the post 9/11 attack 
by American and Northern Alliance forces on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the 
Afghan mountains. It is here al-Andalusi retreats with Taliban forces, and meets his 
death. The narrative ends, after a series of quotes from the Qur’an, with words of 
praise from Abdullah Azzam for Osama Bin Laden (Azzam, 2003, 151-3). This text, 
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and its distribution in the UK, serves to illustrate the desire of Azzam Publications to 
connect the Mujahideen struggle of the 1980s with subsequent jihadist campaigns, 
and explicitly with Al-Qaeda. The war on terror is located as merely the latest in a 
series of infractions against Muslims. The ready connection of verses from the 
Qur’an with Bin Laden’s venerations of Azzam, profess to bestow legitimacy upon 
the then leader of Al-Qaeda. How such literature, and politico-religious declarations 
of this type, have impacted upon jihadist struggles, is demonstrated in chapters four 
and five.  
 
Laura Mansfield’s “In His Own Words – A Translation of The Writings of Dr Ayman Al 
Zawahiri” (2006) is an English language version of his “Knights under the Prophet’s 
Banner”, with additional material comprising al Zawahiri’s statements and 
communiqués from 2001-6. Al-Zawahiri aims the latter at two constituencies – 
intellectuals and Mujahideen. The religious warriors have understood the conspiracy 
against them “They developed an understanding based on shariah of the enemies of 
Islam, the renegades, and their collaborators” (Mansfield, 2006, 23). A medical 
doctor, al-Zawahiri was working for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt when he was 
asked to go to Pakistan to assist Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviets during the war 
against the Red Army. Al-Zawahiri writes:  
I saw this as an opportunity to get to know one of the areas of jihad that might be a tributary 
and a base for jihad in Egypt and the Arab region, the heart of the Islamic world, where the 
basic battle of Islam was being fought (Mansfield, 2006, 28).  
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Al-Zawahiri considers the theological importance of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, 
as he stressed unification, and the dangers posed by internal enemies of Islam, 
tracing such factors as the origins of the Jihad movement in Egypt. This movement 
needs an incubator “where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics and 
organisational matters” (Mansfield, 2006, 35). Significantly the religious nature of this 
movement is emphasised. To al-Zawahiri it is vital that struggle is conducted under 
the correct Islamic principles, as it is in Afghanistan, rather than leftist or nationalist 
slogans, or a hybrid of these approaches, as happens in Palestine. This struggle is 
mandatory: “resistance is a duty imposed by Shariah” (Mansfield, 2006, 128).  
 
Violence is an integral part of the al-Zawahiri method. One statement is entitled 
“Killing Americans” with best practice outlined: “Suicide operations are the most 
successful in inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly in terms of 
casualties among the fundamentalists” (Mansfield, 2006, 200). Whilst the aim should 
be to cause maximum damage to the enemy, this requires a base from which 
fighters may operate – the fundamentalist state. In a significant passage in strategic 
terms, and in particular with regards to the recent emergence of the Islamic State in 
Syria and Iraq, he declares: 
The establishment of a Muslim state in the heart of the Islamic world is not an easy or close 
target. However it is the hope of the Muslim nation to restore its fallen caliphate and regain its 
lost glory (Mansfield, 2006, 201-2).  
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To achieve this caliphate, a vanguard is required. The masses need “A leadership 
that they could trust, follow and understand” (Mansfield, 2006, 224). This is made 
even clearer in al-Zawahiri’s conclusions:  
Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching Jihad against 
them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land that raises the banner of Jihad 
and rallies the Muslims around it (Mansfield, 2006, 225).  
Mansfield’s work concludes with al-Zawahiri’s communiqués post 9/11, when Al-
Qaeda was placed under critical pressure by the loss of its established base in 
Afghanistan. These show the author re-establishing core principles, and responding 
to new developments. On 4 March 2006 al-Zawahiri reiterates the objectives he 
believes all Muslims who support the jihadists should follow. This call to action has 
four parts. Firstly to take action to inflict economic loss on the crusader – through 
bombing and boycott. Secondly – to force the crusader out of Islamic lands. Thirdly 
change corrupt regimes that have sold out to the crusader and finally dawah – 
convert non-Muslims to Islam. There is nothing in these documents to indicate al-
Zawahiri - or Al-Qaeda under his leadership - are likely to depart significantly from 
these declared objectives. But do we observe British Jihadists following the tactics 
and strategic positions adopted by al-Zawahiri? 
This key primary source serves as the most substantial statement of belief, to date, 
by the man who took over as leader of Al-Qaeda in 2011 following the killing of Bin 
Laden. It also reinforces the religious nature of al-Zawahiri’s world view. Struggles of 
particular significance for many Arabs – in particular the Palestinian question – are 
explicitly framed as religious, not national or regional problems. Similarly the focus 
on developing a caliphate, and its association with a return to lost Muslim glories, 
depicts the re-establishment of a by-gone Islamic age.  
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The American academic Bruce Lawrence brought together 24 of Osama Bin Laden’s 
proclamations and interviews in “Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama 
Bin Laden” (2005). Whilst an important primary source, it should be noted these 
statements are not unexpurgated – some religious formulae has been omitted 
(Lawrence, 2005, ix) and it is tempting to speculate the extent to which such 
omissions influence the perceptions of readers and researchers studying this text. 
The statements commence in 1994, when Bin Laden was resident in Sudan, through 
his time in Taliban controlled Afghanistan, to the period immediately after 9/11 and 
finally 2003-5, when Al-Qaeda’s focus switched primarily to Iraq. Lawrence’s 
introduction situates Bin Laden as a polemicist, but with a very particular approach: 
The word imperialism does not occur in any of the messages he has sent out. He defines the 
enemy differently. For him, jihad is aimed not at imperialism, but at “global unbelief.” Again 
and again, his texts return to this fundamental dichotomy. The war is a religious war 
(Lawrence, 2005, xx). 
Lawrence insists Al-Qaeda is not a successor to 1970s left terrorism, draped in 
religious garb. Instead Bin Laden operates within the structure of defensive jihad set 
out by the great Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah in the fourteenth century. It is 
prophetic tradition Bin Laden invokes when discussing the Jews or Israel. Indeed it is 
this very religious base Lawrence considers limiting – Bin Laden has no substantial 
social programme, but instead a focus on martyrdom. 
 
The story of Osama Bin Laden as a global actor begins in the United Kingdom. His 
first public statement, dated 29 December 1994, was published by comrades in the 
Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC), a group of Saudi dissidents in London, 
who had fled King Fahd’s repression of the sahwa in the Kingdom. An open letter to 
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Saudi Arabia’s most important religious authority, Chief Mufti Bin Baz, Bin Laden 
lays the blame for the country’s problems at the Mufti’s fatwas. These have allowed 
usury to spread, the Crusader-Jewish alliance to station troops in the Kingdom and 
worst of all, the Mufti accepted the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO.  
 
The continued presence of American troops in the land of the Prophet dominates Bin 
Laden’s public pronouncements until 9/11. This includes his 1995 call for the 
abdication of King Fahd (again published by the ARC in London) and his 1996 
“Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Sanctuaries.” This begins with the stark opening line “Expel the Polytheists from the 
Arabian peninsula” (Lawrence, 2005, 24). This occupation is referred to 
cataclysmically - as the greatest disaster to befall Muslims since the death of the 
Prophet. In response, Bin Laden seeks a religious awakening, followed by jihad. His 
November 1996 statement “The Saudi Regime”, gives further insight into a method 
for prioritising issues. Faith appears to be placed above what may, in Western terms, 
be referred to as anti-imperialism: 
It is crucial for us to be patient and to cooperate in righteousness and piety, and to raise 
awareness of the fact that the highest priority, after faith, is to repel the invading enemy, 
which corrupts religion and the world, as the scholars have declared (Lawrence, 2005, 42). 
 
In 1998 Bin Laden joined with al-Zawahiri (then wearing the hat of the Egyptian 
Islamic group), Mir Hamzah from Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Ulema (JeU) and Fazlur 
Rahman, a member of Pakistan’s legislative assembly, to sign a fatwa declaring 
jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. This was conducted in the name of the World 
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Islamic Front. The co-signatories proceeded systematically, using seven passages 
from the Qur’an to justify this jihad (Lawrence, 2005, 58).3 Three stated issues 
provoked their ire – America has occupied Islam’s holiest lands, it has pursued 
crippling sanctions against Iraq, and it serves the interests of the Jewish state.  
 
By now Bin Laden was committing himself clearly to the Islamic state the Taliban 
were constructing. He describes Mullah Omar as the commander of the faithful and 
encourages Muslims to support his Emirate “in its capacity as the raiser of the 
banner of Islam in the Islamic world, the true Islam of jihad for the sake of God” 
(Lawrence, 2005, 85).  In April 2001 Bin Laden lobbied the international conference 
of Deobandis in Peshawar, Pakistan in support of the Taliban, calling for spiritual, 
financial and verbal assistance – with jihad coming under the categorisation of the 
‘spiritual’. To Bin Laden, the Islamic state was here.  
 
Even if the emphasis of Bin Laden’s pronouncements may switch from one country 
or cause to another, the religious framework in which he operates does not. Some 
six weeks after 9/11 Bin Laden was telling Al Jazeera “the issue is one of faith and 
doctrine, not of a ‘war on terror’ as Bush and Blair depict it” (Lawrence, 2005, 135). It 
is this immersion of Bin Laden in his belief which colours the statements collected by 
Lawrence, even though for ease of reading, much religious formulae was removed 
from the text. To properly consider the influence of Osama Bin Laden in Britain, and 
the response of academics and politicians to it, such primary source material is 
crucial. We cannot reasonably discuss categorisations such as the term ‘Al-Qaeda 
                                                          
3 These being  Qur’an  2:193, 8:39, 4:75, 8:24, 9:38, 9:39 and 3:139 (Lawrence 2005, 61-2).  
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inspired terrorism’ (HM Government, 2011, 1) without examining the inspirations of 
Al-Qaeda’s founder.  
 
1.3 British Islamism and Jihadism 
Until this year there had been no definitive study devoted solely to the history and 
involvement of British Islamists in jihad – hence in large part, the need for this thesis. 
Instead, with the exception of Rafaello Pantucci’s “We Love Death as you Love Life: 
Britain’s Suburban Terrorists” (2015), the past decade has produced a collection of 
jigsaw pieces, each devoted to a separate part of an ever-expanding puzzle. This 
has seen books centred on London’s role in the global jihad, specific terrorist attacks 
such as 7/7 or the alleged ricin plot, plus the memoirs of those caught up in specific 
events in the war on terror – either as alleged participants, victims or as counter 
terrorism officers.  
Lawrence Archer and Fiona Bawdon raise uncomfortable questions about how the 
media and politicians approach the judicial process in “Ricin: The inside Story of the 
Terror Plot that Never was” (2010). Archer was jury foreman in the trial of five 
Algerians in London allegedly trying to utilise the poison ricin to murder civilians. 
Although no poison was found, US Secretary of State Colin Powell used the case in 
his address to the UNSC on 5 February 2003, immediately prior to the invasion of 
Iraq.  Powell’s actions served to insert domestic counter terrorism into global politics 
in a manner which was stark and, with the benefit of hindsight, unfortunate. The 
danger of turning complex terrorist prosecutions into political sound bites is 
demonstrated by the reality that all the defendants were cleared – except for Kameel 
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Bourgass. Convicted of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance, Bourgass was 
already serving life in prison for murdering a Special Branch officer in Manchester.  
 
Richard Watson’s examination of Al-Muhajiroun “The Rise of the British Jihad” found 
three motivating elements to the group. A fierce opposition to British foreign policy, 
support for the creation of a global Islamic state under a Caliph and finally Islamic 
revolution in Great Britain (Watson, 2008, 35). Watson argues that in the 1990s such 
currents were not taken seriously by the domestic security service, which only 
became aware of a ‘surge’ in Islamist activity in 2003. This leads to his contention:  
Omar Bakri Muhammad was preaching hate in Britain for more than twenty years, 
unencumbered by the state. A hard core of extremist radicals joined him, infecting 
generations of young British Muslims with their nihilistic interpretations of Islam (Watson, 
2008, 38-39). 
Watson presents an indication of the scale and depth of these issues by positioning 
them in some chronological context. What is perhaps frustrating is the strength of his 
monograph is also a weakness – by focusing on the historiography of Al-Muhajiroun 
he provides us with arguably the most detailed study to date of that organisation, but 
little on overlapping or competing elements within British Islamism. For example, 
how influential Al-Muhajiroun has been in university ISOCs is unclear from this 
analysis.  
 
To formulate a more detailed conception of Jihadist and Islamist struggles in the 
United Kingdom, it is also necessary to consider the memoirs of those claiming to 
have been participants. In 2007 Ed Husain published “The Islamist”. A teenage 
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activist in the Islamic Society at Tower Hamlets and Newham Colleges in London, 
Husain’s autobiography charts his journey in, and then out of Islamism. It is a journey 
that has taken him a long way – from the east end of London to spells working in 
Syria and Saudi Arabia. Husain describes with some passion his rejection of what he 
now categorises as extremist values within key British mosques, and Muslim 
representative organisations.   
Of particular interest are the descriptions of Islamic student activism, and how, with 
the benefit of hindsight, Husain sees this as increasing racial tensions in Newham, 
events which ultimately result in the murder of an African Christian student. 9/11 
provoked mixed feelings in Husain, and he notes the contradictory and at times 
confused response to the attacks by British Muslims. This included conspiracy 
theories about Jews: “That type of double thinking, in denial and yet proud at the 
same time, was ubiquitous” (Husain, 2007, 206). Such attitudes lead Husain to take 
what is arguably a pessimistic view of domestic security “I fear the unleashing of a 
firestorm of violence by home-grown Wahhabi Jihadists, influenced by Islamist 
rhetoric, on the major cities of America and Britain” (Husain, 2007, 265).  
 
Maajid Nawaz’s “Radical” (2012), covers some similar ground to Husain. This is not 
coincidental - both were active in east London with Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), although 
Nawaz progressed further in the organisation, both domestically and internationally. 
Growing up in a broadly white environment in Southend, Essex, Nawaz was 
alienated by the racism of both his peers and the authorities. Security and sanctity 
came first via immersion in Hip-Hop culture, then latterly from the development of a 
strong Islamic identity. Nawaz followed his brother Osman into HuT, but is keen to 
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stress this as a political process “Islamism is a political movement with religious 
consequences” (Nawaz, 2012, 86). HuT developed as a prominent force in the early 
1990s, and Nawaz relates how Newham College’s Islamic Society, and the broader 
Students Union, came under their control: “The 1990s in London was the decade of 
Islamism” (Nawaz, 2012, 109). Similarly to Husain, Nawaz came to reject Islamism 
as an entity, but not Islam, his de-radicalisation beginning after being adopted by 
Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience whilst imprisoned in General 
Mubarak’s Egypt.  Nawaz argues Jihadism is a merger between literalist religious 
tendencies and Islamism – a process which took some time to fully gestate.  
Changes in identity played a role in facilitating this – Nawaz suggests that as racial 
issues became less prominent in the United Kingdom, and new waves of immigration 
occurred of North Africans, Somalis and Arabs into British ghettos, many 
increasingly had one thing in common – Islam. A previous British Asian identity was 
subsumed by a narrower Muslim identity. Although clearly alarmed at some of the 
changes he has seen in community life, referring even to self-segregation, 
interestingly Nawaz avoids making any mention of increased religiosity as a 
contributing factor “What had caused this shift was a mixture of discrimination and 
suspicion at home, and a growing awareness of events overseas” (Nawaz, 2012, 
72). 
 
Farhaan Wali has made a notable contribution to scholarship on Islamic Britain with 
his analysis of HuT “Radicalism Unveiled” (2013). Particular criticisms can be made 
of both Nawaaz and Husain – as former radicals, and in the case of Nawaaz a 
former leader in HuT, they bring very particular baggage with them in writing about 
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former comrades and campaigns. As they have chosen to reject their previous 
organisation and beliefs, the last thing they can be considered is neutral or impartial 
commentators.  Additionally, both men have careers which at least in part centre on 
their ‘former’ status – Husain is the Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the 
Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Nawaaz is a prominent writer and 
commentator, prospective parliamentary candidate for the Liberal Democrats and 
runs anti-extremist think tanks Khudi in Pakistan and the Quilliam Foundation in 
Britain. In 2011 he was consulted on the text of David Cameron’s key speech on 
security policy to the Munich Security Conference. 
 
Such criticisms cannot be made of Wali’s research. He has taken a different 
methodological approach, interviewing existing members of HuT, leaders such as 
Farid Kassim and dissecting their literature and activism. Much of this occurs on 
University campuses, indeed HuT appears to have struggled to gain support in 
working class areas and in the north of England. Wali provides a valuable 
assessment of former HuT member Omar Bakri Muhammad, (best known for his 
subsequent activism in Al-Muhajiroun) which suggests a figure far more strategic 
than the comic image of tabloid renown. Subsequent chapters will focus on Bakri 
Muhammad and the group he founded, Al-Muhajiroun, in substantive detail.  
Moazzam Begg is one of 14 Britons to have been detained by the US military at 
Guantanamo Bay. His “Enemy Combatant” (2006) charts his arrest in Pakistan in 
2001 and process through American jurisdiction, but also his earlier time in 
Afghanistan. Prominent in British Islamist circles since the early 1990s, Begg visited 
jihadi training camps in Afghanistan in 1993, Mujahideen camps in Bosnia in 1993, 
61 
 
and later attempted to gain entry to Chechnya. He denies involvement in terrorism, 
but found many elements to admire in the Taliban:  
When I went to Afghanistan, I believed the Taliban had made some modest progress – in 
social justice and in up-holding pure, old-style Islamic values forgotten in many Islamic 
countries. After September 11 that life was destroyed’ (Begg, 2006, 381). 
 
A Salafi, Begg began working for a support group for Islamist prisoners upon his 
release, but condemns the July 2005 bombings, seeing 7/7 as “a serious setback for 
any positive Islamic movement” (Begg, 2006, 381). Begg’s combination of support 
for those establishing sharia in Muslim majority countries, alongside a rejection of 
deadly terrorist violence against civilians in Britain, is one that has gained 
considerable influence within British Islamism. It has become characteristic of the 
prisoner support organisation Cage with which he is a Director.  
 
Omar Nasiri’s “Inside the Global Jihad” (2006) tells of his work as an informant inside 
jihadist organisations for a series of European intelligence agencies. Some sixty 
pages are devoted to ‘Londonistan’, where Nasiri was sent by the French Direction 
Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE). Finsbury Park mosque was initially 
divided, not by extremists versus moderates, but between supporters of Abu Hamza, 
and Pakistanis who wanted a fellow countryman to lead Friday prayers. In time it 
became controlled by followers of Hamza, the older Pakistanis forced out:   
By now it was comprised almost exclusively of young people and angry people. The old guard 
was completely gone. And there were many new people coming in (Nasiri, 2006, 289). 
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A picture of Finsbury Park mosque at the centre of domestic and international 
jihadism is continued by Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory in “The Suicide Factory: 
Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque” (2006). A troubling portrait emerges of 
the UK authorities either being manipulated by a key international figure or simply 
not digesting Hamza meant what he said in his Friday khutbah’s. Here again whilst 
important information on British Jihadism emerges, McGrory and O’Neill’s focus is 
not on the overall categorisation, but a distinct location and single religious institution 
within it.  
 
One of those who attended Finsbury Park mosque during this period was to be 
arrested in the United States in August 2001. A Frenchman of Moroccan extraction, 
Zacarias Moussaoui was eventually convicted in 2006 of six charges of conspiracy 
related to the 9/11 attacks. Abd Samad Moussaoui traces his brother’s life in 
“Zacarias Moussaoui: The Making of a Terrorist” (2003). Although the brothers 
shared a migrant background in a France divided along lines of race and class, 
Zacarias’ move to London appears to have been crucial in his eventual development 
“I think the first mosque Zacarias went into was in Great Britain” (Moussaoui, 2003, 
45).  In time his association with followers of the Salafi strain of Islam in England 
began to trouble his family, although Abd Samad is keen to point out his brother 
knew comparatively little about religion.  
Concern about Zacarias came to be expressed repeatedly – by relatives in France, 
Morocco and at Narbonne mosque. By 2000, French police approached Abd Samad 
suggesting that his brother may be in Chechnya. Few such concerns appear to have 
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arisen in Britain about Moussaoui’s behaviour, leading to a core question raised by 
the book “Why have the British authorities been so lax?” (Moussaoui, 2003, 144).  
This very personal account raises questions concerning the extent to which British 
authorities took seriously Islamist currents prior to 9/11, and places centre stage the 
role of London as a city allegedly shaping and facilitating the expansion of particular 
strands of Jihadism. These are questions which appear repeatedly in the discourse 
surrounding British Jihadism, and are addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
It is perhaps because of the fractured nature of the field that Kenan Malik’s “From 
Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy” (2009) appears impressive both 
in its scope and discernment. Malik takes the robust position multi-culturalism as it 
has been developed in the UK fosters tribalism, cedes power to religious leaders in 
our communities and whilst it has not itself created militant Islam, has instead 
developed the space in which it operates. Malik looks in particular detail at the 7/7 
bombers and their backgrounds. Mohammed Sidique Khan had been in a Leeds 
street gang known as the Mullah Crew, and the three Yorkshire born bombers 
(Khan, Tanweer and Hussain) identified themselves as Muslim, but were in conflict 
with older generations within their community. Having rejected their parent’s 
lifestyles, there is not however a rejection of Islam per se or a recognition of secular 
values – for these young men a different form of Islam is required. Malik’s work is 
important to this thesis because of its scope – he himself comes from an era of 
British Asian political activism which was frequently left leaning and where secular 
currents predominated. In charting the importance of the Rushdie affair and a top 
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down, state sponsored multi-culturalism, Malik is reflecting how his own political 
landscape has been altered. It is on that landscape Britain’s jihadists came to stand.   
 
Significant literature has emerged from serving and former Metropolitan Police 
officers involved in domestic counter terrorism. Andy Hayman was Assistant 
Commissioner – Special Operations, heading Counter Terrorism Command. “The 
Terrorist Hunters: The Ultimate inside Story of Britain’s Fight against Terrorism” 
(2009) brings Hayman together with the BBC’s former Home Correspondent 
Margaret Gilmore. Theirs is a book with a troubled setting. The opposition to the 
merger between Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorism Branch, Hayman’s disputes 
with Commissioner Sir Ian Blair and the wearying political challenges of his role are 
all recounted. Hayman was in post during the 7/7 and 21/7 attacks, as well as the 
2007 Haymarket bombing. He unsuccessfully lobbied MPs for the right to detain 
terrorist suspects for 90 days without charge, and also had to explain critical police 
blunders such as the Jean Charles De Menezes shooting and that of an innocent 
Muslim man in a bungled counter-terrorism raid in Forest Gate in 2006. 
There is however more to Hayman’s narrative than exculpation. The trapeze act 
required to work with Muslim community representatives in countering terrorism, 
whilst investigating, arresting and prosecuting elements within those communities is 
evident. By 10.45 on the day of 7/7, Hayman was beginning the organisation of work 
to reassure the Muslim community “We didn’t yet know for sure that this was an 
attack from terrorists hiding within the Muslim community – but it was a strong 
possibility” (Hayman and Gilmore, 2009, 32). Whilst convinced as to the procedural 
necessity of such an approach, Hayman is withering about the results gained from 
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Muslim-police outreach. He refers to the level of intelligence received from Muslim 
communities as ‘dismal’ and combatively states “If we are spending millions of 
pounds investing in Muslim communities we need to get more for our return than 
pleasant coffee mornings in local halls” (Hayman and Gilmore, 2009, 329).    
A more intellectual analysis comes from career Special Branch officer Robert 
Lambert. Lambert founded and led the Metropolitan Police Muslim Contact Unit 
(MCU), before retiring to a career in academia a. His article “Salafi and Islamist 
Londoners: Stigmatised Minority Faith Communities Countering Al-Qaeda” (2008) 
serves as a precursor to some of the arguments in “Countering Al-Qaeda in London: 
Police and Muslims in Partnership” (2011).   
Lambert argues some Sufi Muslims in Britain have looked to direct islamophobia 
towards rival Muslims such as Wahhabis (Lambert, 2008, 211) and that Islamist and 
Salafi Londoners are far more likely to be equated with terrorism than those following 
other strands of Islam. Here, Lambert adopts the language, not of counter terrorism 
but of youth work. He sees young people in these communities as “at risk” from Al-
Qaeda propaganda. Lambert concludes: “Salafism and Islamism, as causal or 
predictive factors, are no more significant to the profile of an Al-Qaeda terrorist than 
Catholicism was to the profile of a Provisional IRA member” (Lambert, 2008, 38).  
Such an approach invites intellectual challenges. One of the IRA’s most revered 
icons is Wolfe Tone – an Irish Protestant. In its rhetoric from 1798 to date, Irish 
republicanism seeks to include Protestant, Catholic and dissenter (Adams, 2011). Is 
such a cross community approach imaginable from Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State? 
Perhaps anticipating potential criticism, Lambert states of British recruits: 
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It is axiomatic that by the time they become Al-Qaeda suicide bombers (or other active 
terrorists) UK Muslim recruits have bought into an ideology that distorts strands of Salafi and 
Islamist thinking” (Lambert, 2008, 39).  
The frailty of Lambert’s approach, and the rapid manner in which categorising this 
problem as being one related to Al-Qaeda rather than much broader trends such as 
Salafi-Jihadism, are discussed in chapters four and five.   
     
1.4 Academic Studies of Terrorism  
Terrorism Studies is a comparatively new, although fast expanding academic 
discipline. Its articles, books and journals compete on the contested territory of a 
host of divergent actors. Domestic and international government departments, 
religious representative organisations, think tanks, police counter terrorism units, the 
security services, political parties plus of course jihadist actors themselves all have 
core messages they wish to disseminate, and indeed articulations they do not wish 
to see propagated.  
 
Journalist Jason Burke, in his analysis “Al-Qaeda” (2007), establishes potential 
dangers for academics and journalists entering this arena, when he starkly 
comments “Intelligence services lie, cheat and deceive. Propaganda is one of their 
primary functions” (Burke, 2007, 16). He illustrates this with reference to claims 
made in a British government dossier on the 9/11 attacks, published on 4 October 
2001. Burke believes this contains two fabrications and a deliberate omission. First 
are false claims Bin Laden was involved in drug production. Second that Al-Qaeda 
was responsible for the attack on American helicopters in Mogadishu in 1993, 
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immortalised in the film Black Hawk Down. The omission centres on the failure to 
mention Bin Laden’s two year residency on the territory of a British ally – Saudi 
Arabia – whilst mentioning his visits to other countries in the same time period. Burke 
concludes:  
Oddly a convention seems to have developed whereby something from a ‘security source’, 
even if released by politicians, suddenly acquires a degree of reliability. Actually such material 
should be treated with extreme circumspection, not exempted from normal journalistic 
practices (Burke, 2007, 18).  
 
Governments are not neutral umpires, officiating in the field of terrorism and political 
violence. Firstly they are frequently the targets of such aggression. Those at risk of 
physical attack can hardly be expected to be objective or neutral about others 
potentially instigating violence against them. Secondly governments are the ultimate 
arbiters of whether those involved in terrorism should be negotiated with. There will 
be times when governments wish to articulate the desirability of taking such a step – 
and times when evidence is circulated to show either its impossibility or 
undesirability.  
Thirdly, history has shown government, its departments or agents, acting with or 
without sanction from the legislature, have been participants in politically motivated 
violence and terrorism themselves – something they will be loathe to admit. Only 
with the publication in 2003 of the Stevens Enquiry did we get a clear admission from 
within the British government on collusion between elements of the state and 
Loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland (Stevens, 2003). Many of the events Sir John 
Stevens examined had occurred in the 1980s, a ten year period when Paul 
Wilkinson arguably did most to develop the concept of terrorism studies as an 
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academic discipline, and was consulted by government on counter-terrorism 
(Sunday Times Scotland, 1990). A substantive academic critique of collusion failed 
to emerge in this environment.  
 
Such scenarios continue in the fight by Western governments against Islamist 
terrorism. Consider Marc Sageman, recognised as an authority on Al-Qaeda, and 
author of substantial publications such as “Leaderless Jihad” (2008) and 
“Understanding Terror Networks” (2004). Sageman holds positions at the University 
of Pennsylvania and the University of Maryland, and at think tanks the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). He 
also gave expert evidence to the third public hearing of the 9/11 Commission (Kean 
and Hamilton, 2004, 626).  
The cynic may contend an additional element other than academic research factors 
Sageman’s knowledge – he served as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer in 
Islamabad from 1987-89, directing American programmes in support of the 
Mujahideen. Given the importance of this period in the establishment of what was to 
become Al-Qaeda, Sageman can hardly be viewed as a neutral or dispassionate 
witness. Fellow academics can be remarkably reticent about Sageman’s background 
– for example Peter Neumann refers to him as “the American psychologist” 
(Neumann, 2008, 7) a point that is not inaccurate, but is distinctly limited in its 
approach. This is especially so when other researchers contend events such as 9/11 
are evidence of ‘blowback’ from earlier, unwise American policies, such as arming 
and supporting the Afghan Mujahideen. Blowback has been defined as 
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An expression that refers to the unintended consequences of providing support to violent 
dissident groups in other states. These groups, once they are successful, may turn on their 
former benefactors and create problems for them (Lutz and Lutz, 2008, 293).  
Examples such as those of Wilkinson and Sageman illustrate the difficulty in defining 
objectivity and neutrality with regards to prominent academics in terrorism studies. 
Despite these problems, Sageman’s entry on the Foreign Policy Research Institute 
website describes him as “an independent researcher on terrorism” (FPRI website, 
n.d), a categorisation which in terms of historical analysis of Al-Qaeda, is 
contentious.  
 
This does not mean orthodox terrorism studies has failed to provide significant 
insights into the theory, practice and mind-set of terrorist actors. Bruce Hoffman’s 
“Inside Terrorism” (2005), attempts to categorise Al-Qaeda’s structure into four 
elements. This typology begins with its pre-9/11 core, plus individuals who have 
risen through the ranks, replacing those lost in struggle. Second come Al-Qaeda 
associates and affiliates, trained or supported by the core group. Hoffman places the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and a succession of Kashmiri based organisations 
here. Thirdly he presents Al-Qaeda ‘locals’ – those perhaps with distant connections 
to the organisation, but previous involvement in terrorism. Fourthly, and most 
significant perhaps for those attempting to analyse domestic terrorist actors, are 
home grown radicals. These may have no direct connection to Al-Qaeda, but adopt 
its agenda. They are sometimes motivated by considerable enmity to the nations in 
which they live or have settled. Writing before the July 2005 explosions in London, 
Hoffman cites the 2004 Madrid bombers as support for his thesis. Amongst other 
issues, later chapters will discuss the extent to which Britons have been found in Al-
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Qaeda’s core leadership, have worked as affiliates, or could be considered as ‘Al-
Qaeda locals.’ Attention is also given to the extent to which the focus on Al-Qaeda 
as a distinct entity has served to distract from a much broader entity – British 
Jihadism.  
 
Gus Martin writes of the ‘idiosyncratic quality’ of religious terrorism, in 
“Understanding Terrorism” (2006). He argues religion may be a primary or a 
secondary motive in terrorist behaviour, and in the latter case may be less significant 
than cultural issues. Martin warns in particular about the dangers of a simplistic 
approach towards Islam and violence, and stresses the need to discern between the 
lesser and greater jihad. He also attempts to place contemporary jihads in a 
comparatively modern context: 
The precipitating causes for the modern resurgence of the armed and radical jihadi movement 
are twofold: the revolutionary ideals and ideology of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 
practical application of jihad against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan (Martin, 
2006, 188).  
Whether domestic strands of Jihad are thusly inspired is further investigated below.  
 
In “Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response” (2006) Paul Wilkinson 
lists a total of 18 Al-Qaeda affiliates and support groups. These are all in Muslim 
majority nations, except for The Secret Organisation of Al-Qaeda in Europe, about 
which little has been heard in subsequent years. Wilkinson is at pains to stress the 
differences between Al-Qaeda and earlier strains of terrorism, such as the IRA, and 
the focus of his manuscript is primarily historical. Emerging threats, such as those 
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exemplified by Islamist attacks in Holland, Spain and England from 2004-6 receive 
only passing coverage. Wilkinson’s focus is more on how the state should respond to 
terrorism, than an examination of just who the perceived terrorist actors are.  
 
No consideration of terrorism, especially that considered to be religious in origin, is 
complete without considering David Rapoport. “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in 
Three Religious Traditions” (1984) was the first comparative study of religious 
terrorism. Rapoport argues the primary audience for such violence is the deity, 
although he also contends violence in Islam is aimed at social transformation in this 
world. Can we look at – for example – the actions of British Jihadists and see the 
deity addressed in particular acts? 
A difficulty with trying to apply this particular text to contemporary Jihadist violence is 
that when considering Islam, Rapoport focused on the Assassins – a group from the 
Ismaili tradition within Shi’ism (Burman, 1987).  Yet the organisations with which 
Britons have often been associated – Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic State or Jaish-e-
Mohammed, to take just four examples from those listed in figure 5.1 – are all Sunni.  
This does not necessarily prevent Rapoport providing an insight into Jihadist 
methodology. He argues the Assassins based their strategic approach on the life of 
Muhammad, and this was demonstrated in their focus on withdrawing to remote 
locations – migration. One does not have to think too deeply to recall Bin Laden’s 
retreats to Sudan or Afghanistan, or his call to Muslims to migrate from Saudi Arabia. 
Similarly the most controversial of the United Kingdom’s Islamist groups has been 
Al-Muhajiroun, which translates as the emigrants......  
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1.5 Critical Studies on Terrorism 
A second trend within terrorism studies is that characterised by Critical Terrorism 
Studies, centred in the UK around the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism. Their 
approach may perhaps be summed up by the analysis of Richard Jackson, when 
considering the failure of terrorism studies as a discipline to engage sufficiently with 
state terrorism. In the spirit of Robert Cox he surmises “knowledge and its production 
is never a purely neutral exercise but always works for someone and something” 
(Jackson, 2008, 378). This process has consequences – terrorism studies as a 
subject is distorted, dominant power structures reified and elite and state projects 
enabled. In practice, terrorism studies serve the status quo.  
 
Jackson cites prominent academics – such as Walter Laqueur or Paul Wilkinson – 
who have at times recognised the scale and significance of state terrorism – but 
declined to give it the full weight of their research capacity. He contends “a discourse 
analysis of the field reveals that the most notable aspect of the state terrorism 
discourse is its near complete absence” (Jackson, 2008, 382). This is all the more 
noteworthy when Jackson is able to list an exhaustive series of terrorist actions, 
campaigns, groups and repressive regimes supported by Western liberal 
democracies – from the 1985 French bombing of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow 
Warrior to support for Pakistani governments who have sponsored a succession of 
terrorist organisations in Kashmir. 
Ostensibly there is much to admire in the critical studies approach. As Jackson 
states when critiquing the failings of terrorism studies:  “The exposure of this 
73 
 
dominant narrative also opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative and 
potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice” (Jackson, 2008, 387). 
There are also grounds for caution. Some in the field of terrorism studies question 
the perceived originality of the critical approach – in drawing on the wider body of 
critical thought in the discipline of international relations, it is not as new as it 
appears to be (Michel and Richards, 2009). They also question suggestions from 
within the critical paradigm that terrorism is linked to human insecurity and/or poverty 
– propositions which Michel and Richards contend lack empirical validation. A focus 
on state terrorism, and/or critiques of counter terrorist legislation may tell us much 
about how governments respond to violence, and strategic errors in their approach. 
The extent to which critical terrorism studies can develop an informed understanding 
of terrorist actors themselves is less clear. Indeed it may be argued the terrorist actor 
is no longer the centre of the researchers focus.  
 
1.6 Conclusions 
Existing literature gives a comparatively thorough grounding in Al-Qaeda’s 
background, leaders, beliefs, objectives and practice. The writing of Abdullah Azzam, 
plus translations of al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden give significant insight into the 
theological and ambitions of three core figures within Islamism. Here faith serves as 
a guide to strategy. When Abdullah Azzam declares “Jihad and the rifle alone” it is a 
position rooted in his understanding of Islamic history (Azzam, 2003, 13, 18). Faith 
also serves however as the end goal for Ayman al-Zawahiri – a fundamentalist state 
leading to a caliphate (Mansfield, 2006, 201-2). 
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Al-Zawahiri is shown to be a more flexible theoretician than Azzam, establishing a 
four pronged strategy by which those who support the fundamentalists should act 
(Mansfield, 2006, 313-15) these combine action against the crusader with a notable 
religious imperative – dawah to convert non-Muslims. In chapter four we will see how 
a similar approach has been adopted by one high profile British organisation – Al-
Muhajiroun.  
Whilst some religious formulae has been removed from Osama Bin Laden’s writings, 
what emerges is a thinker with a clear conceptualisation of his role within a religious 
paradigm. And whilst Bin Laden is most associated with Afghanistan or Saudi 
Arabia, it is from London that his communiques first emerge.  
 
If primary sources present a somewhat unitary picture, literature on Jihadist violence 
in Britain is more fragmented, with a tendency to focus on particular incidents, 
groups or controversies. What emerges is inchoate – a study of Al-Muhajiroun, 
Finsbury Park mosque or HuT, the sometimes self-exculpatory memoirs of activists 
or those who have now adopted the mantle of former activists. This research takes a 
more rounded, detailed approach, adopting to focus on perceived terrorist actors, 
their actions and objectives in terms of the type of society they are seeking to build. 
The literature of terrorism studies – both orthodox and critical, has limitations, but 
both schools also bring particular theoretical strengths. Orthodox researchers such 
as Paul Wilkinson have taken terrorism, and terrorists seriously. Bruce Hoffman 
presents a possible framework by which religious terrorists in differing societies may 
be considered, and Rapoport’s understanding of a religious terrorism which seeks to 
address the deity serves as a reminder religious actors operate to an environment 
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which is much broader than agitation around socio-economic issues of the day. 
When we turn to the motivations of 7/7 suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan 
that rejection of material factors is explicit. Critical terrorism studies however has 
questioned the balance of debates about terrorism, and seeks to remind us of the 
disparities – particularly in military and economic terms between the West, and other 
regions of the world. Richard Jackson informs the reader that the history of counter-
terrorism polity is one of contradiction and at times violence, even when 
accompanied by rhetorical commitments to peace and democracy.  
 
This research seeks to steer a ‘middle way’ between prevailing orthodoxies. Taking 
jihadist actors seriously, both in terms of their ideas and intentions, as orthodox 
researchers have for some years. But it is not willing to reject the potential inherent 
within critical terrorism studies, not least because of the inherent dangers in 
accepting government strategy in counter terrorism strategies, as displayed so 
clearly by the era of Northern Ireland related terrorism. In adopting this ‘middle way’ 
the potential emerges for an innovative and detailed examination of British Jihadism, 
but also for a rejuvenation and renewal of critical terrorism studies.  
 
The following chapter prepares the groundwork for a detailed study of British 
Jihadism. Before we may consider what this thesis considers to be British Jihadism, 
the broader genealogy of jihadism is addressed, with consideration given to primary 
sources four key thinkers with the Islamist canon – Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, 
Maulana Mawdudi and Abdullah Azzam. The consequences of their ideals are 
discussed in terms of the increasing predominance of Islamist actors in particular 
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struggles, and the contestation fought over concepts of jihad. In the second half of 
the chapter focus moves more towards domestic issues, and the difficulties sections 
of British Islam have had in first acknowledging and secondly responding to 
emerging jihadist currents.  
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Chapter 2 – Contested Territory: Roots, Articulations and Denial 
2.1 Introduction  
Writers positioning themselves within Islamic traditions have offered an array of 
explanations as to what Jihad is, how central it is to Muslim experience, when and 
where it may be justified (Haleem, 2002, Noorani, 2002). A multiplicity of approaches 
has characterised debate in the modern era (Peters, 1995, 372) and the range of 
views expressed serve to illustrate the scale to which the conceptualisation of Jihad 
is not merely a religious or political actuality, but an arena of struggle in its own right.   
This chapter examines the shifting nature of definitions of Jihad, to seek answers for 
their varying nature and application, and locates contemporary adherence to jihadist 
struggle in the agitation of some of the key figures in the 20th century’s Islamic 
revival. This revival is not limited to Muslim majority nations, indeed a core 
characteristic of Islamic organisations in the West has become that they seek to 
address politico-religious issues facing traditionally non-Muslim societies. The work 
of authoritative thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Mawdudi 
is critically examined, as is the extent to which nationalist or secular articulations of 
struggle have been increasingly displaced by the religious. Consequentially the 
objectives of particular struggles are also seen to shift.  
By providing a genealogical analysis of jihad, this thesis moves to provide pertinent 
background to the emergence of politico-religious violence from a small number of 
British Sunni Muslims.  Consideration is given to early domestic interpretations of 
jihad from within the radical milieu which emerged during the protests against The 
Satanic Verses, and to the articulations of American Muslim Yusuf al-Alwaki, an 
activist widely respected within British Islamism who went on to die as a member of 
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Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Here theological justifications are 
presented which demonstrate not just the permissibility of jihad, but its necessity as 
a religious duty.  
A core component of this thesis seeks to address the extent to which those British 
Muslims involved in violence and terrorist attacks may be referred to as religious or 
political actors. When this debate has flared in broader society, it has at times been 
intense. Over the past fifteen to twenty years Muslim representative organisations, 
including the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, 1998, 1999  and 2000) and a series of 
protagonists have contested this space, and with it the right to declare expertise  in 
contemporary terrorism. The defensive response to the emergence of jihadist actors 
from within British Islam has served to obscure the religious impulse of this 
phenomenon, a matter in need of redress.   
 
2.1 The Genealogy of Jihadism  
Jihad is not one of the five pillars of Islam. Professing Islam, prayer, fasting, 
charitable giving (or spending for the sake of God) and pilgrimage are (Turner, 2006, 
100-131). Yet to Bin Laden jihad was the peak of Islam (Lawrence, 2005, 49) and 
few of his pronouncements fail to mention the term, usually expressed as “jihad for 
the sake of God”, “jihad for God” or “jihad in the way of God” (Lawrence, 2005, 18, 
73, 85, 97, 101, 166). In Bin Laden’s world view, jihad is all powerful. In 2004 he 
declared: 
Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, the West today is doing its utmost to tarnish jihad and 
kill anyone seeking jihad. The West is supported in this endeavour by hypocrites. This is 
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because they all know that jihad is the effective power to foil all their conspiracies (Lawrence, 
2005, 218). 
 
To Bin Laden jihad has an end product. It is not merely fighting oppression, but has a 
specific intention. On Palestine for example, he states “Jihad must go on until an 
Islamic government is formed that rules according to the law of God” (Lawrence, 
2005, 209), whilst Bin Laden’s 1998 declaration of war announced the World Islamic 
Front’s “jihad against Jews and Crusaders” (Lawrence, 2005, 58).  
Osama Bin Laden did not develop these positions alone, or in comparative isolation. 
Instead he was standing on an intellectual and theological grounding which can be 
traced over decades of modern Islamic thought. In the succession of explanatory 
texts concerning Islam and violence associated with Islam, prominent references to 
works from the same authors – Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), Sayyid Qutb (1906-
1966), Maulana Mawdudi (1903-1979) and Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) occur 
repeatedly, with the first three being particularly associated with concepts of Islamic 
revival in the twentieth century.  
Despite differing backgrounds of the above thinkers faced a core issue: if the Islamic 
path is the correct one, ordained by God, how to explain the lowly status of many 
Muslim majority countries in the twentieth century? And secondly how to move 
towards the type of society they envisioned? These methodological debates continue 
to permeate Islamist literature. Zafar Bangash, Director of the Institute of 
Contemporary Islamic Thought, demonstrates an ongoing sense of frustration: 
While constituting one fourth of the world’s population, occupying 20 percent of the earth’s 
landmass, producing 20 percent of its mineral and forty percent of its energy resources, the 
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Muslim world should be a leading if not the leading power in the world, yet at the global level it 
is quite insignificant, whether assessed on the material or moral scales (Bangash, 2009, 27) 
 
Hasan al-Banna and six friends formed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, 
seeking to promote an Islamic reformation and the re-establishment of Islamic order. 
There are seven key steps to al-Banna’s revivalism – reform oneself, reform one’s 
family, reform society, free society politically, work for the establishment of an Islamic 
state, re-establish the ummah and revive the caliphate, then lead and guide the 
world in the path of Allah (al-Banna, 2002, 46). A somewhat martial theme emerges 
when al-Banna talks of the Muslim Brotherhood as soldiers obeying orders and 
summarises the movement’s principles: “Allah is our goal, the Messenger is our 
example, the Qur’an is our constitution, Jihad is our way and Martyrdom in the path 
of Allah is our aspiration” (al-Banna, 2002, 56).  
Muslim Brotherhood members were required to take an oath on joining the 
organisation, the fourth of the pillars being jihad. An interesting dichotomy emerges 
in the 2002 biography of al-Banna’s life, where he is quoted as stating “Always 
intend to go for jihad and desire martyrdom. Prepare for it as much as you can” (al-
Banna, 2002, 54). Somewhat defensively a footnote states “The meaning of jihad is 
to strive and put things in order and establish justice” (al-Banna, 2002, 79). This may 
be the case, but does this definition fully explain al-Banna’s reference to martyrdom?  
 
If al-Banna was the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder, it is Sayyid Qutb who was to 
serve as its most important ideologue, and a central figure in the twentieth century’s 
Islamist movement (Fatah, 2011, 27).  If by 2002 al-Banna’s biographers were 
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positioning themselves cautiously about what jihad is and what its consequences 
may be, Qutb spoke in much more direct terms. The analysis in his most famous 
work, “Milestones” (1964), commences with a fixed division of the world into two 
distinct halves – Islam or jahiliyyah (roughly ignorance). Not only is the non-Muslim 
world steeped in jahiliyyah, but so is each country which claims to be Islamic. This 
reality necessitates a return to the Qur’an. Firstly to consider man’s relationship with 
the universe, but secondly: “From it we must also derive our concepts of life, our 
principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life” (Qutb, 
2007, 21). There is no flexibility in the role of sharia in governing day to day human 
relations: 
The basis of the message is that one should accept the shariah without any question and 
reject all other laws in any shape or form. This is Islam. There is no other meaning of Islam. 
(Qutb, 2007, 36).  
 
Qutb conceived Milestones as written for the vanguard who would revive Islam and 
he devotes the entirety of chapter four to the subject of Jihad. His conceptualisation 
has five core characteristics: It is without geographical restriction, it is far from being 
a mere defensive concept, it is obligatory, it is centred on freedom and it is not an 
end in itself, but a means to an end. The significance of this for western adherents to 
Qutb’s analysis is self-evident – if the concept of jihad is without geographical 
restriction, it is as relevant to life in Coventry or Colchester, as Cairo. Qutb offers his 
own definition of jihad as striving – namely any form of activity where Muslims strive 
for the cause of God and Islam. There are no restrictions upon the realm of this faith 
“It addresses itself to the whole of mankind, and its sphere of work is the whole 
earth” (Qutb, 2007, 59-60).  
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Nationalism or loyalty to a particular sovereign state is presented as a troubling, 
modern development, alien to an Islamic consciousness. To Qutb, it is not the soil 
which matters, but the belief upon it. Nor is jihad a merely defensive concept. Here it 
is necessary to observe that Qutb was keen to declare jihad has no relationship to 
modern warfare, either in cause or conduct – the Western lexicon of wars of national 
defence, national liberation, insurgency or counter insurgency do not appear in this 
narrative. Instead it is ‘jihad bis saif’- striving through fighting, which clears the way 
for striving through preaching.  
 
That defensive meanings have been attached to jihad is something which appears to 
particularly frustrate Qutb. He blames this characterisation on the wiles of 
orientalists, a position he adopts repeatedly in the course of this chapter (for 
example on pages 62, 69 and 76) before concluding: “They are ignorant of the 
nature of Islam and its function, and that it has the right to take the initiative for 
human freedom” (Qutb, 2007, 76). This freedom seeks to wipe out tyranny and 
rejects every authority on earth except one – God. The need for jihad remains, 
whether defensive conditions exist or not.  
Substantially, Qutb designates jihad as obligatory. Islam must employ it, irrespective 
of conditions of peace or conflict with neighbours, with the aim of an outcome where 
“the obedience of all people be for God alone” (Qutb, 2007, 63). Only then can man 
serve God, free from servitude. This concept of freedom differs radically from 
Western approaches to the term, which has come to characterise freedom as being 
centred on principles such as democracy, constitutional rights, the rule of law, free 
speech, property rights and some degree of economic independence. To Qutb it is in 
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serving God that man is free, and it is the duty of Islam to annihilate systems which 
oppose the freeing of man. Finally, Qutb does not believe in jihad for the sake of 
jihad. His jihad has purpose – it is a means to establishing divine authority. In words 
which were to be subsequently echoed by Yusuf al-Zawahiri (Mansfield, 2006, 225) 
this creates a headquarters for the movement of Islam, a beachhead “which is then 
to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind, as the object of this 
religion is all humanity and its sphere of action is the whole earth” (Qutb, 2007, 72).  
 
If these are the motivations or reasoning behind jihad through fighting, when may it 
be declared? Based on his reading of al-Taubah in the Qur’an (9: 29-32), Qutb 
considered jihad permissible to establish God’s authority on earth, to arrange human 
affairs to the guidance of God, to abolish satanic forces and systems of life and to 
end the lordship of one man over others.   
Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the 
Last day, and forbid not that which Allah has forbidden by His messenger, and follow not the 
Religion of Truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low (Qur’an 9:29). 
The broad nature of these principles suggest a Jihad that is almost endless – the 
lordship of one man over others which Qutb raises could presumably extend to any 
political system with a President or Prime Minister, or indeed to most economic 
systems. Similarly conflict waged against any who do not believe in Allah or the last 
day infers a similar longevity to conflict with secular political traditions.  
Qutb’s jihad also begs a significant question. If it is striving to secure freedom to 
serve God, what happens to those who do not wish to serve God, or alternatively 
wish to serve a different God (or Gods) entirely? Qutb is specific communities cannot 
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be considered Islamic if they are based on other sources. Although he does not use 
the term, he appears to be talking about contemporary liberal democracies when he 
states; “In this society, people are permitted to go to mosques, churches and 
synagogues; yet it does not tolerate people’s demanding that the shariah of God be 
applied in their daily affairs” (Qutb, 2007, 93). 
 
If this implies a degree of conflict is inevitable between Islam and jahiliyyah, Qutb 
goes further in dividing the world into two future camps. Dar-ul-Islam is the home of 
Islam, where the Islamic state is established, and sharia the authority. The rest of the 
world is Dar-ul-Harb – the home of hostility. Only two relationships can exist between 
these entities – war, or peace via contractual agreement (Qutb, 2007, 118). 
Furthermore a Muslim has no country except for where sharia is established, and no 
nationality save for his belief. This creates an ominous situation as far as Dar-ul-
Harb is concerned: 
A Muslim will remain prepared to fight against it, whether it be his birthplace or a place where 
his relatives reside or where his property or any other material interests are located (Qutb, 
2007, 124).  
This is consistent with the life of the Prophet; Muhammad fought against Mecca, 
although he had been born in the city, had relatives and property there: “The soil of 
Mecca did not become Dar-ul-Islam for him and his followers until it surrendered to 
Islam and the shariah became operative in it” (Qutb, 2007, 124).  
The significance of these words, in terms of providing a potential theological basis 
and justification for British Jihadism is both striking and troubling. Qutb’s analysis of 
Islam presents a considerable challenge for any Western democracies housing a 
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significant number of adherents to Qutb’s arguments. Does a state of hostility exist 
between Muslims living in non-Muslim societies and their neighbours, and does this 
endure until those in the Dar-ul-Harb have surrendered to Islam? This appears 
Qutb’s position as he summarises: “Nationalism here is belief, homeland here is Dar-
ul-Islam, the ruler here is God, and the constitution here is the Qur’an” (Qutb, 2007, 
126).   
 
One of those most repeatedly cited by Osama Bin Laden as an authority on jihad, 
Ibn Taymiyyah, was writing in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Modern Sunni 
fundamentalists have revived the teachings of Taymiyyah (Enayat, 2005, 35), 
undoubtedly noting; “Ibn Taymiyyah’s rigorous works on comparative religion were 
not always pleasing to the Shia or the Christians” (Sardar and Malik, 2009, 112). His 
opposition to innovations in Islam has made him an important reference point for a 
new generation of Salafists, with his writings enjoying prevalence in Islamic 
bookshops in England (Ruthven, 2002, 135) and name being used by a prominent 
Jerusalem based organisation for the distribution of jihadist news – the Ibn 
Taymiyyah Media Center. Johannes J.G Jansen explains Taymiyyah’s enduring 
influence: 
Anger drops from the pages of his books, formulated so beautifully, in such general terms, 
that when a modern Muslim reads it, or even when I read it myself, it is impossible not to think 
of present day Muslim society. The effect of his work is electrifying (Religioscope, 2002).  
 
A chapter of Taymiyyah’s “Governance According to Allah’s Law in Reforming the 
Ruler and his Flock” was published in book form by the Maktabah Al-Ansar 
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bookshop in Birmingham as “The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihaad” (2001). 
Their foreword declares Taymiyyah operates from a declared grounding in the 
Qur’an, the sayings of the Prophet and the practices of the first community of 
Muslims (Taymiyyah, 2001, 3). Here the primacy of jihad is declared, and any 
potential debates closed down: 
The command to participate in Jihaad and the mention of its merits occur innumerable times 
in the Quraan and the Sunnah. Therefore it is the best voluntary (religious) act that man can 
perform. All scholars agree that it is better than the hajj (greater pilgrimage) and ‘umrah 
(lesser pilgrimage) (Taymiyyah, 2001, 24-5). 
 
Paradise and freedom from hellfire are also invoked. Jihad is advocated against the 
enemy aggressor, apostates and those who oppose clear cut rulings of Islam, even if 
they are Muslims. The Medina chapters of the Qur’an, when Muhammad and his 
companions were in exile, are seen as particularly glorifying jihad. One of the most 
striking aspects of Taymiyyah’s analysis is that, when considered in 21st century 
terms, jihad is invoked as something to be considered on a win-win basis. It places 
the individual or community between blissful outcomes – victory, or if defeated, 
martyrdom and paradise (Taymiyyah, 2001, 27). From this perspective, conflict is 
positively engendered, a feeling enhanced by the broad scope of this jihad – it is 
obligatory against those who reject sharia, and against unbelievers (Taymiyyah, 
2001, 33). Of further relevance is the belief that if Muslims take the initiative in such 
conflicts, jihad becomes a collective duty. If sufficient number answer the call, this 
obligation lapses – but the benefit accrues to those who have fought.  
Taymiyyah’s brief analysis is reinforced by the production of theological evidence on 
virtually each page – of the 17 pages of actual text, 16 verses from the Qur’an are 
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used to demonstrate his argument,  along with a further seven examples of 
Prophetic sayings or  hadith. Whilst this may demonstrate theological legitimacy, 
criticisms of the character of this publication exist.  
 
Maulana Mawdudi represents not just a significant figure in 20th century Islam, but as 
the founder of Pakistan’s largest clerical party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) a figure whose 
theoretical work continues to have relevance. There are important nuances to be 
considered when examining Mawdudi’s approach to politics. Whilst he was born in 
British colonial India, and began writing in a sub-continent agitating for freedom from 
British rule, Mawdudi played no part in the anti-imperialist movement for 
independence. His biographers observe: 
The idea of nationalism received concentrated attention from Mawdudi when he forcefully 
explained its dangerous potentialities as well as its incompatibility with the teachings of Islam 
(Ahmad and Ansari, 1979, 8).  
Despite this Mawdudi left India for Pakistan upon partition, where “he has 
concentrated his efforts on establishing a truly Islamic state and society in that 
country” (op cit). This involved a very particular rejection of the multi-cultural state 
India was to become. “He sought an interpretation of Islam that would preclude the 
kind of cultural coexistence that the Indian National Congress party promised.” 
(Nasr, 1996, 4). To Mawdudi, an independent India was pointless if it was to result in 
a Muslim minority dominated by or coexisting with, a Hindu majority.  
 
Whilst Marx saw history centring on the struggle between classes, “History is seen 
by Mawdudi to consist essentially of a perpetual struggle between Islam and 
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Jahiliyah” (Ahmad and Ansari, 1979, 19). On this at least, Mawdudi and Qutb were in 
clear agreement. Mawdudi’s historical analysis leads to a gradualist approach where 
Islamic revolution is developed in stages. This is initiated with individual change, 
proceeding to a community of faith, through an ideological movement, to a new 
society and state, then finally a caliphate. The parallels with the manner in which al-
Banna envisaged the Muslim Brotherhood initiating change in Egypt (above), are 
striking. 
 
The decline which needs to be addressed began when the perfect society of the 
Prophet was lost, and religion and politics separated. However, Mawdudi’s 
programme of a truly Islamic society can come via the ballot box: 
Mawdudi has been hopeful that if the Islamic movement keeps on striving patiently, it will 
ultimately succeed in installing righteous men in power. He is also convinced that the 
democratic structure is congenial to the Islamic state. He also thinks that the democratic order 
will provide the framework in which an Islamic movement can flourish, gather strength and 
bring about the total transformation that it aims at (Ahmad and Ansari, 1979, 26).   
 
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr places Mawdudi, and the JeI, firmly within the school of 
Islamic revivalism. The Jamaat: 
Sought to preserve the place of Islam in society and politics, while it trained an Islamic 
vanguard who would oversee the revival of Islam at the national level and would cultivate 
support for its cause (Nasr, 1996, 41).  
Nasr however sees Mawdudi as more conservative on the concept of jihad than 
other revivalists, and uses a quote which now appears prophetic:  
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He argued that it must not denote “a crazed faith....blood-shot eyes, shouting Allah’u Akbar 
(God is great), decapitating an unbeliever wherever they see one, cutting off heads whilst 
invoking La ilaha illa-llah (there is no god but God) (Nasr, 1996, 74).  
Nasr adds forlornly these are “the very terms in which jihad and its revivalist 
advocates are seen today” (Nasr, op cit). When we consider the alleged participation 
of British jihadists in the beheading of hostages by the Islamic State, Mawdudi’s 
words maintain continued resonance.  
 
2.2  The Displacement of Nationalist Struggles By Jihadism 
The following section sets out, with reference to the Palestinian and Kashmiri 
struggles, how concepts of jihad and a religiously based approach may displace 
what had previously been widely regarded as political struggles viewed in broadly 
nationalist terms. The approach articulated by Mawdudi, of rejecting nationalism as 
an ideology and instead seeking to develop a truly Islamic society, is seen to have 
broader resonance.   
Having been unsuccessfully invoked in 1948 against the nascent state of Israel, the 
concept of jihad appears to have been conspicuous by its absence for subsequent 
decades of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and indeed the confrontations between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours. Until comparatively recently the Palestinian struggle 
was characterised by the dominance of nationalist or even leftist currents in the 
shape of organisations such as the PLO, and constituent groups including 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for 
The Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Emerging Islamist organisations such as Hamas 
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were seen as rivals, especially for control of the Palestinian authority (Mannes, 2004, 
237).  
From 1968-80 the PLO focused on a process of internationalising terrorism, 
operating across borders (Hoffman, 2003, 64) characterised by an ideological 
commitment to anti-Zionism. This was not centred on concepts of the ummah – in 
the case of the PFLP training, support and assistance was given to and by secular 
left wing groups from Europe and Japan (Mannes, 2004, 315). Mark Barnsley, a 
Yorkshire anarchist who joined Fatah forces in Lebanon aged just 17 during the 
Lebanese civil war, recalls a society where religion appeared nominal, and 
observance rare amongst Palestinian combatants (Barnsley, Interview, 2012). 
My recollection is religion played no part in it, the two years I was in Lebanon…. I never saw a 
burka, I didn’t see anyone kneel to pray, the Palestinians were always keen to stress their 
struggle was not of a religious nature (Barnsley, Interview 2012).   
 
This dominance of the struggle against Israel by secular actors engendered 
resentment. The theological distance for nationalism expressed by Mawdudi and 
Qutb is demonstrated in the actions of Abdullah Azzam, who abandoned the 
Palestinian struggle to teach in Saudi Arabia, so distant did he feel the cause had 
become from his faith (Azzam, 2003, 13). Whilst in a minority though, religious actors 
were never entirely absent. In 1969 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia called for a jihad to 
liberate Jerusalem (Abed, 1995, 109). Saudi Arabia was to be the host in 1981 when 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) adopted jihad to ‘rescue’ 
Jerusalem and the occupied territories. Significantly Faisal appears to have been the 
one Saudi leader to meet the exacting standards of Bin Laden, who observed in the 
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later stages of his rule “there was a clear engagement with Muslim issues, in 
particular Jerusalem and Palestine” (Lawrence, 2004, 36).  
 
These interventions brought little immediate change. Whilst demonstrating Islamic 
leaders and nations were using religiously based language to formulate avowed 
goals, the extent to which serious attempts were made to put this rhetoric into 
practice is less clear. Rather than enacting any mandate to conduct concerted 
military action against Israel in support of the Palestinian cause, the 1980s instead 
saw several Sunni Muslim states work with Israel’s primary ally, the United States, to 
focus on jihad against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan.  
The two dates above – 1969 and 1981 – are interesting markers when we take into 
consideration the Islamic revival and its influence both on the language of political 
struggle, and the nature of that struggle itself. It is firstly important to be clear what 
this revival means.  
Revival here is not understood to mean modernisation along Western lines. The revival of the 
ummah is seen as a means toward the establishment of a new society where shariah (Islamic 
law) is applied. Renewal then becomes a prerequisite for the islamization of all aspects of life 
(Abukhalil, 1995, 433).  
We also see between these markers two of the most significant international events 
in the latter half of the twentieth century - Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the 
emergence of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Such international events reinforced 
the potential viability of jihad as a method of achieving goals, especially when the 
Mujahideen were seen as having played a role in a victorious struggle, and the 
defeat of a Superpower.  
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In this period significant change was occurring in the Palestinian territories. The 
formation of the Islamic Resistance Movement (usually referred to in English by its 
abbreviation Hamas) by Muslim Brotherhood members and the first Intifada of 1987 
illustrated a component shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the Hamas 
Covenant states; “There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad” 
(Laqueur, 2007, 436). Hamas sought to contest space previously occupied by 
secular actors: 
The Islamists in the Occupied Territories have enhanced their position by capitalising on the 
weaknesses of the PLO. At the same time, they are working at the grassroots level to help 
people under the increasing economic difficulties resulting from prolonged occupation and 
lack of sufficient assistance from outside sources (Abed, 1995, 110).  
 
Many were slow to understand the nature of the revolution Hamas was beginning. 
For example, although the movement issued its first communiqué in December 
1987, the organisation was not banned by Israel until September 1989 (Mannes, 
2004, 114). Efraim Karsh, an academic and former intelligence officer in the Israeli 
Defence Forces, admits Israel long ignored the rise of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement “in the hope that it would act as a counterweight to the far more powerful 
PLO, equally committed to the Jewish state’s demise. This proved a critical mistake” 
(Karsh, 2007, 218).  
Palestinian writer Ramzy Baroud establishes the development of Hamas, over a 
period since the 1960s, has been incremental and structured, and rooted in its 
religious base: 
The years between 1967 to 1975 were designated by the Islamic movement as the phase of 
“mosque building”. The mosque was the central institution that galvanised Islamic societies in 
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Gaza. It was not simply a place of worship but also a hub for education, social and cultural 
interaction, and later political organisation. In the period between 1967 to 1987, the number of 
mosques in Gaza tripled, rising from 200 to 600 mosques (Baroud, 2009).  
In this same period a crucial figure in the organisation, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, began 
to develop the foundations for a campaign which would utilise violence (Mannes, 
2004, 114) developing a security section which monitored both profane behaviour 
and those suspected of collaboration, and stockpiling weapons. When the first 
Intifada begin in 1987, thanks  
To Sheikh Yassin’s years of preparation, Hamas quickly took a leading role in organizing 
demonstrations and strikes. Within a few months, Hamas began targeting Israeli soldiers and 
civilians (Mannes, 2014, 114).  
As we shall see in chapter six when considering the work of Karima Bennoune, 
Melanie Cooper and Meredith Tax, Sheikh Yassin’s concern to ensure both piety and 
combat is a common combination in communities dominated by jihadist actors. It is 
regrettably one that has received less considerably less consideration by academics 
within critical terrorism studies.  
 
A second example of the displacement of nationalist actors comes from Kashmir. 
India and Pakistan have fought four wars - 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999 (James and 
Ozdamar, 2005, 456) with Kashmir at the centre of three of those conflicts.  
Historically activist involvement in the Kashmiri struggle – either in support of an 
independent Kashmir or a state that was solely located within the territory of 
Pakistan – had been a small but not insignificant political presence in several British 
towns and cities. In 1984 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) members 
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kidnapped a diplomat at the Indian High Commission in Birmingham, and 
subsequently murdered him (Curtis, 2010, 156). By the time the JKLF carried out 
attacks in Indian controlled Kashmir, the forces of power were however changing in 
this region. Just as secular nationalist groups were being eclipsed by Islamist actors 
in the Palestinian struggle, so an identical process unfurled in Kashmir. By 1990 
Pakistan’s primary religious party, Mawdudi’s JeI, had an armed wing, the Hizb-ul-
Muhajideen (Burke, 2007, 98). Pakistani intelligence stopped aiding the left-leaning 
JKLF, and a process began of the sustained funding, training and development of 
Jihadist groups, beginning with the Hizb-ul-Muhajideen:  
They tried to give an Islamic orientation to a secular separatist movement, with disastrous 
consequences. While the increasing involvement of Pakistani groups kept the armed struggle 
alive, it also widened the division within the movement. Many Kashmiri groups resented the 
ISI’s attempts, first to ‘Pakistanize’ and then to ‘Islamize’ the movement (Hussain, 2007, 25). 
 
By the time of the 1999 conflict in Kashmir, LeT, one of the largest of the Jihadist 
organisations in Azad Kashmir, was boasting of some 2000 training camps across 
the Islamic Republic, with The Times reporting “British Muslims join war in Kashmir” 
(Hussain, 1999).  
The participation of Western Muslims was given clear theological support by 
representative organisations. Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, the deputy chairman of the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research, issued a ruling that in the event of war 
between India and Pakistan, it was the religious duty of all Muslims to support 
Pakistan (Roy, 2002). In Britain opposition to the Terrorism Act 2000 from the largest 
Muslim representative organisation centred on the government’s perceived 
criminalising of jihad in Kashmir (MCB, 2001). Subsequent chapters will consider 
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how the Kashmiri training camps in particular re-bounded on Britain, as well as 
considering the broader participation of Britons in jihad in the Indian sub-continent.  
 
2.4 Indigenous Articulations of Jihad 
Having considered articulations of jihad, noted its rise and association with Islamic 
revival, what of Western and more particularly British conceptualisations? How have 
British Muslim writers and intellectuals addressed the subject? The following pages 
consider the approaches of early British Islamist Dr Kalim Siddiqui, perspectives 
from within the Muslim Council of Britain and finally the position of an American who 
worked to establish a significant following within domestic Islamism, Anwar al-Awlaki.  
In the “Muslim Manifesto: A Blueprint for Survival”, the late Dr Kalim Siddiqui stated: 
Jihad is a basic requirement of Islam and living in Britain or having British nationality by birth 
or naturalisation does not absolve the Muslim from his or her duty to participate in jihad: this 
participation can be active service in armed struggle abroad and/or the provision of material 
and moral support to those engaged in such struggle anywhere in the world (Siddiqui, 1990, 
10). 
Written well over twenty years ago, this appears to point in the direction of a physical 
jihad enacted overseas, although quite possibly promoted from a domestic base. 
And yet Siddiqui’s discussion of Jihad was a comparatively minor part, not just of his 
manifesto, but of his broader written output.  The Muslim Manifesto is at heart a 
defensive document, a point best illustrated by its subtitle: a ‘strategy for survival.’ 
Significantly though, Siddiqui seeks to locate British Muslims firmly in the global 
ummah. This requires a rejection of what is seen as imposed options of integration 
and assimilation – in their place comes the categorising of British Muslims into a 
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much broader identity “Every Muslim must pursue his or her personal goals within 
the framework of the Muslim community in Britain, of the ummah, and of the global 
Islamic movement” (Siddiqui, op cit). More traditional markers of identity in Britain – 
those rooted in class, colour, regional or national identities, go unmentioned.  
Siddiqui appears to have viewed British Muslims as greatly imperilled, and states of 
the authorities “Essentially their attitude towards Islam has not changed since the 
Crusades; their strategy remains the same, only their tactics have changed” 
(Siddiqui, 1990, 11). This does not equate to a purely physical threat, nor can British 
Muslims be protected by the law of the land:  
The only survival kit that will work is the one that is entirely community based............. the 
shield of Islam is our only protection under all circumstances. Survival within Islam is the only 
form of survival that has any meaning (Siddiqui, 1990, 13).  
 
In his main theoretical work “Stages of Islamic Revolution” (1999) Siddiqui offers a 
definition of jihad which is rooted in, and attached to, the threats faced by this 
imperilled community, jihad being “total or any part of the struggle to defend or 
promote Islam or the Muslim community” (Siddiqui, 1999, 132). Yet Siddiqui’s 
response to the existential threat faced by British Muslims was not to prioritise jihad, 
although he certainly did not rule it out. Instead he concentrated his political efforts, 
and that of the Muslim Institute he established, in forming a Muslim Parliament for 
Britain (ironically comparable to the Board of Deputies of British Jews) and into 
enthusiastically supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran and its model of a theocratic 
state (Kepel, 2011, 132-3). 
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Siddiqui was not shy of conflict. Some of the rhetoric in the Muslim Manifesto, with 
references to “no-go areas where the exercise of ‘freedom of speech’ against Islam 
will not be tolerated” (Siddiqui, 1990, 19) is incautious, perhaps deliberately so. As 
well as playing a significant role in the propagation of the Iranian fatwa against 
Salman Rushdie (Malik, 2009, 7-8) and the street protests which followed, Siddiqui is 
alleged to have been a fractious figure at a personal level with fellow activists. 
Ziauddin Sardar, who formed the Muslim Institute for Research and Planning with 
Siddiqui before arguing over the nature of the Iranian revolution, alleges that during 
the course of a conversation at the latter’s home in Slough, Siddiqui threatened to 
have his legs broken (Sardar, 2004, 169).  
Re-examining Dr Siddiqui’s work some twenty years later, only parts proved 
prescient to the struggles that were to emerge. The Muslim Parliament was broadly 
irrelevant, superseded by a series of Muslim representative organisations to seek 
public influence after the Rushdie affair, and particularly after New Labour came to 
power in 1997. Nor has his work for the Iranian cause proved particularly significant 
– Britain’s mostly Sunni Muslim population has not looked to Shia Iran for leadership. 
It is the type of Islamic community structures envisaged, where assimilation and 
integration is avoided (except as members of a fixed community) which have proven 
more resilient (Bowen, 2014, 26).  
Siddiqui does appear to have been prescient in stipulating the importance of the 
ummah and jihad. In the last three decades the attachment young British Muslims 
have formed for the ummah, and the desire to respond to declarations of suffering 
from within that ummah, has led to their participation in a series of armed conflicts. 
As chapter five demonstrates Britons have been found  fighting, killing and dying in 
this cause in locations as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, India, Iraq, Israel, 
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Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. The distinctive route Siddiqui signposted for 
British Islam, with its defensiveness, certainty and a vision where jihad is obligatory 
ensures that in any evaluation of British Islamism, and indeed British Jihadism, 
attention must be paid to his ideas.  
 
If Siddiqui’s Muslim Parliament failed to capture sufficient loyalty from British 
Muslims, other organisations emerged who have developed a long term profile. 
Since 1997 the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) has been the country’s largest 
Muslim representative body. As such, they have played a prominent role in public 
debates concerning jihadism. Mohammed Abdul Haleem’s “War and Peace” an 
article written for the MCB book responding to 9/11, “The Quest for Sanity” (2002) 
examines the conditions within Islam where war may be waged. He stresses this is 
regulated by the Qur’an and hadith, and that all wars fought by the Prophet 
Muhammad were either in self-defence or to prevent an imminent attack. Haleem 
argues religious intention is also an essential prerequisite “When fighting takes 
place, it should be fi sabil illah – in the way of God – as is often repeated in the 
Qur’an” (Haleem, 2002, 209).  
This hardly destroys the foundations being built by the likes of Al-Qaeda. If anything 
it reinforces them – anyone reading Haleem’s analysis conversant with the writings 
of Osama Bin Laden will have been aware of the regularity with which Bin Laden 
combined the word jihad with either “jihad for the sake of God”, “jihad for God” or 
“jihad in the way of God” (Lawrence 2005, 18, 73, 85, 97, 101, 166) 
Having correctly stated jihad does not mean holy war (a point few Muslims needed to 
be told) Haleem reminds readers jihad may be conducted via argumentation, 
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financial support or by fighting, and that the Prophet considered the struggle with 
one’s self to be the greater jihad, whilst the battlefield formed the lesser jihad. On the 
important subject of explaining when jihad is justified, Haleem is surprisingly brief – 
the reader is merely informed it must be just and for righteous intention (Haleem, 
2002, 209). Jihad then becomes an obligation to guard religious freedom, for self-
defence or to defend the oppressed. Haleem next moves on to correcting what he 
suggests are misconceptions about the so-called ‘war’ and ‘sword verses’ in the 
Qur’an. He defends both, arguing the defensive background to 2:191 has been 
obscured, whilst the attacks on polytheists referred to in 9:5 needs to be seen in 
context of the attacks upon the early Muslims. The latter is frequently quoted by 
those who argue justifications for offensive violence may be readily found within 
Islam. Haleem reiterates however, that for all the speculation about these verses, the 
word ‘sword’ does not actually appear in the Qur’an.  
As skilfully constructed as this article is, its limitations must also be considered. The 
author makes little or no attempt to address his survey to contemporary events – his 
analysis remains firmly rooted in the seventh century. The question of whether jihad 
in a series of ongoing conflicts may be justified is not addressed directly, but left for 
the reader to interpret.  
 
A much more contemporary approach is taken by an American of Yemeni descent, 
Anwar al-Awlaki (1971–2011). A frequent visitor to the UK, speaking at the annual 
dinner of FOSIS (Keeble and Hillingdon, 2010, 127) and major events organised by 
ISOCs and the Muslim Association of Britain where he was considered an ‘icon of 
Salafism’ (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2011, 28), al-Awlaki subsequently became a 
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prominent figure in AQAP before being assassinated in Yemen in an American drone 
strike. His “44 Ways to Jihad” (2009) combines accessible, colloquial English with a 
staunch belief in the obligatory nature of jihad against the global system of disbelief.  
Importantly for Muslims living in comparatively prosperous countries like the UK, al-
Awlaki stresses the importance of using that wealth for the faith: 
Probably the most important contributions the Muslims of the West could do for Jihad is 
making jihad with their wealth since in many cases the mujahideen are in need of money 
more than they are in need of men (al-Awlaki, 2009, 4). 
 
To al-Awlaki Islam is a martial faith. He cites the impressive total of 19 battles 
Muhammad fought in ten years and states “Jihad is the greatest deed after believing 
in Allah and is the most needed” (al-Awlaki, 2009, 16). Once again, an elevation of 
jihad over and above all of the five pillars of Islam save for faith itself, previously 
detected in the writings of Taymiyyah and Bin Laden, is present. To maintain this, 
and clearly addressing himself to youth in the West, a jihadi culture needs to evolve, 
with nasheeds (religiously inspired songs) in English, focusing on concepts of justice 
and strength, not peace and weakness.  
Before his killing, al-Awlaki appears to have believed significant progress was being 
made by the jihadist cause. Declaring “Western Jihad is here to Stay” and mocking 
the British and American governments: 
The Jihad movement has not only survived but is expanding. Isn’t it ironic that the two capitals 
of the war against Islam, Washington D.C. and London have also become among the centres 
of Western Jihad? Jihad is becoming as American as apple pie and as British as afternoon 
tea (al-Awlaki 2009, 1).    
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2.5 Jihad? Not In Our Backyard? 
A very different battle has also waged over the term Jihadism. This involves those 
from the Islamic tradition, not only uncomfortable at the way the term is deployed at 
times in Western societies, but who have sought to limit its application or its 
utilisation by Al-Qaeda and its supporters. Foremost in this, has been Egyptian born 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the world’s most prominent Sunni theologians. A Muslim 
Brotherhood member who has long lived in Qatar (Roy, 2004, 149-50) the very title 
of his work “Islamic Awakening: Between Rejection and Extremism” (2006) 
demonstrates the nature of some of the intra-Islamic debates being conducted, both 
in Muslim majority nations and in Muslim communities worldwide in an era of 
religious revival.  
Al-Qaradawi defines jihad as “struggling against oppression and injustice in self-
defence” (al-Qaradawi, 2006, 89) and also as “struggling against oppression and 
corruption” (al-Qaradawi, 2006, 91). He describes Islam as preferring jihad to 
personal worship and insists it is an individual obligation if a Muslim land suffers 
foreign aggression. This would appear to give a clear justification for jihad in 
circumstances such as the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003, or the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan. It does not readily justify attacks by Muslims living outside Muslim lands 
– in for example, Europe, or the United States. Al-Qaradawi condemned 9/11 (Roy, 
2004, 179).  
The combination of al-Qaradawi’s standing as a theologian, and his rejection of 
violence aimed at Western cities, was one which earned recognition from British 
politicians. Having visited the UK thirteen times from 1979-1997 (Livingstone, 2011, 
503) in 2005 he was formally invited by Ken Livingstone as part of the Mayor of 
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London’s programme to further engage with the capital’s Muslim communities. 
Indeed Livingstone refers to al-Qaradawi in his memoirs as Sunni Islam’s most 
important theologian (Livingstone, 2011, 502). In 2005 the cleric’s visit to Britain saw 
considerable debate, with a Foreign Office memo recommending to the Home Office 
he be allowed to enter the UK, being leaked and placed online. In that note, Islamic 
Affairs advisor Mockbul Ali stated 
I recommend that, on balance, the Foreign Secretary agree for the FCO to advise that Al 
Qaradawi should not be excluded from the United Kingdom given his influence in relation to 
our foreign policy objectives (Ali, 2005).  
Part of al-Qaradawi’s appeal to British elites appears to have been the 
contemporaneous contrast between his approach and those committed to jihad in 
the West, with the security services seeing him in functional terms “Special Branch 
believed his visit was important in preventing al-Qaeda from recruiting young British 
Muslims” (Livingstone, 2011, 504). So much so that when al-Qaradawi visited the 
Muslim Brotherhood influenced Finsbury Park mosque in 2004;  “the Commander of 
MPSB was on hand to offer support to them and their guest” (Lambert, 2011, 265).  
 
Al-Qaradawi’s prognosis operates from the starting point any definition of what is 
considered ‘extreme’ must be based on the laws of Islam. The extent to which a 
society is religious will affect the extent to which negligence or deviation is permitted. 
Al-Qaradawi is a gradualist, a position he adopts due to his interpretation of the 
revelation of Islam. The Qur’anic texts revealed in Mecca differ to those revealed 
following the Prophet’s flight to Medina – once monotheism was established, 
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prohibitions against particular acts followed. This leads al-Qaradawi to conclude 
gradation is important in achieving goals 
those who call for a return to the Islamic way of life and the establishment of the Islamic state 
need to recognise the necessity of gradation for the realisation of their goals, taking into 
account the sublimity of their goals, their own means and potentials, and the multiplicity of 
impediments (Al-Qaradawi, 2006, 70).   
 
This incrementalism must be particularly challenging for some young Muslims. Now 
in his 80s, al-Qaradawi notes a significant generational difference, with the youth 
more passionate in their faith than elders. Indeed when potentially revolutionary 
change was to emerge in some Arab countries during the Arab Spring, al-Qaradawi 
was to abandon gradualism. A fierce supporter of the uprising in Syria, he has 
articulated the struggle against President Assad in sectarian terms. At a 31 July 
2013 rally in Doha, al-Qaradawi declared the Shia group Hezbollah to be the ‘party 
of Satan’ and insisted every able bodied Muslim trained to fight must join the Syrian 
rebels (Ahram Online, 2013). When leading Sunni clerics met in Cairo to formulate a 
position on the civil war, al-Qaradawi supported the following agreed statement: 
Jihad is necessary for the victory of our brothers in Syria - jihad with mind, money, weapons; 
all forms of jihad. What is happening to our brothers on Syrian soil, in terms of violence 
stemming from the Iranian regime, Hezbollah and its sectarian allies, counts as a declaration 
of war on Islam and the Muslim community in general (Middle East Online, 2013) 
 
For those in Britain who had embraced al-Qaradawi and sought to utilise his 
theological legitimacy against Al-Qaeda - at the Foreign Office, the Metropolitan 
Police Muslim Contact Unit or the office of former Mayor Ken Livingstone, these are 
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distinctly awkward words. Young Muslims in this country, already exposed to 
distressing images of suffering from Syria, could now read clear articulations to 
action. They were also presented with the stark image of Islam being under attack by 
its sectarian opponents – namely Shia Iran and its allies. Chapter five establishes the 
extent to which the call to arms in Syria has stimulated British jihadists, a process 
which has arguably made whatever temporary advantages gained by the British 
state’s ‘alliance’ with Yusuf al-Qaradawi, redundant.  
 
Following 9/11 al-Qaradawi tackled Al-Qaeda directly, and similar condemnation was 
issued by the Muslim Council of Britain. However, a closer examination of their 
stance shows a more tentative position. Whilst the MCB’s Mohammed Abdul Haleem 
provided a historically rooted consideration of the legitimacy of jihad, how did the 
MCB respond to the considerable challenge posed by the development of support for 
jihadism as a concept amongst young British Muslims?  
In 2002 the MCB published “The Quest for Sanity: Reflections on September 11 and 
the Aftermath”. The introduction, by Abdul Wahid Hamid states “The purpose of this 
book is to reflect on that day of horror and anguish” (Muslim Council of Britain, 2002, 
xv). In practice however, the monograph is primarily about the period following the 
attacks, racism experienced by British Muslims, the history of Islam in Britain and an 
assertion of the MCB’s interpretation of Islamic values. Only one of eight chapters is 
devoted to September 11th itself, and that (pp. 3-25) is actually shorter than the 
chapter on Muslims and the media (pp. 43-73).  
Al-Qaeda, its leaders or the concept of Jihad are unmentioned in the chapter on 
9/11, and the foreword by MCB Secretary General Iqbal Sacranie suggests an 
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organisation stuttering in its approach “Terrorism has no religion. Its aim is to spread 
enmity and destruction throughout civilised societies” (MCB, 2002, xiii). Those are 
not the declared aims of Al-Qaeda, nor are they the aims of any terrorist group. 
Sacranie is at best conflating possible consequences with actual intentions. At worst, 
he is deliberating avoiding debate on the objectives established by Osama Bin 
Laden prior to 9/11 – to expel enemies from the holy places of Islam (Lawrence 
2005, 30) and to fight jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (Lawrence, 2005, 69).   
 
Nor is there a substantial discussion of extant conflicts. What is telling about the 
MCB’s post 9/11 analysis is the lack of any indication of an organisation debating the 
rights and wrongs of contemporaneous jihad in Kashmir, Yemen, Afghanistan or the 
Palestinian territories, or those seeking to establish sharia at home or abroad. Yet by 
2002 British Muslim involvement in such struggles – and theological justifications of 
that involvement – was at least a decade old. The deaths of British jihadists in 
Bosnia or arrests of British Muslims abroad for terrorist offences (catalogued in 
chapter five) are absent from the MCB’s worldview. Nor is this the only flaw. Whilst 
Inayat Bunglawala (2002) correctly sketches some of the assaults and property 
damage British Muslims suffered following 9/11, the one death in this period, a racist 
attack on a white teenager in Cambridgeshire, is absent.4  
Al-Qaeda as an organisation is barely considered. The journalist Melanie Phillips, a 
prominent and controversial critic of Islam, is mentioned more times in the book, 
four, than Osama Bin Laden – three.5 It is as if a conscious decision has been taken 
                                                          
4 Ross Parker, a pub employee from Peterborough, was stabbed to death on September 21 2001 as he walked 
home from work. Three British Muslims were later jailed for life for his murder (Peterborough Telegraph, 
2002).  
5 The references to Melanie Phillips are on p.47, 71, 72 and 117. Those to Bin Laden are on p.101, 102 and 102 
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not to present any trace of controversy, or any indication of problematic elements 
within contemporary Islamism. If so, continuing outrages committed by Al-Qaeda and 
like-minded groups, and the 2005 London suicide bombings, were in time to force 
the MCB’s hand.  
 
In both 1996 and 2000 young Muslims from Birmingham had died carrying out 
suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Kashmir respectively. In 2003 two Britons died 
attempting to blow up a bar in Tel Aviv, Israel (see chapter five). Organisations such 
as Al-Muhajiroun, calling for sharia law and/or the establishment of an Islamic 
republic in Britain, were a tiny but recognisable presence in Muslim communities in 
some towns and cities. Yet it does not appear to have been considered by the MCB 
that such trends could result in deadly violence on these shores. Following the 
deaths of 52 civilians in co-ordinated suicide bombings on the London transport 
system, Sir Iqbal Sacranie responded to revelations the 7/7 bombers were British:  
We have received today’s terrible news from the police with anguish, shock and horror. It 
appears our youth have been involved in last week’s horrific bombings against innocent 
people (MCB, 2005).  
 
How could the MCB, who were surely better placed than most to identify and 
address jihadist actors in local Muslim communities, see so little? An umbrella body 
representing more than 250 domestic Muslim organisations, the Muslim Council of 
Britain was formed in November 1997. The MCB’s declared aims were to 
1. Promote consensus and cooperation within the community. 
2. Giving voice to issues of common concern 
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3. Obtaining removal of disadvantages and discrimination faced by Muslims 
4. Fostering a better appreciation of Islam and Muslim culture 
5. Working for the good of society as a whole (MCB, 2007). 
 
From its early days the MCB was responding to, and lobbying politicians and state 
actors about, any association between terrorism and religion. In August 1998 new 
domestic counter terrorism laws were proposed following the American embassy 
bombings in Africa, and the resultant cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Al-
Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. Six months earlier Bin Laden had issued his 
call for ‘Global Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders’. On 25 August 1998 the MCB 
responded to all these developments in a press release, noting with  
alarm the latest outbreak of Islamophobia and the tendency by many respectable media to 
connect each and every incident of violence with ‘Islamic terrorism’ because someone made 
a telephone call or faxed a message on behalf of a never-heard-of-before-or-after 
‘International Jihad organisation’. Even a cub reporter knows that Jihad cannot be declared by 
fax or telephone (MCB, 1998). 
 
When commentating on terrorism in this critical period, the organisation appears to 
vacillate, combining defensiveness with a purely reactive approach to events. 
Whether the British and American governments were taking Al-Qaeda and its call for 
global jihad seriously, the MCB, on this evidence, was not.  The press release ended 
with an indication the organisation acknowledged threats, but was unsure as to their 
origin: “the MCB also expects the British Muslim community to act with wisdom and 
restraint and not to fall prey to any agent provocateur, within or without its ranks” 
(MCB, 1998).  
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The area in which the MCB appears to have acted most decisively is in rejecting any 
association between faith and violence, and in calling for recognition that those 
adopting violence in particular conflicts were correct to do so. On 24 January 2000 
the MCB and Metropolitan Police issued a joint statement following a meeting 
between the MCB’s Secretary General and Assistant Commissioner David Veness. 
The MCB expressed their opposition to the use of the word ‘Islamic’ when terrorist 
issues were being discussed. Such connections were certainly being made. The 
proscription of 21 organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000 made support, funding 
or membership of organisations fighting jihad in Kashmir and Palestine such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Palestinian Islamic Jihad illegal. Although Jihadist actors were 
not alone on the list (Sikh, Kurdish and a Greek Socialist organisation also featured) 
the MCB regarded it as ill-conceived. Yousaf Bhailok, MCB General Secretary 
insisted:  
The Home Secretary has failed to distinguish between legitimate resistance movements who 
fight against the illegal occupation of their own land and organisations like the IRA which have 
targeted mainland Britain (MCB, 2001).  
 
The MCB was thus drawing a clear distinction between those individuals and 
organisations involved in violence overseas, who it clearly characterised as carrying 
legitimacy, and any group targeting mainland Britain. As the latter parts of this thesis 
demonstrate, such a distinction was to become increasingly blurred, most noticeably 
in the cases of Dhiren Barot, who fought in Kashmir and was later convicted of 
domestic terrorist offences and secondly the 2005 London transport bombings. Two 
of the four bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, having 
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trained in camps of the ‘legitimate resistance movements’ in Kashmir (see Chapter 
five).  
 
2.6  Conclusions 
This chapter establishes the theoretical and perhaps more accurately theological 
background to the jihadist actors to be discussed throughout the next three sections. 
Firstly the primacy of Islam is recognised by all the thinkers considered herein – al-
Awlaki, Azzam, al-Banna, Bin Laden, Mawdudi, al-Qaradawi, Qutb, Siddiqui and 
Taymiyyah. All seem to similarly share a world view which divides the globe into two 
rival camps, and this is notably characterised by Mawdudi and Qutb as positioning 
Islam on one side and disbelief on the other. For Qutb Dar-ul-Islam, the home of 
Islam, is where sharia has been established. The rest of the world is Dar-ul-Harb – 
the home of hostility. Thus a strict religious – as opposed to geographical or political 
- division is accentuated.  
What differs in the positions of these men is the method to be adopted to achieve 
their end goal. Whilst Mawdudi from Jamaat-e-Islami and al-Qaradawi from the 
Muslim Brotherhood declare the importance of gradualist approaches, for others the 
time to act is here – most noticeably Azzam, Bin Laden and al-Awlaki. This may not 
permanently isolate such approaches. There is evidence that the gradualist position 
is far from fixed – Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s support for the Syrian jihad, and the broader 
need to take up arms against the Shia being the most notable example.  
For both Qutb, and the British Islamist intellectual Kalim Siddiqui, jihad is obligatory. 
Qutb articulates a world view where Islam and indeed jihad has no geographical 
restriction. Significantly for British readers he uses life of Muhammad to explain that 
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loyalty to place comes second – Muhammad fighting his birthplace of Mecca until 
sharia had been established there. Siddiqui makes clear that being British, whether 
by birth or naturalisation does not remove the obligation to fight jihad, although he 
seems to have envisaged this as an overseas, rather than domestic obligation.  
In terms of those seeking to effect change in Muslim majority societies, a significant 
shift occurred in the final decades of the twentieth century. The Islamic revival, and 
the influence of many of the theoreticians of Islamism listed above, began to impact. 
The particular example of the Palestinian struggle, and the emergence of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement at the expense of more secular and more nationalist minded 
groups, has been give above. In the next chapter a similar process of displacement 
may be seen in both Libya and Kashmir.  
On one level the debates concerning how sharia is to be achieved appear to have 
had minimal effect on the largest Muslim representative body in the United Kingdom, 
the MCB. Its response to the emergence of organisations seeking to bring about 
religious change through violence has been demonstrated in this chapter to be 
defensive and characterised by distinct limitations. At its infancy, the global jihadist 
campaign launched by Al-Qaeda, and consequent British support for it, was thus 
obscured. An important opportunity to gain understanding of jihadism as a concept 
was missed, and those best placed to address the issue of who British Jihadists are 
were instead to be found lobbying to ensure that religious terminology was not used 
to describe acts of violence.  
Having established what jihadists seek, the theological basis from which they 
operate and that their intentions are without geographical limitation, it is time to turn 
towards British Jihadism. The next section, chapter three, demonstrates the 
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considerable appeal the United Kingdom has offered to jihadist actors from across 
the world, who found Britain a convivial base from which to pursue their goals. It 
considers why individuals and organisations committed to achieving sharia in their 
home nations came to this country, and establishes that British Jihadism has 
received broad input from across the Muslim majority world. Here, practice 
envisaged by many of the thinkers considered above could be enacted – such as al-
Awlaki’s desire for jihad through wealth – could be readily enacted, provided the law 
was not directly broken.   
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Chapter 3 – Settlement: The Migration of Foreign Jihadists to the United 
Kingdom 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Earlier chapters have established the re-emergence of Jihadism in the twentieth 
century, either via the articulations of activists such as al-Banna or Azzam, or the 
rediscovery of an important historical figure in Ibn Taymiyyah. Of the protagonists in 
this intellectual conflict, Qutb was at the forefront of those cited as offering 
theological articulation of the view Jihad as a concept is without geographical 
restriction. The boldness of this position coincides with an era of Islamic revivalism 
which saw struggles such as that in Palestine adopt an increasingly politico-religious 
hue.   
The developments within both Islamism nationally and internationally, discussed in 
the introduction, literature review and chapter two of this thesis provides the distinct 
backdrop to some important shifts in the composition of the United Kingdom, and in 
particular its major English cities, from the 1990s onwards. This was to be a period of 
significant migration from Muslim majority nations to Britain, and one where the 
influence of Salafists from North Africa became discernible (Bowen, 2014, 5). 
Although still a small minority nationally in percentage terms, in parts of the country 
the Muslim population’s numerical increase was significant – most notably the 
number in London increased by 405,440 between 2001 and 2011 and in Birmingham 
by 94,394 (MCB, 2015, 26).  
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In order to consider British Jihadism as a whole, the ‘detail’ of this thesis’ title, this 
chapter seeks to examine what is sometimes characterised as a distinct component 
of this issue - the settlement of a series of Islamist and Jihadist émigrés in the United 
Kingdom, often after playing a significant role in armed struggles in their home 
nations (Black, 2005). The particular purpose of this section is to address two 
research questions. Why so many Jihadist actors coalesced in the United Kingdom, 
and also just who are the British Jihadists? It is firstly established a significant 
number of jihadists have indeed settled here in the UK – some 79 individuals are 
named herein. This allows us to go some way to characterise British Jihadism, and 
one of its foundational elements, namely the genuinely international nature of its 
composition, world view and practice. This chapter demonstrates British Jihadism 
has been distinguished by organisational diversity, and genuine breadth in terms of 
the national origins of those jihadis who have settled here. Furthermore, for all the 
focus on Al-Qaeda in the mainstream media, it is merely one of a number of jihadist 
groups to organise in this country.  
This chapter uses the concept of open source intelligence to collate a series of 
twelve tables to establish the scale of migration into the United Kingdom by jihadist 
actors from overseas. It breaks down, on a nation state basis, the jihadists who have 
come here, and presents as much information as possible as to their background, 
activities, motivations and groups. Jihadists from a total of fourteen different 
territories are found to have lived in the United Kingdom at some stage, whilst this 
territory is also one used, on occasion, by Al-Qaeda. Consideration is also given to 
the term ‘Londonistan’ a categorisation found to flourish after particular terrorist 
attacks.  
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Figure 3.1 Overseas Jihadists in Britain by State 
Country Number of known jihadists in Britain 
Algeria 27 
Bangladesh 1 
Egypt 10 
India/Kashmir/Pakistan 4 
Jordan 3 
Libya 16 
Maldives Unknown 
Morocco 2 
Palestinian Territories 5 
Saudi Arabia 4 
Syria 6 
Tunisia 1 
Total 79 
 
The greatest number comes from three North African states with a long history of 
conflict – Algeria, Egypt and Libya. They account for some 53 of the 79 named 
jihadists below.  
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3.2 Algeria  
Algeria’s Islamists first began to migrate in significant numbers following a failed 
attempt to overthrow the government in 1982 (Tawil, 2010, 33). However it was to be 
the events of the early 1990s that was to see the number of Algerians based in 
Britain increase significantly. Initial voting in the December 1991 general election 
saw the Front Islamique du Salut, (Islamic Salvation Front or FIS) victorious, albeit 
on a low turnout (Evans and Phillips, 2007, 169). A scheduled second round on 16 
January 1992 did not occur, as a constitutional crisis was followed by military take-
over – the likely democratic coming to power of an Islamist party had been 
prevented.  
For much of 1992-2004, Algeria was consumed by catastrophic levels of violence, 
with a death toll reported as high as 200,000 (Amnesty International, 2007). Two 
significant jihadist groups fought in this period – Groupe Islamique Arme (Islamic 
Army Group or GIA) and its splinter the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le 
Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or GSPC).6 Fighters who left 
Algeria at this time, headed to areas where military training was available. It is 
estimated over a thousand attended Al-Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan (Foley, 2013, 
26).   
During the Algerian civil war the GIA’s leadership based itself, not in North Africa, 
Afghanistan or a francophone country, but securely here in Britain (Kepel, 2010). 
Redha Malek, Algerian Prime Minister in 1993-4, names Abu Qatada as the GIA’s 
London spokesman (Malek, 2004, 444). That a Jordanian of Palestinian heritage 
should seemingly play a key role in the leadership of an Algerian organisation exiled 
                                                          
6 It is an interesting peculiarity of Algeria’s jihadist groups that such organisations adopt French, as opposed to 
Arab monikers.  
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here, demonstrates this conflict had developed wider characteristics than a struggle 
over who governed in Algiers. Indeed the Islamist campaign in Algeria had long been 
characterised by politico-religious tendencies well beyond the ballot box. The 
assassinations of intellectuals, socialists, secularists and women considered “too 
French in their manners and style of dress” (Evans and Phillips, 2007, 192) 
displayed a broader religious rage rooted in fundamentalism. When feminist Khalida 
Messaoudi was forced to give up teaching in 1993 after a fatwa sentenced her to 
death, exiled Algerian jihadists in London published material insisting her killing was 
merely a matter of time (Evans and Phillips, 2007, 193).  
 
This research names a total of 27 different Algerian Islamists who either settled here 
in the UK, or spent time in Britain before propagating their struggle elsewhere. Some 
very significant players are included figure 3.1 below. These include Abdullah Anas, 
the son in law of Al-Qaeda’s founder, Abdullah Azzam. Anas, who was based in 
Afghanistan from 1983-92, has served on the council in exile of the FIS (Granta, 
2008), and now has British citizenship (Foley, 2013, 267). Similarly Qamar Kherbane 
has played a leadership role in both Islamist politics (the FIS) and jihadism (the 
GSPC) and was given political asylum in Britain in 1994 (Al-Bawaba, 2001). In each 
case asylum was granted even though both men had been expelled from France in 
1992, and deported to Pakistan (Sifaoui, 2002, 124).  
 
Once Algerians were resident, they were extremely unlikely to be deported due to 
the poor standard of human rights in their country of birth. However, some who 
migrated to the United Kingdom appear not to have been fleeing the Algerian 
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dictatorship, but the attentions of the judicial system in democratic France. In 1995 
and 1996, the GIA carried out a series of terrorist attacks there, killing 14 and 
wounding 230 (Foley, 2013, 4). Consequently, the French authorities, clamping 
down on extremists following the 25 July 1995 Paris Metro bombing, noted Algerian 
radicals moving from France to England (Watson, 2008, 51). Getting a precise 
number on those who moved to the UK in this period is difficult, although indicative 
case studies do emerge.  
One of the men who found London more amenable was Salim Boukari, who in 2002 
was jailed for 12 years in Germany, after a plot to carry out a bombing in Strasbourg. 
Interviewed in Kassel prison by Peter Taylor in 2004, the differences between 
France and Great Britain for a young man of his background are evident: 
Life was uncomfortable for a young Algerian student, however uninvolved. Just going out for a 
drink meant the police would come and ask for his papers. London seemed a much better 
bet. "In England, they don't do stuff like this," he said (Taylor, 2004).  
 
The less involved British approach at street level was replicated in the much more 
serious matter of extradition. This came to pose practical difficulties for French 
legislature. On 1 June 1999 the trial opened of 24 men accused of the 1995-6 
bombings, including the Saint Michel Metro attack which had killed eight civilians. 
One significant defendant was tried in absentia – alleged fundraiser Rachid Ramda, 
who was fighting extradition from London. Ramda had been involved in publishing 
the GIA’s organ al-Ansar in the city (Tawil, 2010, 115) and victims lawyer Francoise 
Rudetski stated “His absence is particularly regrettable. Without the money, there 
would not have been a network” (Henley, 1999).  Not until 2005, and after the 7/7 
118 
 
bombings had increased the political temperature, was Ramda deported to France. 
He had spent ten years challenging extradition proceedings.  
 
Of the 27 Algerian émigrés below, six went on to be convicted here in the UK, of 
offences including the murder of a police officer - Kamel Bourgass in 2004 - and in 
the case of Nasserdine Menni, financing a suicide bombing in Sweden in 2010. A 
further five individuals have subsequently been found guilty of terrorism offences in 
other EU countries, including Djamel Beghal, convicted in France on separate 
charges in 2005 and 2013.  Beghal, like Anas and Kherbane demonstrates the 
globalised nature of such actors, having moved between Algeria, France, England 
and Afghanistan. Indeed nine of the Algerian jihadists who lived in the UK appear to 
have used this country as a transit point before eventually heading to participate in 
training camps in Afghanistan or in other conflicts – Belbacha, Benalia, Bouralha, 
Hadjazb, Larussi, Loiseau, Rahman, Sayab and Sufyian.  Most strikingly, alleged 
GIA member Djamel Loiseau was found dead after the 2001 Battle of Tora Bora with 
a flight ticket from London still in his possession (McNeill, 2001). A willingness to 
both kill and die for their beliefs is evident amongst this generation of activists - in 
2005, an Algerian living in Manchester died in a suicide bombing in Iraq.  
Also listed below is Sylvie Beghal, sometimes known as Umm Hamza, the wife of 
Djamal Beghal, and the only female in figure 3.2. Despite her husband being in 
prison in France, in 2004 she returned to live in Leicester, citing to sympathisers the 
more Islamic environment here in the UK (Mafille, 2011). She has since been 
controversially convicted of failing to give information to counter-terrorism officials at 
East Midlands Airport (Casciani, 2013). The fate of two Algerians listed below is 
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unknown to the author – Ali Touchent and Abu Doha Haider. The latter appears to 
have been held in custody in the United Kingdom until 2008, and then, known only 
as U in court documents, to have fought extradition to his homeland (Worthington, 
2009).  
 
A characteristic of some Algerian émigrés, particularly single young men in Britain in 
this timeframe, was an involvement in low level criminality.  
Having fake or doctored ID papers was pretty much routine among many in the Algerian 
community: it went with the territory of being an illegal immigrant and was a simple necessity 
of a life lived in the shadows (Archer and Bawdon, 2010, 53).  
The question of to what extent such lifestyles funded individual criminality and when 
it funded Jihadist activity is complex. Braham Benmerzouga and Baghdad Meziane, 
for example, were convicted of running credit card frauds and passport scams in 
Leicester which aided Al-Qaeda (Guardian Online, 2003) and the Metropolitan 
Police’s Operation Springbourne found similar crimes being committed in London 
(Archer and Bawdon, 2010, 107).  Prior to Kamel Bourgass murdering a Special 
Branch officer in Manchester in 2003, he was on the run from a shoplifting charge 
and a deportation order. At one point Bourgass was given bail, under a different 
name, provided he lived at Finsbury Park mosque (Manchester Online, 2005).  
 
There is some evidence that post 2002, when the United States added the GSPC to 
its list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations, countries previously reluctant to take action 
against Algerian networks, began to act (Tawil, 2010, 184). Public perception of 
these events as action against Algerian jihadists however, appears to have been 
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blurred by immediate post 9/11 concerns about Al-Qaeda as a distinct entity. In 
contradiction of the public’s perception of events, Mitchell Silber goes as far as to 
state it was Algerian civil war veterans who ‘dominated’ Londonistan (Silber, 2012, 
25).  As Jason Burke explains: 
Few militants arrested in Europe in recent years have proved to be simply ‘al-Qaeda’, as 
commonly designated. Instead the majority of them, at least until 2001-2, were linked to the 
GIA and GSPC (Burke, 2007, 218).  
In June 2006 the concept of deportation to Algeria was accepted by English courts 
(Foley, 2013, 220), who had previously taken into predominant consideration 
Algeria’s reputation for torture. Following Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) hearings, nine Algerian terrorists have since been deported to their country of 
origin (Foley, 2013, 220). In assessing the importance of Algerian jihadists in the 
United Kingdom, it is noticeable that the majority of those listed below appear to 
have come to the UK prior to that 2006 legal change. However the collapse of the 
GIA, and the GSPC’s 2007 merger into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has 
not brought an end to the actions of Algerian jihadists in Europe. In 2012 Algerian 
physicist Adlene Hicheur, who had previously worked in this country, was jailed in 
France for sending emails to AQIM. In the same year, Nasserdine Menni, who had 
been living in Glasgow, was convicted of providing financial support to a suicide 
bombing in Stockholm.  
 
Figure 3.2 Algerian Jihadists in Britain 
Name Incident Source 
Abdullah Anas Son in law of Abdullah Azzam, 
granted political asylum in 
London, having been forced 
Foley (2013, 267).  
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out of Algeria and France.  
Served as an assistant to 
Azzam. 
 
 
Wright, (2006, 134). 
Djamal Beghal Lived in Leicester 1997-2000, 
distributing Abu Qatada’s work, 
and also travelled to 
Afghanistan for training.  
Convicted in France of terrorist 
offences in 2005 and in 2013.  
Burke (2007, 220-1). 
 
 
Foley (2013, 115-6). 
Cageprisoners, 23/12/13.  
Mrs Sylvie Beghal, aka Umm 
Hamza 
Left her home in Leicester to 
move to Taliban controlled 
Afghanistan with her husband.  
French citizenship ensured she 
could return to Britain in 2004.  
Controversially convicted of 
failing to comply with Schedule 
7 of the Terrorism Act, she lost 
an appeal against this 
conviction in 2013.  
Mafille, 12/10/11. 
 
 
 
Casciani, 28/08/13.   
Ahmed Belbacha Once of Hampshire, Belbacha 
was arrested in Pakistan after 
9/11. Held in Guantanamo for 
over a decade before being 
deported to Algeria.  
Travelled from Finsbury Park 
Mosque to fight in Afghanistan.  
Reprieve 14/10/10 
 
US Dept. of Defence, 15/01/06.  
Yacine Benalia Left Finsbury Park mosque to 
fight in Chechnya in 2001. 
Burke, 03/10/04. 
Brahim Benmerzouga Lived in Leicester until jailed for 
11 years in 2003, having raised 
funds for Al-Qaeda.  
Guardian Online, 01/04/03.  
Salim Boukari  Lived in the UK before being 
jailed in Germany for planning 
terrorism attack in France.  
Taylor, 09/02/04. 
Kamel Rabat Bouralha Prominent among Algerian 
émigrés at Finsbury Park 
mosque.  
Went to Chechnya to fight in 
2001. Reportedly captured by 
Burke, 03/10/04.  
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the Russians in 2004.  
Kamel Bourgass Convicted in 2005 of the 
murder of DC Stephen Oake in 
Manchester on 14 January 
2003. 
Wylie, 15/04/05.  
Abbas Boutrab From Newtownabbey in 
Northern Ireland. Convicted of 
possessing articles of use to 
terrorism, jailed for six years.  
This was the last use of a 
Diplock trial, without a jury.  
Channel 4 News, 24/11/05. 
Court of Appeal Northern 
Ireland, 2007.  
Haider Abu Doha. Aka Amar 
Makhlulif 
Arrested at Heathrow on a 
false passport in Feb 01, in 
connection with Los Angeles 
airport millennium plot. A 
senior member of the GSPC, 
living in London.  
Burke (2007, 284), Evans and 
Phillips (2007, 285).  
 
Nabil Hadjarab Travelled via Finsbury Park 
mosque to Afghanistan. 
Captured 20/12/01, having 
been injured at Tora Bora. 
US Department of Defence, 
22/1/07.  
 Adlene Hicheur Jailed in France in May 2012 
for 5 years for sending emails 
to AQIM supporters. A 
physicist previously at the 
Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory in Oxfordshire. 
Muslim Weekly 16/10/09.  
Shaw, 04/05/12.  
Rabah Kadre Spent four years on remand in 
HMP Belmarsh, fighting 
extradition to France.  
Convicted in abstentia on 
16/12/04 of plotting to bomb 
Strasbourg market. Upon 
extradition did not challenge 
the conviction, and was 
subsequently deported from 
France to Algeria. 
Cageprisoners, 8/10/09. 
Qamar Eddine Kherbane A Mujahideen veteran and 
leading figure in the FIS and 
GSPC. Granted political 
asylum in the UK, 1994. 
Al Bawaba, 20/09/01.  
Osman Larussi Left Finsbury Park mosque to 
fight in Chechnya in 2001.  
Burke, 03/10/04. 
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Djamel Loiseau A Franco-Algerian who came 
to London, before travelling on 
to fight in Afghanistan.  
Sifaoui, (2003, 101). 
Nasserdine Menni Living in Scotland.  
Convicted of providing material 
support to Stockholm suicide 
bomber Taimour Abdulwahab 
al-Abdaly. Also convicted of 
immigration and benefit frauds.  
Baker, 20/07/12.  
Baghdad Mezianne Was living in Leicester until 
convicted in 2003 of raising 
funds for Al-Qaeda.  
Jailed for 11 years. 
Guardian Online, 01/04/03. 
Rachid Ramda Came to London in 1992 from 
Peshawar, held in connection 
to 1995 Paris Metro bombings.  
Extradition rejected 2002, 
granted 2005. Convicted in 
2006, jailed for ten years. 
Curtis (2010, 390, n84) 
Tawil (2010, 112) 
Scotland Against Criminalising 
Communities, 30/03/06.  
Said Amr Abd al-Rahman Travelled from Finsbury Park 
mosque to Yemen in 1998, 
jailed for terrorism offences in 
Sana’a in 1999.  
Quin (2005, 239).  
Kamil Sagheer  Travelled from Finsbury Park 
mosque to Yemen in 1998, 
jailed for terrorism offences 
there in 1999. 
Quin (2005, 239). 
Omar Saiki A visitor to Abu Hamza at 
Finsbury park mosque, 
subsequently jailed in France 
for heading a terrorist network.  
Sifaoui (2003, 103)  
BBC Website, 13/12/00.  
Mutij Sadiz Ahmad Sayab Came to London to be put in 
contact with recruiters for the 
jihad in Afghanistan, leaving 
Britain in June 2001.  
US Department of Defence 
22/01/07b 
Barghomi Sufyian Came to London for work, but 
ended up travelling onto the 
Afghan camps. Arrested in 
Pakistan in 2002.  
Swinford, 26/04/11. 
Ali Touchent GIA member who visited 
London whilst a suspect for the 
Paris Metro bombings. 
Managed to lose British 
Nasiri (2006, 278).   
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surveillance officers. 
Unnamed A French national of Algerian 
birth, living in Manchester. Died 
aged 41 committing a suicide 
bombing in Iraq.  
Bunyan et al, 22/06/05.  
 
 
3.3 Bangladesh 
On 28 February 2011 Rajib Karim, a Bangladeshi national living on Tyneside 
pleaded guilty to four charges of preparing to commit acts of terrorism or assisting 
others to - he was subsequently jailed for 30 years. Karim first moved to the United 
Kingdom in 1998 to study engineering at UMIST, and married a British Muslim 
before returning to Bangladesh. In 2006 the family came to Britain for medical 
treatment, Karim taking up employment with British Airways (Gardham, 2011, A). 
Although Karim produced literature and electronic media for Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen 
Bangladesh, his concerns were not merely related to events in that country – he was 
in email contact with Anwar al-Awlaki of AQAP (MPS, 2011) who sought to use his 
position within aviation to facilitate a terrorist attack. In emails between the two, 
published upon Karim’s conviction (Gardham, 2011A) it is clear that to al-Awlaki an 
attack on the United States is the ideal, an attack on Britain is considered a definite 
second choice.  
Although isolated as a case, the component parts of this plot illustrate the diversity of 
Jihadism. We have a member of a Bangladeshi Jihadist group, working in Britain 
with a British family, striving with an American in Al-Qaeda in Yemen to carry out a 
terrorist attack against the ‘far enemy’ – the United States.  
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3.4    Egypt 
Jihadist organisations have a long history in Egypt, most notoriously being 
responsible for the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat and consequent, 
failed coup (Heikal, 1983). Returning Egyptian fighters from the 1979-89 Afghanistan 
conflict were able to rejuvenate the jihadist cause in the early 1990s, and attacks on 
security services and western tourists followed (Tawil, 2010, 48).  
The brutality of the Egyptian state’s response, plus significant divisions between the 
Islamists within the country with regards to both tactics and strategy (Mansfield 2006, 
163) ensured the jihadists became increasingly dispersed. Some exiles seeking 
sanctuary travelled to western nations, including an important theological figure from 
the Egypt, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. A teacher of theology at al-Azhar University 
and leader of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Wright, 2007, 56) colloquially known as the 
‘Blind Sheikh’, Rahman migrated to the United States, despite issuing fatwas 
declaring a state of war existed between Christians and Muslims (Wright, 2007, 177). 
The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was followed by Rahman’s conviction 
for inciting terrorism (Bergen, 2001, 101) and initiated a joint FBI-Metropolitan Police 
investigation in the United Kingdom. Case officer Bob Lambert states that Rahman 
“had a small but significant following in London” (Lambert, 2011, 42) and refers to 
reports that one of these followers, Abu Hamza, managed to both praise the attack 
and accuse the authorities of perpetrating a miscarriage of justice against Rahman. 
Such double speak, praising violence yet simultaneously expressing grievance was 
to become a characteristic of Abu Hamza’s output.  
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That investigation, and the declared support for a terrorist attack on a friendly state, 
could have led to a questioning approach being adopted by British authorities 
towards exiles from Mubarak’s admittedly dictatorial rule. Instead, a succession of 
Egyptians were allowed to settle throughout the 1990s, who had serious criminal 
convictions in their homeland (see figure 3.3 below). In October 2001 the Egyptian 
online weekly al-Ahram took advantage of the post 9/11 atmosphere to list a total of 
29 ‘Egyptian-Afghans’ – Egyptian citizens who it claimed were Al-Qaeda members 
and/or associates of the Taliban (Al-Ahram, 2001). Seven were living in Britain, four 
having received political asylum. Issues raised by the conduct of the Blind Sheikh in 
the United States do not appear to have influenced the British government’s decision 
making – each of the four men to be granted asylum in the United Kingdom -  El-
Sayed Abdel-Maqsud, Sayed Agami Muhalhal Mu'awwad, Yasser al-Sirri  and 
Ahmed Hassan Rabie received it after Rahman’s arrest. Remarkably al-Sirri received 
asylum even though he had allegedly been involved in an attempt to assassinate the 
Egyptian Prime Minister (Al-Ahram, 2001). 
Replicating the pattern of behaviour that characterised Algerian émigrés in this 
period, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) supporters in the capital published a newspaper, 
al-Mujahidun (Tawil, 2010, 113) and sought to influence events in their homeland 
from afar. Yet Egyptian Islamist violence showed no desire to act in a restrained 
manner, or to restrict itself to acting solely within its own borders. The 1993 attempt 
on the life of the Egyptian Prime Minister by the EIJ killed only a passing teenager 
(Mannes, 2001, 94) and an attempt to assassinate General Mubarak in Ethiopia in 
1995 similarly failed, despite the support of Sudanese intelligence (Wright, 2007, 
214). That year the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan  was attacked (Wright, 2007, 217) 
and such violence even spread to Europe – the EIJ bombing a police station in 
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Rikeka, Croatia, to demand the release of an imprisoned operative (Mannes, 2001, 
95).  
Perhaps the most serious of these attacks was in November 1997 - the massacre of 
58 tourists and four Egyptians by al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya in Luxor. General Mubarak 
responded by making clear reference to what he saw as the role of Britain and 
Afghanistan in its facilitation:   
Terrorists are protected in countries such as England and Afghanistan......They live on 
English ground and elsewhere collecting money and planning with those in Afghanistan  
(Nasrawi, 1997). 
Mubarak’s intervention was not merely rhetorical. Although he sent his personal 
commiserations to the families of Britons killed in the shootings, as part of the judicial 
investigation he sought the extradition of London based EIJ members, including Adel 
Abdel Bary (Curtis, 2010, 183). However, European human rights legislation 
prevented their removal to a country where torture was routine. The next year Abdel 
Bary was involved in Al-Qaeda’s African embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 
which killed 224 (US Department of Justice, 2012, b). Having fought extradition to 
the US since 1998, Abdel Bary was extradited over thirteen years later, where he 
has pleaded guilty to terrorism charges (Weiser, 2015).  
Given the EIJ and its domestic counterpart al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya were both 
signatories to Bin Laden’s 1998 declaration of jihad by the World Islamic Front, it is 
perhaps no surprise that several British based Egyptians have appeared on the UN 
Al-Qaeda Sanctions List. The best known name is that of Abu Hamza, who was born 
in Alexandria in 1958, and came here as a student before fraudulently obtaining 
leave to remain in Britain, and subsequently British citizenship in 1986 (O’Neill and 
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McGrory, 2006, 10, 13). Others, despite being categorised as contributing to Al-
Qaeda’s activities by the United Nations, are broadly unknown to the wider British 
public and have avoided legal sanction. Consider Hani Al-Sayyid al-Sebai Yusif, an 
exiled member of EIJ who runs the Al Maqreze Centre for Historical Studies in 
London. The UNSC website states: 
Al-Sebai Yusif has provided material support to Al-Qaida and has conspired to commit 
terrorist acts. He has travelled internationally using forged documents, he has received 
military training and has belonged to cells and groups carrying out terrorist operations using 
force and violence involving intimidation, threats and damage to public and private property, 
as well as obstructing the activities of the public authorities (UNSC, 2005).  
 
Another Egyptian on that list, Al Sayyid Ahmed ironically received his British 
passport on 11 September 2001 (UNSC, 2011b) whilst Yasser al-Sirri, convicted in 
abstentia of terrorism charges in his homeland, cannot be extradited as he likely 
faces torture upon his return. His request for asylum in the United Kingdom has 
however been rejected (Whitehead, 2012), possibly indicative of a shift in attitude 
from British authorities. 
During the Syrian Civil War, a significant postscript emerged concerning Abdel Bary, 
which raises further questions as to the wisdom of allowing Egyptian jihadists to 
settle in the UK. His son, Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary, is a prominent British combatant 
in Syria, fighting in a very similar struggle to that which his father participated in for 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bary junior has been an enthusiastic user of social media to 
declare support for the Islamic State. One twitter image showed Bary in their 
stronghold of Raqqa, posing with a severed head and the caption “chillin with my 
other homie, or what’s left of him” (Buchannan, 2014). A further example in the 
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section on Libyan exiles, the Deghayes family of Brighton (below) demonstrates the 
potential for those involved in jihadist groups to be followed by a second generation 
of activists within their own families.  
 
 Figure 3.3   Egyptian Jihadists in the UK 
Individual Comment  Source 
Al Sayyid Ahmed Listed by the UN as affiliated to 
Al-Qaeda.  
UNSC, 2011b 
Adel Abdel Bary EIJ member 
Extradited from the UK in 2012 
to face American charges 
related to the 1998 African 
embassy bombings. Pleaded 
guilty and awaits sentence.  
Tawil (2010, 112).  
FBI, 06/10/12. 
Weiser, 22/01/2015 
 
 
Ibrahim Eidarous EIJ member granted political 
asylum in Britain. 
Died of leukaemia whilst 
fighting extradition proceedings 
re the 1998 embassy attacks.    
Curtis (2010, 181-2) 
 
Haley, 15/10/09.  
El-Sayed Abdel-Maqsud  Ran EIJ operations in Albania 
until moving to London and 
obtaining asylum.  
Al-Ahram, 18/10/01. 
Sayed Agami Muhalhal 
Mu'awwad  
A member of Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad’s Special Missions 
Committee. Granted political 
asylum in Britain in 1995, 
having moved here from 
Yemen.  
Al-Ahram, 18/10/01.  
Muhammad Mustafa al-Muqri A member of Gamaa al-
Islamiyya.  
Tawil (2010, 112).  
Ahmed Hassan Rabie Headed the important EIJ 
office in Albania before 
claiming political asylum in 
Britain in 1997, 
Al-Ahram, 18/10/01 
Usama Rushdi Former media spokesman of Tawil (2010, 142).  
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Gamaa al-Islamiyya.  
 
Lived in Birmingham having 
fled Egypt in 1989.  
 
 
Hope, 14/07/11.  
Hani al-Siba’I, aka as Hani Al-
Sayyid al-Sebai Yusif 
A member of EIJ living in 
Britain since 1994.  
 
A 1998 asylum request was 
rejected due to his EIJ 
membership.  
Tawil (2010, 31, 112) 
 
 
UNSC (2005).  
Yasser al-Sirri Senior figure in al-Gamaa al-
Islamiyya.  
Sentenced to death in 
abstentia in Egypt for 
attempting to assassinate the 
Prime Minister in 1993. 
Granted political asylum here 
in 1994.  
Bodansky (2001, 293).  
 
Al-Ahram, 18/10/01. 
 
 
3.5 India, Kashmir and Pakistan 
Placing an exact figure on the number of Pakistanis in Britain who come from Azad 
Kashmir (‘Free’ Kashmir, that part of the disputed territory under Pakistani as 
opposed to Indian control) is impossible, although there are suggestions as many as 
two thirds could be from the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir (Abbas, 2011, 47). 
Jihadist groups have sought to develop influence, funding and members via the 
diaspora. 
An early indication events in Kashmir carried resonance in Britain came in the late 
1990s, when MI5 and Greater Manchester Police’s Special Branch approached 
Oldham Imam Shafiq Rehman to become an informant. An exile from Kashmir, 
Rehman was the leader of the UK chapter of Markaz Dawa Al Irshad (Wilson, 1999) 
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an organisation better known for its Pakistani military wing – Lashkar-e-Taiba (Gul, 
2010). Noticeably it was the domestic security service, MI5, allegedly seeking to 
recruit Rehman, not its internationally focused partner, MI6.   
LeT (the Army of the Righteous) is a group with whom British Muslims could receive 
paramilitary training from at least 1999 (see chapter five), enjoyed a profile in the 
United Kingdom for some years. Leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed conducted a 
speaking tour in London, Birmingham and Rochdale in 1995 (Fisk, 2010). Banned 
domestically in 2001 (Horne and Douse, 2013) and in Pakistan 2002, LeT went on to 
commit the 2008 Mumbai attacks, killing 166 people (Fisk, 2010). One LeT member 
suspected of involvement in that attack, Raheel Shaikh, has been sought by the 
authorities in the West Midlands, where he was believed to be hiding. A further LET 
member, David Headley, now imprisoned for terrorist offences in the United States, 
has informed authorities he travelled to Derby to meet LET members there in an 
attempt to arrange an attack on Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper which had 
published cartoons of Muhammad (Hill, 2010).  
The tendency for Pakistani jihadist groups to develop support networks in Britain is 
not merely confined to the LeT.  Masood Azhar who led the Harkat ul-Ansar 
(Movement for the Victorious) was an enthusiastic visitor to British Muslim 
communities, especially those from Kashmir.  
Raising funds and recruits, his oratorical reputation preceding him and packing out mosques 
up and down the country, Masood had targeted working-class Pakistani expatriates, who 
maintained strong links with their old homes and had transformed places like Mirpur in 
Pakistan controlled Kashmir, into boom towns (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2012, 296).   
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The potential for visiting speakers to both motivate exiles and seek to shift young 
British Muslims in a particular direction is evident when their literature is studied. 
Kalim Siddiqui (see chapter two) had been clear that jihad was obligatory for British 
Muslims, regardless of their location. So Masood Azhar was explicit in publications 
such as “The Virtues of Jihad” (Azhar, n.d). But he also informed Western Muslims of 
the power this concept gave them, of the fear he insisted their belief induced in 
Western elites. The back cover of the “The Virtues of Jihad” declaring: 
They are afraid of those Muslim youths of Europe who openly stroll the streets of London and 
Paris wearing military clothing and are eager and anxious to participate in the defence of 
Bosnia (Azhar, n.d) 
 
Azhar’s visits to Britain were to come to an abrupt end when he was arrested by the 
Indian authorities for terrorist offences, having unwisely crossed into Indian 
controlled territory. In 1997 his Harkat ul-Ansar was designated a terrorist group by 
the US (Mir, 2008, 131) but simply changed its name and carried on as before.   
Azhar was to spend 1994-99 in custody, despite a young British admirer, Omar 
Saeed Sheikh taking Western hostages in New Delhi in an attempt to force his 
leader’s freedom (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2012, 219). Sheikh and Azhar were 
eventually to escape from Indian custody in the most dramatic of circumstances – 
flown to Taliban controlled Afghanistan in 1999 in a swap for Indian civilians on a hi-
jacked plane held in Kabul (Hussain, 2007, 62).  
On his release Masood Azhar returned triumphantly to Pakistan and formed a new 
organisation devoted to Jihad - Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM, the Army of Muhammad), 
with significant theological support from Pakistani Deobandi scholars (Mir, 2008, 
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131-2).  Here again, the interplay between Pakistani exiles settled in Britain, and 
those participating in jihad at home, came to fruition. In Birmingham Azhar had met 
Abdul Rauf, the former judge at one of Kashmir’s sharia courts. His son, Rashid 
Rauf, was to join Azhar in the JeM (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2012, 296) one of an 
estimated 300 British Muslims of Pakistani heritage to receive training with the JeM 
(Mir, 2008, 86). Rashid Rauf was to go on to play a central role in a 2006 plot by 
jihadists from London and High Wycombe to attack airliners (Silber, 2012, 51) 
eventually being killed by an American missile strike (see figure 5.5) 
 
Figure 3.4 Jihadists from India, Kashmir and Pakistan 
Name Details Source 
Hanif Mohammed Umerji Patel 
aka Tiger Hanif 
Fled counter-terrorism officials 
in India in 1996, and has fought 
extradition against charges of 
killing Hindus.  
Manchester Evening News, 
18/04/13.  
David Headley aka Daood 
Gilani  
LeT member who visited Derby 
in 2009, seeking support for a 
terrorist attack in Denmark. 
 
Subsequently jailed for 35 
years in the US.  
Hill, 11/11/10.  
 
 
Henderson, 24/01/13.  
Shafiq Rehman  LeT member who became an 
Imam in Oldham in 1993.  
Rawstorne, 17/08/99.  
Raheel Shaikh LeT member sought after the 
Mumbai attacks. Indian 
authorities believed he was 
living in Birmingham. 
Erwin, 21/09/09.  
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3.6 Jordan  
The importance of Abu Qatada to émigré Islamists in Britain is a recurring theme in 
this chapter, but his influence also extended to those fighting to establish sharia in 
Muslim majority lands. Shortly prior to 9/11, Osama Bin Laden was criticised by the 
Takfirist Wal Hijra group, on the somewhat obscure grounds that he supported and 
was protected by the Taliban, who had sought recognition from the apostate United 
Nations (Burke, 2007, 184). Bin Laden turned to London, and Abu Qatada for a 
religious ruling in support of his actions: “His fatwa, running to sixty-eight pages of 
closely written Arabic, was widely circulated in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere” 
(Burke, 2007, 184).   
This role of theological adviser was one Qatada had performed previously for groups 
participating in armed struggle. In February 1995 Algeria’s GIA caused outrage by 
issuing a fatwa stating it was permissible to kill the immediate female relatives of 
security personnel. In London, the GIA’s al-Ansar newspaper published Qatada’s 
support for this position (Tawil, 2010, 114) and he appears to have flourished in this 
period as a theological guide (Nasiri, 2006, 269). His tapes on jihad were found in 
the property of the 2004 Madrid bombers (Neumann, 2008, 47-8). The narrative 
listing on the UNSC website, which provides a detailed explanation for Qatada’s 
presence on their Al-Qaeda Sanctions List, lists his involvement with no fewer than 
seven jihadist organisations:  
1. Al-Qaeda 
2. GIA – Algeria 
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
4. Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
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5. GSPC – Algeria 
6. Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
7. Ansar al-Islam – Iraq  
 
In addition to the above, the UN credits Qatada with advising “extremist groups” from 
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and “Al-Qaeda related groups” in the United Kingdom. 
Omar Nasiri was present when Qatada, during a Friday sermon at the Four 
Feathers, shifted his allegiances due to the volume of Muslims being killed in Algeria: 
The GIA had overreached; they were not in a position to decide who the real Muslims were 
and were not. Abu Qatada made it very clear that he believed it was the responsibility of 
every Muslim to work for the overthrow of secular regimes everywhere. But he also said the 
GIA had no right at all to kill other Muslims (Nasiri, 2006, 272). 
 
Qatada’s twenty years in London, and the inability of the authorities to either charge 
him with terrorism offences in Britain or deport him to face the courts in Jordan 
following his original arrest in 2002, mirror those concerning particular Jihadis from 
both Egypt and Algeria. Indeed a similar process was attempted with Jordan, to that 
eventually agreed with Algeria (Foley, 2013, 220) of deportation with assurances 
(DWA) – that a suspect could be deported to a country if specific commitments were 
made by that nation not to abuse the individual, or use evidence against them that 
had been extracted by torture.  
The second Jordanian jihadist to gain prominence within British Islam – Mahmoud 
Abu Rideh – proved to be almost as controversial a figure as Qatada. Like Qatada a 
man of Palestinian heritage, Rideh was a veteran of the Afghan Mujahideen who 
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moved to Britain in 1995, where he became an important fund raiser for Al-Qaeda 
(Tax, 2012, 37). Here, Rideh encouraged Britons such as Moazzam Begg to move to 
Taliban controlled Afghanistan, and is alleged to have worked with Begg to set up a 
girl’s school for the daughters of foreign fighters in the Taliban’s Emirate (Tax, 2012, 
39). An interesting example of cross-fertilisation between domestic and international 
Islamists, and the direction such interaction may take.  
 
Detained in the wave of arrests here following 9/11, Rideh was not charged with any 
terrorist offence, but eventually placed on a control order, restricting both his 
movements and associations (HHugs, 2007). The lack of any charge and his ill-
health ensured Rideh’s case became a cause celebre, with sympathetic coverage in 
newspapers such as The Guardian (Saner, 2009). In an emotive interview with his 
old associate Moazzam Begg, support group Cage reported that so damaged was 
Rideh by the restrictive nature of his control order, that he was confined to a 
wheelchair (Begg, 2008, a). Subsequently Rideh’s family was to return to Jordan, 
and he appears to have reached an agreement whereby his control order would end 
in 2009 if he left the UK (Gardham and Swami, 2010).  
Curiously Rideh then travelled to Syria and Pakistan, and in 2010 was killed in an 
airstrike in Afghanistan, having re-joined former comrades in Al-Qaeda (Gardham 
and Swami, 2010). This development proved somewhat difficult for supporters in the 
UK, with Victoria Brittain writing euphemistically that he was a “prisoner until he died” 
and commenting on the nature of his death merely by noting Rideh’s departure from 
England and locating it inaccurately. “He later died in Pakistan in December 2010, 
almost exactly nine years to the date he was first detained” (Brittain, 2011). 
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Fig 3.5 Jordanian Jihadists in Britain 
Name Details Source 
Hussain Saleh Hussain 
Alsamamara 
Came to Britain in 2001. 
Wanted by Jordanian 
authorities for terrorist 
offences, including association 
with Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
Watson, 16/06/10.  
Abu Qatada Involved with the GIA and 
raised funds in Britain for the 
Chechen Mujahideen.  
UNSC, 2009, a. 
Mahmoud Abu Rideh  
 
Moved to the UK in 1995, 
granted leave to remain in 
1998.  
Killed in an airstrike in 
Afghanistan whilst 
accompanying Al-Qaeda 
fighters. 
HHugs, 01/01/07.  
 
 
Gardham and Swami, 
16/12/10.  
 
 
3.7 Libya  
Western commentators once had a tendency to portray the Gadaffi regime as the 
example par excellence of Islamic state terrorism. Consider for example references 
to the “Islamic revolutionary warfare waged by Libya against the USA and Europe” 
(Hollingsworth and Fielding, 1999, 143) or the views of early terrorism specialist 
Claire Sterling, who observed Gadaffi styling himself as “the Ayatollah Khomeini of 
Africa and the Mediterranean” (Sterling, 1981, 267).  
Libya was a state sponsor of terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s (Lacquer, 1999, 66). 
However few were discerning enough to acknowledge Colonel Gadaffi faced 
considerable internal challenge from those who did not consider his regime 
sufficiently rooted in sharia. Gadaffi’s attempts to style himself as an Islamic leader 
138 
 
of significance first came awry in 1973, when he convened the International Islamic 
Youth Conference in Tripoli. His attempts to emphasise an idiosyncratic combination 
of religion, nationalism and socialism as an answer to the world’s problems, the 
‘Third Universal Theory’, was decisively rejected by the internationally assembled 
Muslim youth, who instead sought answers within their faith (Sardar, 2004, 157-8).7  
Opposition from Islamists within Libya was at times fierce – armed conflict between 
the state and jihadist actors flaring in 1986, 1987 and 1989 (Tawil, 2010, 33-4), yet 
Lacquer’s overview of Libyan terrorism is solely focused on that funded and 
encouraged by Gadaffi – an example perhaps of the limitations in approach of 
orthodox terrorism researchers. The threat posed by the Libyan state to western 
governments was observed, that possibly posed to Libya by Islamic actors 
overlooked. 
The failure of the armed opposition to cause critical damage to the Libyan regime led 
many surviving Islamists to leave for the more welcoming environment of 
Afghanistan, where they were able to re-group. Some exiles also moved to the 
United Kingdom, where it is alleged the approach to Libyan dissidents was 
permissive: 
In time Great Britain found friends in Qaddhafi’s enemies – especially in the radical religious 
movements, which saw Qaddhafi as too moderate and adhering to an Islam that was too lax. 
One of those movements has gotten recent attention: the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 
(Brisard and Dasquie, 2002, 100). 
 
                                                          
7 The British delegate at this conference was Kalim Siddiqui, whose contribution to domestic Islamism is 
discussed in chapter two.  
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The LIFG combined into a single organisation Islamists suppressed by Gadaffi’s 
dictatorship, and those with battlefield experience from Afghanistan (Tawil, 2010, 
49). This appears to have been sufficient to overtake the rival oppositionists of the 
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) and by the mid-1990s “the 
nationalists had been replaced by the jihadists” (Tawil, 2010, 57). The displacement 
of nationalist actors by those stressing overtly religious rhetoric – a characteristic we 
have already seen in Kashmir and amongst armed Palestinian groups – ensured the 
Gadaffi regime became fully cognisant of the threat it faced from armed Islamists. 
Given Gadaffi’s reputation as a proponent of ‘Islamic terrorism’ it is a considerable 
irony that the first warrant issued for the arrest of Osama Bin Laden, came not from 
the United States or Saudi Arabia, but was issued by the Libyan authorities in March 
1998 (Brisard and Dasquie, 2002, 155), leading to an Interpol warrant the next 
month.  
 
This research names a total of 17 Libyan jihadists to base themselves at some stage 
in the United Kingdom. The best known of the LIFG exiles in Britain is Anas al-Liby, 
who applied for asylum in the United Kingdom in 1995, and lived in Manchester until 
fleeing ahead of a counter-terrorism raid in 2000 (Curtis, 2010, 230). It was in al-
Liby’s Manchester home that the authorities discovered a core Al-Qaeda instruction 
manual (Lewis, 2008), “Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants” whilst in this 
period the LIFG bulletin, Al-Fajr, was published from London (Tawil, 2010, 113).   
The presence of al-Liby had long been controversial.     In 1996 Egypt requested his 
extradition, as part of their investigation into a 1995 plot to assassinate Hosni 
Mubarak on a Presidential visit to Ethiopia (Curtis 2010, 230). In a preliminary 
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example of debates which were to reoccur with alleged jihadis who had settled here, 
the British authorities declined to act on the grounds of Egypt’s sorry human rights 
record. Not until 2014 when he was arrested by American Special Forces in Tripoli 
did it appear as if al-Liby may answer in court for alleged participation in the 1998 
African embassy bombings, but early in 2015 he was to die, in US custody, of cancer 
(Cage, 2015).  
Although less well known in the public narrative of counter-terrorism than al-Liby, 
other leaders of the LIFG were also present in Britain during the 1990s. Consider for 
example Abu al-Mundhir al-Sa’idi, who served as the LIFG’s primary interpreter of 
Islamic law, and attended key meetings in Kandahar in 2000, where Al-Qaeda and 
other exiled Arab fighters sought to formalise their relationship with the Taliban 
(Tawil, 2010, 167-9).  LIFG exiles in Britain were not focused solely on matters of 
protocol however. When an attempt was made to assassinate Colonel Gadaffi in 
1997, the LIFG issued its claim of responsibility to Arabic newspapers in London, 
leading to a formal complaint from the Libyan government about what it considered 
to be a threat to its sovereignty from British soil (Canada, 1999).  
There was also clear interaction between LIFG exiles here and international jihadist 
groups with much broader remits than the fight against Gadaffi. As well as al-Liby, 
Abdul Baset Azzouz, an LIFG member and associate of Al-Qaeda’s Aymaan al-
Zawahiri, made his home in Manchester in the 1990s. After being restricted on a 
control order in Britain, he later returned to Al-Qaeda circles in both Pakistan and 
Libya (Mendick et al, 2014).  
Any substantial analysis of Libyan jihadist exiles in the United Kingdom is made 
more complicated by the peculiar and shifting political backdrop to their presence. 
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The nature of the UK government’s relationship with Libya over the past thirty years 
reads as a series of diverse fluctuations - from foe in the Thatcher era, to eventual 
friend at one stage under Tony Blair, and then back to foe again during the Arab 
Spring and the uprising against Colonel Gadaffi. These shifts had a pronounced 
effect on the Islamist opposition to Gadaffi, and their security in Great Britain. The 
LIFG for example was not designated a terrorist group by the United Kingdom until 
October 2005 – after the Blair government’s rapprochement with Colonel Gadaffi 
(Curtis, 2010, 229). This delay occurred despite the group having been recorded by 
the UNSC Al-Qaeda Sanctions List on 6 October 2001, and that of the US Justice 
Department following 9/11.  
 
The practical consequences of the listing of declared terrorist organisations impacted 
on the 2007 trial of three LIFG members from Birmingham, arrested shortly before 
their organisation’s proscription (see figure 3.6). They mounted a defence centring 
on the LIFG’s previous legality. This failed, in particular because the prosecution was 
able to link both the LIFG and the defendants to support for broader jihadist causes – 
for example in Algeria (Birmingham Mail, 2007). This case serves as an indication 
the LIFG’s ambitions were not limited to the mere removal from power of Colonel 
Gadaffi, but that they exercised support for causes beyond Libya’s national borders. 
This appears a common trait amongst exiled jihadists in the United Kingdom, already 
seen with those from Algeria, Egypt and Jordan, where solidarity is expressed 
across a series of Jihadist organisations from differing nations.  
Paradoxically, Blair’s rapprochement with Libya appears to have seen counter-
terrorism policy swing from the extreme of not appearing to consider Libyan Islamist 
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exiles an issue, to the other extreme of assistance in their illegal removal to Colonel 
Gadaffi’s jails. A compensation payment of $3.5 million was made by the British 
government to Sami al Saadi in December 2012 after exposure of a joint rendition 
operation between the United Kingdom, USA and Libya (Al Jazeera, 2012). In its 
period of cooperation with the Libyan regime, MI6 reportedly opened a mosque in an 
undisclosed European city, in partnership with Libyan intelligence, to lure potential 
terrorists (Lewis, 2012), and used a Libyan security agent to monitor exiles across 
the north west of England (Buaras, 2011).  
Such co-operation ceased following the Libyan uprising in 2011, when British policy 
shifted again – to support the overthrow of the regime.  Interestingly from this point 
declarations concerning the problematic nature of Islamist radicals on British soil re-
entered the rhetoric of the Libyan authorities. During the consequent civil war, 
Gaddafi attempted to characterise the campaign against him as a terrorist plot, led 
by jihadists. One example of this was the parading of Salah Mohammed Ali Abu 
Obah (named as Salah Mohammed Ali Aboaoba in some press reports), reportedly 
captured in fighting on Libya’s north coast.  
Mr Abu Obah said he had arrived in Libya from Manchester, England where he had lived for 
more than a decade as a member of the LIFG’s economic department, raising money from 
local mosques and Islamic charities to fund the group’s operations (Clover, 2011). 
Abu Obah went on to inform western journalists he had helped four LIFG members 
from Manchester enter Libya via Tunisia, and in an interview with Channel 4 News to 
state he raised funds for the LIFG at Didsbury Mosque in south Manchester (Miller, 
2011).  
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Domestically Libyan Islamists have seemingly had impact on indigenous strains of 
Islam. For example, it is alleged that by 2001 the Deghayes brothers, Abubaker and 
Omar, had worked with Abu Qatada and Afghan jihad veterans to oust more 
moderate figures at Brighton mosque (Whine, 2009, 21). Much greater focus was to 
be placed on the Deghayes family when Omar was arrested in Pakistan in 2002, 
having fled US occupied Afghanistan. That the stories of Islamists who have settled 
in Britain are at times far from binary is evidenced by the Deghayes family. Omar 
spent five years in Guantanamo Bay, where he was beaten so badly he lost an eye 
(Cobain, 2010). Three of Omar Deghayes nephews, all sons of Abubaker, have 
fought for the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra during the Syrian Civil War, where 
two have been killed (see fig 5.20). Recruitment of foreign fighters to Jabhat Al-
Nusra is strictly on the basis of recommendation: 
Jabhat al-Nusra imposes high barriers to entry for foreigners. They must first be vetted and 
vouched for by someone already in the organisation in a process known as 
receiving tazkiyah. The system has worked well for Arabs with links to the group but it has 
made it more difficult for Europeans wanting to join (Maher, 2014) 
That three young men from Brighton were able to pass this vetting may indicate a 
recommendation rooted in familial connections.   
 
Fig 3.6 Libyan Jihadists in Britain 
Name Detail Source 
Abdulbasit Abduirahim A senior LIFG member in Libya 
who maintained his influence 
whilst in the UK.  
US Embassy, 26/02/08.  
Khaled Abusalama From Birmingham, jailed for 22 
months in trial with Kamoka 
(below) 
Birmingham Mail 12/06/07 
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Abdel Baset Azouz Moved to Manchester in 1994. 
Arrested in 2006 and 
subsequently placed on a 
control order.  
Designated a global terrorist by 
the United States in 2014. An 
associate of the Al-Qaeda 
leadership, left Britain for 
Pakistan, then to head the 
group’s activities in Libya.  
Qureshi 23/04/08.  
 
 
US Gov, Federal Register, 
07/10/14.  
 
Mendick et al, 27/09/14.  
Noman Benotman A former member of the Shura 
Council of the LIFG.  
Now a prominent critic of 
jihadist groups.  
Tawil (2010, 19, n2).  
Abdul Bourouag From Birmingham, jailed for 22 
months in trial with Kamoka 
(below) 
Birmingham Mail 12/06/07 
Omar Deghayes Informed the Americans he 
worked for the LIFG’s Sanibel 
charity in Taliban controlled 
Afghanistan.  
US Department of Defence 
memo: Secret 20290410 (10 
April 2004).   
Abdelrazag Elsharif Elosta Involved in fund raising for the 
LIFG in Britain.  
US Embassy, 26/02/08 
Ismail Kamoka From Lewisham, jailed for 
three years nine months for 
supplying LIFG with cash and 
fake passports.  
Birmingham Mail 12/06/07 
Anas al-Liby Fled Manchester ahead of a 
counter terrorism raid in 2000. 
Arrested in Libya in 2014 in 
connection with the 1998 Al-
Qaeda bombings of US 
embassies in Africa.   
Died 2015. 
Curtis (2010, 230) 
 
 
 
Cage, 13/02/15. 
Maftah Mohamed El Mabruk Fundraiser for the LIFG in 
Britain.  
US Embassy, 26/02/08 
Taher Nasuf Listed by the UN Al Qaida 
Sanctions Committee in 2006 
as a member of the LIFG, and 
as running the associated 
Sanabel Relief Agency.  
UNSC, 13/08/09.  
Salah Mohammed Ali Abu Alleged LIFG fighter from Miller, 15/03/11.  
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Obah Manchester captured during 
the Libyan Civil War.  
Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq aka 
Abdel Hakim Belhadj 
Reported to be the leader of 
the LIFG, and resident in 
London in the mid-90s.  
Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada, 1999.  
Abu al-Mundhir al-Saidi. Aka 
Abu Munthir.  
The LIFG’s Head of Islamic 
Law 
Tawil (2010, 138, n4).  
 
Faraj Hassan al-Saadi A Libyan who had lived in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Italy 
before coming to the UK in 
2002.  
Designated as a terrorist by the 
UN.  
Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v Saadi, 
21/12/09. 
 
 
3.8 Maldives 
The Republic of Maldives may not be the first location which springs to mind when 
considering jihadist actors. Yet some intriguing snippets of information suggest an 
Islamist organisation from the islands, Jamaat Tul Muslimeen (JTM), is based in the 
United Kingdom. In November 2008 a cable sent by the US Secretary of State to US 
embassies, subsequently published by Wilileaks, stated Islamists in the Maldives 
had developed links with Al-Qaeda and Pakistan’s LeT, and that JTM:  
…is an extremist group based in the UK that follows an extremist ideology known as Takfir 
that actively encourages violent jihad and supports criminality against apostate states (US 
Secretary of State, 2008).  
 
Whilst Maldivian jihadists appear to have their closest links to Pakistan (Roberts, 
2011) interaction with suspected terrorists from the UK has been reported in both the 
local and Indian media in 2005 and 2007 respectively (Roberts, 2011).  
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3.9 Morocco 
This research finds two Moroccan jihadists who have spent time in the United 
Kingdom. Jamal Ajouaou serves as a further example of the international nature of 
the jihadist scene in Britain. When designated a suspected international terrorist by 
the Home Secretary in December 2001, his associations were not with a Moroccan 
or British organisation, but with the Algerian GIA and GSPC, the Egyptian al-Gamaa 
al-Islamiya and the Chechen jihadists around Ibn Khattab (SIAC, 2003). 
Houria Chahed Chentouf offers a comparatively rare example of a female Islamist 
convicted of terrorist offences in the UK, for the possession of material of use to a 
terrorist. She dropped a memory stick out of her burka at John Lennon airport on in 
2008, containing weapons making guides. 
Figure 3.7 Moroccan Jihadists in Britain 
Name Details Source 
Jamal Ajouaou A Moroccan citizen who came 
to the UK. Prevented from 
returning to the UK on the 
basis of his support for a series 
of jihadist groups.  
SIAC, 29/10/03.  
Houria Chahed Chentouf A dual Moroccan /Dutch 
citizen, who has lived in 
Manchester. Jailed for 2 years 
in 2009.  
BBC Website, 02/11/09.  
 
3.10 Palestinian Territories 
This research names five Palestinian Jihadists who have settled in the United 
Kingdom, the majority having some association with the Islamic Resistance 
Movement – Hamas. In London, Muhammad Sawalha has been a high profile figure 
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since fleeing Israeli security services in 1990, where he led Hamas leader in the 
West Bank. Sawalha has held the position of UK official on the Political Committee of 
the International Muslim Brotherhood Organisation in the UK (Vidino, 2010, 140) and 
was a founder of the Muslim Association of Britain, leading it for eight years (ITIC, 
2010) - a rare example of someone from a jihadist background taking a position in an 
outward facing Muslim representative body.  
Hamas has also published its monthly, Filastin al-Muslima in the UK since 1981, and 
a children’s publication, al-Fateh, from London (ITIC, 2010A). Some imagery in the 
later, for example featuring a child in the uniform of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades, may be pushing the boundaries of British laws with regards to incitement.  
 
In international terms, perhaps the most important Palestinian jihadist to move to 
London has been Abu Walid, whose name appears in several of the histories of the 
era characterised as ‘Londonistan’. Abu Walid was reportedly ‘second in command’ 
to Abu Qatada at the Four Feathers Islamic Centre in north London, and was a 
veteran of the Afghan camps (Nasiri, 2006, 246, 268). In this period, the French 
security services reportedly discussed assassinating Walid in London (O’Neill and 
McGrory, 2006, 126), although he appears to have faded from prominence after 
moving to Afghanistan (Nasiri, 2006, 282).  
 
Figure 3.8 Palestinian Jihadists in Britain 
Name Detail Source 
Maged Akil A member of Hamas exiled in 
London 
IDF, 27/12/10.  
Zahar Birawi Hamas exile based in London, IDF, 27/12/10 
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who had a prominent role in 
the Muslim Association of 
Britain 
Muhammad Sawalha.   Hamas leader who fled to 
London and has been a 
leading figure in exile circles 
Finkelstone, 20/04/94.  
Abu Walid A Palestinian associated with 
the Algerian GIA, who lived in 
Wembley.  
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
126) 
Majad El Zir Hamas exile based in London IDF, 27/12/10 
 
3.11 Saudi Arabia 
The importance of Saudi Arabian exiles in Britain to Al-Qaeda has been established 
in chapter one – it was the London based Advice and Reformation Committee who 
first distributed the series of pronouncements Bin Laden issued from 1994 onwards. 
Peter Bergen, who was to interview Bin Laden in Afghanistan for CNN in 1997, 
began his journey to the Islamic Emirate in the London suburb of Dollis Hill, meeting 
Saudi exiles Khaled al-Fawwaz, and later Dr Saad al-Fagih who facilitated his 
eventual question and answer session with the leader of Al-Qaeda (Bergen, 2001, 
4). Whilst this thesis names only four Saudi jihadists to take up residence in Britain, 
all moved to London in the 1990s, and have been prominent figures in causes they 
espouse.  
 Bergen suggests the direct nature of Bin Laden’s early statements caused some 
dissent amongst his followers in London – the ARC’s Khaled al-Fawwaz observing it 
un-Islamic to kill civilians (Bergen, 2001, 96). Despite these tactical differences, in 
terms of strategy Bin Laden and al-Fawwaz appeared to be comfortable together 
“Arab journalists in the know referred to al-Fawwaz as ‘bin Laden’s ambassador to 
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Britain’” (Atwan, 2006, 16). How this worked in practice is described by Abdel Bari 
Atwan:  
In November 1996 he came to the offices of the newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, where I am 
Editor-in-Chief, and after some courteous preliminaries and beating around the bush asked if I 
would be interested in travelling to Afghanistan to interview bin Laden, who had recently gone 
into hiding (Atwan, 2006, 16). 
 
Thus was the need of all terrorist organisations – for the nourishment of publicity – 
satiated. Journalist Mark Hollingsworth indicates that al-Fawwaz’s involvement with 
Al-Qaeda extended from publicity into military matters. An interview at a north 
London Pizza Hut on 4 December 1996 allegedly contained the statement: 
I have been discussing with Bin Laden and his supporters a radical change of 
strategy.....Instead of focusing on overthrowing the Saudi royal regime, the focus will be on 
targeting the US as the principle enemy (Hollingsworth, 2001).  
Arrested in 1998 in connection with the African embassy bombings conducted by Al-
Qaeda, al-Fawwaz fought extradition indefatigably until he was deported to America 
in 2012. At the time of writing his trial has just commenced.  
 
Since his deportation, perhaps the best known Saudi exile connected to the United 
Kingdom is a man not actually in the country. Shaker Aamer is the longest serving 
Guantanamo Bay detainee with a British connection – he had been resident in 
Britain for some of the period prior to his arrest in Afghanistan in 2001, and his 
immediate family live here. Aamer was transferred to Guantanamo in 2002, and after 
being tortured, has remained there ever since (Amnesty International, n.d). In terms 
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of the reasons for his initial arrest, Aamer had fought in Bosnia, and later in 
Afghanistan in 2000, and was an associate of a series of convicted jihadist actors 
such as Richard Reid and Zaccarias Moussaoui (Simcox, 2012). Captured at Tora 
Bora, where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fought a desperate last stand following the 
US invasion, he had earlier worked in Afghanistan for Al-Qaeda affiliated charity the 
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (CRT Briefing, 2015).  
 
Figure 3.9 Saudi Arabian Jihadists in Britain  
Name Details Source 
Shaker Aamer A Saudi citizen who is the 
last British resident in 
Guantanamo Bay.  Fought 
in Afghanistan in 2000, and 
worked for an Al-Qaeda 
related charity. 
Simcox, 18/01/12.  
 
CRT Briefing, 2015.  
Dr Saad al-Fagih A Saudi dissident in London 
and long term associate of 
Bin Laden 
Bergen (2001, 5).   
Khaled al-Fawwaz Propagandist for bin Laden 
in London until his arrest in 
1998. 
Extradited to the US in 2012 
in connection to Al-Qaeda’s 
African embassy bombings. 
Currently on trial in the US.  
Jacquard (2002, 94).  
 
 
Weiser, 22/01/2015. 
Muhammad al-Massari Helped Bin Laden develop a 
London office in 1994. 
BBC Press Office, 07/03/04.  
 
3.12 Syria  
In 1982 an armed rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the associated Fighting 
Vanguard, in Hama, was crushed by Hafiz al-Assad (Tawil, 2010, 33). In the period 
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since then at least six important jihadists from Syria have spent considerable time 
living in Britain (see fig 3.10). Here important theoretical work was begun which 
impacted significantly on support for the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate.  
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri ranks as one of the most significant theoreticians and 
practitioners of contemporary jihadism. He is the subject of a major critical work in 
English – Brynjar Lia’s “Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu 
Mus’ab al-Suri” (2014) and al-Suri’s “The Call to Global Islamic Resistance” has 
been partially translated into English as “A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: 
Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto” (2008) by Jim Lacey for 
United States Joint Forces Command.  
Having been part of the failed 1982 uprising, a disillusioned al-Suri later moved to 
Afghanistan, and worked as a trainer in Al-Qaeda camps from 1988-91. A founder 
member of the organisation, he appears to have taken his own route post 1991 
(Tawil, 2010, 29) moving to Spain, then living in London from 1994-7 (Lia, 2014, 
110). Here he edited the Algerian Al-Ansar newsletter for the GIA with Abu Hamza 
(O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 114) although his biographer suggests al-Suri was also 
commuting repeatedly between Afghanistan, Britain, Spain and Sudan (Lia, 2014, 
111). Indeed whilst the opportunity existed for al-Suri to fight with the GIA in Algeria, 
life in the United Kingdom appears to have been a more appropriate environment: 
He had already begun to make a name for himself as a jihadi intellectual and writer and 
clearly felt a much stronger attraction to London and its vibrant environment of Islamists and 
exiled jihadis, than to the GIA’s self-declared ‘Caliphate’ and its vulnerable ‘liberated zones’ 
south of Algiers (Lia, 2014, 120).  
This serves as a further illustration of the attraction of life in Britain, in this period, to 
jihadists from many differing Arab nations. A second characteristic al-Suri 
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demonstrates is the ability of jihadist fighters to operate cross-nationally – in London 
he appears to have contributed his thoughts to the literature of the GIA, LIFG and 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Lia, 2014, 152) before setting up his own media organisation 
in 1996, the Islamic Conflict Studies Bureau (Lia, 2014, 160).  
What seems to have broken al-Suri’s comfortable existence in London was not any 
concern from the authorities, but the Taliban’s establishment of sharia in 
Afghanistan. So impressed by the Taliban was al-Suri that he appears to have 
convinced other Islamists of the need to rally behind them (Tawil, 2010, 146). This 
persuasion “justified both fighting alongside the Taliban and immigrating to areas 
under their control” (Tawil, 2010, 147). Accordingly al-Suri left the United Kingdom 
for life in the Taliban’s Islamic utopia.  
 
Other Syrians in Britain preferred to support the Taliban from a distance. Omar Bakri 
Muhammad left his native Syria as a teenager in 1982, having also been part of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s failed uprising against President Hafez al-Assad (O’Neill and 
McGrory, 2006, 105). He claims to have studied at Egypt’s prestigious Al-Azhar 
University and in Saudi Arabia, before entering Britain as a political refugee in 1986, 
and becoming active in HuT. A significant doctrinal difference was to emerge in that 
organisation, whose focus since its inception had been on developing the caliphate 
in the homeland of Islam – the Middle East. Omar Bakri Muhammad’s belief in 
extending the caliphate to Britain was contra to HuT’s core focuses and in 1996 he 
was expelled (Watson, 2008, 44-5). The group he subsequently founded, Al-
Muhajiroun has been pivotal to British jihadism, and is discussed in detail in the next 
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chapter. Bakri Muhammad was to leave Britain for Lebanon shortly after the 7/7 
bombings, and has not been allowed to return to the country.  
Following the 2011 uprising against President Assad of Syria, one of the first jihadist 
fighters in the country to gain international recognition was a Salafi cleric previously 
based at the Al-Ansar Institute in Poplar in east London, Abu Bashir al-Tartusi (Loeb, 
2012) the assumed name of Shaykh Abdul Mun'em Mustafa Halīmah Abu Basīr. In 
some ways al-Tartusi was the type of Islamic voice the British authorities were keen 
to engage with – he robustly condemned 7/7, and argued it was illegitimate for any 
Muslims with British citizenship to attack their host (Brandon, 2008, 22).  
However, signs of the potentially problematic nature of al-Tartusi’s thought were 
present well before the Syrian conflict began. He is a takfiri – a believer in declaring 
other Muslims apostate if they do not meet his exact jurisprudence, with the 
accompanying disputes and conflicts such actions may bring. Most noticeably al-
Tartusi declared the head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, and senior 
Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi apostate. The grounds for this 
included al-Qaradawi’s perceived criticisms of the Taliban, acceptance of Muslims 
joining the US army and his support for multi-party democracy (Turkish Weekly, 
2008).  
Since returning to his homeland to join the jihad, al-Tartusi has stressed the 
importance of Islamic opposition to the existing regime and appears completely 
focused on the ‘near enemy’ (Bunzel, 2013). On that at least, he and al-Qaradawi 
are in agreement.  
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Figure 3.10   Syrian Jihadists in Britain 
Individual Details Source 
Omar Bakri Muhammad Involved in HuT before 
founding Al-Muhajiroun, a 
group now proscribed under 
the Terrorism Act.  
Watson (2008, 45).  
Abi Dahdah Syrian who eventually obtained 
Spanish citizenship. Spent time 
at Finsbury Park mosque, 
before being convicted of 
terrorist offences in Spain.  
Leiken (2012, 182.) 
Mohammed Al Ghabra Damascus born but resident in 
east London, was added to the 
United Nations Al-Qaeda 
sanctions list in 2009. 
UNSC (2011b).  
Abu Messaab Wrote for the Algerian GIA 
journal, Al-Ansar, which was 
based in London. Had fought in 
the Afghan Mujahideen.  
Roy (2004, 299).  
Mustafa Setmariam Nasar. 
Alias Abu Musab al-Suri 
Lived in Neasden from 1995. 
Edited the GIA publication Al-
Ansar.  
Captured in Pakistan in 2005. 
 
Curtis, 2010, 390-1, n84). 
 
UNSC (2011).  
Abu Bashir al-Tartusi Syrian born cleric from Tower 
Hamlets, prominent in the jihad 
against President Assad. 
Loeb, 22/10/12. 
 
3.13 Tunisia 
This research names one Tunisian jihadist to have spent significant time in the 
United Kingdom. A former professional footballer, Nizar Trabelsi developed 
important contacts in Islamist circles and offers an interesting example of a Jihadist 
actor from North Africa moving across several different environments but working 
with British born Islamists in an attempt to bomb Western targets.  
British shoe bombers Richard Reid and Saajid Badat (who eventually changed his 
mind about blowing up a transatlantic flight) were both associates (O’Neill and 
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McGrory, 2006, 227) although claims also exist that Trabelsi had a much more 
senior role as Badat’s handler (Lambert, 2011, 203). All three men attended Finsbury 
Park mosque and spent time together at an Islamic seminary in Pakistan (Silber, 
2012, 31-2).  
After living in Britain, Trabelsi travelled to Afghanistan, and was one of a group of 
jihadists in Belgium encouraged by Al-Qaeda to conduct terrorist attacks in Europe. 
He was subsequently jailed for ten years for plotting to attack a military base in 
Belgium (Silber, 2012, 310).  
 
3.14 Al-Qaeda in the United Kingdom 
This country has been a repeated place of entry for Al-Qaeda members (see fig 
3.11) with at least twelve significant individuals known to have passed through the 
country. Ramzi Binalshibh, seen with Khalid Sheikh Muhammad as the key strategist 
behind the co-ordinated attacks on the United States in 2001 (Fouda and Fielding, 
2003) spent a week in London nine months prior to 9/11. Members of Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq and AQAP have travelled to the United Kingdom, whilst figures such as Anas al-
Liby, Ramzi Yousef and Nizar Trabelsi all lived in Britain before being facing charges 
for serious offences in other countries, Yousef and Trabelsi being convicted, al-Liby 
dying before he came to trial.  
Despite the proscription of Al-Qaeda, only a handful of prosecutions for membership 
of the organisation have occurred. Rather than reticence, Frank Foley explains the 
low number of legal cases in terms of the characteristics of such organisations; “the 
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informal nature of their networks in Britain means that ‘membership’ of such a group 
is difficult to prove” (Foley, 2013, 200).  
 
Figure 3.11    Key Al-Qaeda members entering Britain 
Individual  Comment Source 
Dr Bilal Abdullah Had been involved with Al-
Qaeda in Iraq.  Carried out 
two failed bomb attacks in 
London and one at Glasgow 
Airport in 2007. Jailed for life.  
Hayman and Gilmore (2009, 
274).  
Anwar al-Awlaki Spent much of 2002-3 living 
in Britain where he was a 
high profile speaker. 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, (2011, 
28) 
Ramzi Binalshibh.  
 
Spent 2-9 December 2000 in 
London. Currently in US 
custody awaiting trial for 
planning 9/11.  
Fouda and Fielding (2003, 
170-1). 
Haider Abu Doha Was living in London during 
1999, whilst planning was 
advancing for the Los 
Angeles Airport Millennium 
plot. 
Burke (2007, 211).  
Khaled el-Fawwaz ARC leader in London. 
Extradited to the United 
States in 2012, and now on 
trial in connection to Al-
Qaeda’s 1998 embassy 
bombings.  
Bergen (2001, 2-4). 
Naeem Noor Mohammed 
Khan. Aka Abu Talha. 
Arrested in Pakistan 
12/07/04. Al-Qaeda computer 
expert, made five visits to GB 
in six years. Studied briefly at 
City University.  
Hussain (2007, 133-4).  
Anas al-Liby Living in Manchester in 1999. 
Indicted for 1998 African 
embassy bombings.  
Arrested in Libya in October 
2013, died of cancer before 
trial.  
Bergen (2001, 206).  
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Abu Ubaida al-Masri Egyptian chemist and bomb 
maker. A Mujahideen veteran 
who moved to the UK, then 
Germany. Trained shoe 
bomber Richard Reid.  
Hunter (2011, 345-6)  
 Nizar Trabelsi A Tunisian who had attended 
Finsbury Park mosque. 
Jailed for 10 years in 2003 
for a planned attack on the 
NATO base at Kleine Brogel.  
Archer and Bawdon (2010, 
77), Vervaet (2010).  
 
Unnamed Yemeni  Visited UK to seek funding 
for AQAP 
Keeble and Hollington (2010, 
226-7).  
Unnamed Yemeni An ‘associate’ of Al-Qaeda, 
arrested in 2010 
May 03/11/10. 
Ramzi Yousef (known in 
Swansea as Abdul Basit 
Mahmoud Karim) 
A Kuwaiti of Pakistani 
heritage. Planned the 1993 
World Trade Center 
bombing. Studied in 
Swansea in 1986-9 
Fouda and Fielding (2003, 
92).  
 
Roy (2004, 301).  
 
 
3.15 Londonistan 
The weight of data in the preceding pages demonstrates the frequency with which 
jihadist actors have settled in the United Kingdom over the past three decades. 
Counting the Palestinian territories as a nation, this has involved jihadists from some 
14 different countries, joined of course by members of a pan-nationalist group in Al-
Qaeda. Whatever the enmity these jihadists displayed to their countries of origin, it 
would be a mistake to see these exiles as disparate, united only by their 
displacement. Frank Foley reminds us of the importance of the ummah:  
Islamist terrorists fight for the ummah – an abstract concept of a global community of 
Muslims. Their ideal is the creation of Islamic states, with a long-term aim in many cases of 
restoring the Caliphate (Foley, 2013, 24).  
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Events in London demonstrate that Islamists came here to advance the cause of the 
ummah. The tendency in the 1990s with which Algerian jihadist organisations were 
able to accept figures such as Abu Hamza (Egyptian born but with British citizenship) 
Abu Qatada (a Jordanian of Palestinian heritage who had settled in the UK with his 
family) or Abu Musab al-Suri (a Syrian with Spanish citizenship living in London) 
serves as a reminder that jihadist struggles are not national struggles, no matter how 
much anger may be displayed towards a particular head of state or government. 
Bigger, regional or global aims are paramount. Even in the case of Syrian Abu 
Bashir al-Tartusi, who has returned home to take part in the fight against President 
Assad, it is Islamic resistance, as opposed to the mere resistance, which matters. As 
soon as the protests against Assad began in 2011, al-Tartusi launched a Facebook 
page entitled “The Islamic Opposition to the Syrian Regime” (Bunzel, 2013). The 
mistakes which Aymaan al-Zawahiri saw as once characterising the Palestinian 
resistance have not been repeated in Syria.  
 
It is worth considering how Britain got itself into a situation where it was hosting a 
succession of jihadist actors, committed to the eventual establishment of theological 
states or a cross national caliphate. In the Thatcher era, the United Kingdom had 
frequently viewed itself as taking counter-terrorism matters more seriously than its 
European neighbours, some of whom lacked Britain’s direct experience of the 
subject. This self-perception manifested itself in policy terms at the diplomatic level. 
For example, at the Luxembourg meeting of the European Council in 1985, the UK 
prevented majority voting being extended onto the issue of freedom of movement on 
the grounds the government did not trust European partners to control the 
159 
 
movements of terrorists. Such opposition also characterised Mrs Thatcher’s 
opposition to the Single European Act (George, 1991, 195).    
At some stage in the following two decades, a role reversal appears to have 
occurred. In time, the question emerged not whether Britain’s allies were taking 
security matters seriously, but if the UK was doing so, and even whether British 
polices were beginning to endanger others. Former Labour Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke first encountered these concerns when serving as Police Minister from 1999 
to 2001: 
There were a number of foreigners, including Ministers of the Interior, who said to me we 
were being over sympathetic in allowing people in. We should be keeping people out more. 
They went on to attach this argument, that by allowing people in we were colluding with 
‘terrorists’. I have never accepted that (Clarke, Interview, 2010).  
Some complaints were very specific in their nature. The issue of Abu Hamza and 
Finsbury Park mosque was raised with the British government by at least seven 
countries – Algeria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Netherlands and Spain 
(O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 288) whilst evidence of Abu Hamza’s material 
assistance to terrorists in Yemen in 1998 was gathered by the British security 
services (O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 288-9) and Yemeni authorities. The pan-
national nature of jihadist operations is further demonstrated by the reality that Abu 
Hamza, an Egyptian living in Britain, was willingly accepted as an advisor by the 
Islamic Army of Aden during its kidnapping of western tourists in 1998 (FBI, 2015).  
 
Writing of the 1990s, Mark Curtis lists four major terrorist groups as operating from 
London – the GIA (Algeria), the LIFG (Libya), the EIJ (Egypt) and Al-Qaeda (Curtis, 
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2010, 256). For this situation to formulate a very particular police approach was 
necessary - one which considered terrorism purely in terms of the instrumental act, 
not its ancillary elements. To prosper terrorism requires a safe haven – a place 
where the actor may develop their tactics, strategy and resources. In the modern 
era, this does not need to be in the same country or even continent as the eventual 
attack – indeed if the safety of the actor is increased by their usual distance from the 
operation, all the better. Prior to 9/11, the British police appear to have neglected 
these ancillary elements to terrorism, and concentrated solely on ensuring the act 
itself did not occur on their territory. Evidence of this approach is scarce, but where 
found, illuminating. Andrew Staniforth of the West Yorkshire Police Counter 
Terrorism Unit is one of the authors of “Blackstone’s Guide to Terrorism”, and wrote 
a long running series “Tackling Terrorism” in Police Review. He writes “From the 
early 1990s, groups with links to Egypt and Algeria began to conduct terrorist 
operations in Western countries, including the US and France” (Staniforth, 2009).  
That is an understatement. Terrorist attacks linked to Egyptian and Algerian 
organisations occurred at the World Trade Center in the United States in 1993 and in 
France in 1995-6. But Staniforth does not address the broader issue. At this time the 
organisations associated with those bombings - Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the GIA 
– were present and active in the United Kingdom, even if they did not conduct an 
attack here. As Curtis argues, their leaderships were resident in Britain, and as this 
chapter demonstrates, so were many of their propagandists and fundraisers. And for 
as long as they avoided breaking British laws, they could operate fully in support of 
their organisations.   
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As with other variables concerning British Jihadism, the concept of ‘Londonistan’ 
begins well before 7/7 or even 9/11. Camille Tawil dates the settlement of senior 
Islamic fighters to 1991:  
London began to attract a large influx of jihadists after the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and 
the escalation of violence in Algeria the following year. Some had fled their countries of origin; 
others had been unable to return home after the end of the Afghan jihad (Tawil, 2010, 112). 
These fighters were entering an environment where politico-religious ideas could be 
freely disseminated. In 1987 Riad El-Rayyes Books became the first company to 
publish Arabic language works from London (El Rayes, 2013), with titles on sale that 
would not have been available in more restrictive societies. These included, for 
example, the work of Egyptian Jihadist Shukri Mustafa, executed for assassinating 
the former Egyptian Minister for Religious Affairs, Sheikh al-Dhahabi, in 1977 
(Jansen, 1997, 90). During the 1990s London was to emerge as a key location for 
the Arab speaking media. Here press freedoms could be enjoyed that were 
impossible in Cairo or Riyadh, and the United Kingdom’s tradition of political asylum 
ensured that as well as journalists, many radicals who were in conflict with their own 
governments found London a more convivial base. Tawil lists four major Arabic 
newspapers, two magazines and the television channel MBC as establishing 
themselves in the British capital during the decade.  
As we have seen, supporters of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian GIA and Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group each began to publish newspapers from London (Tawil, 
2010, 113), as already did Hamas. Only in 1997 did it become illegal to conspire in 
Britain to commit terrorism abroad (Foley, 2013, 248), and even after that date some 
material certainly pushed the boundaries of British laws of freedom of expression. In 
2001 Rifa’I Taha, of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, saw his book “Unveiling the Pinnacle of 
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Islam” published in London by the Islamic Observation Centre. This included the 
author’s discussion of whether it was permissible to murder Coptic Christians (Tawil, 
2010, 142, 3). 
 
The term ‘Londonistan’ was first used in the European media by the respected 
French writer on Islamism, Gilles Kepel on 18 September 2001, in an El Pais (Spain) 
article entitled ‘La Trampa De La Yihad Afgana’.  Kepel had observed its use in the 
Arab media in the previous decade, and found Abu Hamza using it himself when 
they met at Finsbury Park mosque.8 The word, according to Kepel, greatly amused 
Hamza. Analysis of the LexisNexis newspaper database demonstrates the 
development of the term in the period following 9/11: 
 
Figure 3.12 Newspaper references to Londonistan 
Year  All Languages English 
2000 0 0 
2001 39 22 
2002 72 43 
2003 82 44 
2004 59 33 
2005 517 282 
2006 443 320 
2007 267 219 
2008 118 86 
2009 135 92 
                                                          
8 Answer to a question I put to Kepel at his London School of Economics guest lecture “Muslims in Modern 
Europe” 12 January 2010.  
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2010 118 98 
2011 119 101 
2012 61 38 
2013 (up until 21 May) 31 26 
2013 22 May9 – 30 June 37 10 
2013 (1 Jan- 30 June) 68 36 
 
Media references to Londonistan flourish after particular terrorist attacks. The 
Woolwich murder on 22 May 2013 saw more references in all languages to 
‘Londonistan’ in the following five weeks than in the previous five months. The 
London bombings of 2005 coincided with the highest usage of ‘Londonistan’ in all 
languages, whilst for the English speaking media 2006 was to prove the peak. This 
may indicate the number of retrospective articles that were to flourish in the domestic 
press as the enormity of 7/7 sunk in, and established new investigative areas.  
 
In an important comparative analysis of French and British approaches to countering 
terrorism, Frank Foley (2013) compares a robust French approach to Islamist actors 
in the 1990s, to that of the UK. The British did not appear threatened by such 
migrants: “The British police and intelligence services monitored these activists but 
essentially gave them free rein to promote and fund terrorist campaigns in other 
countries” (Foley, 2013, 3). Whilst such quotes provide stark reading, Foley locates 
these disparate approaches in differing institutional norms in each nations approach 
to security. What is sobering however, is that in a decade which saw terrorist attacks 
in Paris and civil war in Algeria: “Perhaps France’s biggest overseas intelligence 
                                                          
9 22 May 2013 was the date of the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby outside Woolwich barracks, by two Islamists.  
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operation against Islamist terrorists at this time was in London – or ‘Londonistan’ as 
they called it” (Foley, 2013, 287).  
 
3.16   Conclusions 
In 1997 the United Kingdom banned the promotion of terrorism overseas. It was an 
action that may be considered overdue – members of jihadist groups from at least 14 
territories are shown to have settled in this country, with four major terrorist 
organisations operating here – the Algerian GIA, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group and Al-Qaeda. This was not a situation which emerged 
overnight, and its roots may be traced back to failed Islamic uprisings in the 1980s in 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Those events, and the end of the Afghan jihad 
provided propulsion. Whilst Afghanistan still acted as an outlet for some jihadis to re-
align, the United Kingdom offered significant ‘pull’ factors – a tradition of providing 
space for those seeking political and religious asylum, an emerging base for Arab 
media and a legal system which did not seek initially to criminalise jihadist actors. 
The high number of Algerians, Egyptians and Libyans listed in this chapter – none 
countries traditionally associated with high levels of migration to Britain – is evidence 
for this propulsion and indeed ‘pull’. Finally, those who settled in other European 
Union countries, taking citizenship, in time found themselves able to move freely to 
the United Kingdom, under European law. Some Spanish-Syrians and Franco-
Algerians took this route. Some, without British or EU citizenship, simply entered the 
country illegally and stayed, making use of an immigration system which was not 
always robust. Kamel Bourgass, the killer of DC Oake in 2003, is perhaps the best 
example of this.  
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Deportation of individuals such as Bourgass was problematic, as individuals were 
likely to be from a country where torture or execution was commonplace. It is here a 
second explanation for the presence of so many jihadis in London and other British 
cities emerges. Once here, Islamists proved hard to dislodge. Only with extreme 
difficulty did the British courts begin to accept the idea of extradition or deportation to 
countries such as Algeria or Jordan. Although sound humanitarian principles may 
explain the courts reluctance, extradition cases involving Abu Hamza and Rachid 
Ramda, to the United States and France respectively, also proceeded at a tortuously 
slow pace.  
 
The preceding paragraphs address why so many jihadist actors from overseas were 
able to coalesce in the United Kingdom, but it is in the detail of the groups and 
individuals who settled in this country that we discover more as to their impulse. A 
theme of this thesis is to stress the centrality of religiosity. The displacement of 
nationalist organisations recognised in earlier chapters in Palestine and Kashmir is 
again observed – for example in Libya. The concept of the ummah was intrinsic to 
the practice of the new groupings, with activists of different nationalities supporting 
and working for organisations which often were not from their country of origin. This 
pan-Islamism is demonstrated by the senior roles taken in Algeria’s GIA by a 
Jordanian, Abu Qatada and also by Abu Hamza, an Egyptian who took British 
citizenship. If demonstrated at leadership levels it was also found in lower ranks – 
consider the 2007 trial of LIFG members in Birmingham, whose work extended 
beyond the overthrow of Gadaffi to wider support for the jihad in Algeria.  
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Whilst recorded in this chapter by their countries of origin, exile in Britain did not 
separate any jihadist from participating in either global struggles or that in their 
country of birth. Of the largest group to come to the UK, at least 27 Algerians, five 
went on to commit terrorist offences elsewhere in the European Union, nine to move 
to jihadist conflicts in other parts of the world – most noticeably Afghanistan or 
Chechnya. For these actors at least, Britain appears to have been a stopping off 
point from which to pursue their understanding of the wider aims of the ummah.  
The Islamist cause was also articulated from Britain by important ideologues. The 
distribution from north London of Bin Laden’s declaration of a global Islamic front, by 
Saudi Arabian exiles, is only the first example.  Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Bashir 
al-Tartusi both found Britain a convivial base from which to theorise before departing 
for jihad elsewhere – Taliban controlled Afghanistan in al-Suri’s case, for al-Tartusi 
the Syrian Civil War. The reasons for the departure of al-Suri provide further insight 
into the religious impulse intrinsic to jihadist actors. Having written for the London 
based publications of jihadist groups from Algeria, Egypt and Libya, he established a 
media facility dedicated to reporting on conflicts across Muslim majority nations - it 
tells us much that he was able to do all this from the United Kingdom. Only one 
imperative could eventually move al-Suri and his family – the realisation that the 
Taliban were creating what was considered to be a genuinely Islamic state.  Only 
then did he leave Britain. As we shall see in later chapters, this allure of actually 
existing sharia was experienced by British born, as well as British based Islamists.  
 
The settlement of so many Islamists in the United Kingdom was to bring significant, 
and sometimes unwelcome attention. The sobriquet ‘Londonistan’ which never 
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seems to quite go away is one example, complaints from at least seven nations of 
terrorists operating from British soil being another.   No history of jihadism in the era 
of Al-Qaeda can overlook the Advice and Reformation Committee, Abu Hamza, Abu 
Qatada or Abu Musab al-Suri. All chose to make London their home.  
It would be a mistake however to see the settlement of jihadists in the United 
Kingdom as a matter to be considered purely in historical terms. The question as to 
what extent values have been transmitted across the generations by migrant Islamist 
actors is now emerging. The Abdel-Bary’s represent an interesting case of an 
apparent unity of ideals and practice within one family, with migrant father and British 
son involved in jihadist organisations across distinct generations – Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad and Al-Qaeda’s African embassy bombings in 1998, and, contemporaneously, 
the British presence in the Syrian jihad. The Deghayes family of Brighton potentially 
offer a similar example of transmission. An uncle involved in the circles of the LIFG, 
captured in Pakistan following 9/11, a father predominant in Islamist circles in 
Sussex, and three teenage sons joining Al-Qaeda in Syria.  
Three Islamists covered in this chapter, Omar Bakri Muhammad (Syria), Abu Hamza 
(Egypt) and Abu Qatada (Jordan) offer prominent examples of overseas Islamists 
who sought to settle in Britain, and from here to influence politico-religious events. 
Unlike al-Suri, they did not seek to leave Britain for the Taliban’s Emirate, nor, with 
the brief exception of Hamza’s sojourn to Bosnia, did they participate in jihad 
overseas. Instead they stayed in London, developing a distinct prominence and 
contesting space within British Islamism. The next section of this thesis considers the 
influence of these men on more domestic matters, and the emergence of a distinct 
British Jihadism, declaring politico-religious goals here in the United Kingdom. Bakri 
Muhammad, Hamza and Qatada, along with the Jamaican Abdullah el-Faisal are 
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portrayed as the clerical leaders of this impulse. In order to properly assess the 
range of British Jihadism, and that this is an operatively British as opposed to 
international endeavour, the actions of British jihadists, in terms of actual and 
planned terrorist attacks, are considered.  
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Chapter 4: British Jihadism  
4.1 Introduction  
On 13 May 2009 the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism published statistics 
on terrorism arrests and outcomes for the 11 September 2001 to 31 March 2008 
(Home Office, 2009). Of 125 terrorist prisoners at 31 March 2008, a total of 62% 
were UK nationals (Travis, 2009). Whilst significant, the foreign jihadists outlined in 
the previous chapter, where prosecuted and imprisoned by the British authorities, 
were seemingly a minority of those involved in terrorism. The report also stated that 
91% of those prisoners affirmed themselves to be Muslim, a remarkable figure given 
the 2001 census found only 2.97% of the population in England and Wales 
described themselves thus, rising to a mere 4.8% in the subsequent 2011 census 
(MCB, 2015).  
Given the decline of terrorism related to Northern Ireland, the spotlight moves to the 
emergence of a new actor – which this research categorises as British Jihadism. 
This chapter serves to address the first research question set out in the introduction 
– what is the history of British Islamist involvement in violence on these shores? It 
does so by cataloguing and chronicling each terrorist attack, and each planned 
attack leading to convictions by jihadist actors in this country in the period 1992 – 31 
March 2015. A series of tables are produced below listing the details of these 
incidents, along with critical analysis of the actor’s perceived intentions and indeed 
justifications. By bringing this information together into one single document it is 
intended this thesis will provide an original contribution to research in this field, 
serving as a valuable tool for future researchers.  
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A further objective of this chapter is to address the second research question - who 
are the British Jihadists? Are they religious or political actors? Are they associated 
with particular districts, mosques, institutions or organisations? By examining the 
motivations of several core attacks, and giving due consideration to their 
organisational background, a significant picture emerges of actors expressing both 
political and religious objections to the society of their birth, and the policies of its 
governments. Particular attention is devoted to the terrorist attacks committed by 
Mohammed Sidique Khan, Nicky Reilly and Michael Adebolajo. In the case of Khan, 
Foucault’s concept of a discursive formation is used to explain the inability of some 
British Muslim representatives to come to terms with religious, as opposed to political 
imperatives in Khan’s actions.  
 
This chapter connects with and builds upon work already undertaken in the previous 
chapter on jihadists settling in Britain, and looks at the specific influence in the 
United Kingdom of four jihadists who gained prominence during the years which 
frame this research. Three of these ‘four lions’ of British Jihadism – Omar Bakri 
Muhammad, Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada came from Muslim majority nations, the 
fourth, Jamaican Abdullah el-Faisal, claimed theological legitimacy via his years 
living and studying in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps characteristically in terms of religious 
actors, all appear to have viewed their interpretation of their faith as offering a design 
for living, not just in Muslim majority nations, but in a nation state of Judeo-Christian 
heritage, albeit with strong secular characteristics.  
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In order to explain the breadth of British Jihadism – the ‘detail’ of the thesis title, this 
chapter goes further than considering terrorist attacks and prominent jihadists. The 
highly charged nature of Islamist and jihadist currents on campus is outlined, and 
found to have considerable longevity. The deep involvement of one particular 
organisation – Al-Muhajiroun in violence is characterised, but it is observed that this 
is not the only side to the group formed by Bakri Muhammad and now led by Anjem 
Choudary. Al-Muhajiroun spends significant amounts of time calling others to the 
faith, and agitating for the introduction of sharia law, not in Muslim majority nations, 
but here in the United Kingdom. These are the practices of an organisation devoted 
to what it considers religious duty. Related to this approach, consideration is also 
given to the broader issue of religion and political violence. At its fringes, British 
Islamism displays a willingness to engage in both threats and violence targeting 
minorities. This tendency, a characteristic of Jihadist actors in Muslim majority 
nations, is thus far under researched, and one that is also considered in the final 
chapter on the response of critical terrorism studies to Jihadism.  
 
4.2 Terrorist Attacks by British Jihadists 
Jihadist actors have been responsible for a total of 54 deaths in the United Kingdom 
since 2003. These killings include that of DC Oake in Manchester in 2003, the 52 
civilians killed in the July 2005 London Transport bombings and Fusilier Lee Rigby 
murdered outside Woolwich barracks in 2013. Additionally five jihadists have killed 
themselves in domestic suicide bombings since 2005 – four on 7/7 and Kafeel 
Ahmed at Glasgow Airport in 2007. The 7/7 attacks in London gave the United 
Kingdom the unenviable record of suffering the first suicide bombings in Western 
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Europe. In total, jihadists have detonated bombs in the United Kingdom on ten 
separate occasions, with varying degrees of success. This figure comprises the eight 
separate public transport attacks in London in 2005, and the 2007 Glasgow and 
2008 Exeter bombings, in which the only casualties were the perpetrators.  
 
In terms of the scale of threat posed by British Jihadism, comparison with earlier 
strains of terrorism is illuminating. This research locates 54 deaths in Britain from 
2003 to 31 March 2015 as a consequence of British Jihadism – an average of just 
under five deaths per year, and a higher figure than that in Northern Ireland. 
Terrorism caused 395 deaths on the British mainland from 1969 to 2001 (Foley, 
2013, 19) 125 related to the Northern Ireland conflict, 270 occurring as a result of the 
Lockerbie bombing.10 Accepting Foley’s figures, in a calendar period of 33 full years 
the Northern Ireland conflict caused an average of just under four deaths annually on 
the mainland, whilst all types of terrorism led to nearly twelve fatalities each year.  
The eight bomb attacks on London’s public transport system in 2005, on 7 and 21 
July, represent the most significant jihadist attacks yet in the United Kingdom. As 
well as the loss to life, there was considerable economic damage. Estimates of lost 
tourist income alone were as high as £300 million (London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 2005). Police believe the 7/7 bombings cost some £8000 to organise 
(Hayman and Gilmore, 2009, 103), a demonstration that in cost benefit analysis 
terms, terrorism works. The motivations of the leader of the leader of the 7/7 cell – 
                                                          
10 For reasons that are unclear, Foley does not appear to have counted the three deaths in the 1999 London nail 
bombings. The perpetrator, David Copeland, was a member of a tiny fascist group, the National Socialist 
Movement (NSM) who targeted minority groups.  
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Mohammed Sidique Khan, are discussed in detail below, as they shed significant 
insight into the character and nature of British Jihadism.  
 
In Michel Foucault’s work on language, a particular role is observed for the author. 
The name of the author is at the centre of texts, it separates them, defines form and 
provides characterisation. “It points to the existence of certain groups of discourse 
and refers to the status of this discourse within a society and culture” (Foucault, 
1977, 123). This becomes problematic in considering terrorism, where the authors 
name is traditionally absent from texts such as communiqués claiming responsibility 
for a particular action. The Provisional IRA, for example, took to issuing written 
statements in the name of the androgynous and pseudonymous ‘P O’Neill’.  Suicide 
videos, by contrast, are made with the participant at the centre of events. Foucault 
continues “the function of an author is to characterise the existence, circulation and 
operation of certain discourses within a society” (Foucault, 1977, 127).  
To Foucault, it is in the text where the author explains events – a process that is 
central to the suicide video, where the process that has motivated the bombing is 
explained. It is perhaps the most individual of texts. The BBC transcript of 
Mohammed Sidique Khan’s suicide video is headed “London bomber: text in full” 
(BBC Website, 2005, b, see Appendix 1). Unfortunately this is not actually the case – 
Khan’s religious salutations as the video commences are not translated from the 
original Arabic – an unsatisfactory omission. The words the BBC leaves out of its 
translation are “Praise be to Allah, blessings and prayers upon his Prophet”. This is 
not the only example of an important jihadist statement being translated in this 
manner – Bruce Lawrence’s translation of Bin Laden’s statements adopts a similar 
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approach “For clarity and flow of language, religious formulae that normally follow 
the invocation of God or the Prophet Muhammad (in particular the customary “Peace 
be Upon Him” have been omitted” (Lawrence, 2005, ix). Whilst perhaps 
understandable, the danger with this approach is it risks swapping the intended 
framework given to a particular snippet of speech by its author, merely for the ease 
of reading of others.  
 
The transcript itself may be divided into four distinct categories. The first is religious - 
those salutations omitted by the BBC. The second is a mixture of the religious and 
political. Khan expresses a cynicism towards the media and government and ends 
with his clear statement “Our religion is Islam........ this is how our ethical stances are 
dictated”  – two of eight separate religious references in the text. It is the third section 
of Khan’s video – from lines 20-34, that is perhaps the best known. Here Khan is at 
his most political: “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world”. Although they are not mentioned by 
name, it is clear this is a reference to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Khan 
adds his condemnation of the treatment Muslims have received in such conflicts 
when he talks of “the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture” (lines 30-31) and 
states that until we (his fellow Muslims) feel security “my people will not stop this 
fight”. That this section of the video is the best known is perhaps indicative of debate 
on religious terrorism in recent years. Some appear ideologically more comfortable 
with the idea of a bomb attack because of flawed foreign policy, than with the 
concept of such an action being consistent with actual or perceived religious belief.  
As Lambert states “Mohammed Sidique Khan and fellow bomber Shehzad Tanweer 
were adamant that the war in Iraq, the war on terror and the UK’s uncritical support 
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for Israel’s oppression of Palestinians motivated them” (Lambert, 2011, 25). Whilst 
that may be the inference of Khan’s comments, it is worth noting he does not 
mention Iraq, Israel or even the Palestinians by name in his declaration.  
 
The fourth section, lines 35-43, sees Khan return to religious concerns, discussing 
his prayer, love of the Prophets and support for contemporaries such as Bin Laden. 
He finishes with what can be seen as a closing message to Muslims, asking those 
listening to pray that his work leads to acceptance into paradise. Khan’s final wishes 
seek a heavenly, rather than secular reward.  
I myself, I myself, I make dua (pray) to Allah... to raise me amongst those whom I love like the 
prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama 
Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and 
sisters that are fighting in the... of this cause. With this I leave you to make up your own minds 
and I ask you to make dua to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and 
enter us into gardens of paradise (BBC Website, 2005, b).  
Foucault would recognise this desire for heavenly reward. It was also his position 
that the author-function is tied to legal and institutional systems which determine 
discourses (Foucault, 1977, 130). The systems in which Khan positions himself are 
his interpretation of what Islam is, and what his duties as a Muslim are.  
Foucault argues that beyond the individual author emerge a series of positions that a 
range of individuals may occupy (Foucault, op cit). Representative voices from very 
differing approaches within British Islam illustrate an acceptance of Khan as a solely 
political actor, and the exclusion of other potentialities. The following section 
considers sources as diverse as Muslim Weekly, a national newspaper with a 
claimed circulation of 50,000 (Muslim Weekly, 2011) Cage, which styles itself as a 
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human rights NGO representing detainees (Kassimeris 2008, Cageprisoners, 2010) 
Muslim student bodies and several Muslim representative organisations. 
 
Muslim Weekly, in an editorial of 7 August 2009, stresses the need for the public 
enquiry into the government’s decision to invade Iraq (the Chilcot Inquiry) to also 
consider its effect on radicalisation. They quote a particular line directly from 
Mohammed Siddique Khan’s suicide video: “Your democratically elected 
governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the 
world”.  Cage’s Asim Qureshi also reproduces Khan’s ‘political’ paragraph in his 
organisation’s critique of Home Secretary Theresa May’s counter-terrorism Prevent 
strategy (Qureshi, 2011). This section of Khan’s speech is serving as what Foucault 
observed to be a ‘discursive practice’ – a primary point of reference that practitioners 
of a discourse return to. Neither Muslim Weekly nor Cage reproduce or consider 
Khan’s preceding lines:  
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation 
doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam - 
obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and 
messenger Muhammad... This is how our ethical stances are dictated (BBC Website, 2005, 
b).   
 
A religious motivation, or even Khan’s possible status as an actor with religious and 
political motivation for his actions, is not countenanced by either Qureshi or Muslim 
Weekly. Near identical approaches are to be found from another Cage activist 
Moazzam Begg in his Critical Studies on Terrorism interview and former Respect 
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party leader Salma Yaqoob. Discussing the extent to which British foreign policy has 
radicalised young people, Moazzam Begg states:   
If you look at the video statements of some of the July 7th bombers, they say clearly why they 
did it. It’s not to justify it, but if you want to know why somebody does something you have to 
hear it from his mouth, and he says clearly that he did it because of Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Kassimeris, 2008, 410-11).  
Yaqoob takes a virtually identical path: 
Mohammed Siddique Khan, the ringleader of the 7/7 bombers in a recording shown on Al-
Jazeera, unequivocally identifies British foreign policy and his opposition to it as the 
justification behind the attacks. (Yaqoob, 2007, 287)  
As with Muslim Weekly, Yaqoob goes on to directly quote Khan’s reference to 
‘democratically elected governments’ perpetuating atrocities.  
Writing of discourses, Foucault suggests an important rule for approaching 
discursive facts “The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different 
question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than the other? 
(Foucault, 1972, 27). We might ask how is it that in Yaqoob’s analysis of Khan, his 
references to foreign policy appear, but not his distinct declarations of faith. 
A related example comes from a 2008 round robin letter signed by leading figures in 
four prominent organisations in British Muslim life: the Cordoba Foundation, Respect 
Party, British Muslim Initiative and Friends of Al Aqsa. In a spirited critique of the 
Quilliam Foundation and its influence on government ‘What Turns Some Islamists to 
Terror’ presents what was by now orthodoxy:  
We believe this is just another establishment-backed attempt to divert attention from the main 
cause of radicalisation and extremism in Britain: the UK’s disastrous foreign policy in the 
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Muslim world, including its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for pro-Western 
dictators (al-Tikriti et al, 2008). 
The writers continue: “those misguided few who are willing to cross the line into 
terrorism are not driven by disfranchisement or Sayyid Qutb’s writings, they do it 
because they are furious about Western foreign policy”. Three of the organisations 
party to this statement – the Cordoba Foundation, British Muslim Initiative and 
Friends of Al-Aqsa have subsequently sought to develop influence with academics in 
the field of critical terrorism studies, a matter discussed in detail in chapter six.  
 
A slightly bolder approach to 7/7 is taken in literature produced for University Islamic 
Societies. “The War on Terror” (London ISOC, n.d.) is a two sided A4 leaflet that has 
been widely distributed at universities11. As well as providing a critique of the war on 
terror, it provides a summary of what it sees as the aims of Osama Bin Laden, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Mohammed Sidique Khan, who are 
respectively described as ‘a leader’, ‘a scholar’, ‘a soldier’ then rather curiously in 
Khan’s case ‘an independent’. Of 7/7 the leaflet states: 
“Was 7/7 a political act? Yes – clearly according to the videos of those who carried out the 
operations, they said it was for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Was 7/7 a terrorist attack? 
Yes the killing of 50 innocent civilians was undoubtedly a terrorist attack done to make a 
political statement.” (London ISOC, n.d.)  
The categorisation of the founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as a 
‘soldier’ and Al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri as a ‘scholar’ is hardly indicative 
                                                          
11 The author received a copy from a literature stand of the University of East Anglia ISOC in 2010, indicating 
distribution was not restricted to London ISOCs.   
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of a rejection of Al-Qaeda’s aims. The involvement of UK university students in 
Jihadist organisations is considered in greater detail later in this chapter.  
 
One of Foucault’s aims was to show why a statement could not be other than it was 
(Foucault, 1972, 27). He also viewed discursive formations as being groups of 
statements. Khan’s political beliefs have dominated debate on 7/7 within a significant 
section of British Muslim opinion, because a discursive formation has emerged 
excluding his religious views, choosing instead to focus on political justifications for 
the bombings. In time, a process of reinforcement has occurred, with disparate 
Muslim commentators selecting the same reference points from his suicide video. 
This process can be found in Muslim Weekly, from Moazzam Begg and Asim 
Qureshi of Cage, in the 2008 round robin letter, and finally from London ISOC, all 
establishing a discursive formation. Given the commitment of critical terrorism 
studies to examine “the discourses and representational practices of terrorism” 
(Jackson et al, 2009, 228) it is regrettable that the interview between George 
Kassimeris and Moazzam Begg, conducted in the Critical Studies on Terrorism 
journal, should readily allow this formation to be reproduced.  
 
Perhaps the least known and least understood British Jihadist attack is that 
conducted by Mohammed Rashid Saeed-Alim, the taken name of Nicky Reilly, a 
white male from Plymouth, Devon, who converted to Islam following 9/11. A man 
with learning difficulties, on 22 May 2008 Reilly entered the Giraffe restaurant in 
Exeter, intending to carry out a suicide bombing. His device detonated prematurely 
in the toilets, and he was the only person injured (Western Morning News, 2008).   
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In choosing a public venue to attack random civilians, Reilly’s methodology was little 
different from each British jihadist attack to that date. Indeed thus far all domestic 
jihadist bombings have been aimed either at public transport sites or licensed 
premises (see figure 4.1). Amongst bombings planned but not conducted due to 
intervention by the authorities we see also see the presence of a licensed venue – 
the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London in 2004, which those convicted following 
Operation Crevice talked of targeting, as well as public utilities, the Bluewater 
Shopping Centre in Kent, synagogues or even a football ground (Silber, 2012, 83). 
Kenan Malik raises a pertinent point concerning the failed Haymarket bombing of the 
Tiger bar in 2007. Just two minutes’ drive away are the Houses of Parliament and 
Foreign office “Yet the bombers chose to park their deadly load outside a building full 
of partygoers – hardly the actions of political soldiers driven to fury by Britain’s 
foreign policy” (Malik, 2009, 85).  
 
A new development in Exeter was that Reilly acted individually, leaving a valedictory 
letter explaining his intentions. This statement, reproduced in full by local media 
following his trial, indicates someone clearly capable of linear thought. If anything 
Reilly’s comments have not been given the analysis they deserved, most likely 
because of public references to his learning disability. Reilly commences his 
statement with the words “In the name of God most gracious, most merciful” (Exeter 
Express and Echo, 2008). These words are taken from the opening line of the 
Qur’an, and are referred to as the basmala or bismillah. This formula is invoked at 
the beginning of important Muslim events (Nanji, 2008, 28). In his translation of the 
Qur’an Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall describes this statement “as an essential 
part of the Muslims’ worship, public and private, and no solemn contract or 
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transaction is complete unless it is recited” (Pickthall, 2008, 5). However lacking in 
education Reilly was, and he was remarkably new to Islam, he had picked up some 
basics of the creed.  
 
Nicky Reilly’s initial complaint is that Muslims are suffering at the hands of Britain, 
Israel and America. This is a pain he has suffered collectively with his fellow Muslims 
“We are sick of taking all the brutality from you” (Exeter Express and Echo, 2008). 
The imprisonment of Muslims and the torture of Muslim women are also cited. Reilly 
then turns from geo-political matters to the prurient, and raises a series of concerns 
about the nation’s moral compass. 
In Britain it's OK for a girl to have sex without marriage and if she gets pregnant she can get 
an abortion so easily. When you are getting drunk on Friday and Saturday night your 
behaviour is worse than animals. You have sex in nightclub toilets. You urinate in shop 
doorways. You shout your foul and disgusting mouth off in the street. It is unacceptable to 
Allah and the true religion Islam. Britain and USA and Israel have no real rules. (Exeter 
Express and Echo, 2008) 
 
 
This is how Nicky Reilly had come to see the country of his birth, and his fellow 
citizens. His world view encompassed a particular duality, combining a critique of the 
war on terror, the related issue of Western policy in Muslim majority countries, and, 
almost simultaneously, a disgust at the morality which he observed on working class 
Plymouth streets he had lived all his life. This religious conservatism, in particular a 
concern about the sexual conduct of society, appears characteristic of jihadist actors, 
and intrinsic to their practice. In the previous chapter the attacks on ‘westernised’ 
women in Algeria by jihadist groups, and the cheerleading of such actions by 
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Algerian émigrés in London was cited. In addition to this Juergensmeyer considers 
examples from both Algeria and Afghanistan where Islamists sought to remove 
women from public life (Juergensmeyer, 2003, 200) and to achieve control over 
public displays of sexuality. To the fundamentalist, the type of decadence Reilly 
expresses his disgust for:  
…..are illustrations of the encroaching power of evil, demonstrations of the pervasiveness of 
the lack of moral values, and examples of how social definitions have become skewed 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003, 202).  
In developing his statement, Reilly also appears to have been influenced by the 
suicide video of Mohammed Sidique Khan. Towards the end of his narrative, Reilly 
uses an identical phrase to that used by Khan “Our words are dead until we give 
them life with our blood” (Exeter Express and Echo, 2008, BBC Website 2005, b). 
Similarly, there is also a reference to Bin Laden, and an indication that Reilly was 
familiar with Bin Laden’s statements “Sheikh Usama has told you the solution on 
how to end this war between us and many others have as well but you ignore us” 
(Exeter Express and Echo, 2008). 
The extent, to which Reilly worked with or was directed by others, is unclear. 
Diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, his mother believes he was easy prey for 
radicalisation (BBC Website, 2008). Devon and Cornwall police regard two men in 
Pakistan, who Reilly was in contact with via the Internet, as having played a critical 
role in assisting him to construct his device (BBC Website, 2010), although the 
actual bomb attack, and the description of his motivation, appear to be his own work.  
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It would be incorrect to assert British Jihadists have been solely preoccupied with 
random attacks upon civilians. Figure 4.1 (below) indicates a growing tendency 
towards targeted violence. Here the intended victims are not random citizens, 
travelling by tube or wining and dining, but have instead been selected on the basis 
of who they are, what they believe or actions they have conducted or been 
associated with. By looking at who is targeted in these incidents, and the 
articulations put forward by participants, the potential emerges to develop further 
insight into who British Jihadists are, and the nature of their motivations. 
Jihadists have been responsible for the death of a police officer and a soldier in this 
type of attack (see figure 4.1) There have also been credible attempts to kill in 
targeted attacks, where the convicted perpetrators have been unsuccessful. The 
attempted murder of Stephen Timms MP in May 2010 by Roshonara Choudhry and 
the deadly weapons assembled to attack the English Defence League (EDL) in 2012 
(see figure 4. 2) are examples where the political views of the victim appear to have 
impacted on their selection for attack. On a further occasion police intervention and 
prosecution has prevented an attempt to kidnap and murder a British Muslim soldier 
by jihadists (CPS, 2008), and secondly an attempt to follow the murder of Lee Rigby 
with a further attack upon military personnel (Crime and Justice, 2015).  
 
On 22 May 2013, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale murdered Fusilier Lee 
Rigby, ambushing the off duty soldier walking back to his barracks at Woolwich, 
south London. A noticeable aspect of this killing was the desire for martyrdom of 
both attackers. Rather than seeking to escape, each waited in the immediate vicinity 
of the body, with Adebolajo delivering monologues to anyone willing to listen, before 
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charging at armed police officers (Sengupta, 2013, a). In a speech recorded at the 
scene by a witness, a bloodied Adebolajo combined an evisceration of British foreign 
policy with a series of religious declarations: 
The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British 
soldiers. And this British soldier is one. It is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. By Allah, 
we swear by the Almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone. So 
what if we want to live by the Sharia in Muslim lands? (LiveLeak, 2013) 
 
Adebolajo appears to have considered his actions a religious imperative, due to 
commandments in the Qur’an. Although a British citizen of African Christian descent, 
he locates his worldview elsewhere: 
By Allah if I saw your mother today with a buggy I would help her up the stairs. This is my 
nature. But we are forced by the Qur'an, in Sura At Tawba, through many ayah in the Qur’an, 
we must fight them as they fight us. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. I apologise that 
women had to witness this today but in our lands women have to see the same (LiveLeak, 
2013).  
The particular chapter referred to by Adebolajo is Sura 9: At-Taubah, considered to 
be one of “stern commandments against idolaters” (Pickthall, 2004, 114). At 9:5 it 
contains the following words: 
Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and 
take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent 
and establish worship and pay the poor due, then leave their way free. Allah is Forgiving, 
Merciful (Pickthall, 2004, 114).  
 
 
A second element emerges, certainly on the part of Abdebolajo. That is the overt 
attachment to religious symbols, and a desire to position himself within the tradition 
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of earlier British Jihadists. At remand hearings he appeared carrying a copy of the 
Qur’an, asking to be known as Mujahid Abu Hamza (Shaw, 2013). Adebolajo’s 
declared intention appeared to be to locate himself in the lineage of perhaps Britain’s 
best known Islamic cleric – Abu Hamza. Yet to students of jihadist struggles, the 
image of a book waving defendant haranguing a court drew parallels with older and 
arguably more substantial figures in the jihadist canon. Some of the earliest televised 
footage of criminal proceedings against contemporary jihadists comes from Egypt, 
and the trials of those arrested in the sweeping detentions which followed the 1981 
assassination of Sadat. In what is perhaps the standard assessment of that period, 
Gilles Kepel’s “The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in  Egypt” (1985) 
one of the assassins, Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli is pictured on the first day of his 
trial, raising his Qur’an above his head and waving it at the court.  
 
In his eventual trial at the Old Bailey, the duality of juxtapositions continued, as 
Adebolajo rooted his actions in his understanding of sharia, and opposition to British 
foreign policy. On 21 May he had prayed to Allah that the person they selected 
would indeed be a soldier (Shaw, 2013b). Lee Rigby was killed after the defendants 
drove a car at him, then he was stabbed repeatedly by both assailants. In his 
evidence, Adebolajo portrayed the initial part of the attack as God’s will “That was 
not something that was premeditated. It just so happened Allah caused him to cross 
in front of my car” (Shaw, 2013b). Adebolajo characterised his defence in strictly 
Islamic terms, insisting an English criminal court was not the place he should be 
judged.  
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In terms of the law, I am a soldier of Allah. I understand some people might not recognise this 
because we don’t wear fatigues or go to the Brecon Beacons to train but we are soldiers in 
the eyes of Allah. Basically, it’s a war between Islam and those military who invade Muslim 
lands (Shaw, 2013b).  
 
The table below gives a full listing of fifteen jihadist attacks in the United Kingdom.  
 Fig 4.1 Jihadist terrorist attacks in Britain 
Date Place/Incident Names  Court Case Comments and 
Sources 
14/01/03 Manchester. 
Murder of DC 
Stephen Oake.  
Kamel 
Bourgass.  
Convicted of 
murder on 
30/6/04.  
Manchester 
Online, 
15/04/05. 
07/07/05 Bombing on 
train near 
Edgware Road 
tube station, 
London. Kills 6. 
Mohammed 
Sidique Khan 
None – Suicide 
Bombing 
Intelligence and 
Security 
Committee, 
2009.  
07/07/05 Bombing on 
train near 
Aldgate tube 
Station. Kills 7. 
Shehzad 
Tanweer 
None – Suicide 
Bombing 
Intelligence and 
Security 
Committee, 
2009 
07/07/05 Bombing on 
train near 
Russell Square 
tube station. 
Kills 26   
Jermaine 
Lindsay 
None – Suicide 
Bombing 
Intelligence and 
Security 
Committee, 
2009 
07/07/05 Bombing on a 
bus at Tavistock 
Square. Kills 13 
Hasib Hussain None – Suicide 
Bombing 
Intelligence and 
Security 
Committee, 
2009 
21/7/05 Detonated bomb 
on tube between 
Stockwell and 
Oval stations. 
Ramzi 
Mohammed 
Convicted of 
conspiracy to 
murder. Jailed 
for 40 years.  
No injuries, 
device did not 
explode.  
Siddique, 
23/04/08 
21/7/05 Detonated bomb 
between Latimer 
Hussain Osman Convicted of 
conspiracy to 
No injuries, 
device did not 
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Road and 
Shepherd’s 
Bush stations 
murder. Jailed 
for 40 years. 
explode.  
Siddique, 
23/04/08. 
21/7/05 Detonated bomb 
accidentally on 
the No.26 bus in 
Hackney 
Muktar Said 
Ibrahim 
 
Convicted of 
conspiracy to 
murder. Jailed 
for 40 years. 
No injuries, 
device did not 
explode. 
Hackney 
Gazette, 
22/03/07. 
Siddique, 
23/04/08 
21/7/05 Detonated bomb 
at Warren Street 
station.  
Yassin Omar Convicted of 
conspiracy to 
murder. Jailed 
for 40 years. 
No injuries, 
device did not 
explode.  
Silber (2012, 
142).  
21/07/05 Bomb intended 
for Shepherds 
Bush station.  
Manfo Asiedu Jailed for 33 
years.  
Bomb dumped 
in a park after 
Asiedu changed 
his mind.  
Siddique, 
23/04/08.  
29/6/07 Tiger Nightclub, 
Haymarket, 
London. A 
secondary 
device was 
placed on 
Cockspur 
Street.  
Dr Bilal Abdulla 
and Kafeel 
Ahmed.  
See below Bombs failed to 
go off.  
 
Smith, Hansard, 
02/07/07. 
30/6/07  Glasgow Airport Dr Bilal Abdulla 
and Kafeel 
Ahmed. 
Abdullah 
convicted, 
Ahmed died of 
the injuries he 
received in the 
attempted 
bombing.  
Bomb failed to 
go off fully, but 
fire ignited. 
 
Crown 
Prosecution 
Service, 
16/12/08.  
22/5/08 Exeter, Giraffe 
restaurant.  
Mohammad 
Rashid Saeed-
Alim (Nicky 
Reilly). 
Jailed for 18 
years. 
Bowcott, 
Guardian, 
Bomb went off 
in the toilet, only 
injuring Reilly.  
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 31/01/09. 
14/5/10 Stephen Timms 
MP.  
Roshonara 
Choudhry 
Convicted at the 
Old Bailey of 
attempted 
murder, 3/11/10. 
Jailed for life 
with a minimum 
15 year tariff.   
Timms was 
stabbed at his 
constituency 
office, but 
survived.  
Dodd and 
Topping, 
3/11/10.  
22/05/13 Woolwich – 
murder of 
Drummer Lee 
Rigby 
Michael 
Adebolajo and  
Michael 
Adebowale  
Both men 
arrested at the 
scene, 
subsequently 
convicted of 
murder and 
jailed for life. 
Off duty soldier 
Lee Rigby was 
murdered close 
to Woolwich 
army barracks.  
Crown 
Prosecution 
Service, 
26/02/14.  
 
 
 
4.3 Failed Jihadist Attacks in Britain  
This research names a total of thirteen credible jihadist plots in Britain, where police 
intervention appears to have prevented loss of life or serious injury, and where a 
successful criminal prosecution followed. For reasons of space less attention is 
devoted to these incidents than to the attacks above. However that thirteen 
substantive plots occurred from 2000 - March 2015 indicates virtually each year a 
jihadist attack has been attempted in Britain but disrupted by police and/or security 
service intervention.  
 
If the thirteen plots below are added to instances of failed attempts to conduct 
bombings on aircraft to the United States, where in 2001 Richard Reid failed to ignite 
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a bomb in his shoes and in 2009 Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab was unable to set off a 
device in his underpants, an issue emerges. Croft and Moore (2010) and Kenney 
(2010) point to the apparent incompetence of jihadist actors. For all the fear 
engendered by their attacks, British Jihadists do not yet possess the tradecraft 
frequently demonstrated by actors at the peak of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Indeed there is a somewhat comic element to grown men in Luton conceiving of 
sending an exploding toy car into an army barracks to kill soldiers, or the 
Birmingham rucksack plot members losing money trading shares online they had 
hoped to use to buy explosives (O’Neill, 2013).  
The story of domestic British Jihadism begins in 2000, a full ten months before 9/11, 
with an MI5 operation monitoring Moinul Abedin of Birmingham and Faisal Mostafa 
of Stockport. In a house and a garage Abedin had rented in fake names, chemicals, 
detonators and protective clothing were discovered (Morris 2002). Abedin was 
subsequently sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for committing an act with 
intent to cause an explosion. His target remains unknown. Mostafa, who had been 
cleared of similar charges in 1996 in Greater Manchester, was again found not 
guilty12 (Morris, 2002). Whilst hardly indicative of an impending wave of terrorist 
violence, the activities of Moinul Abedin serve as an important marker in terms of 
timescale – they pre-date 9/11, they pre-date the allied invasion of Afghanistan and 
they predate by at least two and a half years the invasion of Iraq.   
The 2004 fertiliser plot, which saw jihadists from across the south of England jailed 
for life following a police operation code-named Crevice, provides an important 
indication that foreign policy has served to stimulate, more than create British 
Jihadism. Core members of the group had made multiple trips to Pakistan and 
                                                          
12 In 1996 Mostafa was cleared of explosives charges, but jailed for four years for possessing a gun.  
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Afghanistan from 2000 onwards, and the decision to carry out an attack at home 
appears to have been taken in February 2003 (Silber, 2012, 96) – a full month before 
the allied invasion of Iraq. Given this, and the 2000 Birmingham case, it is necessary 
to conclude; “the threat to Britain pre-dated the invasion of Iraq, but the war and 
subsequent occupation likely contributed to the intensification of the threat” (Foley, 
2013, 28-9).  
When considering targeted attacks by British jihadists, as well as more random 
actions, the presence of religious articulations may be readily discerned. On 30 June 
2012 six Muslims from Birmingham travelled to Dewsbury in West Yorkshire. Armed 
with homemade bombs, guns, knives and machetes, they intended to attack an 
English Defence League rally in the town. A statement they had written addressed to 
the “English Drunkards League” explains their motivations: 
Today is a day of retaliation (especially) for your blasphemy of Allah and his messenger 
Muhammad. We love death more than you love life. The penalty for blasphemy of Allah and 
his messenger Muhammad is death (Muslim Weekly, 10/05/2013) 
The men’s attempt to implement their interpretation of sharia law on the streets of 
Yorkshire was unsuccessful, not least because they arrived after the EDL had 
dispersed. The subsequent discovery of the weaponry they had amassed, including 
two shotguns and two incendiary devices, led to prison sentences of between 18 and 
19 and a half years (Radnedge, 2013). 
What is distinctive about the Birmingham Jihadists message is its separation from 
the purely political objections long raised to the EDL by anti-fascist protestors. 
Organisations such as Searchlight, Hope Not Hate, Unite against Fascism and Antifa 
have all condemned the EDL’s perceived racism and violence towards Muslims, and 
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attempted to disrupt their activities accordingly. With the jihadists however, it is not 
the EDL’s racism that is provocative, but blasphemy that demands the ultimate 
response.  
 
Figure 4.2    Failed jihadist attacks in Britain  
Date Target Names  Trial  Comment 
November 2000  Unknown Moinul Abedin 
and Faisal 
Mostafa, 
arrested in 
Birmingham on 
17/11/00. 
Abedin 
convicted and 
jailed for 20 
years for 
committing an 
act with intent to 
cause an 
explosion. 
Mostafa 
acquitted. 
First known 
domestic 
Jihadist plot, 
pre-dating 9/11 
and the war on 
terror.  
 
Morris, 28/2/02.  
2004 The Operation 
Crevice plot.  
Amongst others, 
the Bluewater 
Shopping 
Centre in Kent, 
and Ministry of 
Sound nightclub 
in London.  
Salahuddin 
Amin, Omar 
Khyam, Waheed 
Mahmood, 
Jawad Akbar 
and Anthony 
Garcia. All were 
from Crawley or 
Luton.  
Each man was 
convicted and 
jailed for life.  
BBC Website 
30/04/07.  
Silber (2012, 
87).  
 
Arrested in 
August 2004.  
Car combs were 
to be placed in 
limousines in 
basement car 
parks.  
Dhiren Barot Convicted 
conspiracy to 
murder 7/11/06, 
Woolwich 
Crown Court. 
Jailed for 40 
years.  
Tax (2012, 34). 
10/08/2006 Liquid Bomb 
Plot. 
25 suspects 
arrested in 
Britain following 
investigation 
involving police 
in Britain, USA 
and Pakistan.  
Those arrested 
Umar Ali, Tanvir 
Hussain and 
Assad Sarwar 
convicted of 
conspiracy to 
murder people 
unknown and 
following a re-
trial, of plotting 
Crown 
Prosecution 
Service, 
08/07/10.  
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came mostly 
from High 
Wycombe and 
Walthamstow.  
(Silber, 2012, 
40).  
to destroy 
transatlantic 
aircraft.  
Ibrahim Savant, 
Arafat Khan and 
Waheed Zaman 
convicted of 
conspiracy to 
murder, after 
three trials.  
2006-7 Birmingham – 
plot to kidnap 
and murder a 
British Muslim 
soldier 
Parviz Khan, 
Mohammed 
Irfan, Bassiru 
Gassama, 
Hamid Elasmar, 
Zahor Iqbal.  
Khan jailed for 
life, for engaging 
in conduct with 
the intention to 
commit acts 
terrorism.  
Four others 
convicted for 
their roles.  
CPS, 18/02/08. 
2008 Bristol Shopping 
Centre 
Andrew Ibrahim Convicted, and 
given an 
indeterminate 
sentence.  
Gardham 
18/07/09.  
2010 Newcastle Rajib Karim Jailed for 30 
years on 
28/2/11 
A British 
Airways 
employee, 
sought to attack 
an aircraft.  
Gardham, 
02/02/11.  
2010  Stock Exchange Nine men from 
Cardiff, London 
and Stoke. 
Arrested 
20/12/10. 
All nine pleaded 
guilty to a series 
of terrorist 
offences.  
Abdul Miah was 
jailed for 16 
years 10 
months.  
 Gurukanth 
Desai, 12 years 
 Mohammed 
Chowdhury, 13 
years, 8 months 
 Shah Rahman, 
12 years.  
 Omar Latif, 10 
Crown 
Prosecution 
Service, 
09/02/12,  
 
193 
 
years 4 months. 
 Mohammed 
Shahjahan, 8 
years 10 
months.  
 Usman Khan, 8 
years. 
 Nazam Hussain, 
8 years.  
 Mohibur 
Rahman, 5 
years.   
2011 Jewish 
community 
targets in 
Manchester 
Mohammed and 
Shasta Khan, 
from Oldham. 
Convicted 
19/07/12. Mr 
Khan was jailed 
for 15 years, his 
wife for 8.  
Frazer, 
20/07/12.  
2011 – arrested 
September  
Birmingham 
Rucksack Plot 
(Operation 
Pitsford) 
Irfan Naseer, 
Irfhan Khalid, 
Ashik Ali 
convicted of 
leading the plot.  
Rahin Ahmed, 
Bahader Ali, 
Mohammed 
Rizwan and 
Mujahid Hussain 
also convicted, 
as were four 
men for 
travelling to 
Pakistan for 
terrorist training.  
Convicted of 12 
counts of 
preparing for 
acts of 
terrorism. Khalid 
and Naseer 
jailed for 18 
years, Ali for 15.  
 
See McCarthy, 
Birmingham 
Mail 26/04/13 
and Peachey, 
Independent, 
26/04/13.   
No specific 
target had been 
selected.  
30/06/12 Attempt to bomb 
EDL rally in 
Dewsbury. 
Omar 
Mohammed 
Khan, 
Mohammed 
Hasseen, Anzal 
Hussain, 
Mohammed 
Saud, Zohaib 
Ahmed and 
Jewel Uddin 
arrested on 4 
July after 
weapons 
discovered in 
their impounded 
All pleaded 
guilty to 
preparing an act 
of terrorism 
between 1 May 
and 4 July 2012. 
(Muslim Weekly, 
10/05/13).   
Knives and guns 
were also taken 
to be used, but 
the men arrived 
after the EDL 
had dispersed. 
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car. 
2012 Luton Territorial 
Army Toy Car 
Plot  
Zahid Iqbal, 
Mohammed 
Sharfaraz 
Ahmed, Umar 
Arshad and 
Syed Hussain.  
All four pleaded 
guilty. Iqbal and 
Ahmed jailed for 
16 years 3 
months, Arshad 
for 6 years 09 
months and 
Hussain for 5 
years 3 months.  
 
Luton Today, 
18/04/14.  
19 August 2014 Attempt to 
behead a British 
soldier in 
London 
Al-Muhajiroun 
supporter 
Brusthom 
Ziamani 
convicted of 
preparing an act 
of terrorism.  
Jailed for 22 
years.  
 
 
Crime and 
Justice 
(20/03/15).  
 
 
4.4 Four Lions? The Clerical Leaders of British Jihadism  
The most controversial figures within British Islamism have, perhaps appropriately, 
been clerics – Abu Hamza late of Finsbury Park mosque, Abu Qatada formerly of the 
Four Feathers centre in London, Abdullah el-Faisal who taught at a series of London 
Islamic institutions including Brixton Mosque and Omar Bakri Muhammad, founder of 
Al-Muhajiroun. Whilst differences exist between the men in terms of ethnic 
background, temperament and personal ambitions, there is also much common 
ground. All four are Sunni Muslims who espouse Salafism, moved to the United 
Kingdom in the 1980s or 1990s, each justify violence at specific junctures, and all 
looked to develop influence with British Muslims whilst simultaneously contributing to 
global Islamic affairs. In turn each was to come into conflict with the British state, and 
the legal systems of other countries.  
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Abdullah el-Faisal 
A Jamaican born convert to Islam, Abdullah el-Faisal makes a living as an Islamic 
preacher, with a particular interest in using social media to advance his arguments. 
El-Faisal’s background gave him particular advantages when propagating his 
interpretation of Islam to black Britons. Just two weeks after she converted to Islam, 
Marion Lindsay took her son Germaine to hear a fellow Jamaican talk about Islam – 
Abdullah el-Faisal (BBC2, 2010). A former drug user, el-Faisal was well placed to 
proselytise to those with an experience of street life, and could offer a distinct, if 
austere alternative to it.  He understood that life because he had lived it, but could 
also offer an understanding of a new vision – el-Faisal had studied Islam in Saudi 
Arabia for eight years (Schoenfeld, 2004, 51).    
Thus educated, he took up life as a peripatetic preacher of Islam, building up a 
steady following through sales of his lectures and sermons (Abbott, 2010).  7/7 
bomber Germaine Lindsay appears only one of many to be influenced by el-Faisal. 
Three British men from Tipton who fought in Afghanistan in 2000-1 – Rhuhel Ahmed, 
Asif Iqbal and Shafiq Rasul were reportedly encouraged on that path, in material 
which emerged via Wikileaks:  
Various Imams and a well-connected cleric named Sheikh Faisal visited the Tipton mosque 
and encouraged the detainee and his friends to commit themselves to the armed struggle 
against the west (US DoD, 29/10/03). 
 
It appears to be only after 9/11 that the authorities digested the detail of what el-
Faisal had been saying for years – that his preaching included not just a call for jihad 
but the arming of Muslim children, and to kill Jews and Hindus. In 2003 he was 
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convicted of soliciting murder, and at the completion of sentence in May 2007 
deported (BBC Website, 2007, b). El-Faisal holds the unwelcome title of the first 
Muslim cleric in Britain to be convicted of inciting hatred (Foley, 2013, 269-70).  
Abdullah el-Faisal settled in Kenya before being deported again - to his homeland of 
Jamaica. There, el-Faisal remains as active as ever, and an indication of his output 
is that a You Tube search of his name on 27 September 2013 listed 122,000 videos. 
In cyberspace the restrictions some governments have placed on el-Faisal in person 
may be readily circumvented. For example an el-Faisal lecture utilising the Paltalk 
system and his own Authentic Tauheed website entitled “Why we hate the Shia” was 
being advertised by British supporters in July 2014 (Non Stop Dawa, 2014). On 
social media el-Faisal has taken a declared position in support of the Islamic State, 
accusing Al-Qaeda of being jealous of IS, and taking a wrong turn under Ayman al-
Zawahiri (Faisal, 2014).  
 
Abu Hamza 
The most recognisable British Jihadist has been Abu Hamza. His jocular rent-a-
quote personality, prosthetic limb, and London accent helped form a public image 
that was a tabloid editor’s dream. A lapsed Muslim who rediscovered the faith, 
Hamza worked at Regents Park Mosque as a cleaner (Lambert, 2011, 81) but had 
greater ambitions. In 1994 he established the Supporters of Sharia organisation, and 
took up a position at Luton Central Mosque (Smith, 2000) He was then appointed to 
take Friday prayers at Finsbury Park mosque, gaining operational control of the 
centre  in 1997 (O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 36). In theological terms, Abu Hamza 
appears to have made up with gusto what he lacked in knowledge. Having noted 
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Abu Hamza’s physical deformities and their provenance in Afghanistan, witness 
Omar Nasiri declared: 
I was even more amazed when I heard Abu Hamza speak. He knew nothing at all about 
theology, which seemed odd for someone who had gone through the camps. He was very 
loud and passionate, but to me he also seemed very ill-informed (Nasiri, 2006, 275).  
 
When Giles Kepel interviewed Abu Hamza at Finsbury Park mosque, they spoke 
Cairene together, the dialect of Arabic associated with Egypt’s capital. Yet Kepel 
found Hamza more comfortable in English (Kepel, 2010), so immersed had the 
Egyptian become in London life. This appears to have been to Hamza’s advantage 
in working with young British Muslims, indeed the difference between Hamza and 
some of the older, Urdu speaking Imam’s in London is significant. 
Radical imam’s were experts at articulating their followers’ cultural anxieties and exploiting 
their conflicted sense of identity, and they did so in the (European) languages in which their 
second- and third-generation European Muslim audiences felt most comfortable (Neumann, 
2008, 36).  
 
Yet this can only serve as a partial explanation for the Hamza phenomenon. Under 
his control Finsbury Park mosque developed a reputation for extremism and 
intemperate behaviour involving young British Muslim men. But it also provided a 
home for the capital’s Algerian exiles, some of whom were prominent supporters of 
jihadist organisations in their homeland. As we have seen in the previous chapter, at 
least nine Algerians appear to have travelled on in this period from Finsbury Park to 
overseas conflicts. O’Neill and McGrory remind us of the importance of Salafism: 
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The core of the Salafi ideology is that Islam has strayed from its origins, and secular Muslim 
society has grown decadent and heretical. Modern standard bearers, like Osama Bin Laden, 
embraced the idea of holy struggle- jihad – to achieve their religious and political objectives 
(O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 276) 
It was this Salafi-Jihadist analysis of the world – and what to do about it - which 
Hamza presented, but with a significant development. “Abu Hamza copied this, and 
finessed the doctrine to appeal to inner city British youths” (O’Neill and McGrory, op 
cit).  
 
Hamza briefly became editor of the GIA’s publication al-Ansar in 1997, and was its 
spokesman during the controversy over a series of massacres (UNSC, 2011). In this 
period, French counter-terrorist officials, fearful of an attack by Algerians on the 1998 
World Cup football tournament in the country appear to have developed a particular 
fear of Hamza and Abu Qatada who; 
Issued a regular flow of fatwas to GIA groups operating in France and Algeria, drawing upon 
a deluge of references from the Qur’an and Salafist theologians to justify all manner of 
violence, including the killing of women and children (Evans and Phillips, 2007, 253).  
The French even seem to have believed that in issues of al-Ansar produced in 
Finsbury Park, operational instructions were being given in code to militants in 
France (Foley, 2013, 287). Abu Hamza was not however so committed to the cause 
that he would allow his support for the GIA to erode his position at the mosque. 
When the GIA issued a communiqué justifying massacres of civilians on the bizarre 
grounds that the population of Algeria was now apostate, Hamza was attacked by 
some Algerians who ripped down a copy of the GIA’s notice inside the mosque 
(O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 44). After clashes saw riot police deployed, Hamza 
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backed down and resigned from his work for the GIA (O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 
44-5).   
 
Media coverage of Finsbury Park mosque increased, especially after Hamza was 
connected in the press to a kidnapping in Yemen by the Islamic Army of Aden-
Abayan (see chapter five) indeed Abu Hamza appeared to rather enjoy the spotlight 
(O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 159) where he became widely caricatured. Supporters 
of Hamza presented him rather differently. When remanded in custody awaiting trial 
in 2005, demonstrations were held by members of Supporters of Sharia outside 
HMP Belmarsh. Hani al Sebai Yusif, Director of the Al-Maqreze Center for Historical 
Studies opined: 
The jailed cleric is reciting the “prayer of the sufferer”. His family said he was reciting another 
prayer, that of the story of Prophet Yunus (Jonah) who was swallowed by a whale but saved 
by God, in the darkness of Belmarsh (Asharq al-Awsat, 2005).  
In 2006 Abu Hamza was jailed for seven years for inciting murder and racial hatred 
during his time as Imam at Finsbury Park mosque. In 2012 was extradited to the 
United States where he was convicted of 11 charges pertaining to the establishment 
of jihadi training camps in Oregon, and terrorist offences in Yemen, being jailed for 
life on 9 January 2015 (FBI, 2015).  
 
Omar Bakri Muhammad  
As the founder of Al-Muhajiroun, Bakri was a high profile, if peripheral figure within 
British Islam. He established the organisation in 1996 after splitting with HuT: “The 
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intention was to use Al-Muhajiroun to recruit young ideologues committed to forming 
a caliphate in Britain” (Watson, 2008, 45). Bakri possibly benefitted initially, like Abu 
Hamza, from being regarded as a bizarre, humorous figure. Watson insists Bakri 
was considered a crank by the British security services, a position assisted in the 
public mind by the television documentary ‘Tottenham Ayatollah’ (Ronson, 1997). In 
one of the first national television considerations of domestic Islamism, Bakri 
Muhammad produced a series of inflammatory and at times eccentric quotes. For 
example whilst discussing elements which would need to change to establish a truly 
Islamic society in Britain under sharia law, Bakri insisted music act The Spice Girls 
should be arrested ‘immediately’ for lewd conduct, whilst positioning himself 
disapprovingly outside the Wood Green branch of record store HMV.  
The author spoke briefly to Ronson about this programme when he was conducting 
a book signing at the Camden Centre in London on 12 November 2011. Nearly 
fifteen years on Jon Ronson made light of his documentary, making the self-
deprecating comment that people like Omar Bakri Muhammad had proven to be the 
exact opposite of how he had portrayed them – he had turned out to be more 
dangerous than funny. Bakri’s organisation, Al-Muhajiroun, is considered in greater 
detail later in this chapter.  
 
Following the 7/7 bombings, pressure on the British authorities to act against those 
who advocated jihadism was intense. Within two weeks of the attacks Bakri gave a 
curious interview to a Saudi exile newspaper. This included an offer to leave Britain 
voluntarily, but also stressed the positive theological work he was engaged in, stating 
he;  
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Had looked after and educated two generations of Muslims youths through religious sermons 
and lectures, and by participating in religious conferences. Bakri said he founded the Sharia 
court in Britain which officiated over 1,400 marriages and 600 divorces. He also established a 
college where hundreds of Muslims youths learned the fundamental tenants of Islam (Asharq 
al Awsat, 2005, b) 
 
Following Tony Blair’s declaration of 5 August 2005 that in terms of counter-terrorism 
‘the rules of the game are changing’ Bakri notably left Britain the following day 
(Foley, 2013, 270). Now based in Lebanon, he has continued to promote his and Al-
Muhajiroun’s ideals, using the Internet to remain in contact with supporters in Britain. 
Three major developments have occurred since Bakri’s sudden departure. Home 
Secretary Charles Clarke revoked his indefinite leave to remain in Britain, and an 
attempt by Bakri to return to in 2006, during a Royal Navy evacuation of British 
subjects from Lebanon during the Israel-Hezbollah war, was rejected (Guardian, 
2006). Never prosecuted in the UK under terrorism legislation, the Lebanese 
authorities have taken a more robust approach to Bakri. In 2010 he was convicted 
for his role in clashes with the Lebanese army, and by 2014 was in prison having 
been arrested as part of an army security drive to counter religious sectarianism 
(Lebanon Daily Star, 2014). Finally, like el-Faisal, Bakri has supported the 
emergence of the Islamic State, arguing that Al-Qaeda had in practice stepped aside 
for the group, and that Syria is now the focus of real hope (MSNBC, 2015).  
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Abu Qatada 
A Jordanian of Palestinian extraction expelled from Kuwait, Abu Qatada moved to 
Britain in 1993 (Wagemakers, 2012, 202). Also known as Omar Mahmoud Uthman, 
and Abu Qatada al-Filastini, Qatada voluntarily left Britain for Jordan on 6 July 2013, 
where he was subsequently acquitted of any role in terrorist attacks in Amman in the 
period 1999-2000. Described as a “dignified departure” and a “hero” by supporters 
(Brittain, 2013, Muslims against Detention, 2013) Qatada had spent the second half 
of his twenty years in Britain locked in legal battles against deportation. Although 
never charged with a terrorist offence here, Qatada was readily referred to in the 
press as Al-Qaeda’s leader in Europe or Bin Laden’s spiritual adviser (Littlejohn, 
2012) and in similar terms by British politicians: 
One individual indisputably a member of the Osama bin Laden team was Abu Qatada, a 
radical cleric who operated as Al-Qaeda’s ‘European Ambassador’ (Gove, 2006, 88).  
Despite an element of hyperbole, Qatada’s work as a propagandist with Algerian GIA 
exiles in London, and providing religious rulings for Osama Bin Laden is evidenced 
in the previous chapter. His role as a spiritual leader at the Four Feathers Club in 
west London to both Arab émigrés and young British Muslims appears to have been 
significant: 
Abu Qatada always gave very learned expositions. He talked about theology, and it was 
clear he knew a great deal about Islam. The lectures weren’t easy – he demanded a great 
deal from his audience (Nasiri, 2006, 269).  
Accompanying this knowledge was a clear commitment to combat. When discussing 
jihad “He made it clear that the armed jihad was the most noble form of all” (Nasiri, 
2006, 268), the type of elevation of jihad we have already seen from both Bin Laden 
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and Qutb. To Johannes Jansen the divide between those with an attachment to 
waging jihad and those who fail to do so, is a key separation between what he terms 
mainstream and fundamentalist Muslims:  
To true fundamentalists, the other, more spiritual meanings of jihad are unimportant, or at 
least much less important than the specific martial meanings of the term (Jansen, 1997, p10).    
 
The greater, spiritual jihad to be a better Muslim is hereby replaced by the lesser 
jihad of the battlefield. Although not personally a fighter, Qatada appears to have 
raised considerable funds in Britain for the Chechen cause (UNSC, 2009, a) and to 
have distributed the work of his fellow Jordanian Salafist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
(Wagemakers, 2012, 202) one of the most important Islamist thinkers alive within 
that tradition (Wagemakers, 2012). During the periods Qatada was remanded in 
custody fighting extradition to Jordan, he devoted his time to contemplation of the 
Qur’an “In the first three years, I completed the memorization of the Book of Allah, 
the Most High, along with lengthy contemplations about it” (Qatada, 2009) 
developing friendships with accused Islamist prisoners and seeking to rally his co-
religionists behind particular causes. One such statement, released via the Islamic 
Observation Center during the tensions over the Muhammad cartoons, “urged 
Muslim youth to defend Islam” (SITE Intel, 2006).  
Since his return to Jordan and successful defence in two terrorism trials, Qatada has 
continued to maintain a high profile in Salafist circles. This has included giving a 
series of interviews to the American Salafi Muslim Bilal Abdul Kareem. Here it can be 
noted that in contradistinction to el-Faisal and Omar Bakri, criticism is articulated of 
the Islamic State. Whilst praising them for fighting Shia Iran, Alawites and apostates, 
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Qatada accuses IS of dividing and fighting against the Mujahideen in Iraq and Syria 
(Kareem, 2015). Reference to the ‘Mujahideen’ here is likely to be a reference to the 
Al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat Al-Nusra, who Qatada supports against the Islamic State 
(al-Amin, 2014).  
 
By 2013, none of the ‘four lions’ of British Jihadism remained in the UK. El-Faisal 
and Hamza having been deported, Bakri Muhammad and Qatada almost certainly 
leaving before they were pushed.  The routes they took in terms of their activism 
differed, with Hamza taking a high media profile, Bakri Muhammad that of group 
based activism. Differences also emerge when their stances on the emergence of 
the Islamic State and its declared Caliphate are considered. Despite such 
dichotomies, radical Imam’s may be seen as conducting specific, similar roles. Peter 
Neumann argues four core elements discerned their work – they serve as chief 
propagandists of the Islamist militant movement, act as religious authorities, serve as 
recruitment magnets and create ‘networks of networks’. This may be nationally, 
internationally, or both (Neumann, 2008, 35). Not all of the four lions performed each 
of these duties all the time, but elements of Neumann’s framework fit their activities. 
Hamza, Bakri and el-Faisal may be considered prolific propagandists. Qatada 
enjoyed international status as a religious authority, whilst Hamza and el-Faisal both 
worked to tailor their appeal to particular demographics within British Islam. Here 
were recruitment ‘magnets’ willing to both travel the country and to utilise new 
technology as a tool for propagating their message. Perhaps the most high profile 
network to emerge as a consequence of this activism was to be Bakri Muhammad’s 
organisation, Al-Muhajiroun, which is considered in the following section.  
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4.5 Al-Muhajiroun: The Emigrants 
Given the repetition with which they appear in the narrative of British Jihadism, under 
a variety of names, it is necessary to examine Al-Muhajiroun in some detail. The first 
step to developing an understanding of the group is to consider their chosen 
nomenclature. The concept of migration is important within Islam. “The Hijrah refers 
to the migration/exodus of Muhammad and the muhajirun (his companions) from 
Mecca to the city of Yathrib” (Yusuf, 1995, 111). The Islamic calendar dates from this 
migration (Sardar and Malik, 2009, 18). Imtiyaz Yusuf observes that historically the 
Hijrah represents a journey of religious intent, and that it has been used by thinkers 
such as Mawdudi and Qutb to justify a withdrawal from states of non-belief (Yusuf, 
1995, 111).  In the name they have taken, Al-Muhajiroun position themselves within 
a key Islamic concept. Although some distance from the heart of Islam in Arabia, 
their situation, as exiles, should not necessarily be considered new or unusual – 
“One third of the ummah exists as minorities in non-Muslim countries” (Sardar and 
Malik, 2009, 150). With an estimated 1.6 billion Muslims in the world (Desilver, 2013) 
at least 500 million live, as Al-Muhajiroun do, in non-Muslim societies, and 
consequently do not live under a legal system which pertains to operate sharia13.  
 
Richard Watson, a BBC journalist who has investigated Al-Muhajiroun for many 
years, published “The One True God, Allah: The Rise of the British Jihad” (2008). He 
places the organisation at the centre of a British jihadism that traverses both the UK 
and Pakistan. Academic Catherine Zara Raymond (2010) narrows Al-Muhajiroun’s 
focus to the overthrow of the British government, and its replacement with an Islamic 
                                                          
13 In addition to this, not all Muslim majority states proclaim sharia, and many who do may not satisfy the 
demands of particular activists.  
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state, based on sharia. From Britain, other states would be overthrown until a 
caliphate was formed. Both writers discern domestic and international goals within 
the organisation’s strategy – an example of the duality which is important to 
recognise if we are to discern a distinct British Jihadism.  
 
Al-Muhajiroun has become a familiar sight in many British towns and cities. Their 
activities centre on dawah, usually conducted at street stalls where shoppers 
congregate, pitches outside mosques and at Islamic rallies and conferences. Their 
message is also spread online, via posters and stickers, and through provocative 
use of the media – in particular holding demonstrations and interventions with 
messages that may alarm or upset those who do not share their approach. Whilst 
using the name Muslims against Crusades, Al-Muhajiroun launched a series of 
protests against British troops parading after returning from service in Afghanistan. It 
is important to stress that these are not characteristic of the type of anti-war actions 
held by the Stop the War Coalition or pacifist groups since 2001. The focus of MAC 
has not been to oppose military intervention or violence per se, but to stress hostility 
to British servicemen and solidarity with the ummah. Activist and former British and 
Commonwealth middleweight boxing champion Anthony Small, who now calls 
himself Abdul Haqq, stated after demonstrating against the 1st Battalion Royal 
Anglian Regiment in Barking “I am a Muslim first and a boxer second. These people 
are killing my brothers and sisters. They come back to this country and parade 
medals they’ve won by killing” (Sabey, 2010).  
Whilst it is provocative demonstrations and stunts such as burning the poppy on 
Remembrance Day that attract publicity, much more routine work centres on 
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propagation of Islam (Choudary, 2011). Typically this work is publicised on social 
media. In an April 2011 example in Peckham, the intervention begins with prayer, 
before Choudary can be seen patiently explaining his ideas to shoppers, many of 
whom prefer to pass by without taking any leaflets. The video however closes 
triumphantly when a man accepts Islam, and makes the shahada (declaration of 
faith) to cries of ‘Allah Akhbar’ and an embrace from Anjem Choudary. It is from the 
shahada that a whole series of consequences follow, and the relationship between 
God and man is established (Sardar and Malik, 2009, 50). Speaking ahead of a 
similar street stall scheduled for east London in 2009, Choudary commented; 
We are going from area to area talking about Islam as an alternative to the current British 
lifestyle....Islam will liberate you from the man-made law and the worship of your own desires 
(Sherlock, 2009).  
Such mundane, routine activity would be familiar to anyone who has been part of an 
evangelical religious organisation or indeed a minor political party.  
 
In October 2004 Bakri closed down Al-Muhajiroun, perhaps mindful of possible 
proscription by the Home Secretary (Schroeder, 2007, 148). Subsequently a series 
of initiatives have been launched by those who were prominent in the original 
grouping, using different names for each organisation. Quintan Wiktorowicz lists as 
many as fifty different Al-Muhajiroun fronts and platforms, a list Catherine Raymond 
increases by fourteen (Raymond, 2010, 13), although the main incarnations have 
been Al-Muhajiroun, Al-Ghurabaa, Islam4UK and Muslims against Crusades. Each 
appears to have a very familiar, almost identical membership, and to conduct itself 
in. a similar manner to its predecessor. The tactic of proscribing Al-Muhajiroun and 
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successor groups does not appear to affect their ability to organise - no one from 
within this current has been convicted of membership of an illegal organisation. 
Indeed, after Islam4UK was banned on 21 January 2010, Anjem Choudary appeared 
on Newsnight that evening with Jeremy Paxman (Raymond, 2010, 24). 
 
How might we begin to categorise Al-Muhajiroun? Melinda Cooper (2008) sees 
radical Islam as conditional on absolute prohibition in familial, moral and sexual 
relations. Religious revivals in the neo-liberal era converge on this point – where 
national, political and economic foundations have been lost the politics of desire can 
still be controlled. Whilst Cooper stresses this element was present in the Muslim 
Brotherhood from its inception, it is interesting to note its preponderance in Al-
Muhajiroun circles. In 2012 activists in the London borough of Waltham Forest 
launched a campaign entitled The Shariah Project. This was a street level campaign 
for sharia law to be introduced in London, featuring activism against the sex industry, 
with website footage of Muslim security patrols to enforce norms of Islamic behaviour 
and debates with (pixilated) female journalists about the probity required of women.  
Such activities occurring in the middle of London provoke media outrage (Robinson, 
2013) but are not a surprise. Imtiyaz Yusuf argues hijrah (migration) has taken on 
particular significance in the post-colonial era “leading to the emergence of different 
interpretations and the establishment of hujar (settlements) relevant to diverse 
Muslim geopolitical areas” (Yusuf, 1995, 112) – this includes dividing territory into 
areas of Islam, and areas of war. The Shariah Project, however small, seeks to 
similarly establish and control territory.  
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This localism is consistent with Cooper’s analysis of what she refers to as an ‘Islamic 
neo-fundamentalism’, which “relocates absolute value in the realm of sexual politics 
and the divine – that is below and above the arena of the nation state” (Cooper, 
2008, 33). Thus calls for sharia law as a right of multi-cultural difference – this is a 
method of maintaining a non-negotiable sense of value. It is the demand for sharia 
that is central to the existence of the fundamentalist and is at the core of the 
definition of the faith expounded by key activists. As Sayyid Qutb states:  
The basis of the message is that one should accept the Shariah without any question and 
reject all other laws in any shape or form. This is Islam. There is no other meaning of Islam 
(Qutb, 2007, 36).   
 
Al-Muhajiroun’s view of Islam is not of a passive or purely spiritual faith, nor despite 
the Shariah Project, is it entirely local. Activists played a particularly prominent role in 
the violence during the international controversy over the Muhammad cartoons. One 
of Al-Muhajiroun’s incantations, Al-Ghurabaa looked to pre-empt any legal action 
against it, stating that its members; 
Do not glorify acts of terrorism, whether committed by individuals, organizations or nation 
states such as the USA or UK; we do not wish to emulate them or praise them and make it 
expressly clear that it is not the intention of any of our articles or comments of our 
representatives (Quoted in Schroeder, 2007, 149).  
 
This position is in contradiction to both Al-Muhajiroun’s conduct as an organisation 
and Al-Ghurabaa’s actions during the anti-Danish protests. It called a march from 
Regents Park Mosque to the Danish Embassy to protest about the cartoons of 
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Muhammad published in the newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. 
This demonstration featured placards with slogans such as “Slay Those Who Insult 
Islam” and was attended by one man dressed as a suicide bomber. Similar material 
appeared on the Al-Ghurabaa website (Schroeder, 2007, 150), and was no idle 
threat - this research has found five members of Al-Muhajiroun who have died in 
jihadist violence (see figure 4.3). These include an activist who was one of Britain’s 
first suicide bombers – Bilal Mohammed from Birmingham, who died in an attack on 
an Indian army post in Kashmir in 2000. Away from the dawah stalls and calls to the 
faith, Al-Muhajiroun has long been a group with a particular affiliation to serious 
violence. A 2013 report by anti-racist group Hope Not Hate suggests as many as 70 
people connected to Al-Muhajiroun have either been convicted of terrorist related 
offences in this country or killed fighting overseas (Lowles and Mulhall, 2013, 19). 
 
By 2008, Peter Neumann was questioning whether Al-Muhajiroun could be 
considered a ‘gateway’ organisation, joined by some who went on to become 
terrorists, or if it was instead a terrorist group (Neumann, 2008, 34). In terms of the 
total terrorist convictions of Al-Muhajiroun members, assembling a definitive figure is 
made problematic by a lack of clarity as to the number and details of members, and 
what appears to be a loose structure of affiliation, especially outside of London. 
Issues are further clouded by the reluctance of authorities to clearly state the politico-
religious background of those convicted of terrorist offences. Arrests in a 2010 plot to 
bomb the Stock Exchange, involving Jihadists from Cardiff, London and Stoke 
followed an Islam4UK meeting in Cardiff (Gardham et al, 2010). Significantly group 
affiliations of the nine men convicted of terrorist offences in this instance is lacking in 
the Crown Prosecution Service press release upon conviction (CPS, 2012), even 
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though it is present in national and local media coverage; “Six of the nine men had 
been personally taught by former Islam4UK spokesman Choudary, while four were 
also in contact with convicted terrorists” (Docklands and East London Advertiser, 
2012a). Similarly Camber et al (2012) refer to the prominent dawah stalls run by the 
Stoke gang members and that “At least two of the defendants were members of the 
MAC’s predecessor, Islam4UK”.  
 
The 7/7 bombings present further example of this ambiguity. Inquest evidence was 
heard that Mohammed Sidique Khan “developed a deepening interest in al-
Muhajiroun” (Addley, 2011) yet the group is unmentioned in the Coroner’s inquest 
report (Hallett, 2011).  One of the few occasions in which Al-Muhajiroun members 
appear to have been collectively investigated and subsequently prosecuted for 
terrorist offences was at the height of the tensions following the invasion of Iraq, 
when Abu Izzadeen and others delivered fiery orations outside Regents Park 
mosque on 9 November 2004. Six members were consequently jailed for inciting 
terrorism (MPS, 2008).  
 
Significant focus returned to Al-Muhajiroun following the Woolwich killing, with 
footage emerging of murderer Michael Adebolajo at the group’s demonstrations. This 
includes a photograph of a 2006 picket at the Central Criminal Court, in support of 
those charged following the Al-Ghurabaa demonstration at the Danish embassy 
(Whitehead et al, 2013). Images appeared to show Adebolajo scuffling with police 
officers shortly before he was arrested. Such articulation of grievance, and 
Adebolajo’s declaration that Muslims collectively are under attack, should not 
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surprise us. For Joseph R Gusfield, “Status politics is political conflict over the 
allocation of prestige” (Gusfield, 1976, 18). An obsession with declaring and 
jockeying for status percolates the thinking of these currents. Al-Muhajiroun in 
Waltham Forest is not acting outside of Islamist traditions by demanding sharia, nor 
is its activist Adebolajo acting illogically in waving his copy of the Qur’an at court, or 
placing himself within a canon of individuals headed by Abu Hamza. To such actors 
it is the denial of sharia, by a society which simultaneously proclaims multi-
culturalism and an equality of religious values, which engenders resentment.  
In his study of American Christian fundamentalists, Hofstadter found “The operative 
content of their demands is more likely to be negative, they call on us mainly to 
prohibit, to prevent, to censor and censure, to discredit and to punish” (Hofstadter, 
2008, 88).   
In any discussion of the extent to which these tendencies characterise British 
Islamism, the role of Al-Muhajiroun in expressing such demands cannot be 
overstated.  
 
Figure 4.3 Al-Muhajiroun’s Jihad: Members killed 
Name Details  Source 
Bilal Mohammed Died in a suicide bombing in 
Srinagar on 25/12/00. Involved 
with Al-Muhajiroun and Jaish-
e-Mohammed. 
Watson (2008, 63).  
Yasir Khan From Crawley, killed in US 
bombing raids on Taliban 
controlled Kabul post 9/11. 
Harris, Wazir and Burke, 
4/11/01. 
Aftab Manzoor Aged 25, from Luton. Killed in 
US bombing raids on Taliban 
controlled Kabul post 9/11. 
Harris, Wazir and Burke, 
4/11/01. 
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Afzal Munir Aged 25, from Luton, killed in 
US bombing raids on Taliban 
controlled Kabul post 9/11. 
Harris, Wazir and Burke, 
4/11/01. 
Omar Sharif Died in 2003 Hamas suicide 
bombing in Tel Aviv. Was 
involved with HuT at Kings 
College, before following Bakri 
Muhammad into Al-Muhajiroun.  
Husain (2007, 263).  
 
 
 
4.6 The Academic Battlefield 
On 11 December 2009, Anjem Choudary chaired a meeting at University College 
London (UCL) entitled “Prisoners of the War against Islam” (BBC Radio 4, 2010). An 
online address was received from Bakri Muhammad in Lebanon. Few of those 
attending could have anticipated the storm about to envelop UCL’s ISOC and indeed 
the umbrella organisation for ISOCs – FOSIS. Two weeks later, on Christmas Day 
an attempt was made to explode an airliner over Detroit, with a bomb positioned in 
the underpants of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.  A wealthy Nigerian who had spent 
time in Yemen, he studied Mechanical Engineering at UCL from 2005-8, becoming 
President of the ISOC in 2006-7.  
The sensitivity of politics and religion on campus, and the approach of academic 
institutions to terrorism was subsequently emphasised. A Daily Telegraph editorial 
thundered “Academic liberalism is a danger to life” calling for a greater focus on the 
activities of ISOCs:  
Liberal British academics, along with their friends in the media and public sector, have a habit 
of diverting any discussion of terrorism away from Islamism towards the evils of Anglo-
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American foreign policy. By doing so they are less likely to offend students from developing 
countries whose delicate sensibilities seem to matter more than security (Telegraph, 2009) 
Perhaps not surprisingly FOSIS felt the need to respond to such media coverage, 
issuing a press release the following day. The organisation, which claims to 
represent 90,000 Muslim students in Britain (BBC Radio 4, 2010) commented:  
There remains no evidence to suggest that Muslim students are at particular risk of 
radicalisation or that university campuses are vulnerable to people seeking to recruit to this 
extreme ideology (FOSIS, 2009).  
It is a wonder that following the attempted plane bombing, FOSIS could claim there 
is no evidence Muslim students are at risk of radicalisation. Abdulmutallab is far from 
being the first recent student leader to be involved with terrorist offences. This 
incident followed those of 2007 Glasgow airport suicide bomber Kafeel Ahmed 
(former President of the ISOC at Queens University) and Yassin Nassari (former 
ISOC President at University of Westminster) who was convicted of bringing guides 
on constructing weapons into the UK. Airline bomb plotter Waheed Zaman, 
convicted of conspiracy to murder in 2010, was ISOC President at London 
Metropolitan University at the time of his arrest.  
Nor was Ahmed even the first ISOC alumni to die in a suicide attack. Tel Aviv bar 
bomber Omar Sharif was a former member of Kings College London ISOC. In 2007 
London Metropolitan University student and Al-Muhajiroun member Syed Hashmi 
became the first man to be extradited from the United Kingdom to the USA on 
terrorism charges – later pleading guilty to providing material support to Al-Qaeda 
(Weiser, 2010) whilst he was studying in Britain.  
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What makes these occurrences particularly disturbing is that those appointed to 
senior positions in student bodies have traditionally been selected because of their 
administrative skills, popularity with others, knowledge of the issues at hand or ability 
at particular tasks. This appears to have been the case with Abdulmutallab, whose 
predecessor as UCL ISOC President, Kassim Rafiq noticed the qualities within him 
(BBC Radio 4, 2010). An independent inquiry convened by UCL to consider whether 
Abdulmutallab was radicalised at the institution rejected the proposition (UCL, 2010) 
and stressed publicly the importance of the institutions commitment to freedom of 
speech. Malcolm Grant UCL Provost at the time of the attempted bombing, insisted 
universities could not be bulwarks against terrorism (BBC Radio 4, 2010).  
The first wave of Islamist student violence in Britain did not come via individuals such 
as Zaman or Abdulmutallab, but occurred more than a decade earlier. Ed Husain 
charts his personal involvement in the provocative behaviour of Islamists at Tower 
Hamlets College in 1992-3. This included putting pressure on female students to 
wear the hijab, and declining to use a mosque minutes away from campus. The 
Islamic Society instead demanded territory on site that they – and only they – could 
control (Husain, 2007, 61-2). At Husain’s next place of study, Newham College, the 
stridency of the Islamic Society was a significant factor in divisions between Muslim 
and African Christian students, events which led to Ayotunde Obanubi being stabbed 
to death (Husain 2007, 151, Nawaz 2012, 130). Sa’eed Nur and Umran Qadir were 
both subsequently convicted for their roles in Obanubi’s murder.  
Little noticed outside of east London at the time, the killing has since developed 
particular resonance, not least because it appears to have played an important role 
in eventually shifting both Husain and Nawaz away from what they now portray as a 
confrontational Islamism. Others involved in the case have taken a different route. 
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Kazi Nurur Rahman was initially amongst those charged with murder, only for his 
prosecution to be dropped. He was later to attend jihadist training camps in Pakistan, 
and to be jailed for buying firearms in a Metropolitan Police sting operation (Wheeler, 
2012). Wary of arrest following the murder of Obanubi, Majid Nawaz sought legal 
advice from a HuT student who was also a lawyer – Anjem Choudary (Nawaz, 2012, 
132).  
 
The Newham College murder serves as a reminder that contemporary debates 
concerning Islamism on campus are not new, but instead have a twenty year plus 
history. It was in the same period that Abdulmutallab’s alma mater, UCL, first 
experienced problems with some Islamist students. Ed Lyon was the Student 
Union’s External Affairs and Welfare Officer at UCL from 1993-4, one of five 
sabbatical officers running the Students Union. Mr Lyon discovered the ISOC 
distributing anti-Semitic posters on campus, and after a meeting of UCL’s Societies 
Board the then ISOC was disaffiliated from the wider students union due to its 
dominance by HuT, producing and circulating anti-Semitic literature and attempted 
intimidation of student union officials (Lyon, Interview, 2010). HuT promotional 
material at this time was certainly stark. A talk by its deputy leader, Farid Kassim at 
the University of Central England was entitled “Battlefield – The Only Place for 
Muslims and Jews.” This was accompanied by a picture of a bomb being placed on 
the Israeli flag, and a caption stating “The (Last Hour) will not come until the Muslims 
fight the Jews and kill them” (Fisher, 1994).  
When Abdulmutallab was arrested for the Detroit bombing, Mr Lyon was surprised to 
see reporters turning to the ‘phenomena’ of Islamists on campus: 
217 
 
It is nice to say this has never happened before – but it is very far from the truth. There’s been 
Islamic extremism on campuses across London in my experience, for quite some time (Lyon 
Interview, 2010).  
Accordingly, since 2005 the National Union of Students ‘no platform’ policy has 
banned three Islamist organisations – Al-Muhajiroun, HuT and MPAC - the Muslim 
Public Affairs Committee (National Union of Students, 2012). Figure 4.4 documents 
some of the university ISOC members and alumni involved in terrorist incidents, or 
convicted of terrorist offences. Eleven separate individuals are named. In an attempt 
to update these records, and to consider the broader issued of British students 
fighting in Syria and Iraq, further information has been sought from both FOSIS and 
UK Universities. An email by the author to FOSIS on 26 August 2014 did not receive 
a reply. Nor did a similar email to UK Universities on 15 October 2014.  
 
Of all British academic institutions, Queens University Belfast arguably has the 
greatest direct experience of terrorism. During the Northern Ireland conflict it had 
staff and students who were perpetrators of terrorism, and its victims (English, 2010, 
Interview). This includes academics Miriam Daly, murdered by the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA), Edgar Graham, murdered on campus by the IRA (McKittrick et 
al, 1999, 830, 967) and Adrian Guelke, who survived a shooting by the UDA. This 
author’s hypothesis such experience may ensure Queen’s took a proactive and open 
approach to enquiries about terrorist alumni proved incorrect – on every occasion I 
attempted to conduct research at Queen’s University into Kafeel Ahmed, the 
institution did not reply to emails. Richard English, then Professor of Politics at 
Queen’s, explained “When the story broke there was a denial to say the story was 
anything to do with us” (English, Interview, 2010). This position was shaped by 
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distinct factors – the attack was on the mainland, Ahmed was the only fatality, and 
knowledge of Islamic politics in Northern Ireland is generally low (English, op cit).   
 
The desire to absolve Islamist students from any negative publicity concerning 
terrorist offences can be dogged. Examples of this approach from critical terrorism 
studies academics are discussed in chapter six, but it is one which may also 
encompass University administrators. The destruction of the twin towers in 2001 
brought renewed attention upon the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and with it the 
rediscovery of bomber Ramzi Yousef’s academic background. Professor Ken Reid, 
Deputy Principal of Swansea Institute (now Swansea Metropolitan University) 
responded cryptically; 
I am personally convinced that the person who is held in New York is not our former student. I 
am personally convinced that our former student is no longer alive and I am personally 
convinced that he was part of a plot carried out against him and former Kuwaiti students (BBC 
Website: Wales, 2001).  
There appear no doubts within Scotland Yard that the Ramzi Yousef who blew up 
the World Trade Center is the same man who studied in Swansea. Bob Lambert 
presents the investigation into Yousef as a model of probity;  
There were no concurrent briefings to the news media about Yousef’s activities in the UK. 
Instead, UK police officers were able to piece together useful information about the four years 
Yousef had spent studying electrical engineering at what was then the Swansea Institute of 
Higher Education without undue media attention (Lambert, 2011, 44). 
 
 
 
219 
 
Figure 4.4     Universities, ISOCs and Terrorism 
 Name University, ISOC and 
Subject 
Terrorist Activity Source 
Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab 
President, UCL ISOC 
2006-7.  
Arrested for trying to 
detonate a bomb on 
flight to Detroit, 
25/12/2009. 
BBC Radio 4.  
04/02/10. 
Jawad Akbar Brunel  University 
ISOC,  
Convicted of terrorist 
offences following 
Operation Crevice 
Keeble and Hollington 
(2010, 130). 
 
 
Abdulla Ahmed Ali City University ISOC, 
Engineering. 
Convicted in the liquid 
bomb plot and jailed 
for life.  
Keeble and Hollington 
(2010, 125).  
Mohammed Gul Queen Mary University 
of London ISOC 
Added 30 terrorist 
videos to video 
sharing websites, 
2008 –2009. 
Creighton, 28/2/11.  
Syed Hashmi London Metropolitan 
University 
A US citizen born in 
Pakistan. Extradited to 
the US in 2007.  
In 2010, pleaded guilty 
to providing material 
support to Al-Qaeda 
and was jailed for 15 
years. 
Weiser, 27/04/10.  
Khobaib Hussain Law, Wolverhampton 
University 
Convicted following 
the Birmingham 
rucksack bomb plot, of 
travelling abroad for 
terrorist training.  
McCarthy, 26/02/13.  
Waseem Mughal Leicester University 
ISOC, Biochemistry 
student.  
Running website for 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Had 
also run the Leicester 
University ISOC 
website.  
Oliver, 5/7/07. 
 
Keeble and Hollington 
(2010, 130). 
 
Leppard and Dowling, 
17/10/10.   
Yassin Nasari President, 
Westminster University 
Convicted of 
possession of material 
Green, 16/7/07.  
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ISOC,  of use to a terrorist.  
Abid Naseer Studying Computer 
Studies at Liverpool 
John Moore’s 
University when 
arrested.  
Convicted in 2015 of 
planning terrorist 
attacks in Manchester 
and New York.  
US Department of 
Justice, 07/07/10.  
FBI, 04/03/15. 
Omar Saeed Sheikh LSE ISOC, Applied 
Mathematics. 
Subsequent terrorism 
convictions in India 
and Pakistan.  
Burke (2007, 87-9).  
Waheed Zaman Serving President of 
London Metropolitan 
ISOC.  
Convicted of 
conspiracy to murder.  
CPS, 08/07/10.  
 
 
4.7 British Islamism and Political Violence         
Whilst incidences of terrorism may dominate political and media discourse, less 
deadly violence involving Islamists is at times an undercurrent within society. This 
section considers examples of anti-Semitic and homophobic incidents, and the use 
of violence to uphold blasphemy codes and Islamic standards within education. The 
Jewish Chronicle columnist Geoffrey Alderman has written:  
The greatest threat to the safety and security of Jews living in the UK comes from Muslims 
living in the UK. Not all British Muslims of course, or even a majority of them. But a section of 
British Muslim society harbours malevolent and occasionally murderous intentions towards 
British Jews (Alderman, 2010).  
Such intentions appear to multiply during periods of particular tension. Incidents in 
the UK increased significantly during the Israel-Gaza war, when in July 2014 95% of 
faith related crime recorded in London was against Jews (Mayor of London, 2014, 
11).  Of those perpetrating hate crimes in London a minority - 45% - were described 
as white British (Mayor of London, 2014,13) implying that anti-Semitic violence is no 
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longer the preserve of neo-Nazis. In Europe the 2012 Toulouse attacks saw a 
French gunmen, Mohammed Merah, shoot dead three schoolchildren and an adult at 
the Ozar Hatorah Jewish Secondary School. Concern about Islamist attacks on 
Jewish citizens has also been expressed across Scandinavia (Eiglad, 2010) and in 
public discourse in Holland and Germany during 2010 (Stauber, 2011). In 2012 
Mohammed and Shasta Khan from Oldham received long prison sentences for 
plotting to attack Jewish community buildings in Manchester (see fig 4.2).Negative 
perceptions about the future of European Jewry have thus aired (Jewish Peoples 
Policy Agency, 2013), with declining populations potentially under threat from both 
nativist far right and Islamic actors. These issues peaked with the 2015 shootings in 
Paris at a kosher supermarket and at a Copenhagen synagogue. 
Hatred is not merely directed at Jews. The existence of what may be termed low 
level threats and intimidation from Islamist actors towards opponents, or those who 
simply attract their opprobrium, is comparatively under researched. Whilst not 
meeting the explicit definition of terrorism, instances of politico-religious violence of 
the type sketched below warrant further future study to see if those involved in such 
actions progress into more significant, potentially deadly jihadist violence.  
In July 2010 activists distributed leaflets outside Jamia Mosque in Derby calling on 
homosexuals to be executed, and also distributed such literature door to door 
(Hough, 2011). In London, Mohammed Hasnath from Tower Hamlets was fined for 
posting stickers with the slogan ‘Gay Free Zone’ across the East End, accompanied 
by a sura of the Qur’an (Brocklebank, 2011). Later that year Hasnath was convicted 
again – for spraying burkas on advertising posters featuring women (Lowles and 
Mulhall, 2013, 47).  
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Whilst such incidents appear minor compared to the deadly violence outlined earlier 
in this chapter, they potentially serve as a method of progression towards support for 
jihadist groups. In May 2012 Mohammed Hasnath received a third conviction – for 
possessing documents of use to a person committing an act of terrorism, namely the 
AQAP magazine Inspire (Docklands and East London Advertiser, 2012b). By 2013 
he was reportedly in Somalia, featuring in an Al-Shabaab video entitled “Woolwich 
Attack: It’s an Eye for an Eye” (Lowles and Mulhall, 2013, 47). Kabir Ali, convicted in 
the Derby case of stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, later spoke 
of his wish to become a suicide bomber, and has since died in such an attack 
committed on behalf of Islamic State, in Iraq (Muslim Weekly, 14/11/14).  
Nor has Britain avoided violence in retaliation for the breaching of blasphemy codes, 
so murderously enacted against the French magazine Charlie Hebdo. In 2008 the 
home of Melanie Phillips’ “Londonistan” publisher, Martin Rynja of Gibson Square, 
was firebombed. He had courted further controversy by intending to publish the 
novel “The Jewel of Medina”, about the Prophet Muhammad’s child bride. Police 
officers covertly filmed three prominent London Islamists buying petrol, followed 
them from Regents Park mosque to Gibson Square in Islington, arresting them after 
they had carried out their attack (Davey, 2008, Islington Gazette, 2009).  
Other types of violence has sought to uphold Islamist approaches to education. In 
2011 four men from Whitechapel were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm 
with intent after religious studies teacher Gary Smith received a fractured skull 
outside the Central Foundation Girls School in Bow. A police recording device 
hidden in one of the gang’s car revealed their motivation to be opposition to a non-
Muslim teaching about Islam (Taylor, 2011). Whilst such a degree of violence 
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appears without justification, an explanation for the opposition to Muslims being 
taught religious studies by a non-Muslim appears in Qutb’s “Milestones”. 
A Muslim cannot go to any source other than God for guidance in matters of faith, in the 
concept of life, acts of worship, morals and human affairs, values and standards, principles of 
economics and political affairs and interpretation of historical processes. It is, therefore, his 
duty that he should learn all these from a Muslim whose piety and character, belief and 
action, are beyond reproach (Qutb, 2007, 108-9). 
 
 
4.10 Conclusions 
This chapter primarily addresses the first research question established by this 
thesis– to catalogue the history of British Islamist violence on these shores. Since 
2000 the UK has seen a series of actual and attempted terrorist attacks by jihadist 
actors articulating a dual justification rooted in religious adherence and opposition to 
British foreign policy. This violence has resulted in some 54 deaths, plus those of five 
suicide bombers. The casualty toll would have been considerably higher had any of 
thirteen catalogued attempted attacks come to fruition.  
From its slightly stuttering start in 2000, Jihadist violence is now an established part 
of British life. Fifteen years of detail however, are yet to entirely extinguish denial. 
Sensitivities ensure that the number of jihadists emerging from backgrounds within 
the higher education system is still a scene of contestation, rather than one gaining 
universal acceptance as an uncomfortable reality.  
Perhaps curiously, given the self-identification of the participants in this violence, its 
religious characteristics have frequently been played down, most noticeably in the 
response discussed above by a succession of Islamic activists to the suicide video of 
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7/7 bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan. Here, in part, is the ‘denial’ of the thesis title. 
A discursive formation has developed which focuses primarily on political 
explanations for the 2005 bombings, and seeks to ignore religious pronouncements 
within the same source text. This analysis therefore details an important 
inconsistency, and seeks to make a substantial contribution towards the 
understanding of what remains the largest domestic terrorist attack in Britain’s 
history.  
 
The second intention of this chapter has been to address the question of who are the 
British Jihadists. In terms of affiliations, British Jihadism is shown to be a disparate 
and diverse entity, although one where certain core elements may be found. Certain 
University Islamic Societies, the Finsbury Park and Regents Park mosques, and the 
Al-Muhajiroun group and its offshoots feature substantially in this historiography. In 
the statements offered by three terrorists – Mohammed Sidique Khan, Nicky Reilly 
and Michael Adebolajo each roots himself in the Islamic faith and predicates their 
actions as a response to the treatment of Muslims by western governments. This 
duality – of faith and suffering under actual or perceived repression – appears a core 
element of just who the British jihadists are.  
For these actors, loyalty is overtly displayed, not to their place of birth or residence, 
but to fellow Muslims. Such a commitment is intrinsic to Islamist practice, a 
component part of the rejection of nationalism we have seen articulated by the likes 
of Mawdudi, Qutb, and Azzam in earlier chapters. Qutb states categorically that 
Muhammad fought against Mecca, despite it being his birthplace and a city where he 
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still had property (Qutb, 2007, 124) – Mecca was outside of the faith, and thus to be 
opposed.   
This rejection of their fellow Britons, is accompanied by a strong religious imperative 
to act against injustice. Sura 9 of the Qur’an commands Adebolajo’s actions at 
Woolwich. It is the will of God that Lee Rigby walks in front of his car, moments 
before he is murdered. Khan’s “obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following 
the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad” (BBC, 2005, b) forms 
what he characterises as his ‘ethical stance’ - committing the London transport 
bombings. This cannot be seen as merely political. As a consequence of his actions 
he asks his fellow Muslims to pray for him, and he seeks entry into “gardens of 
paradise” (op cit). In Devon, as disgusted by the decadence of the streets around 
him as he is by British foreign policy, Nicky Reilly resolved to blow up a local 
restaurant. In 2007 the would-be bombers of the Tiger Tiger nightclub ignored the 
administrative centre of Britain’s political elite in Whitehall, to place a car bomb a 
short distance away outside a Westminster nightclub. British Jihadism seeks to 
punish, not just the impact of government policies upon the ummah, but our own 
behaviour.  
 
The rejection of Britain displayed by Khan, Reilly and Adebolajo potentially indicates 
that the term British jihadism is a misnomer. Yet British Jihadism still has categorical 
value. Each of the men listed above seeks to express and fulfil their faith, not in the 
Muslim majority world, but here in the United Kingdom. For the Birmingham Jihadists 
who attempted to kill English Defence League protestors in Dewsbury, the EDL’s 
blasphemy on the streets of Yorkshire leads to the religious imperative that they 
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must be killed for blasphemy.  For the British Jihadist, sharia law is not some distant 
entity in a Muslim majority land – it is right here, right now. A Muslim will fight against 
his birthplace unless sharia is established there (Qutb, 2007, 124).  
 
In the period before the ‘four lions’ of British Jihadism settled here – Abdullah el-
Faisal, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Muhammad and Abu Qatada – such views would 
have seemed extraordinary. In his study of American monetary campaigners, 
Richard Hofstadter asserts that when cranks achieve a popular following, it is best to 
take their agitation seriously (Hofstadter, 2008, 286). The natural British propensity 
to mock developments that are different or unsettling arguably guided initial reactions 
to those clerical ‘lions’ of British Jihadism who gained a degree of public recognition 
– most noticeably Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri Mohammed. Such a response may 
have worked in 1980s Britain, where Islamist ideas were of less interest to young 
Britons, and Muslim communities smaller in number and in consciousness. Instead, 
this failure to take domestic Islamism seriously as a contender for influence, was 
combined with the ongoing settlement of Islamist and Jihadist actors from overseas 
outlined in the previous chapter. It was subsequently combined with what was 
perceived to be a foreign policy inimical to the ummah.  
The initial reticence of the British state towards to tackle the four lions legally, 
ensured they were able to gain a significant degree of recognition, and some 
localised support, amongst British Muslims. In the midst of the eventual legal travails 
of the four lions, Peter Neumann was speculating that the era of the radical Imam 
may be over – the authorities had now caught up (Neumann, 2008, 36-7) and were 
prepared to take legal action against excesses. That British Jihadism continues, and 
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indeed thrives, despite the absence of the four lions from these shores indicates that 
their influence, although important, is no longer pivotal. Bakri Muhammad’s group, 
Al-Muhajiroun is evidence of this – it has endured through a near twenty year history, 
surviving proscription under counter-terrorism legislation, the deaths of members in 
jihad and prosecution of its activists. In its commitment to dawah, to establishing an 
Islamic Britain under sharia, its sense of grievance and lapses into violence, Al-
Muhajiroun encapsulates British Jihadism.  
 
Having examined British Jihadism in its home environment, and found it to be 
characteristically rooted in a sense of grievance and practical expressions of 
religious faith, the next chapter discusses the extent to which Britons have travelled 
overseas to contribute to the cause of the ummah. In particular chapter six focuses 
on locations where Britons have sought to join indigenous Islamists and Jihadists 
who were already fighting to establish sharia. This is located in the overall theme of 
the research in that it contributes to the ‘detail’ of the thesis title, but in particular 
addresses the second part of this research’s initial question – what is the history of 
British Islamist involvement in violence beyond these shores. The desire to move to 
Muslim majority lands and to experience sharia, which appears frequently throughout 
the next chapter, also contributes to our understanding of the third research question 
– which asks who the British Jihadists are, and whether they constitute religious or 
political actors.  
 
 
228 
 
Chapter 5: The Geographical Distribution of British Jihadis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Speaking of the British Jihadis who fought in Bosnia from 1992-5, Mark Curtis 
observes Parliament said next to nothing on the subject (Curtis, 2010, 214-5) a 
response arguably repeated until the post 9/11 era. This chapter seeks to rectify 
such omissions, and to demonstrate the range of conflicts in which British Jihadists 
have participated across three decades. The following pages break down, on a 
country by country basis, the presence of British actors in Jihadist conflicts on that 
particular nation’s soil, and place an estimate on the number of Britons killed in 
jihadist operations globally since the early 1990s. It is intended that this chapter 
serve as a contribution towards future research by other academics. Whilst the 
Syrian jihad is now receiving the detailed study of academics from across the 
Western world, it is noted that the earlier conflicts listed in this chapter often received 
only perfunctory study.  
 
This chapter addresses a core question in this thesis – what is the history of British 
Islamist involvement in politico-religious violence beyond these shores? It does so by 
detailing some fourteen countries in which British Jihadists have been involved in 
conflict. This builds on the theoretical underpinning developed in earlier sections of 
this thesis, not least the understanding of jihad as a concept without geographical 
restriction, the need to protect the ummah and the position of Qutb that Islam has no 
meaning without sharia. The previous two chapters have illustrated the diverse 
nature of British Jihadism. Firstly, that the United Kingdom has played host to a 
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succession of jihadist actors from conflicts across Muslim majority nations. From 
their safe haven, many sought to influence events in accordance with their politico-
religious aims. Secondly that some of those exiles went on to develop significant 
influence with a minority of British Islamists, as part of a wider movement expressing 
demands for sharia in the United Kingdom and participating in violence domestically. 
This chapter presents detailed information on what may be considered a third 
element of British Jihadism – its contribution to conflict overseas.  
In doing so, this section of the thesis further develops an evidence base for 
assessing a second research question – who are the British Jihadis? Are they 
religious or political actors? Are they linked to particular districts, mosques, 
institutions or organisations? In looking at exactly what Britons have sought to do in 
overseas conflicts, and the groups they have joined, we gain further indications as to 
the nature of this phenomenon.  
Where possible names, dates and figures are given for those known to have fought 
or died, or who have participated in training for armed conflict. Where individuals 
have been processed through the criminal justice system that information is also 
recorded, although it is to be recognised that the judicial system in, for example, 
Yemen, may differ substantially in its approach and standards to that aspired to in 
the United Kingdom.  
Such research is an inexact science. Consider Bradfordian Salman Abdullah, who 
provided information to Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory on Finsbury Park mosque 
“Abdullah estimates that there may have been as many as fifty men from Finsbury 
Park who died in terror operations and insurgent attacks in a dozen or more conflicts 
abroad” (O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 93). Evidence for such a high figure is scant, 
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although conversely accurate lists of those who have died in violence in countries 
such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya or Somalia is not publicly available either. 
But it is not just former jihadists who have provided questionable figures. The 
numbers given for those considered to have trained in Al-Qaeda’s camps in the 
Afghanistan and Pakistan region have been characterised by their volatility.  
The former Scotland Yard commissioner, Sir John Stevens estimated that more than two 
thousand had undergone terror training. His successor, Sir Ian Blair, who saw the same 
intelligence reports as Sir John, put the number closer to two hundred. MI5 has never 
revealed its tally (O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 101).  
 
It is that type of discrepancy – from two thousand to two hundred - which this chapter 
seeks to address, by going some way to collating names and details from the 
overseas jihads in which British Muslims have participated. Some evidence exists of 
attempts by the British state to develop centralised information on those who have 
travelled to jihadist training camps, but there appears no opportunity for independent 
researchers to inspect such records, nor is it a straight forward matter if anyone 
wishes to challenge their presence on such a list. For example, Abdul Rahman was 
a Metropolitan Police constable who resigned from the force after failing counter 
terrorism checks. Media coverage of his legal action against Scotland Yard stated: 
Shortly before Mr Rahman’s clearance was suspended MI5 rechecked details of officers and 
civilian staff at the Met, and other forces, against their records of suspects who had been to 
Pakistan or Afghanistan and who it suspected might have attended terrorist training camps or 
madrassas (Leach and Barrett, 2012).  
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In the absence of access to state records (which may or may not possess a high 
degree of accuracy) this chapter makes use of open source intelligence from 
academic and journalistic research, court cases, support organisations for British 
Muslims arrested for terrorist offences and articles in the ethnic press.  
Firstly it is necessary to list the range of jihadist organisations Britons have been 
members of and/or participated in, over the past three decades. Figure 5.1 lists 16 
Jihadist organisations known to have contained British members, a figure which is 
almost certainly an under estimate, given the mutating nature of the Syrian conflict.  
  
Figure 5.1 Britons and Jihadist organisations  
Organisation Individuals Source 
Afghan Taliban Unnamed taxi driver from east 
London, fighting in Dhani-
Ghorri, Afghanistan. 
Abdul-Ahad and Boone, 
25/11/10.  
Al-Qaeda Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-
‘Owhali 
Bergen (2001, 107).  
 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad Akram Nawaz (2012, 265).  
Harakat al-Islami Bangladeshi Rhuhel Ahmed  Pantucci, 2011. 
Harkat ul Mujahideen (HUM) 
Pakistan 
Omar Saeed  Sheikh Burke (2007, 87).  
Islamic Resistance Movement -  
HAMAS, (Palestine) 
Asif Hanif Watson (2008, 66-7) 
Islamic Army of Aden-Abayan 
(Yemen) 
Abu Hamza Quin (2005, 238). 
Islamic State (Iraq and Syria) Mohammed Emwazi  Mekhennet and Goldman, 
26/02/15.  
Jemaah  Islamiyah (Indonesia) Jack Roche Conboy (2006, 192n) 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Pakistan) Rashid Rauf Married a relative of JeM 
founder Masood Azhar (Keeble 
and Hollington, 2010, 53).  
Al-Shabaab (Somalia) Samantha Lewthwaite Hamilton, 24/09/13. 
Jabhat Al-Nusra (Syria)  Abdul Waheed Majid Sky News, 07/02/14.  
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Katiba Al-Muhajireen (Syria) Ibrahim al Mazwagi Gilmore, 13/06/13.  
Jund al-Sham (Syria) Kabir Ahmed, who later left the 
group and joined IS 
Muslim Weekly, 14/11/14 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistan) Shehzad Tanweer Malik (2009, 110). 
Tehreek-e-Takiban Pakistan 
Jamaatul Ahrar (TTPJA) 
Dr Mirza Tariq Ali Verkaik et al, 16/11/14 
 
This research names ten terrorist bombings involving Britons, or British based 
Islamists, conducted overseas from 1996 to date, in which nine suicide bombers 
have killed themselves. These attacks have occurred in Afghanistan, India, Israel, 
Iraq, Sweden, Syria, and the United States and over the Atlantic Ocean on a flight to 
America. The exact death toll in these incidents is unknown, although the two 
attempts to bring down airliners in 2001 and 2009 could potentially have killed 
hundreds.  
Fig 5.2 Jihadist attacks involving Britons overseas 
Date Place Names Court Case Comments  
1996 Afghanistan Khalid Shaheed None – suicide 
bombing 
O’Neill and 
McGrory (2006, 
87).  
25/12/00 Indian army 
base in 
Srinagar. 
Bilal 
Mohammed 
None – suicide 
bombing 
Watson (2008, 
63). 
22/12/01 Atlantic Ocean, 
attempted shoe 
bombing on 
flight between 
Paris and 
Miami.   
Richard Reid Jailed for life in 
the US.  
CNN, 31/01/03.  
30/04/03 Mike’s Place, 
Bar, Tel Aviv, 
Israel.  
Asif Hanif  None – suicide 
bombing 
Three civilians 
killed.  
Israel, Ministry 
of Foreign 
Affairs, 
30/06/03. 
30/04/03 Mike’s Place, 
Bar, Tel Aviv, 
Omar Khan None – found 
dead in sea 
Israel, Ministry 
of Foreign 
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Israel. Sharif having fled the 
scene.  
Affairs, 30/06/03 
October 2003 Iraq – suicide 
bombing 
Wail al-Dhaleai Shot dead by 
US troops whilst 
trying to carry 
out a suicide 
bombing. 
Taylor 01/09/06. 
February 2005 Iraq – suicide 
bombing 
Unnamed 
French national, 
aged 41.  
None – suicide 
bombing.  
Man had lived in 
Moss Side, 
Manchester, for 
two years. 
Bunyan et al 
22/06/05.  
25/12/09 US airspace 
over Detroit.  
Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab 
Sentenced to 
life 
imprisonment.  
US Department 
of Justice, 
16/02/12.  
11/12/10 Stockholm, 
Sweden. 
Taimour 
Abdulwahab Al-
Abdaly 
Suicide 
bombing.  
Higginson 
13/12/10.  
07/02/14 Aleppo prison, 
Syria 
Abdul Waheed 
Majid 
Suicide 
bombing. 
Sky News, 
07/02/14.  
07/11/14 Beiji, Iraq. Kabir Ahmed Suicide 
bombing. 
Muslim Weekly, 
14/11/14 
 
 
5.1 Afghanistan 
British Islamists have a long history of seeking religious goals in Afghanistan. In 
1993 Moazzam Begg travelled from Birmingham to a JeI training facility in Pakistan, 
before moving to the al-Fajr camp in Afghanistan (Begg, 2006, 53). These camps 
were operational some four years after the Soviets’ departure (indeed after the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist) yet were still producing combatants. Next Begg visited 
an adjoining Arab camp, which he found less spartan, but with only a dozen men in 
training, compared to some 150 at the Pakistani run base. Begg describes listening 
to war stories from veterans of the Kashmir conflict, and it was seeing such a 
location that completed a religious awakening: 
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By the time of my return I considered myself a practising Muslim. The Afghan visit was a life-
changing experience for me. No few days had affected me like that.  I had met men who 
seemed to me exemplary, in their faith and self-sacrifice, and seen a world that awed and 
inspired me (Begg, 2006, 57).  
As part of this religious journey, Begg moved permanently to Taliban controlled 
Kabul in June 2001, taking his family. His support for the Taliban is articulated in his 
memoir: 
When I went to Afghanistan, I believed the Taliban had made some modest progress - in 
social justice and in upholding pure, old style Islamic values forgotten in many Islamic 
countries. After September 11 that life was destroyed (Begg, 2006, 381). 
 
In the fight to establish these Islamic values, little quarter was given. In 1996 ‘Khalid 
Shahid’ from Birmingham died committing a suicide attack against Northern Alliance 
forces (O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, 87) – the earliest likely case of a Briton utilising 
this technique. Shortly after 9/11 two jihadists from Burnley, Afrasiab Ilyas and 
Arshad Miaz, were reported killed by a Northern Alliance attack on Taliban forces 
near Kabul. Fellow Lancastrian Anwar Khan had been held in an Afghan prison for 
four years having been arrested fighting for the Taliban in 1998 (Harper, 
2011).Those arrested in Afghanistan, and its border areas in this period, suffered 
differing fates. Some, such as Munir Farooqi from Manchester, appear to have been 
able to buy their release via family members (Scheerout, 2011) those less fortunate, 
such as Richard Belmar (US Department of Defence, 2003) ended in Guantanamo 
Bay.  
Even after the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan, Britons continued to travel to the 
country to fight. In February 2009 The Independent claimed, based on British Army 
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sources, Briton was now fighting Briton in parts of southern Afghanistan. A military 
spokesman explained:   
This second group, the Urdu, Punjabi speakers etc, who fall back into English, in for example 
Brummie accents. You get the impression that they have been told not to talk in English but 
sometimes simply can’t help it’ (Sengupta, 2009).  
In considering the characteristics of British Jihadism, this inability to lose one’s native 
tongue, even when operating in Taliban controlled territory and attempting for 
security reasons to avoid the English language, is indicative.  
 
In cases contemporary fighting against the post-Taliban government and coalition 
troops appears to take a rather structured approach. In November 2010 Guardian 
journalists spoke to an east London taxi driver who spends most of his year working 
in London, but returns to his homeland with his brother for three months to fight. 
“There are many people like me in London....We collect money for the jihad all year 
and come and fight if we can” (Abdul-Ahad and Boone, 2010).  
The 14 British Taliban fighters listed in table 5.4 below is lower than estimates put 
forward by the authorities. Following the 2011 convictions of Munir Farooqi, Israr 
Malik and Matthew Newton for preparing for acts of terrorism (attempting to recruit 
two undercover police officers to travel from Manchester to Afghanistan to fight 
coalition troops) Greater Manchester Police informed local media they believed 
Farooqi had sent up to twenty men to the conflict (Scheerhout, 2011). This figure is 
impossible to verify – firstly because any such individuals are unlikely to come 
forward and admit their involvement in criminal offences. Secondly because the 
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police do not appear to have levied further charges, or publicly named any suspects, 
despite having, on their own declared estimate, up to twenty such possible cases.  
 
This research names sixteen Britons who have trained in Afghan camps, at least 
nine at facilities controlled by Al-Qaeda. Fourteen Britons are listed who participated 
in combat in Afghanistan, a further ten being killed in the country (see figures 5.4-
5.5). This is higher than the number of British jihadis killed in Pakistan (figure 5.11) 
and is indeed the highest for any country with the exception of the ongoing conflict in 
Syria, an indication of the priority given to establishing, protecting and then later re-
establishing the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. A core component of any discussion of 
these Britons has to be their ideological and theological commitment. Fahad Ansari 
of Cage writes of the Taliban:  
“Despite their flaws, they were the best thing that Afghanistan had experienced in decades. It 
was for this reason that thousands of Muslims from all over the world also migrated to 
Afghanistan over the next few years” (Ansari, 2010, 31).  
Of those who sought participation in this Islamic utopia, he observes; 
“While many did comment on the Taliban excesses in their imposition of shariah, the general 
overall sentiment in Afghanistan was that they were living in the closest semblance of an 
Islamic state that existed in the Sunni world” (Ansari, 2010, 31)  
 
After 2005, Ansari notes the Taliban not only displaying resilience, but building a 
parallel government to achieve two basic needs – security and justice. This has 
ensured that Muslims continue travelling to Afghanistan to join with them, indeed to 
Ansari the support of Muslims internationally is essentially for the Taliban’s cause “It 
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is only if the Muslim world offers them some support and recognition that they will 
have a fair chance to govern and be judged accordingly” (Ansari, 2010, 33).  
 
Figure 5.3 Britons who attended Afghan training camps  
 Individual Details Source 
Feroz Abbasi From Croydon, trained at Al-
Qaeda’s al-Farouq camp, via 
Finsbury Park mosque.  
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
202, 209)  
Rhuhel Ahmed From Tipton. In autumn 2000 
spent 40 days at a camp in 
Kandahar run by Harakat al-
Islami Bangladeshi. 
Pantucci, ICSR, 2011. 
Talha Ahsan In 2013, pleaded guilty in the 
US to providing support to 
terrorists. As part of his plea, 
admitted travelling to a terrorist 
training camp in Afghanistan.  
US Department of Justice, 
10/12/13. 
Saajid Badat Attended Al-Qaeda’s Khalden 
and Darunta facilities.  
Silber (2012, 31). 
Moazzam Begg Attended the al-Fajr training 
camp, plus an adjoining Arab 
site in 1993 
Begg (2006, 50-57).  
Richard Belmar Trained at Al-Qaeda’s al-
Farouq camp in 2001.  
US DoD 15/11/03. 
David Courtailler A Frenchman who converted to 
Islam in Britain. Travelled to 
the Khalden camp at the 
arrangement of Finsbury Park 
mosque.  
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 92, 
97). 
Abdul Haq A Moroccan living in London, 
attended Khalden. 
Nasiri (2006, 145).  
Asif Iqbal From Tipton, attended training 
in Kandahar run by Harakat al-
Islami Bangladeshi. 
Pantucci (2011).  
Oussama Abdullah Kassir aka 
Abu Khadijah 
A Swedish citizen of Lebanese 
descent. Boasted of his 
experience in Afghanistan 
whilst trying to establish a 
training camp for Finsbury Park 
mosque worshippers in the 
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
192).  
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United States. 
Subsequently detained on 11 
terrorism charges in the US in 
2009.  
 
FBI, 12/05/09.  
Binyam Mohammed Trained at the al-Farouq facility 
in the months prior to 9/11.  
US DoD, 26/12/08.  
Zaccarias Moussaoui Attended Al-Qaeda’s Darunta 
site near Jalalabad. 
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
100). 
Mohammed Rashid Daoud al-
Owhali 
Attended the Khalden camp in 
1996 
Burke (2007, 169).  
Richard Reid Attended Al-Qaeda’s Darunta 
base near Jalalabad. 
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
100).  
Jack Roche Admitted his training in 
Afghanistan to Australian 
police.  
Conboy (2006, 192n). 
Omar Saeed Sheikh Attended the Khalid bin 
Waleed camp in 1993.  
Attended a refresher course, 
and also trained recruits at a 
HUM facility near Jalalabad in 
1994. 
Burke (2007, 95).  
 
Fouda and Fielding (2003, 58).  
 
Figure 5.4 British Jihadis fighting in Afghanistan 
Individual Details Source 
Rhuhel Ahmed Was with Taliban forces in 
2000. Also flew out to 
Afghanistan post 9/11 to fight 
for the Taliban.  
Captured by Northern Alliance 
forces.  
US DoD, 28/10/03.  
Aslam Awan Living in Manchester before 
travelling to Afghanistan to fight 
coalition forces.  
Manchester Evening News, 
22/11/07.  
Tarek Dergoul Informed the Americans he lost 
an arm fighting at Tora Bora, 
before escaping to Pakistan, 
where he was arrested.  
US DoD, 28/10/03 
Munir Farooqi A Taliban veteran from 
Manchester, convicted in 2011 
of attempting to recruit further 
fighters to travel there. 
Scheerhout, 10/9/11. 
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Abu Hamza Lost an eye and two limbs 
whilst experimenting with 
explosives at a training camp. 
Nasiri (2006, 221).  
Asif Iqbal Flew out to Afghanistan post 
9/11 to fight for the Taliban. 
Captured by Northern Alliance 
forces. 
US DOD, 28/10/03  
Murad Iqbal Was living with Awan in 
Manchester, before leaving for 
Afghanistan to fight coalition 
forces.  
Manchester Evening News, 
22/11/07. 
Anwar Khan Captured fighting for the 
Taliban by the Northern 
Alliance in 1998. 
Harper, 09/02/11.   
Mohammed Rashid Daoud al-
Owhali 
Fought for the Taliban in 1997 Burke (2007, 174). 
Abu Munthir Left Luton to fight against 
coalition forces following the 
allied invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001.  
Silber (2012, 88).  
Kazi Rahman Entered Afghanistan via 
Pakistan post 9/11 to join the 
Taliban. Later convicted of 
trying to buy guns in the UK. 
Watson (2008, 64).  
Adam Rashid Captured by the Northern 
Alliance whilst fighting for the 
Taliban in 2000. 
Bergen (2001, 269, footnote 
67).  
Shafiq Rasul Flew out to Afghanistan post 
9/11 to fight for the Taliban.  
Captured by Northern Alliance 
forces. Along with Ahmed and 
Iqbal became known as the 
Tipton 3, when transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay.  
US DoD, 29/10/03 (via 
Wikileaks). 
Pantucci (2011).  
Unnamed east London taxi 
driver 
Fighting for the Taliban in 2010 
in Dhani-Ghorri.  
Abdul-Ahad and Boone, 
25/11/10.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Britons killed in Afghanistan 
Individual Details Source 
Munir Ali From Tipton, killed in fighting 
following 9/11.  
Pantucci (2011).  
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Afrasiab Ilyas From Burnley. Killed by 
Northern Alliance forces near 
Kabul in 2001. 
O’Neill (2001). 
Yasir Khan From Crawley. Killed in US 
bombing raids on Taliban 
territory post 9/11. 
Watson (2008, 65).  
Aftab Manzoor From Luton. Killed in US 
bombing raids on Taliban 
controlled Kabul post 9/11. 
Watson (2008, 65).  
Arshad Miaz. From Burnley. Killed by 
Northern Alliance forces near 
Kabul in 2001. 
O’Neill (2001). 
Afzal Munir From Luton. Killed in US 
bombing raids of Taliban 
controlled Kabul post 9/11. 
Watson (2008, 65). 
Mahmoud Abu Rideh Reported killed in US air strike 
on 16/12/10.  
Gardham, 16/12/10.  
Khalid Shahid From Birmingham, he blew 
himself up along with rival 
Northern Alliance forces in 
1996. 
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
87).  
Unknown Taliban fighter with an Aston 
Villa football club tattoo, whose 
body was discovered by British 
soldiers.  
Radnedge, 15/06/09.  
Unknown Taliban suicide bomber who 
conducted an attack at 
Afghanistan’s defence 
headquarters in April 2011, and 
was believed to have travelled 
from London.  
Elliott, 23/04/11.  
 
 
5.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina  
By the time of Baroness Thatcher’s April 1993 call for the West to arm Bosnia’s 
Muslims, many of her fellow Britons were already fighting in the country - the first 
field of operations for British Jihadism. As Bosnian Muslims fought in the Civil War, 
Jihadists travelled to fight alongside their co-religionists, although the brand of Islam 
traditionally practiced in the Balkans was very different to that of the arriving fighters. 
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Theologically the justness of this cause has been clearly articulated “the Bosnian 
struggle against Serbian fascism is undoubtedly a jihad” (Sardar and Malik, 2009, 
61).  
Estimates vary of between 1-5000 foreigners fighting in Bosnia. In contrast to 
prominent Islamic thinkers such as Ziauddin Sardar, Evan Kohlmann paints a more 
problematic picture of Muslim ‘relief workers’ and ‘staff’ of Islamic charities who were 
in practice combatants. Moazzam Begg, one of the Britons who travelled in this 
period, for what he states were charitable activities, suggests five British Muslims 
were killed in combat (Begg, 2006, 68), whilst Kohlmann identifies the only slightly 
higher figure of six (see figure 5.6) 
Several names in that table are clearly pseudonyms, reflecting the tendency within 
Jihadist organisations for individuals to be referred to by their place of origin – al-Libi, 
al-Turki and al-Brittani, for example would be used to refer to individuals from Libya, 
Turkey and Britain. The similarity to the names used on social media by Britons 
currently fighting in Iraq and Syria is striking. The first Briton to be killed in Bosnia 
was Gulam Jilani Soobiah from Leicester in September 1992. Some were 
exceptionally young – Sayyad al-Falastini, from south west London, was just 18 
when he was one of four fighters to die at the Jihadists headquarters at Podbrezje in 
December 1995. Kohlmann suggests they were killed when a bomb they were 
preparing detonated prematurely (Kohlmann, 2002, 163-5).  
There is limited information on British combatant’s daily activities in Bosnia, and how 
as fighters they contributed to the wider struggle. Moazzam Begg and two 
colleagues visited Zenica, where the Bosnian Mujahideen were based. He found 
their training camp to be professional, very international, and run by Arabs with a 
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strong influence from Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Begg, 2006, 68). In a 
contemporaneous video widely distributed amongst Islamists, a Briton calling himself 
Abu Ibrahim, with his face disguised and carrying a rifle stated: 
When I come here you feel a sense of satisfaction, you are fulfilling your duty. You feel that 
you are doing what the Prophet Muhammad and his companions did fourteen hundred years 
ago. You feel that you achieved something (AbuHamza8477, 2008).14   
An unidentified English comrade in arms further posits the conflict in religious terms: 
These people Mujahideen come from all over the world, not just from one Arab country but 
many brothers from France, England, Uganda, Philippines everywhere, not for the money but 
for the sake of Allah for the religion, for Islam (AbuHamza8477, 2008).  
 
Given these religious declarations, how significant was Bosnia subsequently? On 28 
June 2002 Evan Kohlmann made what appears to have been a rather intimidating 
visit to Finsbury Park mosque, where he found Abu Hamza happy to reminisce about 
this period. Kohlmann declares this struggle vital to subsequent actions. “It provided 
an environment where trained foreign Muslim fighters arriving from Afghanistan could 
mingle with unsophisticated but eager terrorist recruits from Western Europe” 
(Kohlmann, 2002, xii-xiii).  
Bosnia also provides the first instance of British Jihadists in conflict against the 
military of their own country. At Guca Gora on 13 June 1993 four British UN vehicles 
were detained by Mujahideen fighters under the command of an unidentified Briton, 
who eventually allowed their release (Kohlmann, 2002, 87).  Jonathan Bronitsky 
                                                          
14 The provenance of this video is unclear, although it is clearly recorded in Bosnia at some stage during the 
Civil War, and has been a mainstay of jihadist propaganda since. It is available on a succession of video sharing 
websites.  
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argues the Bosnian conflict allowed British Islamists to frame government policies as 
damaging to Islam, and to thus crystallise a contemporary issue overseas with 
broader domestic fears about racism and personal security (Bronitsky, 2010, 23).  
Today, the Bosnian civil war appears distant, but is recalled with some reverence by 
British Islamists, concerned that the war on terror has diminished the willingness of 
Muslims to rally to a cause (Ansari, n.d).  More broadly we see in embryo in Bosnia 
many issues and debates that occur repeatedly in the following two decades. Firstly, 
a small number of British Muslim youth taking up arms, in the company of 
international fighters under a broad Islamic banner. Secondly controversy over 
British foreign policy deemed inimical to the ummah. Thirdly concerns some Muslim 
charities had a brief that extended beyond the humanitarian. Fourthly the pitting on 
different sides in conflict, of British soldiers and British Jihadists.  
Perhaps the most important legacy from British Jihadism’s opening salvo comes in 
terms of the precedents established. Of the eleven Britons listed in the Bosnian 
Mujahideen below, four were to be arrested and convicted in subsequent separate 
terrorist trials – Babar Ahmad, Shahid Butt, Abu Hamza and Andrew Rowe.  Ahmad 
went on to develop one of the most important jihadist websites and pleaded guilty to 
terrorist offences in the United States, Butt was convicted of planning to attack 
Christian targets in Yemen, Hamza of offences in both Britain and America, and 
Rowe in the United Kingdom. This would appear to be give weight to the position of 
Kohlmann, that the importance of Bosnia was the synthesis it provided in bringing 
together fighters from Afghanistan with idealistic recruits to the jihadist cause from 
Europe.   
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Bosnia also carries ramifications for contemporary debates. At several stages of the 
jihad in Syria, those sympathetic to British fighters travelling to the country have 
attempted to argue the west has nothing to fear from such men – that they would 
never come back to attack their home countries (Begg, 2013, Cage, 2014). Within 
critical terrorism studies a broader position has been declared that we should not 
judge those travelling to overseas conflicts (Jackson, Interview, 2011). Some media 
articles on the conflict even compared British fighters in Syria to the International 
Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (Monbiot, 2014).  
The behaviour of some Bosnian Mujahideen fighters after that conflict suggests 
articles presenting the view such men would not be involved in broader terrorism 
lack empirical basis. Further details of each of the men’s convictions are listed 
below.  
 
Figure 5.6 Britons in the Bosnian Mujahideen 
Name Details  Source 
Babar Ahmed Suffered a shrapnel wound to 
the head whilst fighting in 
Bosnia.  
In 2013, pleaded guilty in the 
USA to providing and 
conspiring to provide material 
support to terrorists.  
BBC Website 09/05/11.  
 
US Dept of Justice, 10/12/13. 
Shahid Butt Prominent Birmingham 
Islamist, first arrested in the 
Rushdie protests, went on to 
fight in Bosnia.  
Convicted in 1999 in Yemen of 
conspiring to form an armed 
gang, jailed for five years. 
Channel 4 News Dispatches, 
06/08/07.  
BBC Radio 4, 07/02/09. 
 
Quin (2005, 117). 
Omar Deghayes Informed US authorities whilst 
being held in Guantanamo that 
US Department of Defence, 
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he had fought in Bosnia. 10/04/04   
Abu Hamza Made three trips to the country 
in 1995.  
Convicted in the UK in 2006 for 
soliciting murder.  
Convicted in 2015 on terrorist 
charges in the United States.  
Curtis (2010, 214). 
 
Crown Prosecution Service, 
07/02/06. 
FBI, 21/02/15.  
Abu Zubair al-Haili  A Saudi citizen who lived in 
Tooting 
Kohlmann (2004, 29).  
Abu Ibrahim  3rd year medical student at 
Birmingham University, from 
Golders Green. Involved with 
Azzam Publications. 
Kohlmann (2004, 94, 232). 
Michael Jean-Pierre Returned to the Lisson Green 
Estate in London with leg 
injuries from the conflict. 
Watson (2008, 58).   
James McLintock A Scottish convert who claims 
to have joined the Bosnian 
Mujahideen in 1994.  
Walsh, 13/04/09.  
Andrew Rowe  Jailed for terrorist offences in 
Britain in 2005. Had been 
injured in a mortar attack whilst 
fighting in Bosnia.  
Muir, 24/09/05.  
Unidentified Briton Headed a Mujahideen unit 
which arrested British UN 
forces in Guca Gora. 
Kohlmann (2004, 87). 
Unidentified South Londoner Condemns British Muslims 
who talk rather than fight in the 
Mujahideen.  
Appears on the “British 
Mujahideen” in Bosnia video 
(AbuHamza8477, 2008). 
 
Figure 5.7 Britons Killed in Bosnia 
Name Details Sources 
Gulam Jilani Soobiah, aged 44. d. 17/09/1992 in Mostar, when 
his Land Rover was struck by a 
missile.  
Kohlmann (2004, 36).  
 
Abu Ibrahim al-Turki  d. October 1992. Killed by 
French UN troops who were 
travelling to Battle of Butmir. 
Kohlmann (2004, 60-61).  
Abu Muslim al-Turki In his 40s or 50s, killed in battle Kohlmann (2004, 94-5). 
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against Croats.  
David Sinclair  A convert, also known as 
Dawood al-Brittani 
Kohlmann (2004, 95).  
Abu Mujahid al-Brittani  d. 10/9/95 in Operation Badr, 
an attack on the Serbs at 
Mount Poceljevo and Mount 
Paljenik. Had graduated from 
University in 1993, and 
combined charity work with 
Jihad. 
Kohlmann (2004, 138-9) 
Sayyad al-Falastini d. 12/12/95 aged 18, in an 
explosion at the Mujahideen 
training camp at Podbrezje.  
Kohlmann (2004, 163-5). 
 
 
5.4 Chechnya  
No war is purely physical. Britons have also contributed to the jihadi struggle’s 
ideological and cultural elements. The website Azzam.com (named after Abdullah 
Azzam whose importance to the jihadist movement has been a recurring theme in 
this thesis) was at one stage receiving an astonishing five million daily hits for its 
mixture of jihadi statements, interviews, martyrs obituaries and propaganda videos 
(North, 2002). Sister organisation Azzam Publications was run via the British 
Monomarks postal address service in London. The importance of these tools was 
recognised by combatants in the field. The late Saudi Jihadist Ibn Al-Khattab, best 
known for his activities in Chechnya commented: 
The brothers in Britain, may Allah reward them, have put in much efforts to publicise the 
Jihad. There is an organisation by the name of Azzam Publications, which is run by brothers 
who are known to us and maintain regular contact with us. So anyone who wishes to support 
us or requires any further information about the situation here, they should contact this 
organisation (Kohlmann, Dossier, n.d.).  
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Paul Murphy’s analysis of the Chechen Jihad, “The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the 
Faces of Chechen Terror” further outlines how this relationship worked: 
Until November 2001, you could buy your own personal copy of a Khattab video on CD-ROM 
from Azzam Publications for $20.00. The videos, called Chechnya from the Ashes and 
Russian Hell in the Year 2000, show live footage of Chechen suicide truck bombings of 
Russian military barracks in the Chechen towns of Argun and Gudermes in July 2000 
(Murphy, 2006, 33). 
Contemporaneous information was also sent from the front line to Azzam 
Publications, for example by email as Khattab re-grouped his forces having retreated 
from Dagestan under heavy Russian bombardment in August 1998 (Murphy, 2006, 
103). The United States government eventually took action against such activities, 
issuing a 49 page affidavit, requesting the extradition of Azzam webmaster Babar 
Ahmad (United States of America v Babar Ahmad, 2004) and a similar document 
against associate Talha Ahsan. Part of the legal case against Ahmad was the use of 
internet servers in the United States for a website which declared its purpose thus: 
Azzam Publications has been set up to propagate the call for Jihad, among the Muslims who 
are sitting down, ignorant of this vital duty....Thus the purpose of Azzam Publications is to 
‘Incite the believers’ and also secondly to raise some money for the brothers (United States of 
America v Babar Ahmad, 2004, 4).  
This quote demonstrates that Anwar al-Awlaki was not the first Western Islamist to 
raise the concept of jihad through wealth. Equally the priority of Jihad for Muslims is, 
in this approach, again stressed as pivotal.  
 
How many Britons have fought directly in Chechnya? In 2003 Al-Muhajiroun was 
proscribed, a development which in terms of timeframe appears to have followed 
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complaints from Russia that the organisation was sending combatants to Chechnya 
(Curtis, 2010, 274). Xavier Djaffo, a French citizen who had been attending Finsbury 
Park mosque, was killed fighting in ‘The Martyrs Battalion’ in 2000 after an encounter 
with Russian troops. Briton Amir Assadula, an African convert to Islam who had 
fought alongside Khattab for some years, was killed in July 2002 (Murphy, 2006, 99-
100). 
Unlike the civil war in Syria, actually getting to Chechnya appears to have been a 
challenge for British Islamists who wished to physically contribute to the struggle.  In 
1999 the Bosnian Mujahideen veteran from London, Andrew Rowe attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to reach the conflict (Watson, 2008, 45). In a brief section of his 
autobiography Moazzam Begg states “I had heard about people from Britain who 
had gone to join the Chechen struggle” (Begg, 2006, 82) and discusses his plans to 
travel to the region at the height of the jihadist campaign. However, Begg qualifies 
what he personally was attempting to do “I was ready to help in whatever way I 
could, fight if I had to, despite my lack of training” (Begg, 2006, 83). He did not reach 
Chechnya – Georgian border guards refused entry.  As such, this research names a 
mere five British Jihadis to have fought in Chechnya, two of whom were killed – 
almost certainly a significant underestimate.  
 
Fig 5.8 British Jihadis in Chechnya 
Name  Details Sources  
Amir Assadula Killed in the Vedensky district 
in July 2002.  
Murphy (2006, 99).  
Yacine Benalia Left Finsbury Park mosque to 
fight in Chechnya in 2001. 
Burke, 03/10/04. 
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Kamel Rabat Bouralha Prominent amongst the 
Algerian émigrés at Finsbury 
Park mosque.  
Fought in Chechnya in 2001.  
Burke, 03/10/04.  
Xavier Djaffo, aka Massoud al-
Benin. 
A friend of Zacarias 
Moussaoui, was attending 
Finsbury Park mosque.  
 
Killed by Russian forces in 
April 2000, whilst working for 
UK website Azzam.com 
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
93).  
 
Murphy (2006, 100).  
Osman Larussi Left Finsbury Park mosque to 
head to Chechnya to fight in 
2001.  
Burke, 03/10/04. 
 
 
5.5 India, Kashmir and Pakistan 
In December 2008 Prime Minister Gordon Brown described the greatest threat to 
Britain’s security as paradoxically coming from an ally – Pakistan, with 75 percent of 
terrorist plots against the UK originating in the Islamic Republic (Hinsliff, 2009). 
Whatever the reliability of this figure, there has been a significant relationship 
between British Jihadism and Pakistan, a subject already touched upon in chapter 
three. Jihadist training has long been associated with the major organisations 
fighting from bases in Azad Kashmir. In October 1999 a London based rail industry 
professional, Mohammed Sohail, was forwarding emails to those interested: 
Currently jihad training is being done in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan. It is on for 21 days and is 
of beginner’s level. It is organised by Lashkar Toiba. The advanced training is for three 
months and for students it is 15 days. Then there are special courses. If anyone wants to go 
to Afghanistan... I can also do this by arrangement (Berry and Hastings, 1999).    
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When confronted by the Sunday Telegraph about why he was involved in such 
activity, and using his Railtrack email account in the process, Mr Sohail replied with a 
standard explanation: 
I want to make it clear that our organisation has never targeted people in Britain. We 
are involved only with struggles abroad. We see it as a form of self-defence. We 
have a duty to help brothers who are fighting oppression overseas (Berry and 
Hastings, 1999).  
 
In 2000 Mohammed Bilal from Birmingham, killed himself in a suicide attack on an 
Indian army base in Srinagar. This death could have been a spur to the British 
government to take the Kashmir question and British jihadist participation in it 
seriously. However it was only after 9/11, and a renewed possibility of war between 
India and Pakistan following the December 2001 terrorist attack at the Indian 
Parliament, did the UK find its voice. In June 2002 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
informed the Commons;  
There was a clear link between Pakistan’s main intelligence agency and the militant groups 
sending fighters into Kashmir. The government in London had believed this to be true for 
some years but had hitherto not said so in public (Bennett Jones, 2003, xviii-xix) 
Straw denounced those fighting in Kashmir as terrorists. A categorisation which 
presumably applied to those British Islamists, many listed below, fighting alongside 
them?  
 
This research names 27 Britons as having trained in the Pakistani camps, including 
two 7/7 bombers and Mukthar Ibrahim, who organised the unsuccessful 21/7 attacks. 
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This fact alone should ensure that Mr Sohail’s declaration is, with the benefit of 
hindsight, worthless. Indeed it appears characteristic of those who attend such 
camps that they go on to commit or attempt to commit terrorist offences in their 
home country – this applies to 14 of the 27 men listed in figure 5.10. The longevity of 
British access to jihadist camps is also demonstrated in that table - with named 
Britons in Pakistan from at least 1999-2014. However, not all attempts by Britons to 
train in Pakistan have proved a success. In the summer of 2011 Al-Muhajiroun’s 
Richard Dart and Jahingar Alom were unable to find a suitable facility despite 
spending time in the country. Later that year they booked flights to Quetta, having 
sought information from Imran Mahmood on meeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) contacts in the country. Both were turned back at Heathrow (Metropolitan 
Police, 2013).  
The proximity of the Syrian jihad has not brought an end to such adventures. 
Hamayun Tariq from Dudley spent 2012-4 with militants in Waziristan before heading 
to Syria (Malik, 2014). When Al-Muhajiroun member Dr Mirza Ali fled violent disorder 
charges in London in 2014, he absconded not to Syria but Pakistan, where he joined 
the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaatul Ahrar (TTPJA). Struck off in his absence 
by the General Medical Council for hitting a Shia Muslim with a stick during fighting 
at an Al-Muhajiroun rally on Edgware Road, Ali has reportedly been killed by 
Pakistani military action (Glanvill, 2015).  
Figure 5.11 lists a total of nine deaths of Britons in Pakistan. This makes the country 
the third most deadly for British Jihadis, behind only Afghanistan and Syria. Of these, 
eight have been killed by either the American or Pakistani military, seven in drone 
strikes, a demonstration of the extent to which this action against alleged terrorists is 
being utilised, regardless of their nationality.  
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Figure 5.9 Britons who have fought in India, Kashmir or Pakistan 
Name Details Source 
Salman Abdullah A Yorkshireman of Kashmiri 
heritage, he fought in Kashmir 
in the late 1990s travelling via 
Finsbury Park Mosque 
O’Neill and McGrory (2006, 
82).  
Dhiren Barot Fought for a series of non-state 
groups in Kashmir in the years 
before 2000.  
Now serving life for terrorist 
offences in the UK.  
Cage (2014).  
 
 
Figure 5.10 Britons trained in India, Kashmir or Pakistan  
Name Details  Source 
Mohammed Sharfaz Ahmed From Luton. Trained in 
Pakistan for a week in 2011, 
before leaving as his Arabic 
was too poor.  
Convicted in the plot to attack 
Luton TA Centre.  
Luton Today, 18/04/13.  
Jawad Akbar Attended a training course at 
Kohat in North West Frontier 
Province in 2003, and then 
travelled to another in Kashmir. 
Convicted of terrorism in the 
Operation Crevice case 
Watson (2008, 69).  
 
 
Keeble and Hollington (2010, 
130). 
Abdullah Ahmed Ali Travelled with jihadists to the 
Afghan-Pakistan border area 
with the Islamic Medical 
Association in 2003.  
Jailed for life for his part in the 
2003 airline bomb plot.  
Keeble and Hollington (2010, 
44) 
 
Keeble and Hollington (2010, 
125). 
Ashik Ali Trained in Pakistan in the run-
up to the Birmingham rucksack 
plot.  
Jailed for 15 years for terrorist 
Muslim Weekly, 03/05/2013.  
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offences in 2013.  
Dr Mirza Tariq Ali Pakistani born, he became 
involved with Al-Muhajiroun 
after coming to the UK in 2004. 
Jailed in abstentia for violent 
disorder in June 2014, but had 
already fled for Pakistan.  
In November 2014 appeared in 
a video for the TTPJA. 
Verkaik et al, 16/11/14 
Naweed Ali Travelled to Pakistan to train 
with the Birmingham rucksack 
plotters, but had second 
thoughts. Jailed for 40 months. 
Muslim Weekly, 03/05/2013 
Waheed Ali Jailed for 7 years in 2009 for 
planning to attend a terrorist 
training camp. Had already 
attended camps in 2001 and 
2003. 
Williams, 30/04/09. 
Salahuddin Amin From Luton. Attended the 
Balakot facility in 2001. Latter 
jailed following Operation 
Crevice.  
Silber (2012, 94).  
Umar Arshad An associate of Al-Qaeda 
members in Manchester. Fled 
a control order in 2007, and is 
believed to be with fighters in 
Pakistan.  
Cruickshank, 20/01/12.  
Mohammed Babar Trained with Barot in Pakistan 
in 2004 
Hayman and Gilmore (2009, 
285). 
Dhiren Barot Trained with Operation Crevice 
plotters in Pakistan. Now 
serving life (see above) 
Hayman and Gilmore (2009, 
285). 
Anthony Garcia (Previously 
Abdulrahman Adam) 
Trained in the country with 
Operation Crevice plotters and 
two of the 7/7 bombers.  
Gardham, 21/08/10.  
Khobaib Hussain Travelled to Pakistan to train 
with the Birmingham rucksack 
plotters, but had second 
thoughts. Jailed for 40 months. 
Muslim Weekly (03/05/2013) 
Ishaaq Hussain Travelled to Pakistan to train 
with the Birmingham rucksack 
plotters, but had second 
thoughts. Jailed for 40 months.  
Muslim Weekly (03/05/2013) 
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Mukhtar Ibrahim Received training in the period 
2004-5. Went on to lead the 
failed 21/7 bombers in London.  
Curtis (2010, 286) 
Abu Izzadeen (Trevor Brooks) Spent seven months weapons 
training in Kashmir 
Watson (2008, 61). 
Irfan Khalid Trained in Pakistan in the run-
up to the Birmingham rucksack 
plot 
Muslim Weekly (03/05/2013) 
Aabid Hussain Khan Ran a jihadist website, moving 
between Bradford and Pakistan 
whilst claiming to do charitable 
work. 
BBC2 Generation Jihad, 
Episode 2 15/2/10. 
Mohammed Sidique Khan Malakand, Swat Valley 2003, 
plus a further camp in 2004.  
Died committing the 7/7 
bombings.  
Malik (2009, 110-1) 
Shahid Khan Travelled to Pakistan to train 
with the Birmingham rucksack 
plotters, but had second 
thoughts. Jailed for 40 months. 
Muslim Weekly 03/05/2013 
Omar Khyam Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir 
Kalam, Swat Valley, 2003 
Serving life for the Operation 
Crevice plot.  
Curtis, (2010, 286). 
Malik (2009, 111) 
Silber (2012, 87) 
Imran Mahmood Trained in Pakistan from July 
2010 prior to returning to the 
UK in August 2011.  
Jailed for 14 years 9 months 
with two others in 2013 for 
preparing for an act of 
terrorism.  
MI5 25/04/13, MPS 25/04/13.  
Irfan Naseer Trained in Pakistan in the run-
up to the Birmingham rucksack 
plot 
Muslim Weekly 03/05/2013. 
Kazi Rahman Trained with Operation Crevice 
plotters in Pakistan.  
Later convicted of buying guns 
in a counter-terrorist sting 
operation.  
Hayman and Gilmore (2009, 
284). 
Wheeler (2012).  
Mohammed Shakil Jailed for 7 years in 2009 for Williams, 30/04/09.  
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planning to attend a terrorist 
training camp. Had previously 
attended camps in 1999, 2001 
and 2003.  
Shehzad Tanweer Attended camp run by LeT 
(Mudrike, nr Lahore) and 
Manshera, run by HuM.  
Died committing the 7/7 
bombings.  
(Malik, 2009, 110).  
Hamayun Tariq From Dudley, spent 2012-2014 
with militants in Waziristan 
before leaving for Syria.  
Malik, 20/11/14.  
 
Figure 5.11 British Jihadis Killed in India, Kashmir or Pakistan  
Name Details  Source 
Ibrahim Adam From east London. Aged 24, 
absconded from a control order 
in May 2007. Killed by a drone 
in Waziristan in November 
2011. 
Daily Mail, 19/11/11.  
Dr Mirza Ali Al-Muhajiroun member on the 
run in Pakistan. Killed in armed 
forces action against the 
TTPJA,  
Glanvill, 13/03/15.  
Aslam Awan Pakistani born, reportedly 
joined Al-Qaeda whilst a 
student in Manchester. Killed in 
a drone strike in North 
Waziristan in 2012.  
Sadaqat, 21/01/12.  
Mohammed Azmir A 37 year old from Essex, 
killed alongside Adam in 
Waziristan. 
Daily Mail, 19/11/11.  
Abdul-Jabbar A Briton who had been living in 
Punjab, killed by a drone on 
08/09/10 in north Waziristan.  
Cageprisoners, 08/09/10.  
Bilal Mohammed Died in a suicide bombing in 
Srinagar on 25/12/00. Active in 
Al-Muhajiroun and Jaish-e-
Mohammed. 
Involved with the Harkat ul 
Mujahideen since 1994. 
Watson (2008, 63).  
 
 
Curtis (2010, 192) 
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Rashid Rauf  Aged 27, reported killed by a 
drone on 22/11/08 in north 
Waziristan whilst on the run 
from Pakistani custody in 
December 2007. 
Alderson et al 23/11/08.  
Gerry Smith, aka Mansoor 
Ahmed or Abu Bakar. 
Aged 25, killed 11/12/10 in a 
drone strike near Datta Khel, 
north Waziristan. A white 
convert. 
Metro 17/12/10.  
Stephen – surname unknown. Aged 48, killed 11/12/10 in a 
drone strike near Datta Khel, 
north Waziristan. A white 
convert. 
Metro 17/12/10.  
 
 
With at least nine Britons killed in Pakistan, it might be expected a significant number 
would also be in jail in the country for terrorism offences. The only reported person 
however is Omar Saeed Sheikh, on death row since 2003 for the murder of 
American journalist Daniel Pearl (Fouda and Fielding, 2003, 69).  
 
5.6 Indonesia 
The case of Jack Roche, a British born Muslim convert who has lived most of his life 
in Australia, appears to be the only instance of a Briton involved in an Indonesian 
Jihadist organisation – the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Conboy, 2006, 
192n). Roche conducted preparatory work for a JI attack on the Israeli embassy in 
Canberra, a plot subsequently aborted.  
 
5.7 Iraq 
Assessing the numbers of British Jihadists to have fought in Iraq is a complicated 
process. No comprehensive survey has been published of Britons fighting coalition 
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forces in the period following the overthrow of Saddam Hussain in 2003. Secondly 
the success of Islamic State, and its desire to erase the border between Syria and 
Iraq, obscures the location of many contemporary jihadists in-situ. Indeed the very 
nature of Islamic State’s caliphate rejects such demarcation. As it stands, this 
research names four men from the UK known to have fought in Iraq – two British 
citizens and two British residents.  An additional five men have been killed in the 
country – three British citizens and two British residents.  
A recurring theme re-emerges in this data. Whilst those with familial connections to 
Iraq may perhaps be expected to take part in such conflicts, others listed below have 
very distant backgrounds – in Scotland, England, Yemen and France. An indication 
of the international nature of jihadist networks. But it is not just foreign policy which 
stirs such individuals to action. Suicide bomber Kabir Ahmed previously came to 
public attention having been convicted of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual 
orientation, in his home town of Derby (Muslim Weekly, 14/11/14). Equally it should 
be noted that two of the combatants listed in figure 5.13, Abdulla and Al-Abdaly, 
went on to commit terrorist attacks in Europe – Abdulla in England, Al-Abdaly in a 
country which had not directly participated in the invasion of Iraq – Sweden.  
 
Fig 5.12 Britons Known to have fought in Iraq 
Name Details  Source 
Taimour Abdulwahad Al-
Abdaly 
A Swedish-Iraqi who had 
settled with his family for over 
a decade in Luton.  
Died in 2010 in a suicide 
bombing in Stockholm, having 
earlier fought in Iraq. 
Pantucci, 21/08/14.  
Bilal Abdulla An Iraqi doctor. Fought Pantucci, 21/08/14. 
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coalition troops in his 
homeland before committing 
the failed July 2007 bombings 
in London and Glasgow.  
Hilal al Jedda 
 
An Iraqi exile who received 
British citizenship in 2000. 
Arrested by US forces in Iraq 
on 10/10/04, on suspicion of 
attacking coalition soldiers.  
Ross and Rudgard, 11/07/14.  
 
Amnesty International, 
21/07/05.  
Hamzah Parvez A 21 year old west Londoner 
fighting for ISIS.  
Whitehead, 29/08/14.  
 
 
Figure 5.13 Britons Killed in Iraq 
Name Details  Source 
Kabir Ahmed Died carrying out a suicide 
bombing against police in Beiji, 
Iraq on 7/11/14. 
Gatten,  09/11/14 
Abdul Raqib Amin. Alias Abul 
Baraa 
IS member from Aberdeen, 
reportedly killed by a Iraqi 
forces in Ramadi in July 2014 
@Abu_Dujana, Twitter 
(13/07/14).  
Wail al-Dhaleai A Yemeni granted asylum, 
living in Sheffield with a 
Yorkshire born wife.  
Killed by US troops whilst 
attempting a suicide attack in 
November 2003.  
Taylor, 01/09/06.  
Mohammad Nasser Reported killed by shrapnel, 
whilst fighting alongside fellow 
Londoner Hamzah Parvez. 
Whitehead, 29/08/14. 
Unnamed French national of Algerian 
origin, who had been living in 
Moss Side, Manchester. A 
suicide bomber.  
Evening Standard, 22/06/05.  
 
Bunyan et al, 22/06/05.  
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5.8 Israel and the Palestinian Territories 
In April 2003 Asif Hanif from London and Omar Khan Sharif from Derby strapped 
themselves with explosives and attempted to blow up Mike’s Place, a bar in Tel Aviv. 
Hanif, along with three Israelis, was killed at the spot, whilst Khan, somewhat 
mysteriously appears to have fled the scene after problems occurred with his 
explosives. His body was washed up a week later on Tel Aviv sea front (Israel, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). 
It is worth noting that although Britain does have a small émigré population of 
Palestinians, neither Hanif or Sharif came from this community. They were British 
Muslims of Pakistani heritage, from stable family backgrounds (Roy, 2004, 308, 
19n). Both subsequently appeared in suicide videos released by Hamas, giving the 
Israeli government an opportunity to attack international support for the Palestinian 
cause – Sharif and Hanif had associated with the pro-Palestinian International 
Solidarity Movement on arrival in the region (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).  
 
5.9 Kenya 
Kenya has proved to be an important transit point for British Jihadists travelling to 
Somalia, and possibly a terrorist target in its own right. A total of seven Britons have 
been recorded by the Kenyan legal system to this effect, with a major terrorist trial, of 
Jermaine Grant ongoing. In the majority of cases listed below the response of the 
Kenyan authorities has been to deport those detained back to Britain. This number 
has included Michael Adebolajo, who in 2011 is believed to have been prevented 
from joining Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. Having been unable to take part in 
jihad in East Africa, Adebolajo was later to pursue his aims in Britain, murdering 
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soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013. The case of Adebolajo provides further 
evidence that those committed to jihadist causes overseas can possess similar 
ambitions with regards to their home nations.  
 
Fig 5.14   British Jihadis in Kenya 
Name Incident Source 
Graham Andrew Adams aka 
Ahmed Khalid Ibrahim  
A Muslim convert from 
Rochdale. Arrested with 
several armed Somalis in 
Mombasa. Subsequently 
deported.  
News 24, 19/12/07.  
Michael Adebolajo Arrested in 2011, allegedly 
attempting to enter Somalia. 
Deported to Britain.  
Now serving life for murdering 
Lee Rigby.  
Muslim Weekly, 31/05/13. 
Habib Ghani From Hounslow, believed by 
Kenyan police to be on the run 
with Ms Lewthwaite. Reported 
killed in Somalia (see figure 
5.18). 
O’Neill, 29/02/12.  
Jermaine Grant On trial for possessing bomb 
making material and conspiring 
to commit an explosion.  
BBC Website, 17/02/14.  
Samantha Lewthwaite Widow of 7/7 bomber Jermaine 
Lindsay. Wanted by Kenyan 
authorities in connection with 
the same alleged plot as Grant. 
O’Neill, 29/02/12.  
Mohamed Mohamed An 18 year old from Cardiff, 
Arrested at Lamu, Kenya, in 
October 2011, attempting to 
travel onwards to Somalia.  
McGuiness (2011) 
 
 
Iqbal Shahzad As above. Both men were 
deported from Kenya on 
19/10/11.  
McGuiness (2011) 
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 5.10 Nigeria  
The highest profile jihadist group in Nigeria has been Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li al-
Da`wa wa al-Jihad, Arabic for “People Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” It is as Boko Haram, meaning “Western education 
is sinful” in the Hausa language (Zenn, 2014, 5) by which the organisation is best 
known locally and internationally.  
The one Briton to gain a public profile within Boko Haram has been Aminu Sadiq 
Ogwuche, arrested in Sudan in March 2014 in connection with bomb attacks in 
Abuja. A student at the University of South Wales from 2007-10, Ogwuche had used 
social media both after and during his time in Wales to make a series of comments 
advocating violence (Selby, 2014).  
 
5.11 Somalia and Somaliland 
Somalia’s government and institutions collapsed in 1994, and repeated attempts to 
replace them in the following two decades failed. The emergence of the Islamic 
Courts movement from 2006 demonstrated Islamists were attempting to restore 
order, asserting their interpretation of the Qur’an. The profile these events received 
and the development of the Al-Shabaab organisation attracted the attention of both 
sharia seeking Islamists from the rest of the world, and Somali exiles in Britain keen 
to return to fight in their homeland. 
Media speculation has put the number of Britons trained by Al-Shabaab at 50 
(McDougall, 2012), with others supporting their struggle financially from the UK. 
Shabaaz Hussain from Tower Hamlets, for example, was convicted of sending 
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£8,900 to associates in the country for their training (McDougall, 2012). Further 
support has been contributed to relief programmes run by Al-Shabaab, such as the 
Ala-Yasir camp in southern Somalia (Osman, 2011).   
The use of drones against Britons fighting in Somalia is one of a range of counter 
terrorist responses – from attempting to disrupt financial supply routes through to 
depriving dual national fighters in Somalia of British citizenship. This highly unusual 
approach has been enacted at least twice – against Bilal al-Barjawi and Mohamed 
Sakr. Both seemingly left London for Somalia in 2009, were stripped of their British 
citizenship in 2010, and killed by drones in 2012. Whilst those drones were US 
controlled, British counter-terrorism input into the killing of al-Barjawi is likely 
(Webber, 2013) – he was killed shortly after telephoning his wife in the Royal London 
Hospital at Whitechapel, where she had given birth to their child.  
This research records four Britons as having trained in Somalia – all from Tower 
Hamlets in east London. An additional five Britons are listed as part of Al-Shabaab’s 
forces. What is noticeable here, as in Chapter four, is the representation of students 
and recent graduates.  Students from Imperial College, Kings College (again) and 
the University of East London have all contributed to Al-Shabaab’s struggle to install 
sharia in Somalia.  
The deaths of a further five Britons are recorded below, although the names of only 
three are known.  
 
Fig 5.15 Britons trained in Somalia  
Individual Details Source 
Tufual Ahmed Travelled to Somalia with Ali Docklands and East London 
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and Jahangir. Advertiser, 02/08/12. 
Mohammed Shahim Ali Travelled to Somalia with funds 
raised for him by his brothers. 
Docklands and East London 
Advertiser, 05/04/12.  
Mohamed Hasnath Prominent Islamist in Tower 
Hamlets, appears in a 2013 Al-
Shabaab video. 
Lowles and Mulhall, (2013, 47). 
Muhammad Jahangir Travelled with Ali and Ahmed.  Docklands and East London 
Advertiser, 02/08/12. 
 
Fig 5.16 British Jihadis in Somalia 
Individual Details Source 
Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed 
(Recorded as CC in legal 
proceedings) 
Arrested in Somaliland, and 
placed on a control order after 
deportation to the UK. Had 
fought with Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia. 
Absconded from control order 
on 1 November 2013 and 
remains missing.  
Swann and Casciani (2012) 
 
 
 
May, 04/11/13.  
 
CF (name withheld from public 
due to a control order).  
Arrested in Somaliland, and 
placed on a control order after 
deportation to the UK. Had 
fought with Al-Shabaab after 
fleeing a trial for attending 
training camps in Afghanistan.  
Now at university in London.  
London24, 12/04/13. 
Un-named 23 year Kings College law 
graduate, travelled to fight for 
Al-Shabaab in 2010 
Kerbaj, 24/01/10. 
Un-named 25 year old medical student 
from Imperial College, travelled 
to fight for Al-Shabaab in 2010 
Kerbaj, 24/01/10 
Un-named A 24 year old female bio-
medical student at University of 
East London, who joined Al-
Shabaab’s medical unit in 
2010. 
Kerbaj, 24/01/10 
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Figure 5.17 Britons Killed fighting in Somalia 
Individual Details Source 
Bilal al-Barjawi Aged 27. Killed by a US drone 
in January 2012 after 
telephoning his wife in London. 
Webber (2013). 
Habib Ghani Aged 28, from Hounslow. 
Reported to have been shot 
dead in Shongolow following 
an internal dispute in Al-
Shabaab.  
Camber and Smyth, 12/09/12. 
Mohamed Sakr From Newham, killed by a US 
drone in February 2012.  
Webber (2013). 
Unnamed 21 year old from 
Ealing. 
Killed whilst conducting a 
suicide bombing in Baidoa, 
Somalia in February 2009. 
Sengupta, 25/02/09.  
Unnamed teenager Reported killed on an un-
named Al-Qaeda website.  
Owens, 17/07/11.  
 
 
5.12 Sweden 
On 11 December 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi who had lived in 
both Sweden and Britain, attempted to conduct a suicide bombing in Stockholm. He 
killed only himself, although two civilians were injured. The University of Bedfordshire 
graduate, resident in Luton with his wife and family, had been assisted in his 
preparation by Nasserdine Menni, an Algerian living in Glasgow (Judiciary of 
Scotland, 2012).  
Aaron Weisburd conducted an analysis of Taimour al-Abdaly’s Facebook account 
after this death: “we find a predominance of anti-Shiite and anti-apostate videos, 
lesser amounts of anti-Western/anti-USA/anti-Semitic/anti-Israel content (in that 
order)” (Internet Haganah, 2010). Weisburd speculates this may be influenced by 
self-censorship – any online account dominated by Al-Qaeda videos is likely to draw 
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the attention of the authorities. However he also intimates this could be an accurate 
picture of the politico-religious attitudes of such actors: 
Jihadis may attempt to attack the West from time to time, but the real source of their rage will 
be found in their unhappiness with Muslim rulers and with their fellow Muslims more generally 
(Internet Haganah, 2010).  
The sectarianism displayed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Abdullah el-Faisal towards 
Shia, discussed earlier in this thesis, is a further example of this tendency. 
Manifestations of this turning to violence are however rare within British Islamism – 
the anti-Shia demonstration in London by Al-Muhajiroun which led to violent clashes 
in May 2013 being a rare example (Norman, 2013).  
 
5.13 Syria 
In 2010 Ali Marmouk, Director General of Syria’s General Intelligence Service visited 
London. He provided MI6 with a list of British Islamists in Syria (some of whom had 
entered via the conflict zone of Iraq) as part of an attempt to enter into co-operation 
with Whitehall on anti-terrorism matters (Intelligence Online, 2010). The United 
Kingdom had been of specific interest to the Syrian authorities since the 1990s, 
when several Syrians were prominent in Jihadist circles in London (see figure 3.10).  
Since Syria’s uprising against President Assad began in March 2011, a series of 
armed opposition groups have jostled to lead the insurgency. Although the Free 
Syrian Army had initially been the largest of the rebel groups, jihadists gravitated 
towards Jabhat Al-Nusra, Al-Tawhid, Katiba Al-Muhajireen or Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (Cockburn and Hall, 2013) often referred to as ISIS (Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria) and since its declaration of a caliphate, as Islamic State.  One of the 
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errors Osama Bin Laden considered himself to have made was in not giving Al-
Qaeda a resonantly Islamic moniker, which could serve to closely associate in 
Muslim minds his organisation with their perceived struggle (Bergen, 2012). Islamic 
State makes no such mistake.  
Figures 5.18 to 5.20 make a contribution to cataloguing and recording British 
contribution to the Syrian jihad. This research makes no claim to be as 
comprehensive as those, such as the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence at Kings College, who have had the resources 
to chart the Syrian jihad solely, with a team of researchers working on different 
aspects of the subject. It does however, especially when tied to data on earlier jihads 
such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia, aim to produce an 
overview across a significantly greater timeframe. In terms of the numbers of fighters 
recorded below, and the number of deaths, the Syrian conflict, although not unique, 
is now the most important in three decades of British Jihadism. There are estimated 
to be at least 20,000 foreign fighters in Syria, with a quarter of these being from 
Western countries. Some 500-600 are believed to be from Britain (Neumann, 2015).  
 
This research names sixteen British fighters who have been killed in Syria. Some of 
these deaths came in the violence which flared in May 2014 between Jabhat Al-
Nusra and IS (White and Collins, 2014). Others have died conducting suicide 
bombings, in US airstrikes or on the battlefield against Syrian or Kurdish forces. 
Despite a significantly greater focus now on preventing would be fighters and 
supporters of Islamic State from travelling to Syria, there is nothing to indicate either 
a reduction in interest from a small number of British Sunni Muslims in this cause, or 
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a significant reversal in the fortunes of IS. As such, this distinct chapter in the history 
of British Jihadism is likely to continue for some time.  
In addition to those killed in Syria, this research names a total of 31 male fighters 
who have left Britain to fight jihad there, and 13 females who have travelled to the 
Islamic State. The departure of women from the United Kingdom to a conflict of this 
type has not been a characteristic of earlier jihadist activity, although it is estimated 
several hundred have left Europe to join IS (Sherwood et al, 2014). At this stage it is 
unclear how many of the women have travelled to marry fighters, to live under 
sharia, or if any are directly involved in violence. This is likely to be an area of 
considerable future research.  
 
Those in Syria are to be found speaking in broad terms of sharia and protecting 
Islam. Using his understanding of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, Shiraz Maher of Kings 
College has spoken to scores of fighters in Syria. In an examination of those who 
had travelled to Syria from Portsmouth, he found young men who had earlier come 
together in the Portsmouth Dawah Team, a group dedicated to proselytising to non-
Muslims (Maher, 2014).  Observing the Syrian Civil War, they were determined that 
the outcome should be sharia, rather than democracy.  
More generally, he writes of the jihadis’ motivations:  
There are those who are principally motivated by the region’s human suffering, whom we call 
missionary jihadis; there are martyrdom seekers, who regard the conflict as a shortcut to 
paradise; there are those simply seeking adventure, for whom the supposed masculinity of it 
all has great appeal; and, finally, there are long-standing radicals for whom the conflict 
represents a chance to have the fight they had been waiting for (Maher, 2014). 
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Any understanding that the attraction of jihadist causes was rooted in the appeal of 
Al-Qaeda had been critically overtaken by events. That some should make the 
journey from running dawah stalls in Portsmouth’s shopping centre to Syria is 
perhaps not remarkable, given what we know about the characteristic practice of 
jihadist organisations.  
 
Figure 5.18 British Jihadis in Syria 
Individual Details Source 
Mohammed Ahmad  From Birmingham. Fought in 
the Kateeba al-Kawthar group. 
Pleaded guilty to terrorism 
offences on his return to the 
UK.  
Whitehead, 08/07/14.  
Rashed Amani Aged 19. A business studies 
student at Coventry University.  
Arlott, 24/06/14.  
Mohammad Azzam From Manchester. Travelled in 
September 2013. 
Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14b.  
Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary  Aged 23, from London.  
Was reporting from Syria as 
@itsLJinny on Twitter until 
suspended.  
 
Father jailed for 25 years for 
terrorist offences in the United 
States, arising from Al-Qaeda’s 
1998 African embassy 
bombings. 
Daily Mail, 09/03/14.  
 
 
 
US Dept of Justice, 06/02/15.  
Eamon Bradley Aged 25, from Londonderry. A 
Muslim convert from the 
Republican Creggan Estate.  
Deeney, 03/07/14.  
Mashudur Choudhury Aged 31, from Portsmouth. 
Spent the bulk of October 2013 
in Syria.  
Casciani, 20/05/14. 
Aine Davis  From Hammersmith, has been 
fighting in Syria since 2013.  
Collins, 22/08/14.  
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Amer Deghayes From Brighton Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14 
Siddhartha Dhar also known as 
Abu Rumaysah 
Aged 31, from London. A high 
profile member of Al-
Muhajiroun 
BBC News London, 12/11/14 
Mohammed Emwazi A Kuwaiti born Londoner. 
Accused of carrying out a 
series of executions of 
hostages in Syria.  
Mekhennet and Goldman, 
26/02/15. 
Mohammed Hadi Aged 19, from Coventry Arlott, 24/06/14. 
Ahmed Halane From Manchester. Brother of 
the Halane sisters (see below).  
His father teachers Qur’anic 
studies at the Manchester 
Somali Islamic Cultural Trust.  
Scheerhout et al, 10/07/14 
 Abu Handhla Alias of a British IS fighter 
based in Manbij, Syria. Now 
married to Salma Halane from 
Manchester.  
Gadher, 14/12/14.  
Nur Hassan Originally from Kotka in 
Finland, but had been living in 
Whalley Range, Manchester.  
Thompson, 21/11/14.  
Junaid Hussain From Birmingham, believed to 
be fighting for IS in Syria.  
Hunter, 08/09/14.  
Omar Hussain Aged 27 from High Wycombe. 
Former security guard 
Taher, 19/10/14.  
Ismail Jabbar Aged 22 from London Marris, 02/06/14 
Ali Kalantar Aged 18, from Coventry.  
 
Afghan born, he came to 
Britain aged 10.  
Arlott, 24/06/14. 
 
Jones, 28/06/14.  
Reyaad Khan Aged 20, from Cardiff. Had 
previously attended the Salafi 
Al-Manar Centre in Cardiff. 
Appeared in ISIS propaganda 
video of 20/06/14.  
Kennedy, 21/6/14.  
Imran Khawaja  Fought in the Rayat al-
Tawheed group, before faking 
his death to return to UK. 
Jailed for 14 years for terrorist 
offences.  
Crown Prosecution Service, 
06/02/15.  
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Aseel Muthana Aged 17, from Cardiff.  Had 
attended the Salafi Al-Manar 
Centre in Cardiff. 
Kennedy, 21/6/14.  
Nasser Muthana Aged 20, from Cardiff. Older 
brother of Aseel. Had 
previously attended Al-Manar 
in Cardiff. 
Appeared in ISIS propaganda 
video of 20/06/14. 
Kennedy, 21/6/14.  
 Muhammad Hamidur Rahman 
 
One of five men from the Jami 
Mosque in Portsmouth who 
travelled to Syria in October 
2013.  
Casciani, 20/05/14. 
 Mamunur Mohammed Roshid 
 
From Portsmouth Casciani, 20/05/14. 
Yusuf Sarwar  A Birmingham City University 
student.  Fought in the Kateeba 
al-Kawthar group. Pleaded 
guilty to terrorism offences on 
his return to the UK. 
Whitehead, 08/07/14. 
David Souaan A student at Birkbeck, 
University of London, of Syrian-
Serbian heritage.  
Arrested at Heathrow in May 
2014, on his second trip to fight 
in the conflict.  
Court News UK, 03/02/15. 
Shabazz Suleman Aged 18, from High Wycombe. 
Missed his A levels at 
Wycombe’s Royal Grammar 
School and is believed to have 
been in Syria since May 2014. 
Sawer et al, 08/11/14.  
Hamayun Tariq  Mechanic from Dudley, joined 
IS having fought for the Taliban 
in Waziristan 
Malik, 20/11/14.  
Abu Basir al-Tartusi  Imam from London.  Has a 
high profile as an online 
ideologue of the Syrian jihad.  
Loeb, 22/10/12.  
 Assad Uzzaman 
 
From Portsmouth, one of group 
who travelled together to Syria.  
Casciani,  20/05/14 
Abu Yacoub From Walthamstow. Fighting 
for IS at Salaheddin, Aleppo. 
Harper, 17/8/12. 
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Fig 5.19 British Women in Syria 
Name  Details  Source 
Amira Abase 15 year old from Bethnal Green 
believed to have joined IS in 
March 2015.  
Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights, 13/03/15. 
Shamima Begum 15 year old from Bethnal Green 
believed to have joined IS in 
March 2015. 
As above 
Sharmeena Begum 15 year old who attended 
Bethnal Green Academy. Left 
London for Islamic State in 
December 2014.  
Dodd, 13/03/15.  
Khadijah Dare A convert from Lewisham, with 
a high profile on social media.  
Hermann, 25/07/14.  
Samya Dirie Aged 17 from Stockwell. 
Travelled with Yusra Hussien 
to Istanbul, and its believed 
onto Syria 
Hermann, 07/11/14 
Salma Halane Aged 16, from Chorlton in 
Manchester. Twin sister of 
Zahra.  
Scheerhout et al, 10/07/14 
Zahra Halane Aged 16, from Chorlton in 
Manchester.  
As above 
Yusra Hussien Aged 15, reported missing from 
her Bristol home 01/10/14.  
Muslim Weekly, 03/10/14a 
Rehana Begum Islam Left Britain with two children to 
head to Islamic State on 14 
February 2015.  
Watts, 23/03/13.  
Sally Jones A Muslim convert from 
Chatham, married to 
Birmingham IS fighter Junaid 
Hussain 
Hunter, 08/09/14. 
Aqsa Mahmood From Glasgow, most high 
profile British woman on IS 
territory due to her social 
media platform.  
Stewart, 12/09/14.  
Tareena Shakil Aged 25, from Burton-upon-
Trent. Took her 14 month old 
son with her.  
Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14C.  
Kadiza Sultana 16 year old from London. 
Believed to have joined IS in 
Syrian Observatory for Human 
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March 2015.  Rights, 13/03/15. 
 
 
Figure 5.20 Britons killed in Syria 
Individual Details Source 
Mohammed el-Araj Aged 23, from Ladbroke 
Grove. Died fighting Syrian 
troops, August 2013.  
Gardham, 21/11/13.  
Mohammed  Azzam Aged 19, from Manchester.  Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14b 
Abu Hujama al-Britani Pseudonym of a Hounslow 
man killed in August 2013 by 
Assad’s forces.   
Gardham, 21/11/13.  
Abdullah Deghayes Aged 18, killed fighting for 
Jabhat Al-Nusra in Latakia, 
April 2014. From Brighton. 
Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14. 
Jaffar Deghayes Aged 17, from Brighton. Killed 
in October 2014.  
Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14.  
Muhammad Medhi Hassan Aged 20, from Portsmouth. 
Killed during the IS offensive to 
take Kobane.  
Townsend and Malik, 25/10/14.  
Iftikhar Jaman From Portsmouth. Killed 
fighting for IS. 
Soni, 05/02/14.  
Mohammed Azzam Javeed Aged 19, from Manchester. 
Killed February 2014.  
Scheerhout, 28/10/14.  
Abu Layth From the north of England.  Soni, 05/02/14. 
Abdul Waheed Majid Aged 41, from Crawley. Killed 
conducting a suicide bombing 
at Aleppo prison. Video of him 
released by Jabhat Al-Nusra.  
Sky News, 07/02/14. 
Ali al-Manasfi Killed by Syrian troops in May 
2013. 
Parry, 03/06/13. 
Ibrahim al Mazwagi Aged 21 Killed in February 
2013, fighting for the Katiba al 
Muhajireen 
Gilmore, 13/06/13.  
Anil Khalil Raoufi Aged 20. From Didsbury in 
Manchester, killed fighting for 
IS. A mechanical engineering 
student at the University of 
Liverpool 
Malnick, 13/02/14.  
 
Manunur Roshid Aged 24, from Portsmouth Muslim Weekly, 31/10/14C 
Akram Sebah Reportedly fighting for Jabhat 
Al-Nusra and killed in 
Lister, 26/01/14 
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September 2013.  
Mohamed Sebah  Claims he was fighting for ISIS 
and killed in September 2013.  
Lister, 26/01/14. 
 
 
 
5.14 Yemen 
Yemen serves as a small but distinct chapter in the story of British jihadism. At least 
three British Islamists have suffered violent deaths in the country. Peter Bergen 
visited the Islamic centre at Dammaj, where sixteen year old Hosea Walker was shot 
dead in 2000. He found thirty Britons at a site which his translator and driver were 
extremely nervous about entering (Bergen, 2001, 191) and describes a venue with a 
clear military, as well as religious, ethos. Whilst the exact circumstances of Walker’s 
death are unclear, that of Adil Malik, and a British colleague in 2012 was announced 
to the media by his father. Both had been killed in Yemen’s ongoing insurgency.  
 
One explanation for the growth of British Jihadism into maturity is the reluctance of 
many to recognise and address it at infancy. Issues that were to ‘emerge’ in the past 
decade as ‘new’ look remarkably similar to events that were originally played out, 
with different actors and in different locations, in the 1990s. For example, the 
detentions in Guantanamo Bay were not the first time Britons had been incarcerated 
abroad, in questionable legal circumstances and protesting their innocence, whilst 
suspected of involvement in terrorism. Between December 1998 and January 1999, 
eight Muslims from London and the West Midlands were arrested in Yemen, along 
with two Algerian from Finsbury Park mosque, on suspicion of planning attacks on 
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Western and Christian targets in the country. For many, this case served as an 
introduction to the beliefs and practices of the Imam at Finsbury Park, Abu Hamza, 
focus of considerable media attention as his son and stepson were amongst those 
arrested (Quin, 2005, 238). 
In custody the men protested both their innocence and conditions, making 
accusations of torture. As the Yemeni newspaper Al-Bab commented at the time:  
The case damaged relations between Britain and Yemen, and both sides are now keen to 
bring it to a close. An early release would please sections of the British Muslim community 
who have accused the government of not doing enough on the men’s behalf (Whittaker, 
2000). 
 
In retaliation for the arrests, the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan kidnapped a party of 
Western holidaymakers. During a botched rescue attempt by the Yemeni authorities, 
four tourists – three from the UK – were killed. Examination of the phone of one 
hostage taker showed calls made to Abu Hamza in London, during the hostage crisis 
(Bergen, 2001, 180-183). This formed part of the case against Hamza in his eventual 
deportation to the United States (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2012) and 
conviction (FBI, 2015a). 
 
A campaign group, Justice for the Britons in Yemen was formed with contacts in 
London, Manchester and Bradford, with Salma Yaqoob, later leader of the Respect 
Party, acting as Birmingham spokeswoman.  
The goal of this campaign is to see that the fundamental human rights of the five British men 
unlawfully detained in the Yemen are recognised and enforced by the Yemeni authorities; and 
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that the British government fulfils its duty of care both towards the detainees through the 
consulate in Yemen, and towards their families in Britain through the Foreign Office. (Justice 
for the Britons in Yemen Press Pack, n.d) 
 
Whilst the press pack Justice for the Britons in Yemen circulated contained pen 
pictures of four of the men in terms of their family lives, studies and work for charity, 
these observations were to face critical, and not always complimentary scrutiny. 
Criticism was not associated solely with the tabloid press. The Guardian, in an 
editorial headed “Justice in Yemen: British Muslims must act wisely” warned: 
The Islamic Army, in spite of its grand name, is a very small group. Those who have similar 
views in Britain almost certainly number no more than a handful. But the British Muslim 
community for its part needs to guard against any romanticisation of Jihad especially among 
young Muslims. The dangers attached to such romanticisation, and of the actions which may 
follow from it, are very clear (Guardian, 1999). 
Mary Quin was one of those held hostage by the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, giving 
evidence against Hamza at his US trial. Her memoir “Kidnapped in Yemen” is 
remarkable for its tenacity. Whilst four of her tour party were killed, Quin not only 
survived but returned to Yemen to visit the convicted Britons in jail, and travelled to 
London to confront Abu Hamza in Finsbury Park. When Rashad Yaqoob (brother of 
Salma) informed her the British men were in Yemen to study Arabic and learn about 
Islam, Quin states “I decided that if Yaqoob really believed what he was telling me, 
then he was very well meaning but naive” (Quin, 2005, 151).  
 
In this instance, a duopoly of responses may be discerned. In sections of the British 
Muslim community, the men’s accusations of ill-treatment and anger at what was 
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perceived to be the British government’s disinterested response moved to the 
forefront of the story. To some activists it became the story. Other interpretations – 
certainly not on the agenda of community representative organisations - focused on 
the crimes the men were accused of preparing, and their associations in the United 
Kingdom. Despite the warnings sounded by The Guardian’s editorial, there is little 
evidence, post Yemen, the issue of young Muslims travelling abroad to take part in 
violence was addressed by Muslim representatives as problematic. The Muslim 
Council of Britain, whose failings are discussed in detail in chapter two, could have 
used cases such as these to recognise that some serious problems were emerging 
within British Islam. Instead, following the Yemen arrests, Britons continued to travel 
to fight jihad in a succession of theatres with little or no critical comment from 
representative organisations.  
 
Figure 5.21 Britons killed in Yemen 
Name  Details  Source 
Hosea Walker From London, aged 16 when 
shot dead at a mosque in 
Dammaj in 2000. 
Bergen (2001, 192) 
Hisham Killed fighting for 
fundamentalist forces near 
Dammaj in June 2012.  
Metro 27/6/12 
Adil Malik Aged 24. Killed fighting for 
fundamentalist forces near 
Dammaj in June 2012.  
Metro 27/6/12 
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Figure 5.22 Britons jailed in Yemen for terrorism 
Name Details Source 
Samad Ahmed From Birmingham Justice for the Britons in 
Yemen Press Pack (n.d.) 
Shahid Butt Prominent figure at 
Birmingham Central Mosque 
and in the Convoy of Mercy to 
Bosnia. 
Justice for the Britons in 
Yemen Press Pack (n.d.) 
Mohsin Ghalain Stepson of Abu Hamza Quin (2005, 238) 
Malik Nasser Harhara From Birmingham. Holder of 
dual British and Yemeni 
citizenship. IT graduate from 
Westminster University.  
Justice for the Britons in 
Yemen Press Pack (n.d.) 
 
O’Neill and McGrory (2008, 
161). 
Ayaz Hussain A computer studies graduate Quin (2005, 238) 
Gulam Hussain From Luton Justice for the Britons in 
Yemen Press Pack (n.d.) 
Mohammed Mustapha Kamel Abu Hamza’s son Quin (2005, 238 
Shahzad Nabi A 20 year old bus driver and 
cousin of Ayaz Hussain 
Quin (2005, 238) 
 
 
5.15    The Scope of British Jihadism 
A total of 59 British Islamists and British residents have been killed fighting in 
international jihadist struggles from the Bosnian conflict onwards, as recorded in 
figure 5.23 below. When added to the five deaths in Britain in the same period 
discussed in the previous chapter, it establishes a death toll of 64 British jihadis. 
These deaths have come in suicide bombings, in combat with rival Muslim 
organisations, in internecine disputes and at the hands of coalition forces. If 1992 is 
taken as the first year of the British jihad, that is a total of 64 deaths in 23 years – an 
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average of just under three per year. However it is highly likely the figures above are 
an underestimation of the likely total, especially with regards to the Syrian conflict 
and ongoing violence in parts of Iraq.  
It should perhaps be noted that of the ten countries in which British Jihadis have 
been killed, a majority are still experiencing jihadist violence, a further indication that 
the total below is likely to increase in the years to come.  
 
Figure 5.23 Britons killed in overseas jihad 1992 – 31 March 2015 
Country British Jihadist Death Toll 
Afghanistan 10 
Bosnia 6 
Chechnya 2 
India, Kashmir and Pakistan 9 
Iraq 5 
Israel 2 
Somalia 5 
Sweden 1 
Syria 16 
Yemen  3 
Total  59 
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5.16 Conclusions  
This chapter has established the range and depth of British Jihadism overseas 
across three different decades, and in doing so addresses the first of its research 
questions. It details the organisations Britons have joined, countries they have fought 
in, and that at least 59 Britons have died in this cause since 1992. Due to the 
ongoing nature of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and indeed that so few of the areas 
contested by jihadis have established a lasting peace, this figure is only going to rise.  
For all the media coverage it has provoked, there was a marked inevitability about 
British participation in the Syrian jihad. As discussed in chapter three, important 
Syrian exiles, such as Abu Musab al-Suri and more significantly Tartusi had based 
themselves in London. With their understating of the failings of past armed struggles, 
they could take a strategic view of the potential afforded by future conflicts. This 
coalesced with a background of British based Jihadists who had long shown 
themselves long willing to join conflicts where Sunni Muslims were in arms. Some 
fourteen different countries are listed in this chapter where British Jihadism, however 
briefly has appeared. Given this tendency, it would have been staggering if the 
conflict in Syria had progressed without significant British input. 
Malise Ruthven suggests it would be a mistake to see Sunni violence as merely 
reactive or defensive. Its formative period was one of unprecedented expansion 
(Ruthven, 2002, 246) and this is violence which seeks to achieve something – sharia 
– rather than merely seeking to defend or delay the success of a rival ideology.  
It is not difficult to see such ambitions articulated, from young British Muslims in 
Bosnia in the 1990s, to those who fought for the Taliban before 9/11, through to the 
Portsmouth youths who left behind the Portsmouth Dawah Team to go to Syria.   
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The consequences of young Britons travelling to fight in the Syrian Civil War has not 
been merely to contribute to the fight against President Assad, but to help establish 
the Islamic State, to expand and defend its territory. It is in such actions that British 
best combines theory and practice, where the Islam of Qutb or Azzam is no longer 
discussed, but enacted/  
Twenty years of British Muslim participation in a series of Mujahideen type groups 
and their jihads should have ensured that the numbers travelling to Syria, and joining 
the Jabhat al-Nusra or IS was not a surprise. In the words of Ruthven “In the majority 
Sunni tradition, violence in the form of warfare is linked historically to the Islamic 
imperium” (Ruthven, 2002, 246). Those who have established a caliphate in Syria 
and Iraq and seek to maintain it may not agree with the word imperium, but the 
consequences of it appear little different, especially for those from other faiths and 
traditions. The failure to recognise this reality about contemporary Jihadism is 
discussed at greater length in the next chapter, where the inability of critical terrorism 
studies to consider its effects form a central part of the critique of that academic 
approach.  
 
This chapter seeks to address a second research question, asking who are the 
British jihadis. We might begin to address that question by stating who they are not. 
Although getting exact details on the religious backgrounds of those who have fought 
abroad or obtained terrorist convictions at home is an inexact science, it is noticeable 
Muslim minorities appear entirely absent from such data. The organisations Britons 
have gone overseas to join which are listed in this chapter – the Pakistani and 
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Afghan Taliban, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, are characteristically 
sectarian.  
No exact figures exist for how many Shia Muslims there are in Britain. It is not a 
question posed by the census, and the Muslim Council of Britain’s recent analysis of 
the 2011 Census “British Muslims in Numbers” (MCB, 2015) makes no attempt to 
speculate. Estimates suggest however that Sunni Muslims comprise between 80-
90% of the global Muslim community, the Shia minority being 10-20% - and the 
number of Shia in Britain is likely to be of similar proportions to that globally – no 
more than 10-20% (Elgot, 2013).  
Considering the question of terrorism and Islam in the New Statesman, Mehdi Hasan 
wrote: 
Not one of the 111 Muslims imprisoned in Britain on terrorism offences is believed to be a 
Shia. Most Sunnis, like Shias, reject extremism and violence, but in the context of terrorism, it 
is important to understand the exact nature of the threat. To lump all Muslims together is self-
defeating (Hasan, 2010).   
This research has not uncovered instances of British Shia being convicted of terrorist 
offences in the years since Hasan spoke, nor in the two decades previously. Nor do 
they appear to travel abroad in numbers seeking jihad. Whilst British Muslims have 
travelled to Israel to commit suicide bombings for Hamas, as discussed above, they 
have not done so for Hezbollah.  
Considering British Jihadism in this matter is not without challenges – such precise 
details of religious affiliation does not form part of the criminal justice system’s record 
keeping. However, given that in the research period under consideration the United 
Kingdom has invaded and fought an unpopular war in majority Shia Iraq, and we 
282 
 
have seen a potentially radicalising conflict in 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, 
the absence of recognised Shia in both domestic terrorism statistics and jihadist 
campaigns overseas is marked.  
An estimated 50-60% of Iraq’s population is Shia (Ruthven, 2002, 183) and British 
Muslims who are Shia may have been expected, in some circles, to consequently 
respond to the 2003 invasion by taking up arms in defence of their kin. Hardly any 
appear to have done so.  Similarly young men and women from the Ismaili minority 
trend within Shi’ism, and the Ahmadiyya community do not appear within our 
terrorism statistics or the extended narrative of British Jihadism. If, as widely 
accepted, the humiliation of Muslims brought about by our foreign policy is an 
instigator of both domestic terrorism and jihad abroad, it is a hurt and shame that 
appears to have fallen more onerously on Sunni Muslims than others.  
 
Within some Islamist circles in Britain, attempts are made to present the view the 
country has nothing to fear if some of its Muslim citizens travel to fight in overseas 
conflicts. This chapter presents empirical evidence as to the folly of such views. For 
some Islamists a clear distinction may be drawn between jihadist causes abroad and 
at home. Fahad Ansari writes:  
Our greatest error has been our silence while the world and these individuals have equated 
martyrdom operations in Palestine and other occupied lands with acts of terrorism in London, 
operations which are completely different in nature; one is legitimate resistance against a 
brutal military occupation, the latter is blatant terrorism (Ansari, n.d.) 
In this analysis “Violent jihad in Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir and elsewhere is 
not equivalent to the events of 7-7 which have been absolutely condemned by all”. 
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This noble pursuit is “of no threat whatsoever to British society and something not 
only justified but encouraged by international law” (Ansari, n.d). Such words are 
passionately articulated. Yet they require us to ignore the veterans of international 
jihads imprisoned for subsequent terrorist offences. This chapter has established 
that the Bosnian conflict and the Pakistani training camps in particular have 
produced such individuals. Worse, to adopt such a position is to separate the July 
2005 London bombers from LeT and HuM, at whose camps in Kashmir they 
developed and honed their deadly skills.  It is precisely because Jihadism is rooted in 
broader ambitions of achieving sharia and carrying out the word of God that it cannot 
be readily separated into a set of behaviours in Syria, and an entirely different 
approach in the United Kingdom.  
In his work on the ‘paranoid style’ Hofstadter argues that the paranoid does not seek 
mediation and compromise in the manner of a politician “what is at stake is always a 
conflict between absolute good and absolute evil” (Hofstadter, 2008, 31). Expecting 
to see that conflict between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ kept away from the streets of Britain 
appears unreasonable. As we have seen in the previous chapter, when Michael 
Adebolajo was prevented from joining the jihad in Somalia with Al-Shabaab, he 
returned to the United Kingdom and eventually murdered a British soldier.  
But in this conflict, the Jihadist is not necessarily achieving success. Good does not 
appear to be triumphing. The Bosnian Mujahideen were not rewarded with an Islamic 
Bosnia, but a partitioned state in which the traditional Islam of the Balkans 
reasserted its authority over imported Salafi strains. Kashmir remains divided. In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban were removed from power, and Al-Qaeda dispersed. The 
Pakistani legal system remains a mixture of tribal, western and Islamic practices. Al-
Shabaab has lost ground in Somalia. Such a score card functions as a reminder that 
284 
 
whilst victory may be the goal of the Jihadist, at this stage he appears to share much 
with the activists identified by Richard Hofstadter “since these goals are not even 
remotely attainable, failure constantly highlights the paranoid’s frustration” 
(Hofstadter, 2008, 31). If Syria does not prove to be different, the UK will face the 
challenge of how to deal with a significant number of returning, frustrated jihadis.  
Having established the detail of British Jihadism, both in Britain and overseas, and 
the importance of the United Kingdom as a base for jihadist actors and organisations 
from overseas, this thesis now moves from the ‘detail’ to the ‘denial’. The type of 
defensive responses to Jihadist violence which has characterised British Muslim 
representative organisations is shown in the next chapter to also be present in the 
approach of critical academics, within the discipline of critical terrorism studies. The 
argument is presented that not only has a significant opportunity been missed to look 
at both sides in the war on terror critically, but that the religious nature of those 
involved in jihadist struggles has been down played. Worse, this occurs at the 
expense of ignoring the voices of those who frequently suffer most from the 
impositions of fundamentalists.  
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Chapter 6: A Missed Opportunity: Critical Terrorism Studies and British 
Jihadism 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has covered a lot of ground. It has established the genealogy of jihadist 
ideals, and the primacy of religious objectives therein. The displacement of 
nationalist actors by jihadist groups has characterised a series of struggles from 
Libya to Kashmir. Following failed Islamist uprisings in a series of Muslim majority 
nations, or sometimes merely to avoid domestic repression, Jihadists began to settle 
in the United Kingdom in the 1990s in significant numbers. Here they continued to 
fight not only for sharia in their homelands, but internationally. The most prominent 
figures in British Jihadism have, appropriately, been clerics, and from within these 
circles emerged articulation of the need to properly implement sharia, not just in 
Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia, but here in the United Kingdom. For over twenty years 
Jihadists have travelled from these shores to contribute to Sunni Islamist struggles, 
whilst a minority have even turned to violence in their home country. In 2005 the 
United Kingdom witnessed Europe’s first suicide bombings, committed by four of its 
own citizens.  
 
Despite this setting, reference to religious terrorism, or the presence of Islamic 
terminology when discussing attacks such as the killing of Lee Rigby or overseas 
campaigns involving jihadists, is far from ubiquitous. Instead, as discussed in the 
introduction, an orthodoxy has emerged where politicians such as David Cameron, 
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Nick Clegg, Nicola Sturgeon (Gallagher 2007, Muslim Weekly 2013C, Cameron 
2014) and Muslim representative organisations (MCB, 2002) declare a remarkably 
similar position which seeks to debunk any association between Islam – and even at 
times Islamism – and terrorist violence.  
David Cameron’s speech to the 2011 Munich Security Conference, (written in 
consultation with the Quilliam Foundation’s Maajid Nawaz) established this 
government’s wider views on terrorism and extremism.  Cameron spoke of the 
problem of a ‘warped interpretation of Islam’, and made a clear distinction between 
the peaceful religion of Islam (good) and the political ideology of Islamist extremism 
(bad). “It is vital that we make this distinction between religion on the one hand, and 
political ideology in the other.” And further on: “the point is this: the ideology of 
extremism is the problem, Islam emphatically is not” (Cameron, 2011). In the Prime 
Minister’s analysis religion is worthy of mention, but this is contingent on it first being 
praised and a defensive barrier placed squarely in front of it. The challenge the 
government faces is to Cameron political – ‘the ideology of extremism’ – which 
appears to exist in a vacuum separate from any genuine religious expression, 
practice or interpretation.  
David Cameron’s position is not without logic. Internationally, the potential for 
religious rhetoric to polarise has been observed. “The result is that conflicts are 
absolutized, rendering them more intractable, less susceptible to negotiation” 
(Ruthven, 2007, 102). If religion itself may not readily be removed from a conflict, an 
incentive to de-toxify debate by reducing or eliminating the prominence of religious 
terminology emerges. Politicians, police, security services and religious actors 
themselves may all have reason to at times amend, restrict, deny or reduce public 
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association of religion and violence, or to separate an act of violence from the 
declared belief of its perpetrator.  
It is much harder to see why academics should be thus motivated. This chapter 
argues that a significant opportunity to properly examine British Jihadism, and wider 
Islamist currents has gone awry. Responsible for this failure are some of those 
expected to interrogate closely those holding or seeking power – critical academics. 
In examining this failing, this thesis addresses its final research question – in 
challenging traditional approaches to terrorism and counter radicalisation strategy, 
why has critical terrorism studies struggled to come to terms with the concept of 
violence from British Jihadists and the religious nature of their struggle? To find the 
answer to this failing, the core work of critical terrorism studies academics is 
examined in detail, in particular that of Richard Jackson, whose research has been 
pivotal in establishing and maintaining the discipline - the Editor in Chief of Critical 
Studies on Terrorism. Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson’s “What’s So Religious 
about Religious Terrorism” (2011) is also examined thoroughly. This articles 
influence is such that it is currently the most read and most cited on the Critical 
Studies on Terrorism website (CST, 2015). A core foundational text by Jackson, 
Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning “Critical Terrorism Studies: A New 
Research Agenda” (2009) is also dissected.  
The actions of two further critical academics who have adopted very particular 
positions on religious terrorism are considered – those of David Miller and George 
Kassimeris. The work of Miller is important because of his standing – organising the 
2011 Critical Terrorism Studies conference with his then department at Strathclyde 
University “A Decade of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Since 9/11: Taking Stock 
and New Directions in Research and Policy”. He is also organising its 2015 
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conference at Bath University, and is prominently associated with broader political 
currents via the monitoring group Spinwatch, known for high profile research into the 
lobbying and public relations industries. Kassimeris is considered because his 
interview with British Islamist Moazzam Begg – and Critical Terrorism Studies 
approach towards his group Cage - provides an indicative example of what is 
considered to be the stunted development of critical terrorism studies. Begg is not 
interviewed critically, but instead given a polished platform from which to present 
unchallenged a series of Islamist canards. Here is the ‘denial’ that at times 
characterises contemporary British Islamism, meeting the denial of critical terrorism 
studies.  
 
Academic examination of critical terrorism studies has tended to focus on perceived 
or particular failings. These include the suggestion it is not anywhere near as 
innovative as it pertains to be, and the characterisation that its analysis frequently 
ignores good practice within orthodox research for what critics see as ‘straw-man’ 
attacks (Horgan and Boyle, 2008, Michel and Richards, 2009). This chapter adds 
three significant additional charges to those declared shortcomings. That the desire 
to ‘de-orientalise’ terrorism studies leaves it incapable of taking declared religious 
actors seriously. That it has not addressed the human rights abuses of terrorists, in 
particular those from jihadist organisations, and thirdly that in establishing a working 
and in particular a financial relationship with Islamist actors in the UK, critical 
terrorism studies develops the perception and indeed the reality of a conflict of 
interest.  
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This chapter draws on the thinking of two prominent feminist academics – Meredith 
Tax and Karima Bennoune. Both share a position that those concerned about 
abandonment of core human rights principles in the war on terror need to adopt a 
similarly robust critique towards fundamentalist and jihadist currents. That is also the 
position of this thesis. Tax’s “Double Bind: The Muslim Right, The Anglo-American 
Left and Universal Human Rights” (2012) describes itself as “a response to the way 
human rights organisations, the left and academic feminists think about terrorism 
and the Muslim right” (Tax, 2012, 1). By the Muslim right, Tax is not presenting a 
definition rooted in economics, but “a range of transnational political movements that 
mobilise identity politics towards the goal of a theocratic state” (Tax, 2012, 7). This 
combines Islamists seeking an electoral route, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its offshoots, Salafists who distil electoral and street politics and Jihadist-Salafists, 
including the likes of Al-Qaeda. Whatever the differences in method, these groups 
are united by a shared end goal: 
The goal of all political Islamists, whatever means they prefer, is a state founded upon a 
version of Sharia law that systematically discriminates against women along with sexual and 
religious minorities (Tax, 2012, 7).  
An Algerian resident in the US, Karima Bennoune’s “Your Fatwa Does Not Apply 
Here: Untold Stories from the Fight against Muslim Fundamentalism” (2013) is based 
on 286 interviews with individuals of Muslim heritage from 26 countries, who have 
each opposed fundamentalism in their communities. She states “the struggle waged 
in Muslim majority societies against extremism is one of the most important – and 
overlooked – human rights struggles in the world” (Bennoune, 2013, 3). It is certainly 
one overlooked by leading figures within critical terrorism studies.  
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This chapter opens by giving an overview of the core beliefs and in particular the 
research agenda set out by Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen 
Gunning. It then looks at how this agenda has been applied in practice to Islamist 
actors and to the war on terror. It is here that significant problems emerge, not 
necessarily with the research framework, but certainly with its application. Having 
considered the issue of universities and terrorism earlier in this thesis, the third 
section of this chapter returns to campus, to consider how critical academics have 
responded to examples of jihadists operating within the university system. This 
section then expands to offer a critical analysis of the relationship between some 
critical researchers and Muslim representative organisations, in particular with those 
from Muslim Brotherhood backgrounds.  
Well before its media notoriety in 2015, critical terrorism studies also engaged with 
the support group Cage, which has represented a series of individuals charged with 
terrorism. The analysis of feminist authors is used to offer a comprehensive critique 
of this relationship, and more broadly to posit that the failings of critical terrorism 
studies in this field matter, and are substantial. Concluding arguments are made 
which declare the need for a genuinely critical terrorism studies, which takes the 
aims and conduct of jihadist groups as seriously as human rights abuses committed 
in the war on terror.  
 
6.2 Critical Terrorism Studies – An Overview 
This is now a discipline with over a decade’s theoretical development behind it, and 
whose subject matter places it at the centre of prominent contemporary debates. 
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Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning characterise the research 
agenda of critical terrorism studies as having seven core components:  
1. The discourses and representational practices of terrorism, which inform both 
counter-terrorism and terrorism studies 
2. Applying historical materialist approaches to analyse counter terrorism in 
terms of class, capitalism, hegemony and imperialism 
3. Conducting systematic research into state terrorism, in particular of western 
states and their allies.  
4. Broadening the research agenda to other forms of violence and non-violent 
behaviour in social movements 
5. To take gender seriously in terrorism research 
6. Address the western centric approach of existing studies and to include the 
voices of those in the global south 
7. To analyse the ethics, impacts and efficacy of counter-terrorism (Jackson et 
al, 2009, 228-231).  
Paradigmatically this list, although by no means exhaustive, would appear to allow 
for the rigorous study of both perceived terrorist actors, and the governments who 
play a central role in determining how societies respond to violence. There is 
however, arguably a greater interest across the seven points in the response to 
terrorism from the nation state, than there is in the language and practice of 
terrorists.  
Richard Jackson expounded on the origins of critical terrorism studies in an interview 
with the author in Aberystwyth in 2011.  Placing researchers in a series of theoretical 
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backgrounds from approaches such as critical discourse, historical materialism, 
Marxism and social movement theory; 
We are all united by a profound dissatisfaction with the orthodoxy and with the network of 
influential terrorism experts who appear in the media the most, who write the core text books 
that everyone quotes and who get invited to give expert advice to governments (Jackson, 
Interview, 2011).  
Although the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States in 2001 do not appear to have 
been a motivating force for Jackson and other academics to coalesce, the response 
to it was; 
We were very dissatisfied with the response to 9/11, and the war on terror, that was seen to 
be legitimised by their orthodoxy. Critical terrorism studies is an intervention….. To try and 
challenge that orthodoxy (Jackson, Interview, 2011).  
This background would indicate an approach, which at least initially was more 
predicated to critiquing one side in the war on terror – the US and its allies – than Al-
Qaeda. The following pages examine what has happened when critical researchers 
have moved away from that initial focus towards considering the nature of jihadist 
groups.  
 
6.3 ‘Critical’ Approaches to Jihadism and the War on Terror? 
Religious terrorism as a concept has been marginalised by critical researchers, and 
explicitly rejected by leading academics in the field (Jackson, 2007, Gunning and 
Jackson, 2011). On one level, this is surprising. A research framework seeking to 
“include the voices and perspectives of those in the global South” (Jackson et al, 
2009, 230) could hardly ignore those agitating from religious perspectives, nor for 
that matter could it reasonably avoid engaging with those seeking to resist the 
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influence of religious actors. Secondly a declaration has been recorded that “there is 
a pressing need to take gender more seriously in terrorism research” (Jackson et al, 
2009, 230). Again, this could be expected to lead to an engagement with the conduct 
of both state and non-state religious actors in their treatment of females and minority 
ethnic, social and sexual groups. What is the position of people from those groups in 
areas where religious groups are hegemonic? 
The research framework of critical terrorism studies does however come with a 
caveat, which indicates a potential reluctance to seriously consider declared religious 
groups as unitary actors. Theoretically there is; 
The need to deconstruct explanations which focus overly on religion and embed them in 
broader social and political theory – but vitally, without overlooking the role of religion and the 
spiritual (Jackson et al, 2009, 230).  
However, of the five bullet points which follow this quote as topics in need of 
additional research, none reference religion, save perhaps for concern about “the 
Eurocentric and Orientalist underpinnings of the field” (Jackson et al, 2009, 231) 
indeed in the same volume Jeroen Gunning writes of the urgent need to use social 
movement theory to “De-orientalise terrorism research” (Gunning, 2009, 172).  
 How has this ‘de-orientalism’ and ‘de-construction’ of religion and counter-terrorism 
worked in practice? An early critical text to emerge following 9/11 and the invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq was “Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and 
Counter-Terrorism” (Jackson, 2005). Contemplating the language of the war on 
terror, Richard Jackson observes an American construct, where terrorists are 
portrayed by the White House as traitors, perverting their own religion. The reasons 
for this are:  
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The American government had no wish to start a global religious war, thus it had carefully to 
fix the nature of the enemy terrorists in such a way that any possibility they might be 
considered essentially ‘Muslim’ terrorists was forestalled (Jackson, 2005, 64). 
Thus Jackson observes the religious element of their political demands was 
dismissed, and attempts begun to fracture Al-Qaeda from wider global Muslim 
support. George W Bush was to be observed doing this in a speech as early as 20 
September 2001, whilst Colin Powell went even further a month later, arguing Bin 
Laden’s actions demonstrated that he had no faith whatsoever. Powell stated: 
They are evil people. They believe in no faith. They have adherence to no religion…The 
message I have for Osama bin Laden is that he cannot hide behind a faith in which he does 
not believe because, if he believed in it, he would not be doing what he does. (Quoted in 
Jackson, 2005, 65).  
 
Al-Qaeda is now stripped of any vestige of religiosity. Jackson comments “This is an 
attempt to say that Osama bin Laden is a fake and a charlatan who is trying to 
deceive Muslim people” (Jackson, op cit). The Bush Presidency is widely perceived 
to have been characterised by significant blunders in its linguistic approach to the 
war on terror – the controversy over the use of the term ‘crusade’ (Bush, 2001) being 
the most prominent example from a leader whose Christian faith was at the core of 
his understanding of civilisation (Church, 2002, 121). Yet US strategy frequently 
attempted to proceed on the type of lines Jackson describes. The 2002 National 
Security Strategy, for example, avoids any reference to Islam, Muslims or jihad, 
pinpointing the enemy as a noun - terrorism: 
The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is 
not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - 
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premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents (United States, 
2002, 5).  
 
Only upon his death did the United States government formally opt to reconcile 
Osama Bin Laden with his faith. Having killed Al-Qaeda’s leader at Abbottabad in 
Pakistan in 2011, “the Administration stressed the considerable care and attention 
that was extended to the treatment of bin Laden’s body. Here, the requirements of 
Islamic tradition were repeatedly invoked” (Jarvis and Holland, 2014, 434). At a 
press conference, the State Department explained: 
We are ensuring that it is handled in accordance with Islamic practice and tradition.  This is 
something that we take very seriously.  And so therefore this is being handled in an 
appropriate manner (White House Press Secretary, 2011).  
 
In death, Bin Laden became Muslim again. The initial element to Jackson’s work, 
which usefully argues that the United States at times found strategic value in 
secularising the war on terror, was regrettably not built upon. Instead, Richard 
Jackson’s “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic 
Discourse” (2007) takes the investigative tools deployed in his 2005 study of the 
discourse of the war on terror, and applies that approach to analysis of Islamist 
terrorism. Unfortunately, the beliefs and objectives of the participants themselves 
appear of secondary interest.   
There is simply too much variation within ‘Islam’ and Islamic movements for meaningful or 
illuminating generalisations, not least because ‘Islam’ consists of over a billion people from 
more than 50 countries, languages and cultures, five major doctrinal groupings and hundreds 
of smaller sects, theological traditions and cultural-religious variants (Jackson, 2007, 413).  
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Yet Jackson then finds illuminating generalisations can be made providing they are 
positive, stating that: 
Islamic practice is not antithetical to democracy there is a large and sophisticated body of 
research that confirms that Islamic doctrine and practice, including varieties of ‘Islamism’ and 
‘Islamic fundamentalism’, is not typically or necessarily violent, anti-democratic or 
incompatible with secularism or modernity’ (Jackson, 2007, 414).  
This analysis is further characterised by a reluctance to address core texts written by 
religious actors themselves. Despite the wide translation of such texts into English, 
Jackson uses only one primary source from an Islamist figure (Bin Laden’s 
Messages to the World, edited by Bruce Lawrence) relying instead on secondary 
sources. There is nothing from the canon which has influenced contemporary 
Islamist actors - Taymiyyah, Qutb, Mawdudi, Azzam or even a perceived reformer 
such as al-Qaradawi. Neither the Qur’an nor hadith are referenced.  
From the single source of Bin Laden, Jackson deduces: 
These texts reveal a fairly nuanced political analysis and a clear set of political goals, 
including: support for the establishment of a Palestinian state; ending US military occupation 
of the Arabian peninsula and its ongoing support for Israel; overthrowing corrupt and 
oppressive Arab regimes; supporting local insurgencies in Kashmir, Chechnya, the 
Philippines and elsewhere; and expulsion of Western forces from Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Jackson, 2007, 418).   
 
Whilst it may be understandable for Jackson to contend Bin Laden wished to see a 
Palestinian state, and that this is evidence of Al-Qaeda’s political nature, it is far from 
a sophisticated or rounded reading. We have already seen in this thesis that 
portraying conflicts in Kashmir or Palestine as local insurgencies is to ignore the 
297 
 
broader demands of Islamists, and their desire to displace those pursuing purely 
political objectives (Hussain, 2007, 25), (Karsh, 2007, 218). The objectives of groups 
like Al-Qaeda go beyond what Jackson is willing to recognise. Bin Laden illustrates 
this in Messages to the World (the book Jackson cites in support of the above 
quote):  
The legal duty regarding Palestine and our brothers there – these poor men, women and 
children who have nowhere to go – is to wage jihad for the sake of God, and to motivate our 
umma to jihad so that Palestine may be completely liberated and returned to Islamic 
sovereignty (Lawrence, 2005, 9).  
Bin Laden could hardly have been more explicit. Is it a ‘generalisation’ to say this 
strand of thought defines itself as Islamic, having clear religious goals? His position – 
of a Palestine returned to Islamic sovereignty, involving the global Muslim community 
and achieved via the religious tool of jihad, would appear to explicitly rule out all 
other types of state. Further, this is referred to, not as a goal or aim, but a legal duty - 
Bin Laden’s actions appear rooted in his understanding of sharia.  
Perhaps influenced by the need to ‘de-orientalise’ debate, a sensitivity runs through 
Jackson’s writing with regards to how Islamist actors are referred to by the west. 
Satisfaction is expressed at a European Union review of its usage of terms such as 
‘jihadi’ and ‘Islamic’ (Jackson, 2007, 425-6). When pushed on official approaches to 
distance religious references from counter-terrorism, even developing potentially 
inaccurate categorisations such as ‘Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism’, Jackson is 
supportive:  
In the way language works I think there is a much deeper implication there. And the 
implication is that it’s causal, that somehow religion is causally connected to terrorism. 
Islamism is causally connected to terrorism, or concepts of jihad as defined by the Islamic 
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religion are part of the cause, the essence of this terrorism. And my own view is that there is 
no such thing as religious terrorism (Jackson, Interview, 2011).  
By 2007, Western governments were increasingly seeking to develop counter 
terrorism policies articulated in terms avoiding religious terminology. Instead, more 
neutral terms which focused on the criminal nature of terrorist acts were 
emphasised. Speaking shortly after the 2007 attacks in London and Glasgow, Home 
Secretary Jacqui Smith told the New Statesman; 
It is a conscious approach.........and it’s a conscious approach that stems from the need to 
enlist the broadest possible coalition in order to tackle terrorism...So yes its tone, but the tone 
is fundamentally linked to the approach you need to take to counter terror (Bright and 
Kampfner, 2007).  
Here at least, government and critical terrorism academics appeared to be speaking 
in remarkably similar terms.  
 
In “What’s So ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Terrorism” Gunning and Jackson (2011) 
put forward the argument that the concept of religious terrorism is problematic in 
conceptual and empirical terms, and that the behaviour of those labelled religious 
terrorists is often indistinguishable from secular actors. They position such 
terminology within historical power structures, and observe a process which seeks to 
use discourse to legitimise contentious counter-terrorism practices. The article 
proceeds through three distinct sections – considering the origins and usage of 
religious terrorism as a term, critical examination of it as a concept, and finally 
alternative suggestions for how we may study what is tentatively described as “the 
religious dimensions of political violence”  (Gunning and Jackson, 2011, 370).  
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As with Jackson’s 2007 article on Islamic Terrorism, Gunning and Jackson feel able 
to negotiate this issue without detailed reference to written sources from religious 
actors. In this article none are referenced. That means nothing from within the vast 
corpus of literature produced by politically oriented Islamist groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, either in Egypt or amongst its supporters in the west. Nothing 
from any of the Salafist-Jihadist currents, be it Al-Qaeda or the various Pakistani 
organisations, even though the actions of such groups have, along with the war on 
terror, been pivotal in re-igniting academic interest in religious terrorism as a 
concept. Nor do Gunning and Jackson turn to any Qur’anic sources or hadith, even 
though such references particularly occur in Bin Laden’s pronouncements. Before 
religious terrorism is debated as a concept in Critical Studies on Terrorism, any 
combatant who may describe themselves as seeking religious goals or acting in 
accordance with their faith, risks being removed from Gunning and Jackson’s 
conceptual framework.  
The first stage of their argument is to adopt the position that it is not conceptually 
possible to clearly distinguish religious and secular phenomenon. To illustrate this, a 
series of examples is given:  
Religious structures and practices lose their distinctiveness, as parallels can be readily found 
in the secular world: priests have their counterparts in charismatic community or national 
leaders; mosques perform functions overlapping with those offered by community halls, 
rituals, foundational texts and their gatekeepers (priests, prophets, party leaders) can be 
found in both religious and secular communities (Gunning and Jackson, 2011, 374).  
 
There is the element of the fatuous in these arguments. Mosques may well take on 
the function of community halls, but one remains a sanctified building, whilst the 
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other is not. Behaviour considered unacceptable in one, may be permissible in the 
other. National leaders may adopt characteristics resembling those of Priests, but a 
politician such as Stalin’s legal authority came from being President of the Soviet 
Union, not from any resemblances which may be discerned in his character. Few 
foundational texts for political parties are treated with the reverence reserved by 
some for the Bible or Qur’an. It would be one thing to burn the Plaid Cymru 
manifesto on Aberystwyth High Street, another to burn the Qur’an.   
What this framework does allow however, is for Gunning and Jackson to adopt a 
protective intellectual barrier around religion as a concept. If it is accepted religion 
has no distinguishing features from any other belief system – however weak the 
examples cited – a categorisation such as religious terrorism becomes impossible to 
construct. And this is done without detailed reference to any belief systems or core 
religious texts! This stance carries with it the useful adjunct that if it is not possible to 
separate religion from any other belief system, similarly religious terrorism cannot be 
distinguished from other variants either.  
This makes quantitative comparative studies impossible. “How are we to make an 
authoritative claim that actors are religious or secular, let alone that one set is more 
violent than the other?” (Gunning and Jackson, 2011, 379). Such a stance risks 
becoming facile. Firstly because it ignores readily available criteria, such as whether 
a particular group advocates or introduces sharia law on territory it controls. 
Secondly because of the limitations placed on the discipline by such a mind-set. If 
Gunning and Jackson’s approach is accepted, a potential comparative study (for 
example) of the numbers killed by left wing terrorists in Europe in the 1970s, and 
those killed by Islamists in West Africa in the 2010s, would be ruled methodologically 
unsound as it could not be shown the Red Brigades were secular and Boko Haram 
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religious? Here, religious terrorism becomes not so much problematical in empirical 
terms (Gunning and Jackson, 2011, 369), but an impossibility.  
 
A second element in the authors thinking is the proclamation that faith is viewed with 
inherent suspicion within English speaking academia, due to the relegation of 
religion to the private sphere as the modern nation state was developed (Gunning 
and Jackson, 2011, 375). This creates a situation in Middle Eastern and Terrorism 
Studies “leading to the portrayal of Islamists (advocates of an Islamic political order) 
as inherently intolerant, dogmatic and violent, as opposed to the supposedly tolerant 
and pragmatic secularists” (Gunning and Jackson, 2011, 375). This is certainly not 
the framework by which the feminists mentioned in this chapter judge Islamists. 
Karima Bennoune (2013) did not interview 286 secularists for their views on Islam, 
but 286 people of Muslim heritage who have opposed Islamist dogma and/or 
violence in Muslim majority countries.  
 
Having declared the impossibility of religious terrorism, Gunning and Jackson face a 
somewhat difficult task in addressing Hamas - the Islamic Resistance Movement. 
The Hamas Covenant uses a famous hadith to close its article seven; 
The time will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews (and kill them); until the Jews hide 
behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on 
and kill him! This will not apply to the Gharqad, which is a Jewish tree (cited by Bukhari and 
Muslim) (Hamas, 2004, 435).  
Article thirteen declares the only solution for Palestinians is through jihad.  Given this 
reliance on apocalyptic visions of the end day, and the superiority of jihad, some 
careful positioning is required to maintain the articles core argument. “Creating an 
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Islamic state is a more explicitly religiously inspired goal. But even here we would 
query whether this could be usefully categorised as simply religious” (Gunning and 
Jackson, 2011, 377). When Hamas say they want a religious state, and give blood 
fighting for it across a generation, they do not actually mean it!  
 
Interestingly Gunning and Jackson go on to refer to the dynamics of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, plus socio-economic changes, enabling women to take a greater 
role in politics. There is no mention of the extent to which in Hamas dominated Gaza, 
religious injunctions upon women have increasingly stifled individual freedom. These 
range from the imposition of Islamic clothing in schools to a ban on women cycling, 
all enforced by religious police (Bennoune, 2013, 116-7). Without engagement with 
the texts of those who declare religious goals and cite religious sources for their 
actions, or those on the ground who oppose them, Gunning and Jackson’s rejection 
of the importance of religion appears, if the term may be used, preordained. With no 
consideration of the broader social impact of Islamist actors upon their own societies, 
only a partial assessment of the issues is being presented.  
A further characteristic of the critical approach is that central to our understanding of 
jihadists should be consideration not of what they are fighting for, but what, and more 
importantly who, they fight against. And that is easily defined as being Western 
imperialism. Jackson, relying on Pape, insists “For al-Qaeda, religion matters, but 
mainly in the context of national resistance to foreign occupation” (Jackson, 2007, 
418). This is a peculiar statement. Not least because it ignores Al-Qaeda’s clear 
rejection of nationalism as a viable method (Mansfield, 2006, 35-6). Karima 
Bennoune expounds on how approaches such as Jackson’s misrepresent the nature 
of fundamentalists: 
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Some Western observers see Muslim fundamentalists as the stalwart representatives of the local 
standing up to the global, the Jihad versus McWorld scenario. That is not how they are often seen on 
the ground (Bennoune, 2013, 14-15).  
 
If Bennoune’s work has a core purpose, it is demonstrating this reality. For example, 
in post-Saddam Iraq, Al-Qaeda went much further than opposing occupying western 
forces. Having distributed burqa’s for women to wear in a village near Baghdad, they 
murdered a local trade unionist who opposed the practice (Bennoune, 2013, 123). It 
is from such examples that she contends “Jihad is McWorld, just a different version 
of it” (Bennoune, 2013, 15). It is because groups such as Al-Qaeda or Islamic State 
offer an interpretation of Islam that is fashioned for both day to day living and 
explaining contemporary global events, that a rounded analytical approach to them is 
required. Whether there is foreign occupation or not, the fundamentalists’ 
interpretation is extant, be it sharia patrols on the streets of east London or 
compulsory burkas in rural Iraq. In Bennoune’s native Algeria, it is worth noting the 
Islamists, supposedly taking up arms due to the annulment of Algeria’s elections by 
the military, responded by killing hundreds of women. Women participating in sport 
and entertainment were seen as particularly threatening:  
Pop singers, too, were targeted on the grounds that their music, demonised as pornographic 
and anti-Islamic, represented the invasion of Western culture (Evans and Phillips, 2007, 193).   
Algerian fundamentalist practice was predicated on their linkage of post colonialism 
and sexual mores (Cooper, 2008, 37) and whilst Algeria’s military government was 
not minded to cede political power to them, it increasingly did so in social matters, 
most notably in the field of family law. At the local level, Islamist morality was 
reinforced by threats and the use of direct action “One of the most disturbing aspects 
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of this violence is the fact that it is perpetrated in the name of anti-imperialist 
revolution” (Cooper, 2008, 38).  
 
In conceptual terms there are real dangers in failing to accord the status of 
combatant to jihadist actors, in declining to seriously examine the programme, 
methods and end goals of those taking up the gun in Chechnya, Algeria and similar 
conflicts. Paradoxically, this dismissal mirrors the infantilism of colonialism 
(Bruckner, 2010, 42) in the peremptory way non-whites are viewed. Karima 
Bennoune suffers no such inhibitions, and details the nature of the Chechen jihad, 
and its long term impact on civilians, via interviews with displaced Chechens. She 
sketches a trend whereby indigenous Sufi strains of Islam have been increasingly 
displaced by Salafism (Bennoune, 2013, 149). Space for more liberal Muslims has 
narrowed significantly, with attacks in Grozny designed to enforce the veil 
(Bennoune, 2013, 149-153). In the feminist as opposed to the critical approach, 
there is less concern about how jihadists are labelled, than there is about the effects 
of their conduct:  
Most fundamentalist campaigns are local; events like 7/7 in the UK and 9/11 in the US are 
rare compared to pressure, threats and violence at the community level, designed to impose 
ideological conformity and obedience to fundamentalist rules (Tax, 2012, 27).  
To Tax, a dangerous vacuum has emerged where few consider terrorism in terms of 
its effects on the human rights of civilians. Instead, a much greater focus is made on 
human rights issues arising out of counter-terrorism (Tax, 2012, 25-6). On this 
subject, critical terrorism studies may be considered part of the problem, rather than 
part of the solution.  
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6.4 Critical Terrorism Studies on Campus 
Chapter four of this thesis establishes the longevity of controversial issues involving 
both student Islamists and recent alumni. Since the early 1990s these have ranged 
from anti-Semitic and threatening behaviour (Lyon interview, 2010) to support for Al-
Muhajiroun, Al-Qaeda and participation in terrorism. Figure 4.6 of this thesis lists 
eleven examples of the later, including serving ISOC officials. When asked about the 
number of terrorist convictions of students in leadership positions from ISOCs, 
Richard Jackson demurred:  
I am not sure that is relevant at all. If you were to do an analysis of how many convicted 
criminals there were amongst former members of the law society – how many of them were 
engaged in fraud? In later years, I bet you would find a hundred times more than terrorists 
(Jackson, Interview, 2011). 
The flippant nature of this reply belies its absurdity. University law associations do 
not tend to advocate fraud as an ideal, whilst ISOCs are by definition predicated on 
the ideal of propagating Islam. If some students subsequently become involved in 
jihadist groups or support the Islamic State, the issue of their lineage and motivations 
requires a more substantive consideration than being dismissed as irrelevant.  
Richard Jackson is not the only critical academic dismissive of Jihadist terrorism. 
David Miller has enjoyed a high profile in Critical Terrorism Studies, organising two of 
the discipline’s annual conferences and serving as one of the editors of the special 
edition of Critical Studies on Terrorism which followed the 2011 conference. He has 
also taken a particular interest in debates surrounding Islamism on campus. In an 
article “Spying on Academics will not help Fight Terrorism” Miller established 
principled opposition to increased pressure being placed on academics to comply 
with a range of demands by UK Universities outside normal teaching practice. Here 
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a strong case is presented that it is not the job of universities as institutions to be 
monitoring students for immigration purposes, political activism or holding a 
supervisory brief over lecturer’s research into subjects such as political violence 
(Miller, 2013). Independent research is presented as essential to developing an 
understanding of terrorism, and Miller warns against the introduction of a system 
whereby those handling ‘security-sensitive’ information are monitored within the 
academy.  
Whilst a determined case is established that such controls would be illegitimate, less 
convincing is a series of assertions which, taken cumulatively, imply any concern 
about terrorism on campus, or even terrorism per se is in some way unfounded: 
Few people who form their opinions on the threat posed by Islamist terrorism by listening to 
successive government ministers or the BBC will be aware that this type of terrorism makes 
up an extraordinarily small proportion of the terrorist threat across Europe. According to 
Europol – in data supplied to them by all 27 EU governments, the number of Islamist terrorist 
attacks never exceeded 0.7% of the total number of terrorist attacks in any year between 
2006 and 2009 (Miller, 2013).  
 
It is unclear why in an article discussing guidance issued by UK Universities in 
October 2012, terrorist figures for the 27 European Union member states is relevant, 
or why Europol data for the specific years 2006-9 has been chosen. It is not a 
surprise that across the EU as a whole, Islamist terrorism is comparatively low – one 
would expect few jihadists to be active in the Baltic States or the former Communist 
nations of central Europe. In those parts of Europe where borders are disputed, or 
revanchist claims continue, violence from dissident Irish Republicans, or groups such 
as ETA, may endure. The continental picture is irrelevant to UK Universities, who are 
focused upon higher education institutions in the United Kingdom. Here, issues 
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concerning Islamist actors on campus have, as seen earlier in this text, considerable 
history across three decades. Critical academics have every right to question 
whether increased monitoring of staff and students is an appropriate response to this 
problem. They are however on weak ground if seeking to downplay or dismiss the 
issue of terrorism and religious extremism on campus altogether.  
 
At the 2011 Critical Terrorism Studies conference David Miller presented new 
research - “The Cold War on British Muslims: An Examination of Policy Exchange 
and The Centre for Social Exclusion” written with Tom Mills and Tom Griffin (Mills, et 
al, 2011). This work, along with a later publication “The British Israel Research and 
Communications Centre: Giving Peace a Chance?” (Mills et al, 2013) broke new 
ground for critical terrorism researchers in this country. The combination of a senior 
academic, Miller, writing and researching with his PhD students (Mills and Griffin on 
both publications, Mills, Griffin and Hilary Aked on the latter) was not new, but 
receiving direct sponsorship for such work from Islamic organisations based in the 
UK is a radical departure. “The Cold War on British Muslims” is described on the title 
page as “Sponsored by the Cordoba Foundation” whose logo appears alongside that 
of Spinwatch. In the acknowledgments, the author’s state: 
We hope that this report might help to illuminate the somewhat opaque funding arrangements 
of the Centre for Social Cohesion and Policy Exchange. As part of a process of encouraging 
these and other think-tanks to own-up to their funding sources we gratefully acknowledge that 
this report has been produced with the aid of a grant of £5,000 from The Cordoba Foundation. 
Our thanks to its CEO Anas Altikriti for the support (Mills et al, 2011, 53).  
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In the case of the 2013 investigation into the British Israel Communications and 
Research Centre (better known as BICOM) page two of the report reproduces the 
logos of Spinwatch and MEMO – Middle East Monitor, implying joint production, 
although copyright is ascribed solely to Spinwatch.  In terms of funding, a similar 
process is acknowledged to that of the 2011 report, only with MEMO replacing The 
Cordoba Foundation: 
Funding for this study was given by the Middle East Monitor (£5,000). We are grateful for their 
faith in our research skills. We can record that they were model funders in that they provided 
the cash and let us get on with it (Mills et al, 2013, 79).  
 
The Spinwatch website reveals a total of £15,000 in funding from the Cordoba 
Foundation, via payments of £5000 in 2010, 2012 and 2014. Indeed funding from 
Islamic organisations now appears to be a significant income stream – additional 
sums totalling £17,000 having been received since 2012 from MEMO, Friends of Al 
Aqsa and Interpal (Spinwatch, 2015)15. This approach has now travelled from 
Spinwatch into the discipline, with the 2015 Critical Terrorism Studies conference 
being funded with the support of “The ESRC, Islam Expo and the Institute for Policy 
Research at the University of Bath” (Critical Studies on Terrorism, E Mail, 2015).  
 
The breadth and scale of this funding raises significant issues. Most notably, the 
preponderance of Muslim Brotherhood related organisations, and groups formed or 
led by Brotherhood activists, in the above list. When leader of the opposition, David 
Cameron observed that the Cordoba Foundation “is a front for the Muslim 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that Spinwatch meticulously records its donations for public consideration on its website.  
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Brotherhood” (Cameron, 2008). In 2015 an interview with Chief Executive Anas al-
Tikriti on Al-Jazeera was prefaced with the description of it as “Muslim Brotherhood 
linked” (Al-Jazeera, 2015). Although resident in London, Al-Tikriti maintains a 
position amongst Arab elites significant enough for him to meet President Obama at 
the White House in 2014 to discuss the situation in Iraq (Al-Jazeera, 2015) where his 
father heads the Islamic Party (Bowen, 2014, 110).  
Islam Expo, one of the sponsors of the 2015 Critical Terrorism Studies conference, 
was established by Al-Tikriti’s British Muslim Initiative (BMI) (Bowen, 2014, 111), 
itself a splinter from the Brotherhood created Muslim Association of Britain. Innes 
Bowen suggests that BMI’s support for Hamas ensured Labour politicians boycotted 
Islam Expo’s 2008 exhibition in central London (Bowen, op cit). The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s subsequent support for jihad in Syria (Mohsen, 2013) further ensures 
its distance from British politicians, if not critical academics.  
Interpal, who provided Spinwatch with £2000 in 2014, is a charity which works for the 
relief of Palestinians. It too has Muslim Brotherhood associations. In 2008-9 it was 
investigated by the Charity Commission concerning links to Hamas, support for 
suicide bombing and “the charities links to the Union for Good, an international 
confederation of charities close to the Muslim Brotherhood” (Smith, 2013). The 
subsequent report found insufficient evidence to sustain accusations Interpal 
supported terrorism, but did find a lack of diligence in how it worked with Palestinian 
partners, and issued a requirement to end to any relationship with the Union for 
Good (Charity Commission, 2009, 32).  
Friends of Al-Aqsa, a campaigning group which also works on behalf of Palestinians 
donated £10,000 to Spinwatch in 2014. It was formed and is led by Ismail Patel. 
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Here again the Muslim Brotherhood connection comes via Islam Expo and BMI, for 
whom Patel has been a Director and Spokesman respectively (ITIC, 2011). Finally 
MEMO, sponsor of the 2013 analysis of Zionist lobbying, has an established Muslim 
Brotherhood connection through its Director, Daud Abdullah. Abdullah signed a 
round robin opposing possible proscription of the Muslim Brotherhood (Cordoba 
Foundation, 2014), in the capacity of his employment with the Brotherhood 
established BMI.  
 
In summary, of the five Islamic organisations funding critical academics in the UK, 
either via Spinwatch or helping to finance the 2015 Critical Terrorism Studies 
conference, all have Muslim Brotherhood associations to some degree. The total 
donated to Spinwatch alone is £32,000. Taking funding of this nature ensures 
Spinwatch, and critical academics participating in its work, are open to question as to 
the influence Islamist actors have on their research. After all, why else would they be 
so willing to fund it? There is considerable irony in Miller, who has spent much of his 
career debunking the influence of elite lobbyists on our politics, readily working with 
powerful figures in domestic and Middle Eastern Islamism who seek to develop 
political influence via the dissemination of their message. This is also a relationship 
which appears set to continue  
In turning our attention to the ‘Israel lobby’ we decided to focus, in what we hope will be the 
first of a number of reports, on BICOM, the most sophisticated and apparently more moderate 
end of the pro-Israel groups currently active in the UK (Mills et al, 2013, 79).  
Is it likely that future reports, given their funding stream, will be considering the 
influence of Islamist actors in our politics or education system?  
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This co-operation between critical academics and Islamists may appear 
unprecedented. However it is in keeping with the long term strategy of exiled Muslim 
Brothers in the west: 
The Brothers do not advocate isolation from mainstream society. To the contrary, they urge 
Muslims to actively participate in it, but only in so far as such engagement is necessary to 
change it in an Islamic fashion (Vidino, 2011, 11). 
Vidino’s examination of those he categorises the ‘new Western brothers’ refers to the 
Muslim Association of Britain as “a quintessential New Western Brotherhood 
organization in its origins, ideology, connections and methodology” (Vidino, 2010, 
140). The methodology of the Western Brothers is traced to Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s 
1990 statement ‘Priorities’ which envisaged the group’s representatives developing 
positive relationships with leading tiers in Western societies. From this position the 
Brothers would seek to play a central role in administering Muslim community life in 
public bodies, achieving hegemony in those communities, whilst at the same time 
professing the Islamist position on geopolitical issues. As a consequence the 
Western Brothers have been found 
…defending the Islamist regime in Sudan to opposing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, from 
attacking secular rulers throughout the Middle East to presenting various Islamist groups 
operating in the region as genuine advocates of democracy opposing corrupt dictatorships, 
they have advocated the many causes of the global Islamist movement (Vidino, 2010, 86).  
Opinion is divided as to the direction the Western Brothers wish to take European 
societies on the long term – Vidino separates respondents on this question into 
‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists.’ However it is to be as noted that as recently as 2002 al-
Qaradawi was talking of an Islamic conquest of Europe via preaching and ideology 
(Vidino, 2010, 92). In such language the theoretical propositions established within 
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the Muslim Brotherhood, that there are no restrictions upon the realm of Islam (Qutb, 
2007, 59-60) reappear. Whilst al-Qaradawi rejects the method of groups such as Al-
Muhajiroun, their respective intentions for European societies appear identical.  
 
It is at this point we might expect a genuinely critical approach towards Islamist 
groups operating in the UK to appear, not least as Islamising society may be far from 
compatible with a core approach of critical terrorism studies – taking gender 
seriously. Thus far, such research has been distinctly lacking, both at the domestic 
and international level. During the brief period of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt 
from 2012-13, violence against political opponents and journalists flourished, as did 
the instigation of an Islamic constitution in what was seen as, at best, a flawed 
process (Bennoune, 2013, 298).  President Morsi placed himself above the law, 
heralding a ‘new era of repression’ (Amnesty International, 2012). Does the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s brief record in office sit with the progressive goals declared by 
Jackson, Smyth and Gunning in 2009? Could the Morsi period in Egypt, and the 
resistance to it, be independently researched by academics funded by the 
Brotherhood’s British supporters?  
 
For critical terrorism studies, further reputational issues emerge. The possibility of an 
open assessment of religious terrorism, or counter terrorism initiatives which may 
impact on British Muslims, is greatly reduced when conference funding is provided 
by an organisation which seeks power and influence in the Muslim community. 
Certainly the study of British Jihadism is affected by such a relationship. The 
extraordinary closure of Finsbury Park mosque by counter-terrorism police in 2003, 
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and its eventual transfer to Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood over 
the heads of supporters of Abu Hamza (Bowen, 2014, 109) can hardly be properly 
assessed by those funded by key participants in the events. Similarly the 2003 Tel 
Aviv suicide bombing, involving British jihadists on behalf of Hamas (see chapter 
five) is unlikely to be considered in a truly critical manner by academics working with 
the Hamas supporting BMI.  
 
It is the Muslim Brotherhood which gains from its association with academia, and is 
using it to try to protect its status in the United Kingdom. When indications emerged 
the British government may proscribe the Brotherhood under counter terrorism 
legislation, a full page advertisement was taken out in The Guardian of 28 May 2014, 
decrying such a possibility. Among the signatories and their respective organisations 
listed were Ismail Patel of Friends of Al-Aqsa, Anas Al-Tikriti of the Cordoba 
Foundation, Dr Daud Abdullah of the British Muslim Initiative and Mohammed 
Kozbar of Islam Expo. Of the eight academics on the list, the biggest grouping was 
from critical terrorism studies – Marie Breen Smyth, Richard Jackson, and David 
Miller (Cordoba Foundation, 2014). 
 
6.5 Critical Terrorism Studies and Cage 
If a critical approach is to dominate the methodology of critical terrorism studies 
considering the war on terror, should that same approach be continued when 
considering recognised terrorist actors? Or those suspected or accused of 
participating in terrorism? In 2008 in Critical Studies on Terrorism George Kassimeris 
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interviewed Moazzam Begg, a Briton formerly held without charge in Guantanamo 
Bay. The relationship between critical terrorism academics and Cageprisoners (now 
Cage), the organisation of which Begg is a Director, is ongoing. Asim Qureshi of 
Cage has published articles in the disciplines journal (Qureshi, 2009, Qureshi, 2010) 
and presented a further paper at its 2014 conference. When Qureshi was under 
sustained criticism in 2015 for comments at a press conference concerning British 
Jihadist Mohammed Emwazi, Richard Jackson tweeted his support, insisting “I’ve 
always thought Cage did important work for human rights” (Jackson, 2015).  
Like his organisation, Begg is a controversial figure. On 7 February 2010 Gita 
Saghal, Head of the Gender Unit at Amnesty International’s Secretariat, publicly 
denounced that Amnesty had been working with Begg and Cage in a campaign 
entitled ‘Counter Terror with Justice’. Saghal commented:  
As a former Guantanamo detainee it was legitimate to hear his experiences, but as a 
supporter of the Taliban it was absolutely wrong to legitimise him as a partner (Kerbaj, 2010).  
Saghal was equally scathing at any suggestion Begg or Cage believed in human 
rights as a concept. This is important, especially in the context of Amnesty 
International. As an organisation, it had long steered a delicate course which allowed 
it to condemn, for example, excesses from the British state in Northern Ireland, 
without sharing a platform with those in the Irish Republican movement who 
espoused violence. Even during the apartheid era in South Africa, Amnesty had 
maintained a distance from those who would use or advocate violence. Now, it gave 
a platform to a man who supported the Taliban. Going even further, Amnesty, who 
had refused to accept the African National Congress had a right to bear arms to end 
minority white rule, now accepted a concept of ‘jihad in self-defence,’ thus “endorsing 
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a myth that has been used to justify fundamentalist atrocities from Iraq to 
Afghanistan to Algeria” (Bennoune, 2013, 22).  
 
No hint of impending controversy surrounding Begg is discernible from his interview 
in Critical Studies on Terrorism. Indeed proceedings open with a questionable 
premise in only the second sentence: “Moved by the plight of the Afghani people, in 
2001 Begg travelled to Kabul with his family to start a school for basic education and 
provide water pumps” (Kassimeris, 2008, 405). Here Kassimeris ignores the 
background reality that Begg had long sought out Islamist controlled territory – the 
Mujahideen camps in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Chechnya (Begg, 2006, 66, 53, 87). 
Nor does the statement about a school appear to be borne out by Moazzam Begg’s 
autobiography. This offers two reasons for his move to Afghanistan. Begg was 
running the Maktabah Al-Ansar Islamic bookshop in Birmingham, one of the primary 
distributors of Salafi-Jihadist literature in this country (Bhatt, 2010, 40). These 
associations increasingly brought the attention of the police and security services. 
Begg explains;  
My close friends were constantly being visited by MI5. They used to ask them to inform on 
me, but I was quite open with everyone about my plans. I didn’t have anything to hide. In the 
bookshop I used to hear a lot about Afghanistan from people who were going back and forth 
regularly, and one of them told me about a school project that he had initiated in Kabul (Begg, 
2006, 90).  
 
However the school had already been built by the time Begg left for the Taliban’s 
Emirate “The headmaster of the school even phoned me from Kabul to thank me” 
316 
 
(Begg, 2006, 91) [for assistance Begg had given]. Meredith Tax is perplexed as to 
claims by Fahad Ansari of Cage that in Afghanistan Begg was involved in developing 
education for boys and girls: 
But how could this be, when the Taliban did not allow education for girls over the age of eight 
and had closed down all the girls’ schools in Afghanistan? The answer is that the school was 
not for Afghan girls. It was a school set up by al-Qaeda’s treasurer and Begg for the children 
of foreign jihadis, including his own (Tax, 2012, 39).  
Instead of these educational commitments, analysis of Begg’s autobiography 
indicate his reasons for emigrating appear to have been financial, and a weariness 
towards Britain brought about by the attention of the authorities: 
The simple fact of the cost of living weighed with me too. Many people told us we could live in 
the best areas of Kabul for less than a £100 a month, and gradually the idea of uprooting the 
family and going there to live took hold of me, and as I talked about it, seemed quite possible 
(Begg, 2006, 91-2) 
A further line in the interviews introduction is contentious: “Begg is a spokesman for 
the Human Rights organisation Cageprisoners” (Kassimeris, 2008, 405). This 
repeats what the then Cageprisoners stated on its website: 
Cageprisoners Ltd is a human rights organisation (company registration no: 6397573) that 
exists solely to raise awareness of the plight of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other 
detainees held as part of the War on Terror (Cageprisoners, 2010) .  
 
Difficulties emerge however when a deeper examination of Cage’s work is 
conducted. Amongst those supported by Cage have included Abu Hamza, convicted 
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in this country of soliciting murder, and would be shoe bomber Saajid Badat,16 
convicted of conspiracy to destroy, damage or endanger an aircraft. These were not 
detainees, but individuals granted due process and convicted after proper 
consideration of evidence in open court (Bennoune, 2013, 345-6n). Until his death at 
the hands of the US military in 2011, Cage repeatedly publicised the fugitive Yemini-
American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, including an interview between Moazzam Begg 
and al-Awlaki on 31 December 2007, and a section of its website, ‘Islamic Focus’ 
which included al-Awlaki’s calls for jihad (Tax, 2013, 60). This approach leads 
Meredith Tax to conclude; 
Its principle of selection has less to do with universal, indivisible human rights than the desire 
to support activists in jihadi networks. In fact, rather than doing human rights work, the 
organisation is obeying the Salafist injunction to ‘free the prisoners’ i.e. free those Muslims 
who have been jailed for making war on unbelievers and invaders of ‘Muslim lands’. It has no 
interest in any other Muslim prisoners (Tax, 2012, 46).  
It is certainly possible to take the impression from Cage’s website it is devoted to the 
support of imprisoned jihadists, and the propagation of like-minded ideals. 
Unfortunately we do not get the opportunity to hear such positions debated with 
Begg – Critical Studies on Terrorism fails to levy such questions. This is all the more 
curious when Begg’s own autobiography, mentioned at the start of Kassimeris’ 
interview, talks so openly about his visits to Jihadi training camps in the years prior to 
his detention (Begg, 2006, 50-57, 59, 66-7 and 87).  None of these criticisms is to 
deny the human rights abuses Begg and others suffered at Guantanamo Bay and 
more broadly in American custody. Indeed Kassimeris’ questions do allow Moazzam 
                                                          
16  Many references to Hamza and Badat were removed in changes to the then Cageprisoners website which 
followed the controversy provoked by Ms Saghal’s charges.  
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Begg to paint a vivid picture of life as a detainee and its effects upon him as an 
individual. But a critical perspective should surely require a robust approach to actors 
other than the state, its organs and orthodox terrorism researchers? To quote 
Richard Jackson:  
Discourses are significant not just for what they say but also for what they do not say; the 
silences in a discourse can be as important, or even more important at times, than what is 
stated (Jackson, 2008, 379). 
On re-reading Kassimeris’ interview, what is absent from the questioning is at times 
more striking than what is present. The interviewee’s positions are all too often 
accepted, without critical response, by the interviewer. A failing that the critical 
school observes in orthodox terrorism studies, the weak acceptance by academics of 
what they are told, is in this instance, replicated when considering Moazzam Begg of 
Cage.  
 
6.6 Why the Failings of Critical Terrorism Studies Matter 
To address this question, it is firstly necessary to acknowledge critical theories do 
develop significant influence, be it within the distinct parameters of academia, or 
across broader society. In Middle Eastern Studies, Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ is the 
core text (Allen, 2006, 296) even if this sometimes means stretching his arguments 
well beyond their original emphasis. Whilst Charles Allen notes the robust criticisms 
Said made of elements within the Arab world, these appear to be increasingly 
overlooked, and he observes that ‘Orientalism’ has ended up “giving further 
credence to the widespread Muslim self-image of the umma as innocent victim of 
Western oppression” (Allen, 2006, 296).  
319 
 
Similarly Meredith Tax sees debate about the status of Muslim women as 
increasingly off limits for any western feminist “She will be beaten over the head with 
Edward Said, a self-declared secularist who must be turning in his grave to see the 
use his followers make of him” (Tax, 2012, 100).  In the 1995 afterword to a new 
edition of ‘Orientalism’, Said acknowledged his analysis had at times been taken in a 
different direction by certain consumers; 
Yet Orientalism has in fact been read and written about in the Arab world as a systematic 
defense of Islam and the Arabs, even though I say explicitly that I have no interest in, much 
less capacity for, showing what the true Orient or Islam really are (Said, 2003, 331). 
Edward Said’s friend Christopher Hitchens talks of the ‘galvanising’ effect of 
‘Orientalism’ (Hitchens, 2012, 505). The book coincided with the years where 
existing Middle Eastern ‘experts’ were made to look increasingly deficient by their 
inability to predict the Iranian revolution, the assassination of Sadat or the coup 
attempt which followed it. Said’s critical analysis of academic and political attitudes 
towards the East is thus far from peripheral, indeed in time his analysis, or adapted 
interpretations of it, appear to have become predominant. Nor is Middle Eastern 
Studies unique in mainstreaming what may be seen as critical approaches. In 
Security Studies the Copenhagen School has arguably traversed a similar route, to 
the extent that in terms of academic publications and doctorates “the Copenhagen 
School has become as mainstream as it is possible to get” (Croft, 2012, 77).   Critical 
approaches of earlier orthodoxies can therefore develop real influence, the question 
is perhaps whether should it occur, such influence for critical terrorism studies would 
enhance, or regress, our understanding of terrorism?  
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In terms of religious terrorism, and significant organisations within it such as Al-
Qaeda, critical terrorism studies appears to have little to contribute. Evidence is 
scant of critical academics displaying the type of interrogative approach towards 
Islamists or Jihadists as taken towards western governments. Instead conformism 
rules. What appears inherent in supposedly critical analysis of religious actors is, 
perhaps surprisingly, a complete inability to take their ideas and practice seriously. 
Consider this exchange between Kassimeris and Begg: 
GK: Do you see yourself as a political activist or a political spokesman? 
MB: I don’t see myself as a political activist; I see myself as a human rights activist. 
GK: Do you think torture is an effective way of extracting information from detainees – 
because it’s happened? (Kassimeris, 2008, 407).  
To George Kassimeris, Moazzam Begg seemingly appears as a mere victim of 
American cruelty, not as an activist in his own right with an established view of how 
human relationships should be properly organised. Might we not expect a question of 
how a ‘human rights activist’ ending up supporting the Taliban? Richard Jackson 
defends the approach taken by Kassimeris in terms of the need to respond to extant 
political realities: 
In the broader case of challenging the dominant discourse to give voice to people who are 
treated as ‘evil’ terrorists, I think this is an important part of re-balancing. That’s kind of what 
we are trying to do (Jackson, Interview, 2011).  
The importance of this re-balancing means that the impact of Begg’s support for the 
Taliban – the human rights of women, religious minorities or those Afghans who 
simply did not share the Taliban’s excesses – remains unexplored. This is perhaps 
the most substantive failing of critical terrorism studies thus far. In the cause of ‘re-
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balancing’ the discourse surrounding terrorism, the voice of those who suffer from 
the application of fundamentalists religious beliefs, risks being extinguished. A core 
aim of critical terrorism studies – taking gender seriously, is forgotten. The feminist 
voices of Meredith Tax or Karima Bennoune matter less than those of Cage or 
Muslim Brotherhood related groups. The voices of indigenous opponents of 
fundamentalism remain absent.   
To Richard Jackson, Jihadist causes, such as that in Chechnya which Begg sought 
to join, and Britons such as Babar Ahmad supported via the Azzam.com website, 
should not be readily condemned:  
It is part of our imposition of values to say anyone who goes to fight in Chechnya must be 
dodgy. There were people who fought against the fascists in Spain, now we valorise them. 
Somehow we have to not keep imposing a western liberal dominance, and using it as a frame 
for justifying everyone (Jackson, Interview, 2011).  
 
A core failure of ‘critical’ academics is the inability to seriously engage with the long 
term goals of jihadist actors on their own terms. It is as if the re-shaping of Muslim 
majority communities under their control – as cited by Bennoune in particular – was 
not happening. Whilst the fear of ‘orientalism’ offers some explanation, this failing 
also appears to be rooted in the inability to see jihadist practice as anything other 
than political, and the flawed categorisation of its violence as solely reactive. 
Consider Richard Jackson on the 7/7 attackers:  
What they are doing is political. It is aimed at ending a political policy and it is aimed at ending 
British foreign policy that they couldn’t change in any other way, or they felt they couldn’t. The 
election couldn’t work, petitions, demonstrations, nothing worked. They felt that violence 
might work, and in that they are following any other tradition (Jackson, Interview, 2011).  
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This is a remarkably similar approach to the discursive formation on the London 
bombings established by Muslim Weekly, London ISOC, Salma Yaqoob, Asim 
Qureshi of Cage and Anas al-Tikriti of the Cordoba Foundation et al (see chapter 
four). Here Mohammed Sidique Khan’s perceived criticism of Labour’s foreign policy 
is emphasised, his declaration of Islamic ethics made in the preceding lines, 
excluded (see Appendix one). 
Jackson’s blind spot is even more frustrating when other academics, often with a 
long history of engaging critically with the defence and security policies of Western 
states, do manage to take the comparatively small step of recognising jihadist actors 
possess a normative vision. Consider Paul Rogers, who assesses Al-Qaeda as 
establishing both short term aims measured in the decades, and a single long term 
objective, which may take a century or more (Rogers, 2008). Rogers sees Al-Qaeda 
as possessing six short term goals – removing Western forces from all Islamic lands, 
replacing the House of Saud, removing all unacceptable ‘Islamic’ regimes, defeating 
Zionism, supporting Islamist separatists in struggle and ending the power of the ‘far 
enemy’ – the US. The long-term aim is the establishment of a caliphate, extending 
outwards from the Middle East.  
….since this is a revolutionary movement based on a religious belief, there is an important 
eschatological aspect. The movement’s leadership does not expect to see its goals achieved 
in its lifetime. The movement is in this perspective viewed as merely the contemporary aspect 
of a much greater historical process (Rogers, 2008).  
This gradualism should be familiar to any reader of Mawdudi or al-Qaradawi, let 
alone Qutb. It serves the purpose of understanding Al-Qaeda’s opposition to foreign 
interference in Muslim majority nations, but equally grasps that the organisation is far 
from reactive. It is a duality critical terrorism studies should reflect upon.  
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6.7 Conclusions 
Critical terrorism studies may have much to tell us about the dangers of domestic 
counter terrorism initiatives, and the problematic nature of our foreign policy. This 
chapter has established however that it fails to make a substantial contribution to the 
understanding of Islamist currents, Islamic fundamentalism or jihadist groups. British 
Jihadism has passed it by, and the actions perpetrated by British Jihadists ignored, 
save for the desire to characterise such actions solely in terms of responding to 
western aggression. Indeed the failure to engage with primary sources in both 
Jackson (2007) and Gunning and Jackson (2011) indicates it is not just British 
Jihadism, but Jihadism per se which has failed to receive proper examination. For 
Miller (2013) concerns of terrorism or fundamentalism on campus are merely ones to 
be dismissed as lacking in legitimacy.  
The research framework established by Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and 
Jeroen Gunning (2009) did not necessarily lead to this impasse. Its seven core 
components do allow for the study of terrorist discourse and practice, and declare 
the need to take gender more seriously than it has been (Jackson et al, 2009, 228-
31).  The difficulty is that the most innovative work on the effects on women of 
fundamentalism and jihadism is being done outside of critical terrorism studies. 
Melinda Cooper and particularly Meredith Tax and Karima Bennoune would appear 
to be standing not merely outside critical terrorism studies, but in opposition to it. The 
failure of critical terrorism studies to recognise the domestic goals of jihadist actors, 
and their affects at the local level, is substantial.  
In terms of assessing self-declared religious actors, some weaknesses were inherent 
in the discipline at the initial stage – the desire to ‘deconstruct’ explanations seen to 
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‘overly focus on religion’ (Jackson et al, 2009, 230) is with hindsight an indication 
that deconstruction ran the risk, in practice, of becoming elimination. Indeed the later 
methodological framework declared by Jackson and Gunning (2011) appears 
designed to make any concept of religious terrorism both impossible to measure and 
indeed impossible to acknowledge.  
A fear of being ‘Eurocentric’, of ‘orientalism’ and the dogged inability to take the 
ideas and practices of fundamentalists seriously in their own right, has hamstrung 
critical academics. Ironically they now sound remarkably similar to western political 
elites on issues such as the need to remove religious terminology from counter-
terrorism discourse.  
One development in critical terrorism studies has been its engagement with, and 
increasing sponsorship by, Islamist organisations. Some £32,000 has gone to the 
critical academics at Spinwatch, whilst funding is now being provided at an 
organisational level for critical terrorism studies annual conference. The proper 
academic consideration of British Islamism, in all its shades and currents, from the 
local to the jihadist, is unlikely to be achieved if simultaneously accepting funding 
from some of the more influential groups within contemporary Islamism. A conflict of 
interest exists, which needs to be addressed by critical academics at Spinwatch, and 
more generally within the critical terrorism studies discipline. The approach taken to 
Cage, however, both as an organisation and in the form of Moazzam Begg, does 
suggest that even before critical terrorism studies began receiving funding from 
religious actors, it was not approaching them in anything like a questioning manner.  
These failings are regrettable, as in terms of critiquing rendition, state terrorism or 
foreign interventions, critical terrorism studies as a discipline, makes an important 
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contribution to research. It is within critical circles that the author, for all its failings, 
still wishes to position himself. But the need for critical terrorism studies to embrace 
properly rounded research using the same standards in analysing religious terrorism 
as it has western actions in the war on terror is pressing. In this failing, it is worth 
noting critical terrorism studies is not alone. The feminist analysis of Meredith Tax 
and Karima Bennoune raises the deficiencies of the Anglo-American left in 
responding to the rise of Islamism, and its more violent manifestations. Critical 
terrorism studies can now be added to that list. Karima Bennoune concludes: 
I think when we talk about Muslim fundamentalism we have to actually talk about it. It exists. It 
gravely menaces the human rights of people of Muslim heritage. It is just as deserving of 
critical discussion as US foreign policy or the Israeli government or anti-Muslim bias 
(Bennoune, 2013, 24).   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis set out to describe the depth and scope of a discernible British Jihadism, 
and explain the reticence in the academy to accepting this phenomenon. The open 
source data brought together in addressing the four research questions herein 
serves to give British Jihadism the attention this subject has long deserved, and to 
demonstrate the ‘detail’ of this work’s title.  The response from British Muslim 
representatives to these events, and regrettably from some critical academics, 
serves as the ‘denial’. The term British Jihadism is, in many ways, contingent. A 
British Jihadist is a Briton, or British resident who undertakes jihad. British Islamist 
thinkers such as Kalim Siddiqui appear to have initially conceptualised jihad as a 
religious duty to be conducted overseas, in the cause of the ummah. The practice of 
groups such as Al-Muhajiroun, and individuals, particularly in the case of Michael 
Adebolajo, demonstrates that this jihad can be as applicable domestically as 
internationally. British Jihadism may therefore be discerned by its location, by its aim 
to take action to install sharia law in this country. When we look more closely at 
British Jihadis overseas national characteristics may still emerge – consider the 
British Jihadis in Helmand, unable to stop themselves from lapsing into English.  
 
The first question considered in this thesis sought to establish the history of British 
Islamist involvement in violence, both on these shores and beyond. In answering 
this, it can first be stated that British Jihadism predates Al Qaeda, and shows every 
indication of potentially post-dating it. The narrative of politico-religious violence 
involving British Muslims is a small, but not insignificant part of our modern history. 
This research establishes at least 59 Britons have died since 1992 in jihadist 
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violence abroad, plus 5 have killed themselves conducting suicide bombings in the 
UK. British Jihadism has been responsible for 54 deaths in this country and an 
unknown number abroad.  
It is fortunate that the death toll above is not higher. Others would no doubt have 
been killed in transatlantic plane bombings or the attempt to kill EDL demonstrators 
in Yorkshire, but for the success of the authorities in disrupting attackers and/or the 
incompetence of some participants. British Jihadism has repeatedly demonstrated 
itself willing to kill its fellow civilians in large numbers, but has not always had the 
capacity or capability to do so.  
 
The allure to some of Islamic utopias is stark. Here, Jihadism is both religious and 
political. Whilst some of the articulations enacted may appear political – whether to 
intervene in Afghanistan one year, Iraq, Somalia or Syria the next – religion is not the 
means of the struggle, but the end. To the British Jihadist, an independent or 
nationalist Afghanistan is not the desired outcome - an Islamic Emirate living under 
the Qur’an is all. To understand British Jihadism requires both a recognition, and 
indeed comprehension of this dual nature. To illustrate the paradoxes inherent in 
this, consider the debate between British Guantanamo Bay prisoner Moazzam Begg, 
and two FBI officers who interviewed him in Cuba. Begg complains throughout his 
memoirs that he was denied due legal process, but comments: 
I wanted to live in an Islamic state – one that was free from the corruption and despotism of 
the rest of the Muslim world. 
So you chose the Taliban?’ 
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I chose Afghanistan. I admit I have made mistakes – but had it not been for 9/11, I think I 
would still be living happily in Afghanistan 
Probably as a member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban 
I knew you wouldn’t understand. The Taliban were better than anything Afghanistan has had 
in the past twenty-five years. You weren’t in Afghanistan – not before nor during the Taliban. 
Child sex, rape, looting, robbery, murder and opium production only ended when they took 
control.  
And in came amputations, floggings and executions..…. (Begg, 2006, 214). 
 
The most challenging adherents of British Jihadism are those activists unwilling to 
take the gradualist road towards sharia established by Mawdudi, al-Qaradawi and 
contemporary Muslim Brotherhood activists, or to be satisfied with seeking, as Begg 
and others have, Islamic utopia overseas. The activities of Al-Muhajiroun, and 
demands to implement sharia on the streets of Britain, as evidenced by campaigns 
in east London, are small and peripheral, but they serve both to antagonise and 
damage community relations. Whilst it is tempting to trivialise bearded young men 
chasing away sex workers on the streets of Walthamstow, that response to British 
Jihadism –the failure to take seriously actors such as Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri 
Muhammad – appears unwise given past precedent. British Islamism, and indeed 
British Jihadism present ideas which deserve to be taken seriously, not least 
because they have been demonstrated repeatedly to inspire action.  
 
British Jihadism is unlikely to be pacified by influences from abroad. With the 
exception of Bosnia or possibly Chechnya, the combat zones listed in this thesis that 
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British jihadis have travelled to and fought in, remain combat zones. British Jihadists 
have taken what can be described as, if the term may be used, an ecumenical 
approach to their violence. They have appeared in organisations as diverse as 
Hamas in Palestine, Jemaah Islamiyah of Indonesia, the Taliban and Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen in Pakistan, Al Qaeda, as well as forming their own groups, or acting 
independently. The 59 to die in violence abroad have done so across 11 countries, 
whilst 14 different nations have so far seen British Jihadists on their territory. Virtually 
anywhere the ummah appears in conflict, and Sunni Muslims are in arms, Britons 
are present.  
 
The second question this research sought to address was why so many Jihadist 
actors have coalesced in the United Kingdom. The story of Osama Bin Laden as an 
international religious figure seeking influence with Muslims globally began here in 
1994, when colleagues in the Advice and Reformation Committee issued his first 
public proclamation from north London offices. Chapter three has detailed 79 
jihadists from overseas who settled in the United Kingdom in the era that has 
become colloquially known as ‘Londonistan’. Although these actors came from 14 
different territories, a majority, 53 came from either Algeria, Egypt or Libya.  
 
The turbulence brought about by failed Islamist uprisings in four North African states 
in the 1980s, the ending of the Afghan jihad, and the brutality of many dictatorships 
in the Muslim majority world each provided a stimulus for jihadists to leave their 
home nation, or to stay away from it if they had already left. Britain, with a tradition of 
comparative hospitality towards migrants, and its emerging centre of Arab media, 
offered a tempting location. That however, can only be part of the story. Some of the 
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Islamists ‘fleeing’ to London at this time were making good their getaway, not from 
Algerian torture chambers, but the French judiciary. Others had a long involvement 
in violence in jihadist groups for whom any form of governance other than their own 
interpretation of the Qur’an would always be unacceptable.  
 
Once here, such men proved difficult to dislodge. The question of extraditing alleged 
terrorists from Britain to countries where they face serious charges has been 
recurrent throughout the research period covered by this thesis. Whilst the potential 
for extradition to Algeria and Jordan was eventually introduced, it has not proved 
possible to remove alleged offenders to Egypt, due to the history of torture in that 
country. The removal of suspects to countries where higher standards may be 
expected, has also at times proved slow-paced, as the thirteen years to deport Abdel 
Bary to the United States, and the decade to remove Rachid Ramda to France, 
demonstrate. Abu Hamza was able to serve nearly all of a prison sentence for 
inciting murder, whilst fighting extradition to the United States.  
Similar issues have bedevilled cases involving alleged jihadists from the Indian 
subcontinent to settle in Britain, and jihadists from Pakistan in particular have been 
eager to use the UK as an arena for fundraising and developing influence. The 
cross-fertilisation between British Jihadism and Pakistan has had deadly 
consequences. In allowing terrorist groups such as the LeT and HuM to organise 
and fund raise in the United Kingdom, and for Britons to go to Kashmir to train, the 
skills necessary to bring the 7/7 attacks to fruition could be developed. This research 
shows that at least half of those trained in such facilities in Pakistan have gone on to 
be convicted of terrorist offences in Britain. Four British veterans of the Bosnian 
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Mujahideen were subsequently convicted of terrorism. Any idea the UK has nothing 
to fear from such foreign adventures is demonstrably false.  
 
After new terrorist attacks, such as that in Woolwich in 2013, the term ‘Londonistan’ 
re-enters our political discourse. The tolerance once displayed to prominent jihadist 
organisations allowed to organise, recruit and plan activities in the United Kingdom, 
provided they did not directly carry out violence here, was more than a lapse 
adoption of the traditional British approach to granting asylum. Such practices are 
consistent with a long standing preference for religious elites over secular, nationalist 
or socialist trends in Muslim majority countries (Curtis, 2010). Adopting that 
approach in the United Kingdom required a reluctance to take religious actors 
seriously, and the refusal to see such currents as a potential alternative or rival to 
western systems of governance. The engagement with Yusuf al-Qaradawi and 
Muslim Brotherhood influenced organisations as bulwarks against Al-Qaeda, or even 
against Abu Hamza, was demonstrated as conceptually flawed by the development 
of the Syrian jihad, and the support of Islamists for it. Now the challenge is less ‘Al-
Qaeda inspired terrorism than an entity opposed to Al-Qaeda – the Islamic State.  
 
The third question considered in this thesis asked who are the British Jihadists. Are 
they religious or political actors? Are they linked to particular districts, mosques, 
institutions or organisations? The reality that individuals such as 7/7 bomber 
Mohammed Sidique Khan view themselves as acting in accordance with the 
requirements of faith is repeatedly underplayed, although not by the jihadists 
themselves. The response by politicians to each jihadist attack is now established – 
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to distance those responsible from the politico-religious currents in which they have 
moved, often for some years. The motivations for police officers and politicians in 
doing so is perhaps a necessity and arguably admirable – they wish to avoid a 
backlash against Muslim citizens who may be crassly associated with the actions of 
a small number in that community. They seek support and information from Muslims 
in disagreement with the behaviour of their co-religionists. Academic research 
however, cannot be encumbered by such concerns.  
 
The call for sharia in British towns and cities, as controversially articulated in the 
demands of the Rushdie protestors in 1989, has come to be put into practice, for 
example by Al-Muhajiroun’s Sharia patrols in east London, or the Birmingham jihadis 
who travelled to Dewsbury intending to murder EDL members for blasphemy. Nicky 
Reilly displayed as much a concern with countering the indecency he observed on 
Friday nights in Plymouth as he did with Anglo-American foreign policy. The 2007 
Haymarket bombers sought to attack, not the Foreign Office, but a nightclub a few 
streets away. Such is the preoccupation of jihadist organisations, and their milieus. 
However amateurish, the above examples are deeply divisive, and present 
challenges to liberal democratic norms. As well as presenting danger via actual or 
intended terrorist attacks virtually each year since 2000, the threat of the British 
jihadist lies in the problems Richard Hofstadter identified arising from right wing 
radicals in the United States. As they do not seek attainable results, the danger 
comes in the changes they make to our political climate.  
Yet positive narratives do exist. Pascal Bruckner reminds us: “Every time a Western 
country has tried to create a special legal code for minorities, it has been members 
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of those minorities, usually women, who have protested” (Bruckner, 2010, 150). The 
research of Meredith Tax and Karima Bennoune serves as a reminder that it is within 
Muslim communities, both here and in Muslim majority nations that Islamist and 
Jihadist actors primarily operate. Whilst jihadists may seek martyrdom, it is away 
from the battlefield where they exercise power in accordance with their 
interpretations of religious texts. It is in the community where they need to be 
robustly opposed. The failure of critical academics in particular to engage with this 
uncomfortable reality is deeply disappointing.  
 
British Jihadism is the preserve of Sunni Muslims, many of whom are strongly 
associated with Salafi organisations and traditions. Whilst members and alumni of 
University ISOCs have an ignoble record when it comes to terrorist convictions, such 
issues appear to shift from campus to campus – no one University appears to have a 
permanent, as opposed to an episodic problem. No ISOC has the in-depth 
association with British Jihadism as that demonstrated by the Al-Muhajiroun 
organisation, or the various off-shoots it has grown throughout its history. Certain 
religious institutions appear repeatedly in this thesis - no narrative on the subject 
could be complete without reference to Finsbury Park or Regents Park Mosques. It is 
likely that the difficulties concerning Finsbury Park provoked this extraordinary line in 
the Prime Minister’s statement on anti-terror measures following the July 2005 
bombings: 
We will consult on a new power to order closure of a place of worship which is used as a 
centre for fomenting extremism and will consult with Muslim leaders in respect of those clerics 
who are not British citizens, to draw up a list of those not suitable to preach who will be 
excluded from Britain (Blair, 2005).   
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Although it took eight years, to an extent the latter half of Blair’s proposal has been 
enacted – the ‘four lions’ of British Jihadism - Omar Bakri Muhammad, Abdullah el-
Faisal, Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada have each been removed from or have left 
British soil. The importance given to ridding the country of some of its ‘turbulent 
priests’ should serve as a clear example that these are issues pivoting on theological 
as much as temporal matters.  
 
The aims, beliefs and practice of British Jihadism is remarkably consistent. A duality 
may be discerned in organisations such as Al-Muhajiroun, and from individuals over 
the past a decade as demonstrated in this thesis by Mohammed Sidique Khan, Nicky 
Reilly and Michael Adebolajo. That is to critique British and western foreign policies, 
and to declare religious imperatives. The demand for a caliphate and sharia law, to 
live according to the Qur’an and the sayings and practice of the Prophet appears 
fixed. It is the tactics and issues focused upon, that are more variable.  Tomorrow’s 
Mohammed Sidique Khan is likely to be less concerned with the allied invasion of 
Iraq as by overthrowing Assad, but his ethical stances and the type of society he 
wishes to establish will still be fashioned by his understanding of Islam.  
A British Jihadism has emerged, which sees itself as part of a global ummah, has 
comparatively deep roots across three decades, and finds enemies both at home 
and in a series of old and emerging conflicts abroad. Yet its staunchest adherents 
are often as concerned with dawah – bringing people to the faith – as they are with 
combat. The practice of Al-Muhajiroun and the Portsmouth Dawah Team serve as 
evidence that you can do both.  
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The final research question set out by this thesis focused on the academy. In 
challenging traditional approaches to terrorism and counter radicalisation strategy, 
why has critical terrorism studies struggled to come to terms with the concept of 
violence from British Jihadists and the religious nature of their struggle? Two 
significant ironies concerning critical terrorism studies emerge in this research. In 
worrying about how Jihadist violence is referred to, politicians and critical academics 
inhabit remarkably similar territory. Equally, each has sought out Islamic partners it 
may work with, whilst simultaneously rejecting any conceptualisation of religious 
violence. Events were to ensure the UK government was shown to be unwise in 
some of its partnerships, and this research develops new understanding of some of 
the relationships critical academics have developed with Muslim Brotherhood related 
groups and individuals in the United Kingdom. The conflicts of interest which emerge 
need to be addressed if critical terrorism studies is to develop genuinely challenging 
academic research into terrorism itself, as opposed to merely critiquing government 
policy.  
 
Some of the weakest responses to British Jihadism and international jihadist groups 
have been demonstrated to come from within British Islam. The stuttering response 
of the MCB to the emergence of Al-Qaeda and the increasing number of British 
jihadis fighting overseas, and the highly selective response to 7/7 from a series of 
organisations, have all been detailed in this research. And yet it is towards British 
Islamist organisations that critical researchers have increasingly turned. On past 
precedent, the product of these relationships, whilst financially advantageous to a 
minority of researchers, and likely to articulate demands for status from Muslim 
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Brotherhood related groups involved in this process, is unlikely to bring forth an 
improved understanding of terrorist actors.   
 
It is here that critical terrorism studies is at its most deficient. In a series of countries 
nationalist or left-leaning opposition movements have been displaced by Jihadists. 
Palestine, Kashmir and Libya serve as historical examples of this, the decline of the 
Free Syrian Army, as contemporary. Yet jihadist groups are not anti-imperialists in 
the traditional sense of the concept. Bin Laden did not recognise the term, targeting 
instead ‘global unbelief’ (Lawrence, 2005, xx). In power, Islamist groups often attack 
those from the weakest minorities on their territory (Tax, 2012, 7). In building a 
Caliphate, the Islamic State seeks to recapture the lost glory of Muslims alluded to 
by Al-Qaeda’s Aymaan al-Zawahiri (Mansfield, 2006, 201-2).  
The failure of critical terrorism academics to engage with primary source materials 
from jihadist groups and their leaders undermines the type of understanding 
necessary to properly assess such developments. Richard Jackson’s flawed 
understanding of Al-Qaeda’s goals as political and in some way nationalist or anti-
imperialist (Jackson, 2007, 418) is exacerbated by the disciplines broader failure to 
engage with how Islamists legislate in the territories they control. Here, an 
appreciation of feminist critiques of Islamism is long overdue, and would still sit 
within the research paradigm Jackson, Gunning and Smyth established in 2009. The 
fear of ‘orientalism’ may be so debilitating though, that a serious assessment of 
religious terrorism or the Islamic State as an entity, is too problematic for these 
researchers. If terrorism studies has a purpose, it is surely to inform debates such as 
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those over Syria and the Islamic State. If critical terrorism studies is stymied here, it 
risks irrelevance.  
Academics do not have the same role in society as police officers or politicians. A 
role of the academic is to demonstrate what is happening, and to suggest 
explanations as to why. Removing religious terminology and concepts from debate 
should not come automatically to research in this field – indeed as this thesis 
establishes, the use of primary sources indicates the centrality of religious objectives 
to many of our domestic terrorist actors. The contested territory of British Jihadism 
guarantees controversy and emotive debate. Whilst this is likely to continue, political 
and religious sensitivities, and confused input from both critical academics and 
politicians, should not be allowed to restrict debate. That has been going on for long 
enough.  
 
London proved important to the development of Al-Qaeda. But the veterans of Saudi 
Arabia’s Islamic awakening who distributed Bin Laden’s pronouncements were not 
the instigators of British Jihadism.  Nor were the veterans of Algeria’s GIA or 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad who moved to Britain in the same period. It is the synthesis of 
these international factors with the domestic that give us British Jihadism. The 
decline of secular values within British Asian politics, ironically assisted by British 
political elites (Malik, 2009), a British Islam that was simultaneously defensive yet 
contesting for status, plus the influence of a global Islamic resurgence, all combine to 
prepare the backdrop to what has been a shifting of tectonic plates. Two years 
before Al-Qaeda began to disseminate Bin Laden’s analysis of global events via the 
United Kingdom, British Muslims had already picked up the gun to serve in the 
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Bosnian Mujahideen, and it was five years since the protests in many English cities 
calling for the head (literally) of Salman Rushdie for blasphemy. 
 
Richard Hofstadter observed that “the problems of yesterday are not solved but 
outgrown” (Hofstadter, 2008, 223). As the distance from 7/7 increased, it became 
tempting to consider British Jihadism had declined. From 2006 until the middle of 
2013, British Jihadists did not mount a successful, deadly attack in this country. Such 
contentions were proven premature by the Woolwich murder, and the rise of the 
Syrian jihad.  In the Islamic State young British Islamists are pursuing the same 
dream an earlier generation was chasing in Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Some 
will be killed there, or will fight as long as they can before departing for similar 
conflicts elsewhere. Others will return to Britain, some seeking to build sharia in 
London, Birmingham and other British cities. This should remind us that British 
Jihadism, like its counterparts overseas, is about far more than the counter-terrorism 
policies governments establish to respond to it: 
Ultimately however, Muslim fundamentalism is not essentially a security question for 
Westerners. At its very core, it is a basic question of human rights for hundreds of millions of 
people who live in Muslim majority countries and populations around the world (Bennoune, 
2013, 13).   
This thesis has sought to throw new light on the former proposition and provide a 
foundation to explore the latter in future research.  
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Appendix One  
 
Last Updated: Thursday, 1 September 2005, 22:01 GMT 23:01 UK  
 
E-mail this to a friend Printable version 
 
London bomber: Text in full 
The full text of the 
videotape of Mohammad 
Sidique Khan, one of the 
four 7 July bombers, which 
was aired on Arabic 
television channel al-
Jazeera and in which he 
explains his motives. 
I'm going to keep this short 
and to the point because it's 
all been said before by far more eloquent people than me. 
And our words have no impact upon you, therefore I'm going 
to talk to you in a language that you understand. 
Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood. 
I'm sure by now the media's painted a suitable picture of me, 
this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put 
a spin on things to suit the government and to scare the 
masses into conforming to their power and wealth-obsessed 
agendas. 
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we 
believe. 
Our driving motivation doesn't come from tangible 
commodities that this world has to offer. 
Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, 
and following the footsteps of the final prophet and 
messenger Muhammad... This is how our ethical stances are 
dictated. 
Your democratically elected governments continuously 
perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. 
 
Mohammad Sidique Khan carried out the Edgware 
Road bombing 
  
340 
 
And your support of them 
makes you directly 
responsible, just as I am 
directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my 
Muslim brothers and sisters. 
Until we feel security, you will 
be our targets. And until you 
stop the bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture of 
my people we will not stop this fight. 
We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the 
reality of this situation.  
 
A second part of the tape was less clear, but he could be 
heard saying: 
I myself, I myself, I make dua (pray) to Allah... to raise 
me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the 
messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved 
Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahri and Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that 
are fighting in the... of this cause. 
With this I leave you to make up your own minds and I ask 
you to make dua to Allah almighty to accept the work from 
me and my brothers and enter us into gardens of paradise.  
 
 
It is not known when the videotape, aired on 1 
September, was made 
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